City upon the Atlantic Tides: Merchants, Pirates, and the Seafaring Community of Boston by Pitt, Steven
CITY UPON THE ATLANTIC TIDES: MERCHANTS, PIRATES, AND THE  
SEAFARING COMMUNITY OF BOSTON, 1689 – 1748 
by 
Steven John James Pitt 
B.A. in History, Buffalo State College, SUNY, 2005 
M.A. in History, University at Buffalo, SUNY, 2008 
Submitted to the Graduate Faculty of  
the Dietrich School of Arts and Sciences in partial fulfillment  
of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy 
University of Pittsburgh 
2015 
ii 
UNIVERSITY OF PITTSBURGH 
DIETRICH SCHOOL OF ARTS AND SCIENCES 
This dissertation was presented  
by 
Steven John James Pitt 
It was defended on  
June 26, 2015 
and approved by 
Jennifer Gaynor, PhD, Assistant Professor, Department of History and Anthropology, University  
at Buffalo, SUNY 
Van Beck Hall, PhD, Associate Professor, Department of History 
Patrick Manning, PhD, Professor, Department of History 
Dissertation Advisor: Marcus Rediker, PhD, Professor, Department of History 
iii 
Copyright © by Steven John James Pitt 
2015 
iv 
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This dissertation examines colonial America’s maritime history through the lens of its most 
developed and powerful port city – Boston – and an Atlantic economic system reliant on ships 
and sailors. The maritime perspective fills significant gaps in colonial Boston’s historiography, 
ranging from transformative events such as the 1689 revolution and the town’s dramatic 
economic rise and decline. The port city perspective, meanwhile, anchors the maritime history in 
a fixed historical trajectory with familiar actors, vessels, and shipping routes, revealing the 
centrality of maritime labor, impressment, piracy, and trade in the Atlantic from 1689 to 1748. In 
pursuit of the elusive sailor and ship, this dissertation draws on merchant accounts and letters, 
ships’ papers and logbooks, court records and sailor depositions, state papers, newspapers, 
customs records, sermons, diaries, political and economic tracts, and travel literature. The results 
of this investigation demonstrate that maritime labor created wealth, stability, and security in 
colonial Boston, underscoring the profound symbiotic relationship between the port and the ships 
and seafarers upon which it depended.    
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1.0 INTRODUCTION 
The great Atlantic tide “flowed over our Wharffs” and into the streets of Boston to “so surprising 
a heighth, that we could sail in Boats in the Street from the South Battery to the Rise of the 
Ground at King-Street.” Water rapidly filled the cellars of homes, warehouses, and shops along 
the waterfront, destroying merchant goods, shipbuilding tools, supplies and foodstuffs meant to 
last New England’s long, cold winters. Flood waters inundated “lower Rooms” everywhere and 
many townsfolk “were oblig’d to run away with their Meat half dress’d upon their Spits and in 
their Potts into their Neighbours, or into their upper Rooms, their Fire being all put out, and the 
wood floating about the Rooms.” The deluge damaged thousands of pounds of property. Most 
waterfront families were blissfully ignorant of the disaster befalling them on that fateful morning 
of February 24, 1723, as most were attending services further inland at the North Church in 
Clark’s Square.1
The Reverend Cotton Mather addressed his congregation with a newly prepared sermon 
most appropriately entitled “The Voice of GOD in a Tempest.” The howling winds and gathering 
storm of “Hail, Rain, and Snow” over the previous day and night had inspired Mather to address 
his growing concerns that avarice, blasphemy, and irreligiousness ran rampant in God’s chosen 
“Citty upon a Hill.” He condemned the growing materialistic desires and pursuit of profits that 
the Atlantic economy had elicited among the wealthy elites of his congregation:  
LET the Uncertain Riches, on which we see One Element this Day make such 
Depredations, and, GOD knows how soon Another may do more! – have no more so large 
a room in our Hearts, but let our Affections be more set upon the things that are Above; 
where Tides can’t break thro’ & Spoil; and where we have Better & a Lasting Substance.  
1 Boston News-letter 28 February 1723; “Natural History” Boston News-letter 28 March 1723; New England 
Courant 4 March 1723.  
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When the church doors finally opened around noon, Mather’s flock “found that GOD had in an 
uncommon and surprizing manner, poured the Waters of the Sea upon the Earth.” Many 
parishioners had to be “carry’d to their Houses in Canooes.” As the tide slowly receded from the 
streets of Boston, it carried the material wealth of merchants – the imported English goods, often 
paid for with labor and blood of sailors and slaves – out into the wider Atlantic Ocean.2
The tides that submerged Boston’s waterfront in 1723 gave the merchant community a 
feel of the watery world of the port’s seafaring population, which formed the cornerstone of 
Boston’s economy. Without a poorly paid class of sailors to increase merchants’ profits, Boston 
would have had no magnificent wharves, such as the famous Long Wharf built in 1710. Nor 
would Boston merchants have enjoyed houses of “Brick, Stone, Lime,” which were “very 
stately” and “handsomely contrived.” Although merchants regularly touted their own industry in 
Boston’s rise, some contemporaries comprehended that the town’s prosperity rested on the backs 
– sometimes literally – of seafaring men. For instance, Cotton Mather declared in 1699, “we are 
beholden to them, for a very great part of those Enjoyments, whereby our Lives are sweetened. 
The Invaluable Benefits, by means of our Seafaring Friends done unto us, obliged us to no little 
Value and Friendship for them.” Yet Boston’s development, paradoxically, coincided with 
merchants’ devaluing the labor and lives of sailors.3
2 For a good discussion of John Winthrop’s “Citty upon a Hill” argument see, Darrett Rutman, Winthrop's Boston: A 
Portrait of a Puritan Town, 1630- 1649 (New York: Norton, 1965), chap. 1; For attack on wealth see, Cotton 
Mather, The Voice of GOD in a Tempest (Boston, 1723), 8 and 17-19, quote at 19; New England Courant 4 March 
1723.  
3 For description of Boston’s wealth see, John Dunton, Letters from New England, 1686, (Boston: Prince Society, 
1867), 67-68; Cotton Mather, The Religious Marriner (Boston, 1700), 9.
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* * * 
In the late seventeenth-century Boston emerged as English America’s foremost colonial 
hub of shipping, ship building and outfitting, and maritime labor. Every spring, typically in April 
or May, Boston’s merchants anxiously waited on the incoming Atlantic tides to bring the first 
ships from England. English ships and ship captains carried news of events in Europe, personal 
correspondence, and European goods. Boston’s mercantile elite then decided where the outgoing 
Atlantic tides should take their own ships, sailors, cargoes, and news. On some days, the peaceful 
and rhythmic ebb and flow of the Atlantic tides mirrored the relationship of Boston elites to the 
seafaring community. At other times, emulating the deluge of 1723, the Atlantic tides violently 
swept ashore and sailors challenged elite prerogatives through riot, desertion, mutiny, and piracy, 
disrupting the nascent capitalist system of commerce that generated merchant wealth. 
Boston’s maritime focus was practically preordained with its founding. The Puritans, 
under John Winthrop’s guidance, settled the “tadpole-shaped peninsula” called Shawmut by the 
local Indian tribes in the summer of 1630. By September, enough settlers had arrived to warrant 
a proper English name – Boston. Even so, the settlement had few appealing qualities. It had little 
arable land for farming or grazing and little wood for firewood or construction of buildings. As 
one contemporary, William Wood, described, “Their [Bostonians] greatest wants be Wood, and 
Medow-ground, which never were in that place.” Boston’s hinterland was unable to support a 
large population or produce tradable goods for an Atlantic market. On the positive side, the 
peninsula lacked swarms of mosquitos, rattlesnakes, and wolves. Boston’s true saving grace, 
however, was the excellent harbor that connected the town to wider Atlantic trade networks. In 
1635, Wood foresaw Boston’s potential in this regard. He noted that Boston was “fittest for such 
as can Trade into England, for such commodities as the Countrey wants, being the chiefe place 
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for shipping and Merchandize.” Boston’s geography ensured that the town’s inhabitants would 
look seaward for their livelihood and “in the long run the influence of the Atlantic was to 
predominate in the town.”4
The persecution of Puritans in England and the subsequent emigration caused Boston to 
grow steadily. Within twenty years the town consisted of 3,000 people. Immigrants to Boston 
generally came from the ranks of merchants, skilled tradesmen, and mariners. Some immigrants 
brought capital and connections to develop Boston’s shipbuilding and trade. In the 1640s, the 
town established close trading ties with the West Indies and Iberian Peninsula, exchanging fish 
and timber for silver, gold, and wine. By the 1650s, Captain Edward Johnson, a founder of 
Woburn, Massachusetts, proclaimed it could not “be imagined, that this Wilderness should turn a 
mart for Merchants in so short a space, Holland, France, Spain and Portugal coming hither for 
trade. Shipping, he claimed, was “going on gallantly.” The North End of Boston matured into a 
vibrant maritime community of sailors, shipbuilders, and merchants with a contrasting mix of 
lavish houses and low taverns catering to the seafaring population. In 1686, a visitor remarked 
that Boston appeared and felt like Bristol in England, which only London surpassed in terms of 
its shipping and seafaring population. A little over a decade later, Cotton Mather, the minister of 
North Church, affirmed that “Seafaring people” were “a very numerous People, in my 
Congregation.” By 1723, when the great tide swallowed the waterfront community, Boston had 
at least fifty-eight wharves and shipyards jutting out into the harbor, most of which were located 
4 Rutman, Winthrop's Boston, chap. 2, quote at 24; William Wood, New-England’s Prospect (Boston: Publications 
of the Prince Society, 1858), 42; Rutman, Winthrop’s Boston, 254.  
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in the North End. Meanwhile, the names of streets, Ship Street, Fish Street, and Fleet Street, told 
the town’s history.5
Boston was colonial America’s leading port. By the 1680s, the population exceeded 
6,000, the largest among the English American colonies with Port Royal, Jamaica second with 
4,500 inhabitants. In 1735, Boston maintained a population twice the size of Philadelphia and 
New York. Boston retained its frontrunner status until approximately 1760 when Philadelphia 
surpassed the port with a population of over 17,000. In terms of shipping, Boston’s entrances and 
clearances exceeded other North American ports until the eve of the American Revolution. In 
1723, New York had roughly a third and Philadelphia roughly fifteen percent of Boston’s 
arriving and departing vessels. In 1713, Boston had 139 ships (100-400 tons) enter or clear. After 
that year, Boston newspapers no longer consistently identified vessel types in their “entrances 
and clearances” section because there were too many to count. Thirty-two years later, 
Philadelphia’s shipping had gained on Boston with entrances and clearances equaling a little 
under two-thirds the number of Boston’s but only fifty-seven vessels identified as “ships.”6
Tables 1 and 2 in the appendix demonstrate Boston’s maritime supremacy during the first 
half of the eighteenth century through statistics gathered from customs records in newspapers. 
Previous attempts to represent Boston’s colonial shipping have relied on post-1750 data. For 
5 Rutman, Winthrop’s Boston, 147; J. Franklin Jameson ed., Johnson’s Wonder-Working Providence (New York: 
Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1910), 247; Dunton, Letters from New England, 1686, 67-68; Diary of Cotton Mather, vol. 
1: 1681–1709; vol. 2: 1709–24, ed. Worthington Chauncey Ford (New York: Frederick Ungar Publishing Co., 
1957), 2:323; Carl Bridenbaugh, Cities in the Wilderness: The First Century of Urban Life in America, 1625-1742
(London, Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press, 1938), 172.  
6 For population figures of Boston, New York, and Philadelphia see, Gary B. Nash, The Urban Crucible: Social 
Change, Political Consciousness, and the Origins of the American Revolution (Cambridge, Massachusetts; Harvard 
University Press, 1979), appendix, table 13, 407-408; For shipping figures of Boston, New York, and Philadelphia 
see, Boston: Tables 1 and 2; New York: “Entrances and Clearances,” American Weekly Mercury 1723 and New York 
Weekly Journal 1734; Philadelphia: “Entrances and Clearances,” American Weekly Mercury 1723 and Pennsylvania 
Gazette 1745; For 1730 results for all three ports see, Arthur L. Jensen, The Maritime Commerce of Colonial 
Philadelphia (Madison, Wisconsin: The State Historical Society of Wisconsin, 1963), appendix, table 3, 292.  
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example, economic historians James Shepherd and Gary Walton relied heavily on shipping and 
tonnage data from 1768-72 to portray Boston’s and New England’s trade for the entire colonial 
period.7 These tables, based on new data, provide valuable insights into continuity and change in 
Boston’s shipping for specific years and over multiple decades. The data highlights the 
importance of trade with England, North Carolina (naval stores), and the Bays of Campeche and 
Honduras (logwood). The data also allow us to trace the activities of specific Boston ship 
captains and ships. The tables also reveal the importance of events such as Spanish capture of the 
Bay of Campeche in late 1716 and the eruption of piracy on New England’s coast, which 
impacted Boston’s merchants and trade.   
How did Boston with its poor hinterland establish and maintain such a dominant 
economic position and become, in the words of King Charles II’s customs agent, Edward 
Randolph, “the Metropolis of ye American Plantacons” for the better part of a century?8 The 
answer rests in the labor of its seafaring and waterfront communities. Population statistics 
support this conclusion. An analysis of Boston’s shipping suggests that in 1706 the town 
required 1,100 to 1,600 officers and sailors to carry on its trade. By 1728, the vessels coming 
into and out of Boston needed 2,200 to 3,300 seafarers.9 It is difficult to ascertain how many of 
7 James F. Shepherd and Gary M. Walton, Shipping, Maritime Trade, and the Economic Development of Colonial 
North America (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1972); see also, Murray G. Lawson, “The Routes of 
Boston’s Trade, 1752-1765,” in Colonial Society of Massachusetts, Transactions, 1947-1951 (Boston, 1959), 81-
120.  
8 Edward Randolph to Coventry, June 17, 1676, in Robert Toppan, ed., Edward Randolph: Including His Letters and 
Official Papers from the New England, Middle, and Southern Colonies in America, 7 vols. (Boston, 1898), 2: 203.  
9 These approximations are derived from my work on entrances in Tables 1 and 2 and eighty-seven Boston-based 
portledge bills collected from various archives for the colonial period. In 1706, the list of vessels entering Boston 
was fifteen percent ships, eighteen percent brigs, sixty-two percent sloops, and five percent ketches. The customs 
data for 1728 does not include vessel types so I extrapolated the 1706 percentages to 1728. This means the estimate 
for that year is probably undervalued, as the number of ships entering Boston most likely increased. I also took into 
consideration that coasters averaged four entries into Boston per year. I therefore divided the number of sailors 
necessary to man the coasters by four. I arrived at the required number of seafarers based on the typical range of 
tonnage for these vessel types and Ralph Davis’s figures for the per ton average worked by seafarers see, Ralph 
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these men actually called Boston home but historians have estimated that around 1700 at least 
1,000 sailors lived in Boston, which amounted to fifteen percent of the entire population. As 
Boston’s shipping increased, this number likely followed suit. Meanwhile, the tradesmen who 
outfitted and built ships constituted twenty-five to forty percent of Boston’s working population 
during the colonial period. The labor of these seafarers and shipbuilders and outfitters supported 
a relatively large merchant class that equaled another fifteen to twenty percent of the “working” 
population. The maritime economy therefore employed close to seventy percent of the male 
population.  As suggested in Chapter 6, any Bostonian would have been hard-pressed to subsist 
without financial connections to the waterfront.10
This dissertation examines colonial America’s maritime history through the lens of its 
most developed and powerful port city – Boston – and an Atlantic economic system reliant on 
ships and sailors. The maritime perspective fills significant gaps in colonial Boston’s 
historiography, ranging from transformative events such as the 1689 revolution and the town’s 
Davis, The Rise of the English Shipping Industry in the 17th & 18th Centuries (London: Macmillan &CO LTD, 
1962), 58-59.     
10 For sailor population see, Curtis P. Nettels, The Money Supply of the American Colonies before 1720 (Clifton: 
A.M. Kelley, 1934), 102; For population of tradesmen and merchants see, Jacob M. Price, “Economic Function and 
Growth of American Port Towns in the Eighteenth Century,” Perspectives in American History 8 (1974): 123-86, 
appendix C, 177-183 and Nash, The Urban Crucible, appendix, table 1, 387-391. For a good understanding of 
Boston’s economy minus the emphasis on seafarers and logwood see, Nettels, The Money Supply; W.T. Baxter, The
House of Hancock: Business in Boston, 1724-1775 (New York: Russell & Russell, Inc, 1965 [1945]); James Lydon, 
“Fish and Flour for Gold: Southern Europe and the Colonial American Balance of Payments,” The Business History 
Review, 39 (Summer, 1965): 171-183; Price, “Economic Function,” 123-186; Bernard Bailyn, The New England 
Merchants in the Seventeenth Century (Cambridge, Mass and London: Harvard University Press, 1979); James 
Lydon, “Fish for Gold: The Massachusetts Fish Trade with Iberia, 1700-1773” The New England Quarterly 54 
(December, 1981): 539-582; Stephen Innes, Creating the Commonwealth: The Economic Culture of Puritan New 
England (New York and London: W.W. Norton & Company, 1995); David Hancock, “Markets, Merchants, and the 
Wider World of Boston Wine, 1700-1775,” in Entrepreneurs: The Boston Business Community, 1750-1850 edited 
by Conrad Wright and Katheryn Viens (Boston: The Massachusetts Historical Society, 1997): 63-95; Margaret 
Newell, From Dependency to Independence: Economic Revolution in Colonial New England (Ithaca and London: 
Cornell University Press, 1998); Margaret Ellen Newell, “The Birth of New England in the Atlantic Economy: From 
its Beginning to 1770” in Engines of Enterprise: An Economic History of New England edited by Peter Temin 
(Cambridge Mass., London: Harvard University Press, 2000), 75-92; Hunter, Purchasing identity in the Atlantic 
world. Gary Nash’s excellent study, The Urban Crucible, has some material on sailors in Boston, especially in 
regards to their wages, but he does not follow them out into the Atlantic nor does he effectively connect Boston to 
the Atlantic economy.      
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dramatic economic rise and decline. The port city perspective, meanwhile, anchors the maritime 
history in a fixed historical trajectory with familiar actors, vessels, and shipping routes, revealing 
the centrality of maritime labor, impressment, piracy, and trade in the Atlantic from 1689 to 
1748. By employing the metaphor of the Atlantic tides – linking the port to the sea and vice 
versa – this study underscores the profound symbiotic relationship between Boston and the ships 
and seafarers upon which it depended.    
Many historians have treated ships and seafarers as peripheral to this Atlantic port city. 
They have privileged merchants, politicians, commodities, trade routes, and economic 
development while excluding the ships, ship captains, and seamen on which they depended. 11
Historian Marcus Rediker has called this predisposition “terracentric” and argues that the 
resulting histories have refused “to consider the ocean as a real, material place of work and 
habitation, a place where identities have been formed, where history has been made.” Daniel 
Vickers, focusing on port towns, has similarly argued that we need to understand seafarers as 
human subjects that lived and worked within communities and not just stereotypical 
11 See note 10 above; Even a chapter on Boston’s maritime history neglects sailors, Alex Roland, W. Jeffrey Bolster, 
and Alexander Keyssar, The Way of the Ship: America’s Maritime History Reenvisioned, 1600 – 2000 (Hoboken, 
New Jersey: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 2008), chap. 7. This bias is not unique to Boston but dominates port city 
studies see, John G. Clark, New Orleans, 1718-1812: An Economic History (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State 
University Press, 1970); Franklin Knight and Peggy Liss eds., Atlantic Port Cities: Economy, Culture, Society in the 
Atlantic World, 1650-1850 (Knoxville, Tennessee: The University of Tennessee Press, 1991); David Harris Sacks, 
The Widening Gate: Bristol and the Atlantic Economy, 1450-1700 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991); 
Kenneth Morgan, Bristol and the Atlantic Trade in the Eighteenth Century (Great Britain: Cambridge University 
Press, 1993); Cathy Matson, Merchants and Empire: Trading in Colonial New York (Baltimore and London: The 
John Hopkins University Press, 1998); Camilla Townsend, Tales of Two Cities: Race and Economic Culture in 
Early Republican North and South America (Austin, Texas: Texas University Press, 2000); Gerrit Knaap and 
Heather Sutherland, Monsoon Traders: Ships, Skippers and Commodities in Eighteenth-century Makassar (Leiden: 
KITLV Press, 2004); Patrick O’Flanagan, Port Cities of Atlantic Iberia, 1500-1900 (Great Britain: Ashgate 
Publishing Company, 2008); Alejandro De La Fuente with César Garcia Del Pino & Bernardo Iglesias Delgando, 
Havana and the Atlantic in the Sixteenth Century (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2008); Nuala 
Zahedieh, The Capital and the Colonies: London and the Atlantic Economy, 1660-1700 (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 2010). For studies that give sailors a central role in their analysis of port cities, see, Peter 
Linebaugh and Marcus Rediker, The Many-Headed Hydra; Daniel Vickers, Young Men and the Sea: Yankee 
Seafarers in the Age of Sail (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2005); Craig Marin, “Coercion, 
Cooperation, and Conflict along the Charleston Waterfront, 1739-1785: Navigating the Social Waters of an Atlantic 
Port City” (Unpublished PhD Dissertation, University of Pittsburgh, 2007). 
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troublemakers apt to be ignored and disparaged. This study heeds both calls to action by 
populating ships, exploring transatlantic voyages, and demonstrating the seafaring community’s 
impact on Boston.12
Sailors, because of their mobility and poverty, are notoriously difficult to study. Yet 
study them we must. In pursuit of the elusive sailor and ship, this dissertation employs and 
integrates a wide range of primary and secondary sources. It draws on merchant accounts and 
letters, ships’ papers and logbooks, court records and sailor depositions, state papers, 
newspapers, customs records, sermons, diaries, political and economic tracts, and travel literature 
to examine Boston’s seafaring community through both qualitative and quantitative methods. It 
engages with the historiography of colonial Boston, maritime history, and Atlantic history. The 
variety of primary and secondary sources allows the chapters of this dissertation to navigate 
between Boston’s local social and economic conditions and critical events and experiences of 
seafarers, ship captains, and merchants in the wider Atlantic world.  
Historians of colonial Boston in particular have been reluctant to embrace the port’s 
maritime past beyond the merchant perspective and abstracted trade routes. They have instead 
tended to analyze Boston in the eighteenth century by looking forward to the Boston Tea Party, 
Boston Massacre, and some of the city’s most famous revolutionaries. Many prominent 
historians therefore present a teleological narrative in which Boston steadily marches towards the 
American Revolution. Carl Bridenbaugh contends that the similar cosmopolitan and enlightened 
experiences of the elites in Boston, Newport, New York, Philadelphia, and Charleston led to a 
united front against the power of the British and “In so doing, …, they transformed their 
12 Marcus Rediker, Outlaws of the Atlantic: Sailors, Pirates, and Motley Crews in the Age of Sail (Boston: Beacon 
Press, 2014), 2-3; Daniel Vickers, “Beyond Jack Tar” The William and Mary Quarterly 50(2) (April 1993): 418–424 
and Vickers and Walsh, Young Men and the Sea. 
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communities from English colonial into American cities.” G.B. Warden argues that from 1689 to 
1776, Boston went through successive revolutions in practice and thought, which subsequently 
culminated in the American Revolution. Gary Nash, meanwhile, narrates the coming of the 
American Revolution from the perspective of growing discontent among the lower and middling 
classes as social stratification increased in Boston, New York, and Philadelphia: “Thus, the 
history of the Revolution is in part the history of popular collective action and the puncturing of 
the gentry’s claim that their rule was legitimized by custom, law, and divine will.” As this 
dissertation will demonstrate, sailors had a much longer history of challenging elites’ privilege to 
“rule.”13
The chronology of this dissertation, 1689 to 1748, rejects the inevitability of the coming 
of the American Revolution by braiding together the chronologies of the maritime Atlantic with 
Boston’s rise and decline as an Atlantic port. The thread uniting these chronologies is the 
changing relationship among elite merchants and politicians, the waterfront’s tradesmen and 
laborers, and seafaring men as Boston became a central rather than peripheral node in the 
Atlantic economy, England’s Empire, and London-based credit networks. Many historians have 
argued that the Glorious Revolution of 1688 transformed Boston’s and New England’s 
economic, political, and social systems through new imperial and mercantile policies but none 
have considered the impact of these changes on the seafaring population, nor have they studied 
how maritime affairs shaped the new policies.14 There is a clear downward trajectory in the 
13 Carl Bridenbaugh, Cities In Revolt: Urban Life in America, 1743-1776, (London, Oxford, New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1955), 419; G.B. Warden, Boston: 1689-1776 (Boston and Toronto: Little, Brown and Company, 
1970); Nash, The Urban Crucible, 383-384.  
14 Ricahrd S. Dunn, Puritans and Yankee: The Winthrop Dynasty of New England, 1630-1717 (New York: W.W. 
Norton & Company INC., 1962); Richard L. Bushman, From Puritan to Yankee: Character and the Social Order in 
Connecticut, 1690-1765 (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1970); Phillip Haffenden, New England in the 
English Nation, 1689-1713 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1974); Richard R. Johnson, Adjustment to Empire: The New 
England Colonies, 1675-1715 (United States of America: Rutgers University Press, 1981); J.M. Sosin, English 
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treatment of sailors after the town’s 1689 Revolution, an event triggered by a mutiny among the 
crew of the Royal Navy frigate H.M.S. Rose, and adoption of maritime policies imported from 
England. Prior to 1689, Boston merchants supported illicit trade, privateering, and cooperation 
with pirates. Sailors received both wages and a privilege, which was space on board the vessel to 
ship their own commodities. This effectively made them shareholders in the voyage. The joint 
responsibilities and rewards increased cooperation while decreasing potential conflicts among all 
parties. Indeed, Boston court records during the 1680s are remarkable for the lack of disputes 
between ship captains and sailors or ship captains and merchants for that matter, which stands in 
direct contrast to the succeeding sixty years.15
Boston’s 1689 Revolution had a vital role in changing customary relations between 
politicians, merchants, and the seafaring community. England’s new king, William III of Orange, 
believed the revolution was an unwarranted power grab by Boston elites, although in reality their 
reluctant participation in the event protected the overthrown English officials from a waterfront 
mob. Boston elites sought to mollify King William by condemning previous irregularities in 
trade – practices that made Boston attractive for seafarers – and actively supporting his war with 
France. The war created many hardships for the maritime community. Politicians actively 
supported Royal Navy impressment of transatlantic seafarers and the port became a favored 
location for Royal Navy vessels. They also became executioners of pirates, who were previously 
courted for the economic benefits they bestowed upon small frontier towns, to further 
demonstrate their loyalty to England’s vision for the American colonies.  
America and the Revolution of 1688: Royal Administration and the Structure of Provincial Government (Lincoln 
and London: University of Nebraska Press, 1982).  
15 These assertions are based on a close analysis of Suffolk County Supreme Judicial Court Files (hereafter cited as 
SCSJCF), Massachusetts State Archives (hereafter cited as MSA) and Suffolk County Court of Common Pleas 
Record Books (hereafter cited as SCCCPRB), MSA for the period of 1680 to 1748.  
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Merchants concurrently entered and embraced the credit and trade networks of their 
English counterparts in pursuit of manufactured goods and shipbuilding materials. New 
England’s trade deficit with England skyrocketed and Boston merchants’ account books 
reflected this imbalance. In the first decade of the eighteenth century, the trade imbalance 
averaged £51,489 per year. From 1730 to 1739, the deficit more than doubled, to an average of 
£137,728 per year.16 This importation debt had an important function in Boston’s Atlantic 
economy. It created social connections and financial arrangements with London merchants that 
cemented Boston’s status as leading purveyor of English manufactured goods to the rest of the 
North American colonies. This crucial position within England’s network of trade also enabled 
the port to maintain its large merchant fleet and shipbuilding industry. The trade imbalance, 
however, put pressure on Boston merchants to increase remittances to England. They turned to 
logwood, a dyewood from the Bays of Campeche and Honduras used in the European textile and 
furniture industries, as a partial solution. The logwood trade catered to Boston’s maritime 
strengths. It required the strong backs of sailors to harvest the wood and ships for transport. 
Conditions in the lagoons were harsh and the seafarers required close, sometimes abusive, 
oversight by ship captains. Closer ties with England after 1689 also led to the adoption of 
English mercantile practices that strove to abolish sailors’ privileges and increasingly 
commodify and decrease the value of their labor. By the early 1700s, it appears the custom of 
granting privileges extended only to ship captains and mates. Impressment, early persecution of 
pirates, the harsh logwood trade, and adoption of English mercantile practices increasingly 
internationalized, marginalized, and exploited seafarers while merchants and waterfront 
tradesmen benefitted at their expense.  
16 For New England’s imports and exports to England see, Sir Charles Whitworth, State of the Trade of Great 
Britain in its Imports and Exports, Progressively from the Year 1697 (London, 1776), 63-64.  
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This ruthless pursuit of profits at the expense of workers inspired thunderous jeremiads 
from ministers, which in modern times have in turn generated historiographical debates 
regarding the decline of Puritanism. Today most historians contend that there was no significant 
change in religious practice among the second and third generations of Puritans and that 
“declension,” so important to an earlier generation of historians, is a myth.17 Although personal 
religiosity may not have changed, it is clear in the study of the waterfront that earlier Puritan 
ideas, which limited material acquisition and the exploitation of others, no longer held sway. As 
historian Darrett Rutman aptly surmised, “In America, the acquisitive instincts of the 
contemporary Englishman would rush to the surface, overwhelming [John] Winthrop’s 
communal ideal.” Furthermore, in the pursuit of profits, Boston merchants had opened the gates 
to a significant population of foreign maritime laborers, who altered the cultural and religious 
make-up of the town during the early eighteenth century.18
Sailors recognized their central importance to Boston’s rise and refused to submit to their 
declining economic and social position in the town. They resisted impressment and work in the 
logwood trade through desertion, mutiny, riots, and violence. From 1716 to 1728, pirates 
17 The historiographical debate over the decline of Puritanism is still alive and well despite attempts to bury the 
debate with the argument that declension was a myth and only lived within the minds of second and third generation 
New Englanders, see, Robert G. Pope, “New England versus the New England Mind: The Myth of Declension” 
Journal of Social History Vol. 3, No. 2 (Winter, 1969-1970): 95 – 108. Pope argues against intellectual historians 
such as Perry Miller, in particular his work The New England Mind: From Colony to Province (Cambridge, Mass., 
1953), who took at face value the jeremiads of ministers such as Increase and Cotton Mather. Meanwhile, Mark 
Valeri has recently argued that merchants and ministers worked together in order to justify and incorporate new 
commercial practices into Puritanism, see, Mark Valeri, Heavenly Merchandize. How Religion Shaped Commerce in 
Puritan America (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2010). For more on the decline of Puritanism and the 
reformation of manners, see, Richard Gildrie, The Profane, the Civil, and the Godly: The Reformation of Manners in 
Orthodox New England, 1679-1749, (United States: Pennsylvania State University, 1994) and David Hall, Worlds of 
Wonder, Days of Judgment: Popular Belief in Early New England, (United States: Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 1989).   
18 Rutman, Winthrop's Boston, 22. For the influence of seamen on young men in Boston see, Steven J. J. Pitt, 
“Cotton Mather and Boston’s ‘Seafaring Tribe’” The New England Quarterly 85.2 (June 2012): 222–252. I agree, 
however, with Christine Leigh Heyrman that the experience of seafarers in Boston does not reflect the cultural and 
religious experiences of other New England seafarers see, Christine Leigh Heyrman, Commerce and Culture: The 
Maritime Communities of Colonial Massachusetts, 1690-1750 (New York, New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 
1984).  
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challenged the entire Atlantic economic system with their brazen attacks on the shipping of all 
nations. Boston’s merchant fleet earned special retribution for the town’s central role in
persecuting and hanging pirates. Sailors became adept at using the local legal system and vice-
admiralty courts to their advantage, causing merchants and ship captains consternation on a 
regular basis. The difficulties stemming from controlling a defiant maritime population 
decreased Boston merchants’ profits and undoubtedly contributed to their decision to seek wealth 
outside of transatlantic shipping during the 1740s.  
Boston elites undermined the town’s maritime economy by mistreating the seafaring 
community through impressment and war profiteering at the expense of shipbuilding and 
transatlantic trade. In 1744, Boston’s merchants, tired of what they considered meager profits or 
“Cutting and Shuffling” as one put it a few years earlier, pulled their capital out of shipbuilding 
industry, sold vessels engaged in the logwood and transatlantic trade, cut exports to England by 
almost half from the previous decade, and accepted large government contracts that gave 
immediate and large profits to wage war on France and supply English troops and vessels with 
supplies. Many of their London counterparts followed a similar strategy, reaping the economic 
benefits of war. War with France also initiated plans by Massachusetts Governor William Shirley 
to seize Louisbourg. In his quest for glory, Shirley zealously catered to the Royal Navy’s heavy 
impressment demands. Mobile sailors fled to friendlier ports and foreign vessels avoided Boston, 
harming the ship outfitting industry. Philadelphia, New York, and Newport filled the void 
Boston left in shipping and shipbuilding. The anger of the remaining maritime community 
swelled and in November of 1747 erupted into a three day riot over impressment and injustice. 
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By 1748, the town’s elites had thoroughly damaged the town’s previous maritime economy but 
their own wealth had, at least in the short-term, increased.19
 To summarize, between 1689 and 1748 Boston grew to economic dominance among all 
English American ports. Compared to its rivals, New York and Philadelphia, Boston had a poor 
hinterland and initially relied on exports of fish and timber to support its economic growth. By 
the 1710s, however, Salem, Marblehead, and Gloucester had taken control of the fish trade. 
Boston merchants turned their attention to the wider Atlantic trade networks and the ships and 
men who sailed them. They consequently built their empire on the labor of maritime workers, 
harvesting logwood from Spanish America, building and outfitting ships, and controlling the 
distribution of English manufactured goods to other North American colonies. These mutually 
reinforcing economic strategies are unexplored or underexplored in the history of Boston’s rise 
because historians have long marginalized the lives and labor of workers who got wet. They are 
the key to the hidden history of colonial Boston.  
19 Peter Faneuil to Benjamin Faneuil, September 7, 1738, Volume F-4, Faneuil Letterbook, 1737-1739, Hancock 
Family Papers, Baker Library, Harvard Business School (hereafter cited as HBS); Shirley had also recently lobbied 
for and obtained a position for his son as a Royal Navy officer in 1742, which likely factored into his pro-
impressment policy. Governor William Shirley to the Duke of Newcastle, May 4, 1742 in Charles Henry Lincoln, 
ed., Correspondence of William Shirley, Governor of Massachusetts and Military Commander of America, 1731 –
1760 (New York: Macmillan, 1912), 1: 86-87.  
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2.0 THE ROYAL NAVY AND BOSTON’S 1689 REVOLUTION
In spring 1689 revolution came to the shores of America with the news of William and Mary’s 
takeover in England’s “Glorious Revolution.” Bostonians seized the moment to revolt against the 
“tyrannical” Governor Andros and his council. Most historians have seen Boston’s revolution as 
fundamentally similar to England’s revolution. Boston elites plotted behind the scenes, organized 
the lower classes, and brilliantly carried out a bloodless revolution – a “Protestant putsch” as 
Stephen Saunders Webb has coined it.1 This romantic vision of the revolution has persisted and 
even dominated historical interpretation despite its weak evidential foundation. Boston elites did 
not plan the revolution that occurred on April 18, 1689 nor did they gain control of the situation 
until damage had already been done. Rather, the evidence overwhelmingly shows that Boston’s 
Revolution of 1689 began in a mutiny aboard H.M.S. Rose Frigate, then stationed in Boston’s 
harbor. Ferocious conflicts flowed off the ship and into Boston, igniting revolution. 
This chapter traces how the Royal Navy’s introduction to the provincial town of Boston 
impacted local politics, economics, and culture. It then segues into an analysis of the maritime 
origins of Boston’s 1689 revolution, the revolution itself, and the aftermath. The results of this 
investigation present a hitherto unknown history of the 1689 revolution. The mutiny on H.M.S. 
Rose generated the necessary political and economic ties with England that were responsible for 
Boston’s meteoric rise among English American ports. Boston’s seafaring community suffered 
the consequences of closer connections to London as politicians and merchants adopted 
metropolitan attitudes and maritime policies.        
1 Stephen Saunders Webb, Lord Churchill’s Coup: The Anglo-American Empire and the Glorious Revolution 
Reconsidered (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1995), 182. 
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* * * 
 In May 1686, the fifth-rate H.M.S. Rose, commanded by John George, arrived in Boston, 
becoming the port’s first long-term station ship. The Rose immediately transformed Boston’s 
politics, society, and economics. This floating icon of English power brought with it documents 
that annulled the Massachusetts Bay Charter of 1629, the foundation of Puritan power in the 
colony. The Massachusetts Bay Colony was forced to create a new interim government under 
Joseph Dudley. Few in Boston agreed with the changes taking place. Dudley, however, 
recognized the political pressure a Royal Navy frigate with twenty-eight cannons and more than 
a hundred men could exert on a small community and strategically employed it to his benefit.  
On May 21, he boarded the Rose with a few of his gentlemen friends, to a salute of twenty-one 
guns. He then did a victory tour of the harbor and was saluted by the forts on Castle Island in 
Boston Harbor and the South End of town. Samuel Sewall, a devout Puritan, merchant, and 
judge, downplayed the boisterous display but could not hide his dismay that the marriage of 
politics and religion in the Massachusetts Bay Colony had ended. The military had legitimized 
Dudley’s rise and nullified the Massachusetts’ Charter.2
Unlike Dudley, Edward Randolph failed to grasp the political and economic significance 
of introducing the Rose to Boston. For him the warship had one purpose – to serve his needs as 
the customs agent. Randolph’s commission granted him the right to prosecute all vessels 
engaged in illicit trade in Boston Harbor. He expected to profit handsomely from this 
arrangement and Captain George and the Rose were to help him. Captain George had other plans 
for his ship and crew. Like Randolph, George planned to seize smugglers in Boston Harbor but 
2 Log of the H.M.S. Rose, May 22, 1686, ADM 51/3955, The National Archives (hereafter cited as TNA); M. 
Halsey Thomas ed., The Diary of Samuel Sewall, 2 vols. (New York, New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 1973), 
1:115. Sewall notes that the Castle fired twenty-five guns and then the Rose responded but the Rose’s logbook has 
the accurate account.    
18 
he would bring them before the vice-admiral (Dudley), not Randolph. George would then receive 
the full one third of the proceeds granted to Royal Navy officers for prizes. The legality of 
George’s scheme had a weak foundation, as the harbor was Randolph’s jurisdiction while 
George had full authority to halt smuggling and piracy on the high seas. Nevertheless, the 
audacious captain moved forward with his plot.3
The two men had many potential targets. Boston authorities had long skirted the 
Navigation Acts and nominally supported smuggling, considering it crucial to the town’s 
economic well-being. The most egregious trade violation committed by Boston merchants was 
direct trade with other European countries. In the early 1670s, the problem became so dire that 
Parliament even toyed with the idea of blockading Boston’s harbor. The third Anglo-Dutch War 
(1672-74) permanently shelved that proposal. Yet the annulment of Massachusetts’ Charter and 
the Rose’s presence in Boston were, in part, a long overdue response to Boston’s trade 
irregularities. Captain George’s and Randolph’s plans to seize ships violating the Navigation 
Acts in Boston’s harbor had the potential to damage the profits of local merchants and the 
functioning of the entire economy.4
Captain George struck first in June 1686 and successfully brought smugglers before the 
vice-admiral. Randolph adamantly objected to George’s encroachment into revenue streams he 
considered his own. He employed but a handful of deputies with authority to search incoming 
ships for illicit goods. He could not compete with the numerous boats and entire crew of the 
Rose. Soon a “warm dispute” developed between the two men. Randolph complained bitterly to 
3 J.R. Tanner ed., Pepy’s Memoirs of the Royal Navy, 1679-1688 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1906), 55-58. For more 
on ship captain’s behavior during this time period, see, N. A. M. Rodger, The Command of the Ocean: A Naval 
History of Britain, 1649-1815 (New York and London: W.W. Norton & Company Inc, 2004), 122-124. 
4 Richard R. Johnson, Adjustment to Empire: The New England Colonies, 1675-1715 (United States of America: 
Rutgers University Press, 1981), 25-27. 
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President Dudley. Dudley initially ignored the customs agent, allowing George to continue to 
seize ships in Boston Harbor. Randolph suspected collusion between Dudley, his council, and 
George in depriving him of his rightful money, which by early July he estimated to be above 
£500. Randolph, always suspicious, assumed that Dudley and the council manipulated George 
for nefarious reasons, but the evidence strongly suggests that George bullied Dudley and the 
council. Randolph found it difficult to believe that George, an Englishman and Anglican, would 
collaborate with backward, Puritan Bostonians. George, however, acted alone and shared the 
profits of seizing vessels in Boston Harbor among his officers and crew, cementing their loyalty 
and minimizing discontent. Like so many historians past and present, Randolph failed to 
consider George, his crew, and the Rose as a political, economic, and cultural force in their own 
right. 5
The conflict escalated in early July 1686 when the Rose’s coxswain refused to let 
Randolph speak to one of his customs deputies after searching a recently arrived vessel. George 
had undoubtedly ordered him to keep the information from Randolph while he sent sailors to 
search the ship and claim informer status. Randolph taunted the coxswain, calling him “a sawcy 
fellow” and declaring he “deserved to be laid by the heels.” Soon George arrived at Randolph’s 
house and verbally “abused” him “beyond expression.” George did not take lightly threats to his 
loyal men and of course a seafarer was expert in the art of insults. Randolph became the target of 
an entire crew’s wrath and they did not spare those close to him. Perhaps at George’s behest, 
Unton Deering,6 a third son of an affluent nobleman, had the crew spread rumors that 
5 Edward Randolph to John Sansom, June 30, 1689, in Robert Toppan, ed., Edward Randolph: Including His Letters 
and Official Papers from the New England, Middle, and Southern Colonies in America, 7 vols. (Boston, 1898), 6: 
183-184.  
6 Unton Deering was a volunteer officer on board and came from a fairly affluent family in England. His name is 
often spelled Deering or Dearing but I have also seen it as Derring and Dering. I have chosen for the purpose of 
consistency to use “Deering” except when used in quotations.
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Randolph’s wife had been a prostitute on the Nottingham Estate back in England. Randolph 
angrily wrote Deering’s powerful relative by marriage, Sir Robert Southwell, in the hopes of 
quelling the sailor’s scandalous accusations. He failed, and instead these rumors eventually drove 
Mrs. Randolph to flee back to England, leaving behind a sad and embittered husband. Captain 
George likely hoped Randolph would join his partner, leaving him as the sole authority to 
condemn vessels involved in illicit trade.7
George kept the Rose stationed “within 2 cables length of Boston” for most the summer 
and fall to continue his lucrative undertaking. By mid-July, George lost his competition, as 
Randolph reluctantly departed Boston for Rhode Island and Connecticut to obtain their 
cooperation in annulling their charters and joining the Dominion of New England. During 
Randolph’s sixteen day absence, George cunningly shirked his real duties by ordering Lieutenant 
Condon to fit out a brigantine to search the coast for reported pirates. His search and seize 
operation flourished and he obtained over £200 before Randolph’s return.8 By the end of the 
month, even Dudley desperately wished to detach the parasitic Captain George and the costly 
H.M.S. Rose from Boston. In a pointed letter to William Blathwayt, Secretary of Trade and 
Foreign Plantations, he remarked, “I should be very Glad of particular Orders for her [the 
Rose’s] Disposall or returne if her service here be not judged worth the Expence.”9 If Dudley 
greatly profited from his relationship with George, as Randolph alleged, the president would not 
7 Edward Randolph to Sir Robert Southwell, 10 July 1686, Randolph Letters, 4: 92-93. For Deering-Southwell 
connection see, Francis Haslewood, Genealogical Memoranda Relating to the Family of Dering of Surrenden-
Dering, in the Parish of Pluckley, Kent (London, 1876), pp. 17-18; Randolph’s wife returned to London in August 
of 1687 see, Edward Randolph to William Blathwayt, 5 August 1687, Randolph Letters, 6: 225.   
8 Randolph returned to Boston in a foul mood and he sent three letters to prominent officials regarding George’s 
conduct. In one letter, he informed the future governor, Edmund Andros, that Connecticut and Rhode Island cared 
little about the dissolution of their charters. Rather, the two colonies complained heartily over Captain George’s 
harassment of their shipping in Boston, see, Edward Randolph to Sir Edmund Andros, 28 July 1686, Randolph 
Letters, 6: 190-93;  Edward Randolph to William Blathwayt, July 28, 1686, and Edward Randolph to Dr. William 
Sancroft, Archbishop of Canterbury,  August 2, 1686, Edward Randolph, 4: 97-100 and 103-110.    
9 Joseph Dudley to William Blathwayt, July 31, 1686, Edward Randolph, 4: 195-196.  
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have been so anxious to see the Rose sail away. The arrival of the H.M.S. Dartmouth, 
commanded by the belligerent Captain George St. Loe, from the West Indies in late August only 
furthered Dudley’s desire to get rid of George.10
Authorities feared the Royal Navy crews now loitering about Boston. English sailors had 
a reputation for frolicking, blasphemous, and riotous behavior that did not sit well with Puritan 
ministers. For instance, in September 1686, Captain St. Loe petitioned the council to allow him 
and his crew to have a bonfire in Boston to celebrate the Queen’s birthday. They denied his 
request, expressing concern that the fire would incite a riot and possibly burn down the town. 
Sailors from the Dartmouth and Rose, however, refused to forgo a chance to celebrate and held 
their bonfire on Noddles Island,11 now East Boston. To the chagrin of the council and town 
ministers, a number of revelers from Boston attended the party as well. The firing of guns and 
loud “hussas” went well past midnight and into the early morning of Sunday. Religious leaders 
trumpeted their displeasure at the profanation of the Sabbath. After Boston’s 1689 revolution, 
one minister reminisced, “her [the Rose’s] men playing Reakes on shoar to the Great offence and 
disturbance of the inhabitants.”12
The influx of English outsiders only increased when Governor Edmund Andros arrived 
on December 20, 1686 with two regiments of English soldiers and roughly 200 more Royal Navy 
10 On 5 August, George did finally depart Boston in the Rose to search for the pirates infesting the coast. For 15 days 
the Rose meandered along the coast never going far from Boston harbor. On 20 August, he returned to Nantasket 
Road in Boston Harbor. Undoubtedly he had learned of the Dartmouth frigate’s approach to Boston. He once again 
decided to fit out a different ship, place Lieutenant Condon in charge, and have him search for the pirates. George 
stayed in Boston to attend to his affairs and maintain the power he had established since his arrival in May, see, Log 
of the H.M.S. Rose, August 1686, ADM 51/3955, TNA and Edward Randolph to William Blathwayt, August 23 
1686, Edward Randolph, 6: 198-99.
11 Today referred to as Noodles Island.  
12 Another bonfire party was held by the seafarers on 14 October 1686 for the King’s birthday. Robert N. Toppan, 
ed., “Records of the Council of Massachusetts under Joseph Dudley,” Massachusetts Historical Society, 
Proceedings, 2d Ser., XIII (1899- 1900), 270-71; Sewall, Diary, 1:122-124; Log of the H.M.S. Rose, September 25 
and October 14, 1686, ADM 51/3955, TNA; Increase Mather, A Vindication of New England from the vile 
aspersions cast upon that country in The Andros Tracts, ed. W. H. Whitmore, 3 vols. (Boston, 1868-74), 2: 54.  
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sailors on board the fourth-rate H.M.S. Kingfisher. The profound multiplication of Anglicans and 
seafarers led to more “profane” change in Boston. Under Dudley, Anglicans had received little 
relief from a hostile populace. Puritan ministers attacked their practices and beliefs. They 
hindered Boston’s Anglican minister, Robert Ratcliff, from forming a church, compelling him to 
preach in the cramped town-house. Upon arrival, Andros asked Increase Mather and Samuel 
Willard if they might allow Ratcliff the use of their churches but they adamantly refused. Andros 
initially accepted their response; however, after attending one of Ratcliff’s sermons in the town-
house, he forced Willard to open the doors of South Church to the Anglicans.13 Puritan 
churchgoers also found the redcoats’ noisy musket volleys during their sermons offensive. 
Andros further angered Massachusetts Bay colonists by vacating the lands granted to them under 
the old company charter, initiating a process whereby the colonists had to pay a fee to reapply for 
their lands. For Bostonians, these acts constituted the most blatant attack yet on their economic 
and religious rights.14
On April 30, 1687 the Kingfisher docked in Charlestown for repairs. Soon after the town 
became a hotbed of what Puritans denounced as Anglican, “papist,” and pagan vices. In May, 
townsfolk, perhaps with the help of the Kingfisher’s sailors, erected a maypole to play music and 
dance around. The maypole shocked stalwart Puritans. As Increase Mather exclaimed of 
maypoles in 1686, “It is an abominable shame, that any Persons in a Land of such Light and 
Purity as New England has been, should have to Face to speak to think of practising so vile a 
piece of Heathenism.” Many in Charlestown agreed with Mather and the town constables 
13 This uncomfortable situation lasted until Spring 1688 when King’s Chapel opened its door as the first Anglican 
Church in Boston see, Viola Barnes, The Dominion of New England: A Study in British Colonial Policy (1923: 
reprint, New York: Frederick Ungar Publishing Co., 1960), 127-130. 
14 For general disturbances caused by the increased Anglican presence, see, Sewall, Diary, 1: 133-138 and Increase 
Mather, Testimony Against Several Prophane and Superstitious Customs (London, 1687). For taxation and land 
grants, see, Johnson, Adjustment to Empire, pp. 74-83.    
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chopped the maypole down after Samuel Phips, a selectman, recommended the action. Within 
the week, however, a few mischief-makers challenged Puritan orthodoxy and patience by raising 
a larger maypole with a “Garland upon it.” Andros used his authority to silence the Puritan 
ministers who attempted to critique the culture emanating from the sea, his soldiers, and 
Anglican beliefs.15 The maritime and Anglican presence in Charlestown instigated another clash 
of cultures that May. Joseph Phips, the brother of Samuel Phips and a Puritan, attended an 
Anglican funeral and kept his hat on during the parson’s sermon. This common practice among 
Puritans greatly offended the new captain of the Kingfisher, John Grimsditch, and a fistfight 
broke out. Governor Andros blamed Phips for the disorderly conduct and ordered a court date for 
the proud Puritan. Royal Navy seafarers, as we will see shortly, did not believe Phips or the 
Puritan community had been punished sufficiently.16
The Rose’s arrival in Boston brought change in its wake. Captain George became an 
immediate and powerful political and economic figure. He provoked all other authorities with his 
aggressive money-making schemes, verbal abuse, and veiled threats of violence. Meanwhile, the 
crews of Rose and other naval vessels left a lasting cultural impression, as they forcefully 
subjected the predominantly Puritan community to maritime, Anglican, and plebeian traditions. 
Governor Andros supported their efforts, using his authority to help break down religious and 
15 Some historians have asserted that sailors from the Kingfisher were responsible for the maypole, see, Thomas 
Jefferson Wertenbaker, The Puritan Oligarchy: The Founding of American Civilization (New York: Charles 
Scribner’s Sons, 1947), 163 and Philip Ranet, Enemies of the Bay Colony: Puritan Massachusetts and its Foes (New 
York: Peter Lang, 1995), 120.  This, however, appears to be a misreading of Samuel Sewall’s diary entry of 26 May 
1687, which joins the issue of the maypole with the fistfight between Joseph Phips and Captain John Grimsditch, 
see, Sewall, Diary, 1:140-141. The seafarers undoubtedly participated in the jovialities surrounding the maypole, 
especially with their ship under repair and little else to do. Increase Mather noted that “Vain Persons” intended to 
raise a maypole “when the time shall come” in October of 1686, see, Mather, Testimony Against Several Prophane 
and Superstitious Customs, A4-A5. This sermon was censored in Boston by the Andros administration, which 
explains its London publication in 1687.   
16 Samuel Sewall notes from rumor that Phips attended a soldier’s sermon on Wednesday May 18, 1687. I suspect 
Phips attended Captain Thomas Hamilton’s (the Kingfisher’s previous captain) funeral on Tuesday May 17, 1687. 
This would better explain Grimsditch’s extreme actions, Sewall, Diary, 1:140.  
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cultural boundaries. His encouragement, however, may have served to embolden typically 
marginalized men.    
The tumultuous political circumstances in Boston between 1686 and 1689 generated 
sharp disputes between colonists and the Royal Navy. Royal Navy officers, colonial bureaucrats 
and ministers, and royal appointees struggled for power. These contests ensnared working-class 
sailors, customs deputies, and town constables in an increasingly violent environment that tended 
to undermine the authority of local elites. Royal Navy ship captains encouraged conflict with the 
locals to consolidate their authority and inspire loyalty among their crews. For George, the 
intense squabbles had practical applications. They distracted an unpaid crew stationed in a port 
far from family and friends and with little to keep them busy. George created an “us versus 
them” mentality that he successfully transferred to other Royal Navy crews passing through 
Boston. Violent interactions between George’s crew and townsfolk occurred only when other 
Royal Navy vessels were in port. 
George first employed the aid of another Royal Navy ship captain in his feud with locals 
in late August 1686. Local authorities had stalled George’s lucrative operations in Boston Harbor 
by favoring Randolph’s claims for the search and seizure of illicit goods.17 George refused to 
step aside quietly, and when threatened, he enlisted the aid of Captain George St. Loe of the 
H.M.S. Dartmouth. On October 20, Lieutenant Condon sent a sailor named David Simpson to 
seize the ketch Providence from Newfoundland with explicit orders not to allow Randolph’s 
deputies on board. Simpson fulfilled his duty admirably. When Randolph’s deputy, John Luggar, 
arrived to seize the vessel, Simpson picked up an ax and “swore to cut the said Luggar in pieces” 
17 In September 1686, George tried to condemn smuggled goods in Boston and then New York but Randolph 
thwarted him on both occasions. Randolph, however, still believed the government allied with George against him, 
see Edward Randolph to Governor of New York Boston, September 20, 1684 [1686], Edward Randolph, 4: 125-
126.  
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if he came on board. Another customs deputy, William Hill, made the attempt and received a 
slash to his face for his efforts. In response to the violence, Randolph solicited the aid of 
Constable Isaiah Toy in bringing Simpson to prison. The constable and customs deputies 
managed to apprehend Simpson after a scuffle and more verbal threats. They marched Simpson 
toward the courthouse, joined along the way by Judge and Councilman Richard Wharton.18
Naval officers liked to maintain control of disciplining their seamen, and sailors, navy or 
otherwise, frequently acted to protect fellow crewmates from prison. George also believed he 
had the King’s authority to seize vessels in Boston Harbor and that Simpson had acted in a legal 
manner. Therefore, when George heard of Simpson’s arrest, he enlisted Captain St. Loe’s help to 
free the captured seaman. A gang of naval officers and sailors confronted Randolph, Toy, 
Wharton, and Simpson on Broad Street. George and St. Loe “without any provocation in a 
Violent Scurrilous manner,” questioned the constable and elites holding Simpson “but had not 
patience to hear, or receive any Answers but run furiously upon the Constable … with their 
staves.”  In the ensuing scuffle with the constable, two of George’s sailors rushed up behind Toy 
to liberate Simpson. One of the seafarers cried out “my Capt. is my life,” illustrating the loyalty 
of George’s crew. As the fray took a violent turn, Judge Wharton threatened to “raise the 
Towne” against George and his allies. St. Loe retorted, “You show what You will be at, You will 
be ready to raise the Towne against his Majesties Authority.” Both sides claimed the King’s 
authority with valid reasons. George and St. Loe halted their attacks, however, as a growing 
18 Depositions of Edward Randolph, John Luggar, Erasmus Stephens, and Isaiah Toy, October 21 and 22, 1686, 
Massachusetts Archives Collection, 328 vols. (hereafter cited as Mass. Arch.), 127: 120-123 and 127. Randolph’s 
deposition is also published in Edward Randolph, 4: 126-128.  
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crowd of townspeople assembled. Neither captain, however, desired to look weak in front of 
crewmates and kept up a verbal tirade against the local authorities.19
The fight to liberate Simpson illuminated power relations between the Royal Navy and 
local authorities. St. Loe declared to Judge Wharton that “the worst man he had on board, was a 
good a man as himself [Wharton],” quite the insult for a man who regularly passed judgment on 
lowly seafaring men. Captain George, stung by months of disagreement, similarly told Randolph 
that the lowliest of his seamen had more power than Randolph to seize ships in Boston Harbor. 
He also mocked the interim government calling the council “a Company of pittyfull little 
fellows.” Both men threatened Randolph, his deputies, and Wharton with violence should they 
be caught in the harbor or at sea, suggesting that the captains understood that in town their 
powers were limited but they had full control of the harbor. After Wharton penned a court order 
for Simpson, St. Loe derisively expressed to the Councilmen that they would be better off 
delivering Simpson to their own homes and beds “then to Send him to Prison.” This was not an 
idle threat. Together, the two Royal Navy vessels had close to two hundred men who could 
create headaches for authorities. This is exactly what St. Loe had in mind. As he departed, St. 
Loe called for his crew to come ashore.20
 The drama between the two ship captains and Boston authorities continued for weeks. 
The day after the incident, magistrates summoned George and St. Loe to answer for their actions. 
The captains firmly refused, insisting that the council and therefore the court had no authority 
over them. If President Dudley, however, had orders for their ships then they would be followed. 
The court sent four more summons as the day progressed, the last of which included the 
19 Depositions of Richard Wharton and Joseph Webb, October 21 and 22, 1686, Mass. Arch., 127: 124-125 and 
126a. Wharton’s deposition is also published in Edward Randolph, 6: 202-204.  
20 Depositions of Edward Randolph, Michael Perry, Richard Wharton, John Luggar, Erasmus Stephens, Isaiah Toy, 
Joseph Webb, James Coffin, and Francis Cooke, October 21 and 22 1686, Mass. Arch., 127: 120-130.   
27 
president’s seal. George and St. Loe ignored them. In a final communication with the captains 
that day, the court ordered them to keep their sailors on board their vessels past “Candle light.” A 
number of Boston’s inhabitants had complained to the court of “severall miscarriages & 
misdemeanours committed by the said Captaines Men” after the quarrel in the streets. With 
Simpson in prison, St. Loe had his men keep his promise to Wharton.21
 Captains George and St. Loe knew that local authorities could not touch them on board 
their ships at sea. They resisted all court summons except one, to which St. Loe excused himself 
for his absences and mockingly challenged the court’s prerogative. The magistrates were not 
amused. They sent a letter “to acquaint the said Captaine Saintloe” that his nonattendance broke 
the law and “therefore that this Court hath not been so wanting to themselves or the due formes 
of proceedince as he may suddainly imagine.” The magistrates adjourned for the day, expecting 
St. Loe to attend court in five days. On October 23, the Rose frigate let loose its cannons in an 
apparent effort at intimidation. Judge Samuel Sewall recorded the event in his diary: “about 
7aclock the Frigot fires many Guns, Drums and Trumpets going. I heard the Guns.” George 
meant to show the magistrates and Boston’s inhabitants his potential for mayhem.22 St. Loe, 
meanwhile, failed to keep his appointment with the magistrates on October 27. But that same 
day, one of his sailors, Giles Smith, made a grand entrance to court after abusing and swearing 
“wicked oaths” at another Boston constable, Jabez Neigus. The court fined Smith twenty 
shillings and returned him to St. Loe for corporal punishment. St. Loe probably “punished” 
21 “Records of the Council of Massachusetts under Joseph Dudley,” 272-274.  
22 There does not appear to be a reason for the Rose frigates display other than George’s conflict with Boston 
authorities. No ships were entering port and there was no reason for celebration. Condon suspiciously neglected to 
mention the “salute” in the ship’s log as he regularly did on other occasions, see, Log of the H.M.S. Rose, October 
23, 1686, ADM 51/3955, TNA. Sewall, Diary, 1:124.  
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Smith with an extra ration of rum. The tone of the magistrates’ decree to Smith expressed 
exasperation with Captains George and St. Loe.23
The two Royal Navy commanders considered their power and authority equal to or 
greater than colonial authorities. In this instance, they had physically attacked a town constable, 
derided Dudley’s councilmen, threatened retribution, and allowed their sailors to harass locals. 
They refused to attend court summons or respect Boston’s laws and alleged their authority came 
directly from the king. George and St. Loe won this first violent power struggle, which set the 
stage for further riotous and aggressive actions by Royal Navy crews.    
 In his Letters Written from New England (1686), John Dunton described Boston’s
sanctimonious attitude towards non-Puritans and foreigners. Dunton wrote to his brother, “I had 
not given you the Trouble of so large an account of the manners of the Bostonians, nor rak’d in 
such a Dunghil of Filth, but that this sort of People are so apt to say, Stand off, for I am holier 
than Thou.” 24 Sailors, meanwhile, took offense to the superiority of local authorities and at times 
responded aggressively. This volatile combination reached a boiling point in May 1687 when 
Samuel Phips offended the Kingfisher’s new captain and the two Royal Navy crews by wearing 
his hat during their deceased captain’s funeral. Andros’s modest punishment of Phips apparently 
did not satisfy the seafaring men’s thirst for revenge, and Captain Grimsditch led “fivetie or 
sixtie” seafarers from the Kingfisher and Rose on a rampage through the town. Upon hearing the 
commotion, Timothy Phillips, a town constable, ran home to obtain his staff to thwart the riot. 
He met Grimsditch and his crew just outside his house, whereupon he ordered them to disperse. 
In response, a few sailors disarmed Phillips and then Grimsditch took a swipe at him with a 
23 “Records of the Council of Massachusetts under Joseph Dudley,” 275.  
24 John Dunton, Letters from New England, 1686, (Boston: Prince Society, 1867), 69-74, quote at 74. Ned Ward  
held similarly unsavory views of Bostonians, see Edward Ward, A Trip to New England (1699) in A Collection of 
the Writings of Mr. Edward Ward, II, (London, 1717), 171-178. 
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drawn rapier. Outmatched, the constable fled into his home but the seafarers followed. They 
broke down the door, stole several items, and “ransacked” the dwelling, forcing Phillips to
abandon his own home. A minor cultural slight had detonated a longer, larger struggle between 
the Royal Navy and Boston authorities.  
Governor Andros called Grimsditch before him on the night of the riot to answer for his 
actions. Afterwards, the boatswain of the Kingfisher told the constable, Timothy Phillips, that 
“all was well on the Capt. Side.” Phillips and his fellow constables John Chamberlain and 
Nathaniel Adams, not content with Andros’s leniency, confronted the governor to seek redress 
for the riot and Grimsditch’s violence. The boatswain had not lied; Grimsditch had turned 
Andros against the town constables. The governor upbraided the constables and went so far as to 
threaten them with imprisonment. As the constables left, the governor warned them “look to your 
Self and have a care for you are marked.” 25 Seafarers had little respect for local authority and 
readily resorted to intimidation and violent behavior. With over 300 seafarers on the Kingfisher
and Rose combined, Andros had no intention of exerting his authority and limited resources for 
the safety of a few town constables. In fact, he offered a glowing, albeit inaccurate, 
recommendation of Grimsditch to the Secretary of the Admiralty that led to a promotion: “the 
captain demeaned himself well and kept the ships company in very good order.” Andros’s 
complacency, even nominal support, ensured that the Royal Navy seafarers had would take 
further revenge on the local community.26
Two months later, four of Captain George’s most stalwart friends and colleagues from 
the Rose joined with three fairly prominent Bostonians for a night of drinking, troublemaking, 
25 Depositions of Timothy Phillips and John Chamberlin, January 24, 1690 and February 4, 1690, Mass. Arch., 35: 
119a and 217.      
26 Edmund Andros to Secretary of the Admiralty, September 5, 1687, in Andros Tracts, 3: 74-75; Grimsditch was 
promoted to captain of the Larke based on Andros’s recommendation, see, Tanner ed., Pepys Memoirs, 92.  
30 
and eventually bloodshed. The Kingfisher still lay at dock under repair, Andros had effectively 
undermined local constables, and the Rose’s men believed themselves impervious to any 
repercussions. The night began with drinking. Unton Deering, George’s confidant who began the 
malicious rumors about Randolph’s wife, invited the youthful Thomas Richards27 and John 
Bonamy28 of Boston to share a bottle of punch on board the Rose. A little before 8:00, Andrew 
Belcher (Boston ship captain/merchant),29 John Wiggoner (first mate), Edward Briggs (ship 
surgeon), and Thomas Cutler (common seaman) joined them. As historian Viola Barnes 
discovered, Captain George “connived at a certain amount of illicit trade, for which reason the 
merchants preferred to have him examine their cargoes.” With Wiggoner and Captain Belcher, a 
known smuggler, both in attendance the likely topic of conversation was how to get illicit goods 
into or out of Boston. The bottle of punch soon expired and the crew relocated to the Three 
Cranes tavern for more drinking. The night’s entertainment turned dangerous when the merry 
gang left the tavern and Wiggoner, a figure of authority, returned to the Rose. After this point, 
the sequence of events varies depending on the witness. Belcher contends that the seafarers went 
ahead of the three Bostonians and out of sight. Shortly thereafter they “heard a woman cry out 
that her child was killed.” Belcher, Richards, and Bonamy apparently fled to Belcher’s mother’s 
house and innocently fell asleep without reporting the incident. Belcher’s deposition is either a 
27 Richards was born in 1670 and came from a renowned New England family. His uncle, Major John Richards, 
owned a large swath of the North End with numerous shops for shipbuilding. He served as Massachusetts agent in 
London from 1682-1684 and in 1692 participated in the Salem witch trials as a judge. John Richards had no children 
and therefore passed on all of his Boston waterfront property to Thomas Richards when he died in 1694, see, John 
Richards Last Will and Testimony, 1 April 1694, in Abner Morse, A Genealogical Register of the Descendants of 
Several Ancient Puritans, Volume 3  (Boston, 1861), 9-13.       
28 John Bonamy worked for and lived with John West, arguably the most powerful man on Andros’s council. 
29 In 1687, Andrew Belcher was a wealthy ship captain but he would soon be one of the wealthiest merchants in 
Boston. He gained much of his wealth from smuggling and trade with pirates. He was the father of Jonathan Belcher 
who served as Massachusetts’s governor from 1730 to 1741. Richards sent a message to Belcher to have him join 
them on the Rose, see, Depositions of Andrew Belcher and John Bonamy, July 20, 1687, MSS. Middlesex County 
Court, 1684-1693, Folio 126.  
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damning self-indictment of his illegal dealings with the men of the Rose frigate that he did not 
want authorities to discover or a testament to his immoral character.30
Belcher lied to frame the seafarers and exonerate Thomas Richards. According to Cutler, 
the young, inebriated Richards wished to impress his seafaring friends and “made an offer to 
break the window of any house” along their path. Richards, or likely the seafarers for him, 
targeted the house of Nathaniel Adams, one of the constables who went before Andros to 
complain about the riot in May. As Andros had warned, the seafarers had “marked” the town 
constables for abuse. Richards’s rock smashed through the window, landing in the cradle of 
Adams’s baby. Nathaniel’s wife, Hannah, ran outside screaming “some rogue had killed her 
child.” She witnessed three men running away, including Cutler, who swiftly returned to his 
ship. Deering, however, drew his rapier and approached Adams. Her husband ran out of the 
house towards Deering, who stabbed the defenseless constable. In a rather cowardly action, 
Nathaniel Adams fled, leaving his wife and child behind. Hannah bravely grabbed a piece of 
wood and knocked Deering to the ground before running back inside.31
The commotion dangerously drew more people into the streets to face the enraged 
Deering and the remaining gang. Luke Perkins, a concerned citizen, arrived at the request of the 
wounded Adams to find a small group of men milling about Adams’s wharf. Perkins questioned 
the crew’s intent calling to them, “what do you mean to kill all you meet?” One of the men 
taunted Perkins, threatening to do just that. Perkins wisely departed to seek out Constable John 
30 Barnes, The Dominion of New England, 66. Belcher’s deposition is the most unreliable, as no one corroborates his 
story. Bonamy even admits Richards was not with them when they arrived at Belcher’s mother’s house; rather “he 
came immediately” after them. Both Bonamy and Belcher seem to be covering for their young friend, see,
Depositions of Andrew Belcher and John Bonamy, July 20, 1687, MSS. Middlesex County Court, 1684-1693, Folio 
126.    
31 Depositions of James Cutler, Hannah Adams, and John Wilmont, July 20, 1687, MSS. Middlesex County Court, 
1684-1693, Folio 126; Sewall, Diary, 1:144.    
32 
Chamberlain and additional aid. Cordwainer Samuel Hunting, meanwhile, had been awakened 
by the cries and ran down the waterfront to Adams’s wharf where he found “a parcel of men at 
the ferryway.” He tried to engage the men in conversation but they attacked. George Exter, a 
ferryman, “saw Mr. Deering and Doctor Briggs run at Capt. Hunting with drawn swords” intent 
on harming the cordwainer. He also observed that “Thomas Richards was there” but the 
ferryman “did not see him strike.” Hunting’s neighbor, William Jamison, arrived to witness the 
end of the violent scene. Doctor Briggs, perhaps finally realizing the seriousness of his situation, 
ceased his attack and offered to heal Hunting’s wounds. Briggs and Jamison aided Hunting to his 
home where Briggs dressed his wounds; however, Hunting had Jamison fetch Justice Greaves to 
arrest the ship’s surgeon.32
The night’s drama ended when Luke Perkins returned to the ferry with Constable John 
Chamberlain and reinforcements. Chamberlain declared the King’s Peace “whereupon one called 
Mr. Deering Swore God Damn” and attacked yet again, wounding Perkins. Chamberlain also 
received thrusts from Deering’s rapier but blocked them with his staff and knocked Deering to 
the ground. He apprehended Deering and brought him before Justice Greaves. The seafarer railed 
against his incarceration; he cursed the judge and declared he “would have killed two or three.” 
Briggs also had hard feelings regarding his imprisonment and swore to a fellow prisoner, 
Thomas Clarke, that if “he saw Mr. John Cutler33 of Charlestown he would Run him through 
with his sword.” When charged with the crime, Briggs desperately claimed Richards was the 
culprit who attacked Hunting. But all other testimonies, including Hunting’s, accuse Deering and 
32 Depositions of Luke Perkins, Samuel Hunting, George Exter, William Jamison, and Edward Briggs, July 20, 
1687, MSS. Middlesex County Court, 1684-1693, Folio 126. Briggs stated in his deposition that he arrived at the 
scene to find Thomas Richards striking Samuel Hunting with his cane. I am inclined to believe the account of the 
ferryman since he was not involved in the affray nor charged with a crime.  
33 It seems likely that Cutler, a Charlestown anchorsmith, had some role in ensuring Briggs made it to prison the 
night of 19 July. Briggs’s statement underscores the personal connections and animosities that developed between 
seafarers on the Rose and townsfolk in Boston and Charlestown.   
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Briggs for the violent attacks. The two men spent fifty-three days in prison awaiting a court date. 
It came on September 6, 1687, four days before the Rose set sail to cruise the coast. The jury 
released Deering and Briggs to the frigate after obtaining the costs of their confinement and court 
fees. The two officers would not forget their imprisonment by the people of the Massachusetts 
Bay colony.34
The confluence of seafaring culture, retribution, alcohol, and youth produced the night of 
July 19, 1687. Seafarers learned from their officers to challenge local and Puritan authority, 
disrespect constables, and claim the King’s Peace as their own prerogative. They saw Boston and 
Charlestown as lawless playgrounds where riots and violence could be committed without 
repercussions. Alcohol made them brave, stupid, and dangerous. The seventeen-year-old 
Richards became a pawn in the battle between the Royal Navy and the town constables when he 
threw the rock into Constable Adams’s house. Deering purposefully escalated the night’s 
entertainment into a riot by attacking Nathaniel Adams, his wife, and everyone else who crossed 
his path. The masculine maritime world Deering lived and worked in emphasized strength, 
daring, and showmanship. Deering’s night of foolish bravery, bloodshed, and imprisonment 
added to his fearsome reputation among the crew and even elevated his already high status in the 
eyes of Captain George. The “terror and affrightment” 35 inflicted upon the inhabitants of 
Charlestown and Boston by the officers and seamen of the H.M.S. Rose, Dartmouth, and 
Kingfisher, represented the conscious breakdown of local authority by Captain George, who 
wished to profit from the chaos. For Bostonians, witnessing young men like Richards imitate 
34 For details of Chamberlain’s engagement with Deering, see, Depositions of John Chamberlain, Luke Perkins, and 
Nicholas Lobdin, July 20, 1687, MSS. Middlesex County Court, 1684-1693, Folio 126 and Deposition of John 
Chamberlain, February 4, 1690, Mass. Arch., 35: 217. For Deering’s release, see, MSS. Middlesex County General 
Sessions, 1686-1698, 21. The charges against Edwards are in MSS. Middlesex County Court, 1684-1693, Folio 126 
but no verdict was given. I assume he was released with Deering, as he served aboard the Rose before the 
Revolution of 1689; Log of the H.M.S. Rose, September 10, 1687, ADM 51/3955, TNA. 
35 MSS. Middlesex County Court, 1684-1693, Folio 126. 
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seafarers and seek their approval through mischief intensified the “terror” felt by the religious 
community.36 Furthermore, the lack of punishment for the crimes committed was a constant 
reminder to the people of Massachusetts that the Charter laws of their forefathers could no longer 
be enforced. The growing discontent among the populace towards the Andros administration and 
Captain John George had important ramifications when William of Orange seized the throne of 
England in December of 1688.  
 Historians have long debated the origins of the revolution that occurred in Boston on 18 
April 1689. Some have considered it a spontaneous uprising of the masses. Others have claimed 
Boston elites plotted the revolution in advance. The latter historians have also falsely 
sensationalized the character of Robert Small, the Rose’s carpenter, who seized Captain George 
and thereby incited Boston’s revolution.37 They have called him “the notorious carpenter” and 
“the fanatical Protestant petty officer.” In truth, we do not know Small’s religious affiliation and 
it seems highly unlikely he, like most seafaring men, was “fanatical.”  His compatriot and the 
overall leader of the mutiny, Jarvis Coppindale, the Rose’s navigator and mathematician, 
however, expressed strong support for the Protestant King William III. Historians have utterly 
36 The riot of July 19 resonated with Samuel Sewall who noted five months later, “This day, or Monday, was buried 
one Mr. Lock [Ben Lock of the Rose] in Capt. Hamilton’s Tomb. It’s thought he kill’d himself with Drink. Was in 
the Riot that Capt. Hunting was wounded in at Charlestown, as is said.” Ben Lock had nothing to do with the riot in 
Charlestown but Sewall tied the Rose frigate and all its men to that event. For the record of Lock’s death in the 
Rose’s ship log, see, Log of the H.M.S. Rose, December 19 and 21, 1687, ADM 51/3955, TNA.  
37 My account of the revolution closely follows that told by Richard Johnson in Adjustment to Empire, 88-96. 
Unfortunately, few historians have adopted the inconvenient truth that Boston elites had little to do with planning 
the uprising. For instance, Owen Stanwood creates an inaccurate chronology for events so as to ignore the seafarers’ 
role. He places George’s capture at ten o’ clock, after a crowd and militia had formed. Even John Riggs, Stanwood’s 
“most reliable first-person account” does not support his chronology of events. In fact, no first-person account 
supports his chronology see, Owen Stanwood, The Empire Reformed: English America in the Age of the Glorious 
Revolution (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2011), 102 and 240-241n35. The vast majority of 
historians, at least, place George’s capture prior to the formation of a mob and the militia’s call, see, Barnes, The 
Dominion of New England, 242; David S. Lovejoy, The Glorious Revolution in America (New York: Harper and 
Row, 1972), 240; Johnson, Adjustment to Empire, 90; J.M. Sosin, English America and the Revolution of 1688: 
Royal Administration and the Structure of Provincial Government (Lincoln and London: University of Nebraska 
Press, 1982), 92; Ricahrd S. Dunn, Puritans and Yankees: The Winthrop Dynasty of New England, 1630-1717 (New 
York: W.W. Norton & Company INC., 1962), 254; Kenneth Silverman, The Life and Times of Cotton Mather (New 
York: Harper & Row Publishers, 1984), 69-70.   
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neglected Coppindale, leading to significant errors in interpretation of events on board the Rose
and Boston’s 1689 revolution. They have instead relied solely on the word of that beacon of 
good manners and credibility, Captain John George and his gang of criminal compatriots like 
Unton Deering and Edward Briggs, all the while ignoring the overwhelming evidence from the 
rest of the crew and the Council of Safety.38
After the release of Deering and Briggs from prison, the number of Royal Navy seafarers 
in Boston radically declined when the Kingfisher departed for London on 8 September 1687 and 
the Rose sailed for Cape Sables on 10 September 1687. Boston, however, remained the Rose’s
primary station even though the vessel had been slated to return to England in May of 1687. The 
ship required major repairs during the spring and summer of 1687. When it was finally ready to 
sail for England, news arrived that the French had seized two Massachusetts fishing vessels 
returning from Newfoundland, prompting Andros to retain the ship. As a result, the Rose’s 
“disgruntled” crew had to persist indefinitely in a wretched colonial setting without pay.39
In 1688, Andros finally put Captain George and the Rose frigate to work. For 186 days 
the Rose either cruised the coast or monitored shipping in Nantasket Road just outside Boston 
Harbor.40 The crew finally experienced some excitement beyond drinking, rioting, and 
38 For Small quotes see, Guy Howard Miller, “Rebellion in Zion: The Overthrow of the Dominion of New England,” 
Historian 30 (1968): 439-459, quote at 451 and Webb, Lord Churchill’s Coup, p. 188. For like-minded studies see, 
John Gorham Palfrey, History of New England During the Stuart Dynasty, Volume 3 (Boston: Little, Brown, and 
Company, 1870); Barnes, The Dominion of New England; Theodore Lewis, "Massachusetts and the Glorious 
Revolution" (Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Wisconsin, 1967); G.B. Warden, Boston: 1689-1776 (Boston and 
Toronto: Little, Brown and Company, 1970); Lovejoy, The Glorious Revolution in America; Ian K. Steele, “Origins 
of Boston’s Revolutionary Declaration of 18 April 1689” The New England Quarterly 62:1 (March, 1989): 75-81, 
quote at 8; Sosin, English America and the Revolution of 1688; Ian K. Steele, The English Atlantic 1675-1740
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986); Stanwood, The Empire Reformed.  
39 Edward Randolph to William Blathwayt, August 5, 1687, Edward Randolph, 4: 226; Edmund Andros to Secretary 
of the Admiralty, September 5, 1687, in Andros Tracts, 3: 74-75. 
40 After arriving in Boston in 1686 the Rose spent only 15 days at sea. In 1687 the Rose spent 68 days at sea. 1688 
was the only year the seafarers on the Rose spent more time at sea than in port, see, Log of the H.M.S. Rose, ADM 
51/3955, TNA. 
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tormenting local authorities in Boston and Charlestown. On May 14 the seafarers of the Rose
ransacked a trading post of the Frenchman Jean-Vincent D’ Abbadie de Saint-Castin at 
Penobscot Bay with Governor Andros’s permission. Saint-Castin, who had a number of Abenaki 
wives, responded by encouraging his Indian allies to attack English frontier settlements in 
Maine. George and his seafarers had precipitated a war.41 By the time the Rose returned to 
Boston in October, the conflict with the Abenaki Indians in Maine had intensified and spread. 
Press gangs prowled the streets, seizing men to serve on the frontier to the great displeasure of 
the inhabitants. As Owen Stanwood has argued, Bostonians saw the conflict with the Abenaki as 
part of a papist plot to destroy them – a plot that Andros appeared to be supporting by first 
ignoring the problem and then impressing their men and thereby weakening the city’s defenses. 
Puritan ministers supported this view and lent trustworthy voices to the rising fear.42
As New England grappled with the Abenaki and imagined papist threats, Whig elites in 
England worked to rid themselves of a very real papist king by inviting William of Orange to 
invade England. On November 1, 1688, William’s fleet, commanded by the defector Admiral 
Arthur Herbert, set sail for England. The English Navy, commanded by Lord Dartmouth, 
attempted to intercept the prince but easterly winds kept it from proceeding from the Gunfleet 
near Medway. No evidence exists to suggest widespread disloyalty to James II in the English 
navy during this early stage. William successfully landed his army at Torbay and ordered the 
41 According to Randolph, George “roade with his frigott before Casteen’s door” and sent Lieutenant Condon to 
speak with the man. Soon after, Saint-Castin fled from the trading post, leaving George and his men free to loot the 
place when Governor Andros arrived. If Saint-Castin did not claim the goods in Pemaquid, George could condemn 
them. Randolph does not seem to agree with the decision, noting that St. Castin “does not well like to be under the 
French Government, [he] desires to live indifferent.” In October 1688, Randolph expressed his belief that Saint-
Castin was behind the Abenaki aggressions and supported them with guns, powder, and shot. Edward Randolph to 
John Povey, June 21, 1688, Edward Randolph, 4: 224-225; Edward Randolph to William Blathwayt, October 16, 
1688, Edward Randolph, 4: 272-273; Log of the H.M.S. Rose, May 15, 1688, ADM  51/3955, TNA; Johnson, 
Adjustment to Empire, 85-86; Barnes, The Dominion of New England, 222-223.  
42 In September of 1688 alone, 54 men were taken from Boston and Charlestown see, Sewall, Diary, 1:176-178; 
Stanwood, The Empire Reformed, 74-81.  
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march for London. After a few small defeats, James II lost his nerve on December 10 and fled to 
France with his wife. He briefly returned a week later but William bullied him into flight again.43
 Loyalty to James remained strong among some naval officers and seamen, who 
facilitated his escape to France. Captain Trevanion of the Harwich and Captain Macdonnel of the 
Assurance manned the small fishing vessel that brought James across the English Channel. They 
continued to serve James and commanded French ships in the invasion of Ireland in 1689. 
Captain Wilford of the small fireship Eagle allowed James to hide on board his ship before 
proceeding on to France. He could do so because Wilford was “an honest and loyal Officer, and 
could govern his men who had been so many years with him.” The same could not be said of 
Travanion’s large crew. The king had first requested to board the Harwich but the captain replied 
“he (could) answer for the fidelity of his Officers” but “he was not able to do it for the common 
Seamen.” Trevanion and Wilford had tested the waters among their officers and seamen to judge 
whether James could safely board their ships. The same process of testing the crew’s loyalty 
undoubtedly occurred on all Royal Navy vessels, as officers evaluated the impact of William’s 
ascension.44
Rumors of William’s landing at Torbay began arriving in Boston by February of 1689 
just as the Rose initiated preparations for the sailing season. When the tide allowed, the ship 
hauled off the dock on March 10, 1689. By then, concrete, if not reliable, knowledge of events in 
England had arrived in Boston. Jarvis Coppindale noted, “Thomas Curtis came to my cabin 
before we haul’d out of the Dock and Told me that the Prince of Orange was Landid and that the 
King was fled into France.” Shortly thereafter, the Rose frigate became a veritable hotbed of 
43 Rodger, The Command of the Ocean, 136-140.  
44 J.S. Clarke, The Life of James the Second: King of England, 2 vols. (London, 1816) 2:276-277; Rodger, The 
Command of the Ocean, 143. There was a great deal of worry after the Glorious Revolution that seafarers would 
desert the Royal Navy and join “Foreign Princes and States,” see, London Gazette, 6 May 1689.     
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rumors, plots, and actions. The rumors emanating down from the captain’s cabin to the rank and 
file suggested Captain George intended for the Rose to join King James II in France. 45
The officers and crew reacted with excitement, anxiety, and fear. Like Travanion and 
Wilford in England, George knew he needed the crew’s support to sail for France. Samuel 
Orders, his loyal barber, set out to discuss the option with the crew. George found mostly 
resistance to the scheme as had naval officers in England. When Orders approached Jarvis 
Coppindale with this plot, the officer told him, “The Capt. was but one man, and that he should 
first know the shipes companies minds for he could not goe alone.” When Orders questioned 
Coppindale’s reasons for not supporting George, he replied, “I did not speak for myself, but the 
Shipes company, I told him if we went for France we should be Proclaimed Rebells to our 
Country, and loose oure wages.” The crew would collect three years of outstanding wages when 
they returned in London. Seamen had mutinied for far less. Orders tried to allay their fears by 
claiming George intended to offset their wages by capturing English and Dutch ships prior to 
leaving for France. Always the opportunist, George knew from experience the wealth from prize 
ships far exceeded his and the crew’s wages. He underestimated, however, the crew’s, and 
especially Coppindale’s, unwillingness to take the risk or abandon their homeland.46
A cadre of officers and seamen aboard the Rose supported George’s plan, especially if it 
allowed them to ransack Boston. Besides Samuel Orders, some of the most vocal advocates for 
George’s scheme were none other than Unton Deering, Edward Briggs, John Wiggoner, and 
James Cutler. Wiggoner expressed his approval of going to France to Thomas Pope. Isaiah 
45 Historians have long wondered when verifiable news of the Glorious Revolution arrived in Boston. Coppindale’s 
deposition suggests that even lower officers on the Rose knew fairly early. Log of the H.M.S. Rose frigate, March 
10, 1689, ADM 51/3955, TNA; Deposition of Jarvis Coppindale, May 1, 1689, Mass. Arch., 107: 11. Note: The few 
historians who have used the seafarers’ depositions have opted not to give their names and therefore they remained 
anonymous. Given the nature of this study, I feel it is appropriate to allow the seafarers to speak for themselves.     
46 Deposition of Jarvis Coppindale and William Dickey, May 1, 1689, Mass. Arch., 107: 11. 
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Shorting, meanwhile, overheard the purser “say to Unton Dearing, Jack (a by word much used 
amongst that gang47) I hope to have one engagement with these dogs before we goe by God we 
will make the slats fly bravely from that Meeting House, Dearing replyed that he hoped to have a 
whole string full of silver tankards.” Doctor Briggs remembering his time in prison, chimed in 
“that by his maker he would plague some of them Rogues and Whores for their old Kindnesses 
towards him.” Deering and Briggs did Captain George a great disservice by bringing their own 
personal grudges to the table. Samuel Orders never suggested the Rose intended an attack on the 
port. Deering and Brigg’s rants, however, created a hothouse for rumors on board the Rose –
rumors that if spread to Boston could incite a riot.48
As stories circulated among the tightly packed crew, the Rose continued to prepare for its 
forthcoming, mysterious voyage. Every winter the Rose unloaded ballast, rigging, ship stores, 
cannons, and sails in order to dock in Boston or Charlestown. Come spring, the crew had to 
reload all those items. After hauling off the dock, the process of reloading, repairing, tarring, and 
provisioning the ship generally took a month. The clock was ticking for the seafarers against a 
voyage to France: on March 16, the crew loaded the ballast; on March 19, the rigging came 
aboard; on March 20, the seafarers positioned the ship’s guns. For Robert Small, a ship 
carpenter, and four others, the tension became overwhelming when they discovered on March 28 
that “Capt. George had a Grant for his sails” from the governor. The five men quietly deserted 
the ship and joined Boston’s waterfront community. Jarvis Coppindale, meanwhile, remained on 
board the ship to enlist the aid of the remainder of the crew. On the morning of March 29, the 
47 Shorting’s inclusion of this aside suggests deep fractures among Rose frigate’s crew with Deering’s “gang” 
favoring George and the rest of the crew supportive of a return to England and their wages.     
48 Deposition of Isaiah Shorting, May 1, 1689, Mass. Arch., 107: 12.  
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captain received his sails and bent them – the ship could now sail. It still required, however, 
further gunpowder, wood, food, beer, and water before it could safely depart.49
On April 4, 1689, John Winslow brought reliable evidence of William’s ascension by 
way of Nevis. Andros unwisely attempted to suppress the news by tossing Winslow in jail for 
sedition. Unfortunately for him, the man had already given Boston’s printers the necessary 
documents to stimulate the robust spread of information.50 The news did not alter plans on board 
the Rose. If anything, Andros’s actions may have given George further confidence in his 
decision. Small and his compatriots may have actively worked against him by spreading the 
rumors they had heard on board the Rose. Besides the previously mentioned rumors, the 
seafarers accused Lieutenant Condon of being Catholic and part of a Papist plot to bring Boston 
down.51 Further uncertainty spread among Boston’s inhabitants when they learned that impressed 
soldiers, desiring their unpaid wages, had deserted the frontier and marched on Boston. The 
soldiers’ mutiny prompted Boston’s elites, including Cotton Mather, to take precautions. Samuel 
Mather wrote after his father’s death, 
49 Because historians have overlooked the role of the seafarers in precipitating the revolution, they failed to 
recognize the straightforward chronology leading to Small’s desertion and eventual instigation of the revolution. 
Log of the H.M.S. Rose frigate, March 10, 1689, ADM 51/3955; Deposition of Robert Small, William Rouse, 
William Mims, John Sholls, and John Wister, April 29, 1689, Mass. Arch., 107: 4.  
50 Deposition of John Winslow, February 9, 1689, Mass. Arch., 35: 216; Steele, The English Atlantic, 104-105. 
Official notice could have arrived earlier but Increase Mather, who had been in London since 1687 petitioning for 
the removal of Andros and a renewal of Massachusetts’s Charter, convinced William not to send Andros instructions 
to rule in his name. Mather undoubtedly waited on his son, Cotton Mather, to gather evidences of Andros’s 
mismanagement of the Dominion of New England to force William’s hand in removing the governor from power, 
see, Michael G. Hall, The Last American Puritan The Life of Increase Mather, 1639-1723 (Middletown: Wesleyan 
University Press, 1988), chap. 7 and Sosin, English America and the Revolution of 1688, 83.  
51 Lieutenant Condon was almost certainly Catholic but, like Captain George, it is unlikely he had any designs on 
Boston. For the seafarers of the Rose, the threat of losing wages and access to home probably far outweighed the 
threat of a papist plot; however, if they desired to rile up Bostonians they picked a very believable threat, see, 
Deposition of John Sladd, William Ford, and Samuel Mixture, May 1, 1689, Mass. Arch., 107: 12 and Letter of 
Captain George to Samuel Pepys, June 12, 1689, in Charles M. Andrews ed., Narratives of the Insurrections, 1675-
1690 (Charles Scribner’s sons, 1915), 216; For more details on the influence of the Papists plots on Boston’s 
revolution, see, Stanwood, The Empire Reformed, chap. 3 and Sosin, English America and the Revolution of 1688, 
89-91. 
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the principal Gentlemen in Boston met with Mr. Mather to consult what was best to be 
done, and they all agreed, if possible, that they would extinguish all Essays in our people 
to an Insurrection; but if the Country People to the Northward by any violent Motions 
push’d on the Matter so far as to make a Revolution unavoidable, Then to prevent the 
Shedding of Blood by an ungoverned Multitude.
Boston elites thus met on April17, 1689 not to plan a revolution but rather to discuss the 
suppression of mutineers in order to protect Andros and his council. 52
 Events on the Rose outpaced the mutineers and caught Boston’s elites by surprise. On
April 12, the seafarers loaded a last barrel of beef and eight barrels of pork onto the Rose. Fully 
provisioned, the ship only “waited on Sr. Edmund Andros.”53 Then on the morning of April 18 
between eight or nine o’clock, Captain George with John Wiggoner set out from the Rose for 
Boston’s North End to meet with the governor and inform him that the ship was ready to sail. 
Jarvis Coppindale likely sent advanced word to Robert Small of George’s intent to go ashore on 
the eighteenth because Small and his fellow deserters awaited the captain and Wiggoner as soon 
as they stepped ashore.54 Small’s intent was to keep the Rose from departing for its unknown 
52 Samuel Mather, The life of the very Reverend and learned Cotton Mather (Boston, 1729); Cotton Mather made 
similar claims in Cotton Mather, Pietas in Patriam: The Life of His Excellency Sir William Phips (London, 1697), 
52; Barnes, The Dominion of New England, 241-242. Finally, an account much closer to the revolution states the 
“Gentlemen in Boston” would “endeavor to prevent what ill effects an Unform’d Tumult might produce,” see, An 
Account of the Late Revolutions in New-England: In a Letter, June 6, 1689, Andros Tracts 2: 195. 
53 Log of the H.M.S. Rose, April 13, 1689, ADM 51/3955, TNA; Extract of a Letter from Bristoll in New England 
unto Mr. Mather and Others, April 29, 1689, CO 5/855/2, TNA. This assertion raises some interesting questions 
regarding Andros’s intentions. He had tried to keep news of the revolution hidden and now it appears he intended to 
sail with the Rose. Where he intended to sail is, of course, a mystery; however, one little used anonymous account 
recounted, “the Rose Frigat now in our Harbour was intended to carry off our Late Governour for France, & to take 
any of our English Vessels that might be coming in unto us,” see, An Account of the Late Revolutions in New-
England: In a Letter, June 6, 1689, Andros Tracts 2: 194-195. This account was written over a month after the 
seafarers gave their depositions and the author may have been privy to them. He accurately notes George’s plan to 
seize ships to pay the crews’ wages.    
54 Jarvis Coppindale, the ship’s navigator, would have been privy to George’s sailing plans and probably sent word 
to Small. After George reclaimed the ship with the council’s consent, he immediately imprisoned Coppindale “as 
one who chiefly opposed his designs.” I shall return to Coppindale further in the text, see, Petition of Jarvis 
Coppindale, CO 5/855/66, TNA. Besides Captain George’s self-serving letter to Samuel Pepys, the wording of 
which seeks to deflect blame for the insurrection onto the people of Boston and not solely onto his own shoulders, 
there is no evidence that any person from Boston was involved at this early stage. If Bostonians had truly intended 
the overthrow of Andros government on April 18, 1689, seizing the captain of the Rose, while important, would not 
have been first on their to-do list. Now, seafarers, who faced the loss of three years’ worth of wages and the 
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destination. The act, however, created pandemonium in a town already on edge. Soon thereafter 
a riot erupted among the residents of North End. Samuel Prince, a New England ship captain 
then in Boston, recounted at length,  
I knew not any thing of what was intended, till it was begun; yet being at the north end of 
town, where I saw boys run along the street with clubs in their hands, encouraging one 
another to fight, I began to mistrust what was intended; and, hasting towards the town-
dock, I soon saw men running for their arms: but, ere I got to the Red Lion, I was told 
that Captain George and the master of the frigate was seized.55
With the Boston-based waterfront mob escalating, attentions turned to hated and 
threatening government officials. Edward Randolph, “was seized upon and hurried to the 
common Goale by a Company of Ship Carpenters, Ship Chandlers and others whose Livelyhood 
depended upon the Sea,” whereupon the mob freed Robert Glanville and seven other 
pirates/privateers from jail.56 Even as the mob seized important Andros officials, Boston elites 
met to implement their plan to provide leadership and protect the lives of their fellow elites. By 
noon, and probably earlier, leadership of the mob had transferred to officers of the Boston 
militia, which met at the Town-House to hear a declaration57 produced and agreed upon by 
Boston elites like Cotton Mather, Simon Bradstreet, William Stoughton, Thomas Danforth, and 
abandonment of their native country, had an excellent motive for seizing George to keep him from sailing, see,
Letter of Captain George to Samuel Pepys, June 12, 1689, in Andrews, Narratives of the Insurrections, 216.        
55 Letter of Samuel Prince, April 22, 1689 in Andrews, Narratives of the Insurrections, 186.     
56 Randolph had hoped to receive a big payoff from seizing these privateers and their goods. He was quite upset at 
their release, see, Mr. Randolph's Account of irregular Trade in New England since the Revolution, Edward 
Randolph, 5: 36-37.
57 There is much historical conjecture regarding the creation of the Declaration of April 18, 1689. Ian Steele and 
J.M. Sosin argue that the Declaration of April 18, 1689, which detailed the grievances of the Massachusetts Bay 
Colony against Andros and his government, is proof that Boston’s elites plotted and enacted the revolution because 
it could not have been written immediately. It is likely that the majority of the document was not written on 18 April 
1689, however, as Johnson argues, it could easily have been created to support Increase Mather’s efforts in London 
to remove Andros. Despite the lack of evidence, Steele contends, “Boston’s declaration was a carefully crafted, 
deliberately derivative, instrument in a well-prepared coup that toppled the Dominion of New England.” Steele, of 
course, has no opinion regarding the seafarers of the Rose frigate, see, Steele, “Origins of Boston’s Revolutionary 
Declaration of 18 April 1689,” 81 and Sosin, English America and the Revolution of 1688, 93. Many historians 
attribute the document to Cotton Mather. Therefore Steele and Sosin also argued that Cotton Mather destroyed his 
letters and diary entries during the period of the revolution because of incriminating material, see, Steele, The 
English Atlantic, 104. Historians do not know when or why Mather destroyed those diary entries and letters so any 
conclusions drawn from the act is mere speculation.  
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Thomas Richard’s uncle, John Richards. They had made the fateful decision to join with the 
insurrection against Andros’s government thereby absolving Jarvis Coppindale, Robert Small, 
and their fellow supporters of any wrongdoing in challenging their commanding officer. They 
also took control of events.  
From the Town-House, Boston’s elites sent Andros, who had bunkered down in Fort 
Mary, a missive to assure him of their astonishment “with the Peoples sudden taking of Arms; in 
the first motion whereof we were wholly ignorant.” The letter continued by asking Andros to 
surrender the fort and himself; Boston’s elites could thereby promise “all security from violence” 
– but Andros refused.58 Subsequent events illustrate what Boston’s revolution would have looked 
like if it had been planned and coordinated by the elites. With Andros’s refusal to surrender, the 
militia moved out from the Town-House around two o’ clock to surround the fort. Seeing 
thousands of men marching on the Fort, Lieutenant Condon “put out all her [Rose’s] flags and 
pennants, and opened all her ports” but the ship failed to fire. Some historians maintain that 
Condon waffled without his captain aboard, insinuating Boston elites had made a wise decision 
to initiate the revolution by capturing Captain George, but far more likely Jarvis Coppindale and 
his supporters crippled Condon’s ability to act. Captain George considered Coppindale “as one 
who chiefly opposed his designe;” this may have been the point where he revealed his alliance 
with Small.59
The mutinous crew forced Condon to outfit a small pinnace to go ashore. He was hard 
pressed to find volunteers because the crew of the pinnace consisted of just a small handful of 
unlikely men. Unton Deering, the violent nobleman and volunteer officer of the crew, 
58 At the Town-House in Boston: April 18th, 1689 in Nathaniel Byfield, An Account of the Late Revolution in New-
England (London, 1689), 20.  
59 Letter of Samuel Prince, April 22, 1689 in Andrews, Narratives of the Insurrections, 186; Petition of Jarvis 
Coppindale, CO 5/855/66, TNA.  
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commanded the boat. He was aided solely by Captain George’s loyal barber, Samuel Orders, and 
Doctor Edward Briggs. It goes without saying that barbers and surgeons were typically not part 
of royal navy landing parties nor could three men mount an effective rescue. Some witnesses on 
the Boston side believed the pinnace intended to free Andros from the troops surrounding the 
Fort. Yet neither John Riggs, Andros’s servant who was with the governor during the revolution, 
nor an anonymous Andros supporter, possibly the Anglican Reverend Robert Ratcliff, mention 
an attempt by Andros to escape via the pinnace to the Rose. Condon’s agenda in sending 
Deering, Orders, and Briggs ashore therefore was not a futile rescue attempt but rather to inform 
Captain George of the Coppindale led mutiny on board his ship. The militia seized the pinnace as 
it made landfall and escorted George’s loyal supporters to the common gaol and to their target, 
Captain John George. Deering and Briggs once again resided in a Massachusetts Bay prison. 
Samuel Orders, meanwhile, spoke to Captain George to explain that Coppindale, Small, and the 
rest of the mutineers had reacted to what he had “reported Amongst the Shipe’s Company,”
namely that George intended to seize vessels supporting William III to make up the crew’s three 
years’ worth of wages and join King James II in France.  According to the sailor Will Ford, 
Orders said he would rather take responsibility for the mutiny and suffer the consequences than 
“the Capt. Should, but the Capt. Would not call him to an account for it.” This exchange suggests 
that the crew had not completely turned on George but rather, due to Orders’s rumors, they had 
insufficient knowledge to allow the ship to sail or support an effort to attack Boston’s militia.60
60 “At the Council of Safety of the People and Conservation of the Peace, April 22, 1689,” in Robert E. Moody and 
Richard C. Simmons eds., The Glorious Revolution in Massachusetts: Selected Documents, 1689-1692 (Boston: 
Colonial Society of Massachusetts, 1988), 56. For imprisonment and release see, Log of the H.M.S. Rose, April 18, 
1689, ADM 51/3955, TNA and Deposition of William Ford, May 1, 1689, Mass. Arch., 107: 11.  
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Orders may have also delivered the ship’s logbook to Captain George. After April 16, 
1689, logbook entries are no longer written by Lieutenant Condon.61 The handwriting of the new 
author is remarkably similar to Captain George’s when compared to his letter to Samuel Pepys 
on June 12, 1689. Upon George’s death on May 24, 1690, the handwriting returns to that of 
Lieutenant Condon, further indicating that the new author had been Captain George. After the 
handwriting change, logbook entries maintain the voice of Lieutenant Condon and became a 
vehicle for George’s deception.62
As Orders conversed with George in prison, the revolution outside reached its climax. 
Under the promise of safe passage, Sir Edmund Andros left the besieged Fort at four o’clock 
with a small contingent to meet with the newly formed Council. He was summarily arrested, and 
soon thereafter Fort Mary surrendered without a shot fired. As night fell, the Rose and the Castle 
still had not officially surrendered. Condon, however, could not act due to the crew’s mutiny. 
The next morning, the Council sent its own officers, not “the carpenter’s co-conspirators” as one 
historian claims, on board the Rose to demand its surrender in the name of the Prince of Orange. 
Small had no need to send his supporters on shore because Jarvis Coppindale had already turned 
the crew. Upon receiving the officials, almost the entire crew “gave 3 chears and struck yards 
and Topmast” – all but “Mr James Cuttler and Thomas Curtis” who “in anger replyed God Dam 
the Prince of Orange and all such Rogues as stand for him.” Cutler and Curtis stood with their 
friends Deering, Briggs, and Wiggoner in supporting George and Condon against the mutinous 
crew.63 Three days later, the council released George, Wiggoner, Deering, Briggs, and Orders 
from prison but they confiscated the Rose’s sails to keep the ship from fleeing. The Council 
61 Logbook entries were often a day or two behind, which explains the discrepancy between the dates when the 
handwriting changes and the revolution. 
62 Log of the H.M.S. Rose, ADM 51/3955, TNA.  
63 Webb, Lord Churchill’s Coup, 193; Depositions of John Skerret, John Punch, and John Sladd, May 1, 1689, 
Mass. Arch., 107: 11 
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informed Captain George of their action. Unable to depart Boston, George smartly stayed on 
shore as a guest in Colonel Samuel Shrimpton’s house to plot a new course of action and 
influence the decisions of the council. 
The Council of Safety, which formed on April 19, knew the maritime origins of the 
revolution and set out to discover why it had happened.64 After taking the ships sails on April 22, 
they received a deposition from Small the next day outlining his part in the mutiny. On April 29 
they asked for another deposition from Small but also included his fellow deserters. They 
recommended the Council ask the sailors on board for the truth of what happened on April 18 
and provided a list of names. The Council followed Small’s recommendation the next day, 
ordering Lieutenant Condon to send ashore Joseph Love, Jarvis Coppindale, John Scarlet, 
William Marsh, Thomas Williams, John Rimer, Samuel Orders, Thomas Curtis, and John 
Tressels. Small had welcomed the council to send not only friends but also George’s supporters, 
Orders and Curtis. Captain George, however, learned about Small’s recommendation and tried to 
prevent the examination. Condon replied to the Council that he “had a special command from the 
Captain this morning, not to lett any of his men goe ashoare until further orders from him.” The 
majority of crew, however, felt they had received the blessing of the Council and expressly 
ignored George’s demands. On May 1, 1689, seventy-five men, undoubtedly those who favored 
William III and England, mutinied, jailed Lieutenant Condon and his supporters, and many went 
on shore. Fifteen of them put their names to depositions detailing the vivid chronology of events, 
64 Most historians who study Boston’s 1689 Revolution have examined the Massachusetts State Archives Collection 
Volume 107 but failed to analyze documents 2, 2a, 4-5, 9-13, which concern events on board the Rose and provide 
some of the strongest evidence that the sailors from the Rose initiated the revolution. Moody’s and Simmon’s large, 
647 page edited collection, The Glorious Revolution in Massachusetts: Selected Documents, 1689-1692, draws 
heavily on the Massachusetts Archives Collection Volume 107 but neglects almost all of the relevant documents 
pertaining to the Rose. It does not include any of the sailors’ depositions.  
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verified by the Rose’s ship log, leading to Small’s capture of George, which incited Boston’s 
populace to revolt.65
Over the next few days, power on board the Rose resided in the crew’s hands. On May 3, 
1689 they sent a “Declaration” to the Council to inform them that they were “Protestants and 
True Subjects to the Crown of England.” They arrested Condon and George’s followers “until 
they be either convict[ed] or cleared by A legal trial, lest ere we are Aware we find what we most 
feaire being in Danger to be by them given Away to A Forreign Power.” Upon learning of the 
crew’s action, George went to the Council and informed them of “the Ill That might happen to 
his Ma’tys shipp, by such disorders, and that the Kings Navy was Govern’d by an Established 
Act of Parliament, and was wholy Independent from any Government ashoare.” The threat 
worked – had not unruly seafarers caused havoc in Boston over the past three years? The Council 
therefore betrayed the seafarers to George and ordered them to follow the likes of Deering and 
Briggs. Jarvis Coppindale, Small, and some others refused to return on board.66
The pendulum of power on the Rose swung back to the middle with the crew uncertain of 
the Council’s support and George still reluctant to board the ship for fear of action against him. 
George believed he had sway in the Council through his friend and ally, Colonel Shrimpton. 
Tensions on the Rose boiled over on May 16 when a fire broke out in Boston. Some of the crew 
witnessed the fire and apparently joked about it. The ship’s cook, a Mr. Beckett, “desired them 
nott to Lafe or shew any Joy.” Condon, sensing an opportunity to exert his authority over the 
65 Samuel Shrimpton was on the Council and probably informed George of Small’s actions against him. Deposition 
of Robert Small, April 29, 1689, Mass. Arch., 107: 4; Letter of the Council to David Condon and Letter of David 
Condon to the Council, April 30, 1689, Mass. Arch., 107: 5.  
66 The Declaration of Some of the Officers and Seamen Belonging to the Rose Friggot, May 3, 1689, Mass. Arch., 
107: 13; This is one George’s few truthful statements in his letter to Pepys, which has so tainted historians view of 
the seafarers of the Rose. He fails to mention that he lost complete control of the ship and that his supporters were 
arrested. Likewise, Condon is silent in the ship log, see, Letter of Captain George to Samuel Pepys, June 12, 1689 in 
Andrews ed., Narratives of the Insurrections, 218 and Log of the H.M.S. Rose, May 1689, ADM 51/3955, TNA.    
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wayward crew, struck the cook “upon the fase and made him all of A gore Blud [blood] and 
Abused him by ill Languages caling him son of A whore, son of A Bitch, son of A slave, Little 
nasty Dog.” He compared the cook to Small and told him to “goe Ashore to him and be dam’d.” 
Small and Coppindale also sensed in the fire an opportunity to regain their previous position of 
power on the Rose. According to George, Small desired the Council to place him in charge of the 
ship and remove George as commander. Word spread around Boston that Captain George of the 
Rose and his officers had started the fire. A mob formed to break down Shrimpton’s door and 
whisk George away to prison. At the Council’s behest, three boats departed for the Rose to arrest 
Condon and five others.67
The Council knew George and Condon had nothing to do with the fire but held them to 
protect themselves from an angry populace. Two days later, they released the officers back to 
their ship, much to the dismay of the crew. George again decided to remain ashore. Small’s 
credibility with both the Rose’s crew and the Council appears to have been hurt by his unwise 
power play. George took advantage; he kept steady pressure on the Council to force Small and 
Coppindale back onto the Rose; then on May 29, he regained the crews’ loyalty by having 
Condon and his officers declare full support for William III and England. Condon had the crew 
celebrate by firing twenty-one guns. By late May, George fully understood the circumstances in 
England. He knew that not one Royal Navy vessel had joined James II in France. He also knew 
that his crew wanted their wages and to return to England. George now shared these goals but he 
first had to silence Small and Coppindale and get his sails back from the Council.68
67 Testimony of Andrew Newell, Samuel Berry, Edward Peneycot, Thomas Jull, May 18, 1689, Mass. Arch., 107: 
32a; Letter of Captain George to Samuel Pepys, June 12, 1689 in Andrews ed., Narratives of the Insurrections, 218; 
Log of the H.M.S. Rose, May 16, 1689, ADM 51/3955, TNA.  
68 On merchant vessels, wages and sailing plans were the two main reasons for mutinous action by seafarers. Once 
wages were paid or sailing plans made to their liking (usually the sailing plans made in their original contracts) the 
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On June 1, 1689, George won a major victory in the Council of Safety in his battle to 
regain full control of the Rose and its men:  
Upon Complaint of Captain John George … Ordered that all persons belonging to said 
frigatt now on shore do forthwith repair to their duty onboard, unless they shew just cause 
unto the Council to the contrary. And that no Officer or Seamen belonging to sd. Frigate 
be here after found on shore without certificate from the Captain, Lieutenant, or Chief 
Officer for the time being on board on pain of imprisonment. This order to be posted up 
at the Coffee house and the Ship Tavern in Boston. 69
Oddly, the Council concurrently formed a committee to investigate the actions of George and his 
officers. These Boston elites apparently knew very little about the seafaring life for they had 
given George’s officers great power over their men by forcing them to stay on board the Rose. 
Coppindale, a fully literate and educated officer, read the order and fatefully decided to submit to 
it. Coppindale had learned that George “had obtained favor of the Council” by “surrendering the 
ship to his Majesties [William’s] service” and perhaps felt confident his actions would go 
unpunished. George’s men, however, refused to let bygones be bygones and as soon as 
Coppindale stepped on board the Rose they clapped him in irons.70
Coppindale’s incarceration provides the best piece of evidence to contradict Captain 
George’s oft quoted and relied upon interpretation of Boston’s 1689 revolution. As he languished 
in prison on board the Rose with irons about his legs, Coppindale managed to compose a letter to 
his friend, Robert Small; it is worth quoting in its entirety:  
seafarers often returned to work for the same captain, see, Marcus Rediker, Between the Devil and the Deep Blue 
Sea: Merchant Seamen, Pirates, and the Anglo-American Maritime World, 1700-1750 (Cambridge, Massachusetts: 
Cambridge University Press, 1987), chap. 5; Letter of Captain George to Samuel Pepys, June 12, 1689 in Andrews 
ed., Narratives of the Insurrections, 218; Log of the H.M.S. Rose, May 29, 1689, ADM 51/3955, TNA.  
69 Colonel Samuel Shrimpton was present at the meeting which sent the seafarers back to the Rose, see, At the 
Council of Safety of the People and Conservation of the Peace, June 1, 1689, Mass. Arch., 107: 81. He undoubtedly 
was instrumental in its creation. As George notes, Shrimpton “was very kind to me in all this Affaire,” see, Letter of 
Captain George to Samuel Pepys, June 12 1689 in Andrews ed., Narratives of the Insurrections, p. 217.  
70 Petition of Jarvis Coppindale, CO 5/855/66, TNA.  
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Brother Small, 
The first of June I was put into the Irons. The Seventh of June I was Robed [Robbed] of 
all I had about me by [John] Wiggoner and [Unton] Dearing: Then the[y] ransack my 
chest in the stearage privately. I knowing nothing of it, and what I have lost I cannot tell, 
until I am att Liberty to look over my things, the[y] took what they pleased and [I] doe 
still continue in Irons, but I thank the Lord that gives me the Patience to suffer for my 
King and Country. So having no time to write but by stealth I rest your faithful friend  
June the 13th 1689      Jarvis Coppindale  
[P.S.] I had both Bonds and Bill for the receit [receipt] of money in England whether they 
be safe I can give noe account. 
Over the course of three years in New England, Coppindale had apparently amassed quite a bit 
of wealth. If George intended for France, the navigator would have lost not only his three years’ 
worth of wages but also the ability to cash in his bonds and bills. Coppindale may have been a 
true and loyal subject to the crown but he had self-serving economic reasons to keep the Rose
from sailing anywhere else but England. His English bonds and bills must have held significant 
value because two days after writing this letter to Small, we find “Mr. Deering one of our [the 
Rose’s] voluntiers” on a ship for London with his newly acquired loot. This same Unton Deering 
was overheard “upon the quarterdeck” on April 28, 1689 “wishing and swearing that ten or 
twelve French ships would com[e] in and batter the towne down and set it on fire about their 
Ears.” Like Coppindale, however, English bonds and bills trumped Deering’s favor of France.71
 With Coppindale in prison, George regained most of the crew’s support. On June 7, the 
committee investigating George asked Condon to send ashore sixteen men to testify against the 
captain. Condon refused them and the committee failed to follow up on the issue. George, 
71 Letter of Jarvis Coppindale to Robert Small, June 13, 1689, Mass. Arch., 107: 94; Log of the H.M.S. Rose, June 
15, 1689, ADM 51/3955, TNA; The rest of Deering’s statement on April 28, 1689 is intriguing because he appears 
to make a joke about his time in prison in Charlestown. After Deering’s tirade about French ships attacking the 
town, “Samuel Mixture made Answer what shall we doe then Mr Dearing replyed we shall done well enough, only it 
might be they [the French] would put us in Prison,” see, Deposition of Samuel Mixture and Thomas Williamson, 
Mass. Arch., 107: 12.   
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meanwhile, plotted with some of Boston’s leading merchants, Samuel Shrimpton among them, to 
obtain his sails from the Council. To that end, the merchants submitted a petition on his behalf 
on June 10. They assumed the “danger” from the captain was “over” and the merchants needed 
the Rose to help protect their shipping from pirates that had mysteriously appeared on the 
Massachusetts coast. George and the merchants, however, could not convince the Council, nor 
the committee investigating George, of his innocence. They denied the merchants and George’s 
own request for the sails, informing the captain he could have his sails back when the Council 
received orders from England. The committee investigating George probably played an 
important role in this decision. They conveyed to the Council that “It is credibly reported that 
one of the Principle evidences [Coppindale] is on board in Irons, the rest of them to keep from 
under that Confinement have signed a paper wherein they seame to lay blame to Mr. Small and 
that they doe not desire to come onshore any more about that matter.” The committee also 
concluded that the decision to force the seafarers to remain on the Rose hindered their 
investigation. By this point, however, the Council had completely lost the crew’s trust.72
The Council’s decision not to return the Rose’s sails infuriated George. Their rejection 
forced George to compose a fateful and historically influential letter on June 12 to the Secretary 
of Admiralty, Samuel Pepys. George did not want to write this letter – if his desires had been 
met, namely the return of his “sailes” and “orders…to return home,” historians would not have 
this farcical letter to distort their histories. Naturally, George did not admit to the English 
Admiralty that many members of his crew believed he intended for France, much to the 
72 For George’s account of his attempt to get his sails back and the Council’s actions see, Letter of Captain George 
to Samuel Pepys, June 12, 1689 in Andrews ed., Narratives of the Insurrections, 218-219; Petition of Boston 
Merchants, June 10, 1689, Mass. Arch., 107: 92; Captain George’s Letter to the Government, June 11, 1689, CO 
5/855/32, TNA; Report of Committee Investigating Captain George, undated, Mass. Arch., 107: 32. Although this 
report is undated, I am confident that the jailed individual was Jarvis Coppindale and Captain George places the date 
in which the committee asked for the testimonies of his seafarers on June 7, 1689. Condon’s refusal was also 
referred to in the report. 
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detriment of their pocketbooks.73 He did not mention that Small seized him just as his ship 
prepared to sail. He did not admit that his officers had been imprisoned. Nor does he give any 
reason for the crew’s mutinous behavior beyond misleading attacks on Robert Small. He does 
not mention Jarvis Coppindale at all and for good reason.  
George instead complained that “no reasonable” evidence of the Glorious Revolution had 
arrived in Boston until May 26 and 29 when he decided to declare for William. He then 
attempted to deflect responsibility for Boston’s revolution by falsely claiming, “the People of 
this place and country pretending themselves dissatisfied with the Government of Sir Edmund 
Andros rose up in Arms, seiz’d me first, and run me into the common Goal, by the Instigation of 
Robert Small my Carpenter.” Small had been with the “Rebells” for days “spreading rumours” 
that Andros meant to set Boston on fire on one end of town whilst George fired the other, “then 
with our Gunns from the Friggatt to beat downe the rest, and goe away in the smoake, designing 
for France.” Seeking the moral high ground, George immediately states, “w’ch doubtless will be 
thought unreasonable to believe.” Small would have agreed with George for he said nothing of 
the sort in his depositions to the Council.74 The “notorious” carpenter was not yet done, he “went 
downe to the Platforme and travers’d severall Gunns against the Frigg’t, and would have fired 
73 There are twenty-three seafarers names attached to depositions accusing George and his officers of wrongdoing, 
see, Mass. Arch., 107: 2, 4, 5, 9-12, and 32a. John Love, the Gunner, mentioned by name and rank in the first list of 
men the Council desired to question and Captain George states in his letter, “The Gunner and Boatsw’n have both 
declined theire duty and obedience since these troubles,” makes twenty-four seamen against George see, Letter of 
Captain George to Samuel Pepys, June 12 1689 in Andrews ed., Narratives of the Insurrections, 219. As previously 
mentioned, seventy-five men deserted the ship for Boston on May 1, 1689. Randolph writing in November 1688 put 
the crew’s number “above eighty,” which suggests the only men who stayed on board were those loyal to George 
and part of Unton Deering’s “gang,” see, Edward Randolph to William Blathwayt, November 8, 1688, Edward 
Randolph, 6: 281.     
74 Stanwood’s recent study shows just how distorted the historical record has become because of George’s letter: 
“Additionally, according to Small, George and Andros conspired to escape from Boston in a blaze of glory. The 
governor “intended to fire the Towne at one end,” while the Rose fired on the other, after which the officers would 
“goe away in the smoake, designeing for France.” Stanwood attributes to Small quotes derived from George’s letter 
even though we have Small’s own words to suggest otherwise, see, Stanwood, The Empire Reformed, 102. In two 
depositions, Small only detailed events concerning the Rose and George’s intent to sail for France, see, Deposition
of Robert Small, Mass. Arch., 107: 2a and 4. 
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them, but was prevented by the people: he proposed severall ways of takeing or burning the 
shipp, but not Adhered to.” Small apparently eagerly desired the death of his “faithful friend,” 
Jarvis Coppindale, who was on board the Rose during the revolution. After effectively smearing 
Small’s name in the historical record, George adamantly denied he intended for France. In fact, 
George was “sure it never entred into my [his] thoughts, much less that I [he] should take a 
resolution thereof.” The thought had most definitely entered George’s thoughts, just as it had for 
Royal Navy commanders in England. We will never know if George intended to act on those 
thoughts because his crew ensured the ship did not sail from Boston.  Ironically, the very man 
George wrote to, Pepys, had been removed from his position and resided in prison on suspicion 
of supporting James II.75
Captain George had a fine mind for deceit. Samuel Prince recognized George’s character 
shortly after the revolution: “But as it is incident to corrupt nature to lay blame of our evil deeds 
anywhere rather than on ourselves, so Captain George casts all the blame now upon that devil 
Randolph.” The committee formed to investigate George agreed. They gave a final report on 
George and his supporters on July 4, 1689 wherein they concluded that George and several 
others were “persons disaffected to their present Majesties and Government.” Without 
testimonies from the crew, however, the Council felt it could not press charges. The Council had 
had its chance on May 3, 1689 to charge George and his supporters when the seafarers controlled 
the ship but they had acted too tentatively. Seafarers on the Rose respected strength and quick 
action, as demonstrated by George, St. Loe, Grimsditch, Deering, and Robert Small. The newly 
formed Council represented the antithesis of such ideals, which made cooperation impossible for 
75 The remainder of the George’s letter, which details George’s engagement with the Council to regain control of his 
crew and sails, appears fairly accurate when matched with existing records, see, Letter of Captain George to Samuel 
Pepys, June 12, 1689 in Andrews ed., Narratives of the Insurrections, 218-219.          
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the majority of the crew. Coppindale, the erudite navigator and mathematician, made the most 
rigorous attempt and had faith the Council would protect and support him. Coppindale, as we 
know, found himself shackled in irons for his efforts and petitioning the king in faraway England 
for his release. Small, the savvier of the two regarding seafaring life, disappeared when he knew 
they had lost to George. No orders from the Council would put him back on board the Rose.76
As a man of action, George had no intention of allowing his ship to wallow endlessly in 
Boston’s harbor. He had a restless crew who desired a return to England and he needed to 
appease them. In a paradoxical twist, the Council did a role reversal with Captain George in the 
minds of many of the Rose’s seafarers; the Council now held the crew’s wages hostage owing to 
their refusal to return the Rose’s sails. At least the seafarers were consistent. Even before writing 
Pepys, George developed his most elaborate scheme yet to force the Council to return his sails; 
he fitted out pirates in Boston to harass the New England coast. George also had some of his men 
and acquaintances volunteer to join the pirates. Thomas Pounds and William Coward had served 
on board the Rose while Thomas Hawkins had married into the family of George’s benefactor, 
Samuel Shrimpton. The Council, rather than give George his sails, fitted out at its own expense 
two sloops, the Revenge and Mary, to deal with the pirates. The Mary successfully captured 
Pounds at Tarpaulin Cove in October 1689. Ned Loper, a Dutchman, apprehended Hawkins, who 
had left Pounds earlier. Hawkins and Thomas Johnson confessed to George’s involvement. 
Hawkins’s connections in Boston ensured that many of Boston’s elites would step forward to 
protect the pirates on behalf of the powerful Councilman and merchant. Shrimpton’s 
involvement in George’s scheme is unknown; however, historians do know much of his wealth 
came from illegal trade with pirates, which continued well into the 1690s. All the pirates, except 
76 Letter of Samuel Prince, April 22, 1689 in Andrews ed., Narratives of the Insurrections, 189; To the Honored 
Governor and Council, July 4, 1689, Mass. Arch., 107: 174; Petition of Jarvis Coppindale, CO 5/855/66, TNA.   
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for Johnson, received reprieves from the gallows. The Admiralty, meanwhile, rewarded Pounds 
with a Royal Navy captaincy after his trial in England and within a few years he was serving in 
Virginia under the supervision of Edmund Andros.77
The Council declined to censure George for his part in the pirate conspiracy and when 
they received orders in December from England to give his sails back they readily did so. The 
Council had had enough of the Rose frigate, its captain, and its crew. George immediately set to 
work, preparing the decrepit ship for sail. The Rose’s sails, however, had been destroyed by 
neglect and George had to acquire a new set. Still, George had the ship ready to sail by late 
March 1690. The night the ship sailed, George whipped the crew to action by spreading rumors 
that the Council intended to hold the ship and retake its sails. The Council had, in fact, ordered 
the Rose to convoy two mast ships from Piscataqua to London. George wanted to ensure the 
crews loyalty and support through anger against the Council. It was a narrative he likely desired 
to parade in front of the admiralty when he arrived in London. The crew, fearful of yet another 
delay in obtaining their wages, rapidly bent the ship’s new sails and fled Boston in the middle of 
the night.78
On May 24, 1690, as the Rose sailed for England, Captain George met his match in 
deceit. A frigate flying English colors hailed the Rose and came up beside it. As two ships came 
abreast, the frigate “Immediately put Abroad his French Colours and fired a broad side on the 
Rose.” The two ships engaged in a furious battle for over two hours. Shrapnel tore through the 
77 Deposition of Jacobus Loper, undated, MSS. Suffolk County Supreme Judicial Court Records, 30: 2539; Mather, 
A Vindication of New England in Andros Tracts, 2: 54-55; For an excellent study that makes the same argument 
regarding George’s role in supporting Pounds and Hawkins see, John H. Edmonds, “Captain Thomas Pounds, Pilot, 
Pirate, Cartographer, and Captain in the Royal Navy,” in Publications of the Colonial Society of Massachusetts, 
Transactions, XX (1917-1919): 29-84.     
78 Orders to Restore the Rose Frigate’s Sails in “Captain Thomas Pounds, Pilot, Pirate, Cartographer, and Captain in 
the Royal Navy,” 64-65; Log of the H.M.S. Rose, December 1689 - March 1690, ADM 51/3955, TNA. 
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Rose’s rigging and new sails but the crew fought valiantly and the French man of war fled. The 
French commander, however, had ordered his men to take “particular aim at a Commander on 
deck (brandishing his sword and encouraging his men to fight) and shot him down.” The brave 
man in question was Captain John George, who fought and died with his friend and ship master, 
John Wiggoner, Thomas Hawkins, the pirate, and Samuel Mixture, a seafarer who had provided 
depositions against the audacious captain.79 Only in the maritime world could such a strange 
group of men die fighting together against an enemy that a few months before could have been 
their allies.      
With George’s death, his role in Boston’s revolution and supporting pirates quietly 
disappeared from the histories. Increase Mather remarked on the impact of George’s death on the 
historical record, declaring George “was full fraught with a Bloody Malice against that honest 
people [Bostonians], which in time he would have shown had not a French Bullet by the way 
carried him to his own place; and so it becomes us to say less of him: doubtless he wants not 
embalming by the Art of Apothecary!” To realize the truth behind the origins of Boston’s 1689 
revolution and deliver justice to Jarvis Coppindale, Robert Small and the rest of the Rose’s
seafarers, “embalming” George “by the Art of Apothecary” is necessary, if a tad impolite.80
* * * 
 The Rose’s stealthy departure from Boston left in its wake four years of profound 
political, economic, and social change. Captain John George’s pursuit of riches and power 
clashed with the dreams and aspirations of both Boston’s elites and other English officials sent to 
79 An Account of the Fight between the Rose Frigatt and a French Man of War off of Cape Sables in Edmonds, 
“Captain Thomas Pounds, Pilot, Pirate, Cartographer, and Captain in the Royal Navy,” 82-83; Abstracts of Letters to 
Thomas Brinkley, CO 5/855/357, TNA; Log of the H.M.S. Rose, May 24 and 25, 1690, ADM 51/3955, TNA.  
80 Mather, A Vindication of New England in Andros Tracts, 2: 54.  
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impose imperial control. The ambiguity surrounding authority in Boston after the dissolution of 
their Charter allowed George to become a little “Caesar.”81 Immoral crew members like Unton 
Deering could instill “terror” into the local population through their excessive play and revenge 
schemes without major repercussions. Then, when James II fled for France, George took a major 
risk – a risk Royal Navy commanders elsewhere shunned. He ignored his crew’s desire to remain 
loyal to England and collect their wages; he refused to inform them of his intended sailing plans. 
The crew reacted normally and mutinied, setting in motion the events of April 18, 1689. 
George knew his mistakes. He also knew how to undo them and regain his crew’s 
loyalty. He used his authority to undermine the rebellious seafarers both in Boston and in 
England. His letter to Pepys transformed the historical record and left hidden his role in inciting 
Boston’s 1689 Revolution. He aggressively suppressed the story of Jarvis Coppindale, Robert 
Small, and the other brave seafarers who cried out for their right to collect their wages and return 
to England and their families. Boston’s Council of Safety failed to recognize the threat George 
posed to his seafarers. They blundered into a seafaring drama without the maritime knowledge 
necessary to support the crew effectively, even though they distrusted George. The Council 
betrayed Coppindale and the crew’s trust because they fully supported and relied on the system 
which gave men like George immense authority over their seamen. Historians have likewise 
failed to heed the call of the oppressed seafarers of the Rose.  
 There is, of course, another story that can be told – a story not hidden by a ship captain’s 
deceit. This story entails Boston and English elites appropriation of the seafarers’ mutiny and 
how they turned it to their advantage. The discourse elites developed after Boston’s revolution 
grew naturally from their own experiences. The Mathers and their allies placed the revolution 
81 Edward Randolph to John Sansom, June 30, 1689, Edward Randolph, 6: 183-184.  
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within their long struggle for political, economic, and religious freedom.82 Randolph, Palmer, 
and Andros sought to portray the revolution as a conspiracy developed by “New England’s 
Faction” that had resisted their agenda of imperial control.83 These particular elites who engaged 
in a transatlantic debate knew little about events on board the Rose or the Boston waterfront on 
April 18, 1689.84 Nor did they care. They had their own battles to wage and hatreds to address.
The seafarers, too, had a very real battle to fight over – wages and sailing plans. Coppindale had 
very real English bonds and bills to exchange in England. The seafarers of the Rose knew from 
their captain and officers that direct action and force effectively challenged authority.  
On April 18, 1689, the seafarers of the Rose acted, and in so doing transformed Boston’s 
historical trajectory. To protect Andros and his supporters, Boston elites felt compelled to 
endorse the revolution and King William III. The king, however, never fully trusted the accounts 
coming from Boston’s elite men. As Increase Mather related, “The Earle of Monmouth assured 
me that the King was offended at New England because they had Imprisoned their Governor and 
could prove nothing against him.” He dismissed all charges against Andros and his supporters. 
He then rewarded Andros with the governorship of Virginia. King William’s distrust of 
Bostonians became more apparent when he granted Massachusetts a new charter in 1691 that 
removed all religious qualifications for voting and holding office. The king would also now 
appoint all governors. Still, in the aftermath of the 1689 revolution, Boston elites threw their full 
82 Mather, A Vindication of New England in Andros Tracts, 2: 54; List of Charges against Andros and his 
Government, Mass. Arch., 35: 254-276.    
83 A Particular Account of the Late Revolution, 1689 in Andrews ed., Narratives of the Insurrections, 193-210; 
C.D., New England's Faction Discovered, in Andrews ed., Narratives of the Insurrections, 253-67; John Palmer, An 
Impartial Account of the State of New England (London, 1690) in Andros Tracts, 1: 21-62; Andros’s Report of his 
Administration, 1690-91 in Andrews ed., Narratives of the Insurrections, 221-35.        
84 The elites on the Council of Safety who did know of the sailors’ role in starting the revolution had a war torn, 
impoverished, and rebellious colony to rule. As they prepared a case against Andros and his administration in 1690 
they also mounted an expedition against the French in Port Royal in order to show its loyalty and support of King 
William III see, Phillip Haffenden, New England in the English Nation, 1689-1713 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1974), 88-90.    
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support behind William’s war effort with France and prosecuted previously welcomed pirates 
and smugglers to prove their loyalty.85  The former decision would have a direct and negative 
impact on Boston’s seafaring community through local and Royal Navy impressment. The latter 
decision confirmed that Boston merchants would adhere to England’s maritime laws and 
practices. The sailors of the Rose, ironically, had helped to create a political, economic, and 
social environment not unlike the one they had left behind in England.   
85 “The Autobiography of Increase Mather” quoted in Hall, The Last American Puritan, 236. For Andros and 
Massachusetts charter of 1691 see also, Hall, The Last American Puritan, 230-236 and 240-254. 
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3.0 IMPRESSMENT AND THE INTERNATIONALIZATION OF BOSTON 
SEAFARERS 
The last two decades of the seventeenth century saw the introduction of the Royal Navy and the 
spread of credit-based economies in the American colonies, which transformed Boston’s 
maritime and mercantile communities. Royal Navy vessels introduced new sources of authority 
in the ship captain, new capital in ship outfitting and repairing, and new diversity in maritime 
labor. The English institution of impressment shadowed Royal Navy vessels, directly and 
negatively impacting Boston’s maritime labor force. Impressment drew many Boston seafarers 
into a growing pool of transatlantic maritime laborers who, because of their occupation, could be 
torn away from family, friends, and their home community for years to protect the interests of 
empire and capital.  
Scholarship on Royal Navy impressment in Boston typically highlights the 1740s, 
culminating in the highly dramatic Knowles Riot. In November 1747, Admiral Charles Knowles 
had his press gangs sweep Boston’s harbor and waterfront, indiscriminately seizing seamen and 
waterfront laborers. The trajectory of the Knowles Riot is uncannily similar to the 1689 
Revolution discussed in the previous chapter. According to reports, “foreign” seamen initiated a 
riot, imprisoning hostages from among the press gang officers and crew. They were soon joined 
by locals with grievances of their own against the Royal Navy, the local government, and 
merchants of Boston. The rioters destroyed merchant property, and then marched upon the 
governor’s home to demand the release of the impressed sailors. Also like the Revolution of 
1689, historians have speculated that powerful elites secretly oversaw the riot because merchants 
were upset that impressment hindered their trade. This approach diminishes the maritime 
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component of the riot while stressing local concerns at all socio-economic levels. It also adds to 
a pervasive myth that Boston and New England had a culture of impressment that featured 
colonial elites and seafarers cooperatively resisting Royal Navy press gangs.1
The predominance of the 1740s in the historiography of impressment has caused 
historians to overlook the equally or more important 1690s. This decade saw the introduction of 
heavy-handed impressment practices in Boston and other colonies by the Royal Navy. Boston 
especially drew unwanted attention from undermanned Royal Navy vessels because it possessed 
North America’s largest pool of maritime labor and attracted the most incoming vessels. More 
importantly, after the Boston 1689 Revolution Boston elites desired to demonstrate their loyalty 
to King William III, often at the expense of lower-class men. Although Massachusetts governors 
and Royal Navy captains sometimes had fierce disagreements over issues of power, seafaring 
men in Boston rarely benefitted from those arguments and frequently experienced hardships at 
the hands of both parties. For many Boston sailors, impressment invariably broke their 
relationships to family and friends, and many found it difficult to return to their homeport. And 
yet when local ship captains attempted to protect sailors from impressment in the West Indies 
and England, merchants in Boston disapproved. Sailors, meanwhile, sought fair compensation 
for their labor in dangerous and trying times. This chapter seeks to explain how the Royal Navy 
1 For overview of the Knowles riot and studies emphasizing the 1740s see, Jesse Lemisch, “Jack Tar in the Streets: 
Merchant Seamen in the Politics of Revolutionary America,” The William and Mary Quarterly 25(3) (July 1968): 
371-407; John Lax and William Pencak, “The Knowles Riot and the Crisis of the 1740’s in Massachusetts,” 
Perspectives in American History 10 (1976): 163-214; Marcus Rediker, Between the Devil and the Deep Blue Sea: 
Merchant Seamen, Pirates and the Anglo-American Maritime World, 1700-1750, (Cambridge and New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 1987), 251-253; Nicholas Rogers, Press Gang: Naval Impressment and Its Opponents 
in Georgian Britain (London: Continuum, 2007), 86-89; Denver Brunsman, “The Knowles Atlantic Impressment 
Riots of the 1740s,” Early American Studies 5 (Fall 2007): 324-66 and The Evil Necessity: British Naval 
Impressment in the Eighteenth-Century Atlantic World (Charlottesville and London: University of Virginia Press, 
2013). Brunsman argues Massachusetts had a culture of impressment that united local elites with the local maritime 
community in opposition to impressment see, The Evil Necessity, 127-128, 135, 190-191, and 222-223. His 
contention rests heavily on the case study of colonial Salem by Daniel Vickers and Vince Walsh that emphasizes the 
part-time nature of maritime labor in Salem see, Daniel Vickers and Vince Walsh, Young Men and the Sea: Yankee 
Seafarers in the Age of Sail (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2005).   
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and Boston elites, each in their own way, forcibly internationalized a generation of Boston 
seafarers for the benefit of town, empire, and trade. It ends in 1708 when Queen Anne declared 
impressment in the American colonies illegal, an important date and victory for Atlantic 
seafarers. 
* * * 
King William’s War radically changed Royal Navy impressment practices for all English 
seafarers including those in Boston. Impressment under the Stuart kings, as historian Christopher 
Lloyd notes, “was done on a temporary basis to fit out a ship or an expedition, or to man the fleet 
during the summer months.” Impressed seafarers’ subjugated status lasted only until the crew 
was discharged and received their pay or tickets in England. Seafarers had the opportunity to 
return home, visit family and friends, and take care of their finances before once again 
confronting the threat of impressment anew in the spring. The few colonial seafarers who had the 
misfortune of being impressed had an opportunity to flee back home. King William altered this 
practice during the winter of 1692 – 1693, ordering that impressed seafarers would henceforth be 
obligated to endure continuous service until the conclusion of the war or death. Seafarers could, 
and frequently did, take matters into their own hands and obtained freedom through desertion. 
This law further encouraged the Royal Navy to practice, in the words of Captain George St. Loe, 
“that epidemical grievance, which so much galls and disturbs the seamen … namely of being 
turned over from ship to ship.” The Royal Navy frequently turned seafarers over at the end of a 
voyage from one vessel to another in order to complete the manning of a departing ship. In the 
process, many turned-over seafarers were demoted, could not get their pay, and lost esteemed 
crewmates and ship captains. Turning over also decreased the likelihood that impressed seafarers 
could desert. Like impressment, the practice of turning over seamen demonstrated to English 
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seafarers that they were both unfree and unappreciated by those in charge. From 1692 onward, 
Boston seafarers, too, increasingly faced the prospect of finding themselves hauled aboard a 
Royal Navy vessel against their will to serve the interests of King and Country.2
King William resorted to continuous service for impressed seafarers because the Royal 
Navy’s faced an acute manning problem. England’s war with France during the late seventeenth 
century required the service of over 40,000 seamen. By 1697, the English Navy had nearly 
50,000 men on its payroll. Economic theorists, meanwhile, believed that England’s commerce 
required an additional 33,000 to 48,000 seamen to operate smoothly. Suffice it to say, England’s
seafaring population was not nearly large enough to accommodate both the Royal Navy and 
merchant marine during wartime. In the late 1670s, Sir William Petty estimated that England’s 
ability to man both the navy and merchant marine fell short by roughly a third.3
The needs of the navy and commerce increased dramatically during King William’s War, 
escalating the competition between the merchants, privateers, and the Royal Navy for maritime 
labor. In this competition each contestant had its own weapons: merchant vessels had high wages 
and, depending on the trade, possibilities for advancement; privateers had dreams of fortune and 
less severe discipline; and Royal Navy vessels had state-sanctioned violence in the form of press 
gangs. “Their Majesties’ ships,” as seafarer Edward Barlow observed, were also “better 
victualled than most merchant ships … and their work is not so hard.” In England, the Royal 
Navy and press gangs had the upper hand but in the American colonies ambiguous power-
relations between Royal Navy ship captains and colonial governors muddied the waters. 
2 Christopher Lloyd, The British Seaman, 1200–1860: A Social Survey (London: Collins, 1968), 124; Captain 
George St. Lo, England’s Interest; Or, a Discipline for Seamen (1694) in J.S. Bromley Ed., The Manning of the 
Royal Navy: Selected Public Pamphlets, 1693-1873 (London: Navy Records Society, 1976), 39. For more on the  
continuous service of impressed seamen and the practice of turning over see, Brunsman, The Evil Necessity, 30-31.     
3 Lloyd, The British Seaman, 1200–1860, 114; William Petty, Political Arithmetic (London, 1690), 48-49.  
64 
Furthermore, seafarers in the western hemisphere had grown accustomed to defending their 
homes on their own terms by joining privateers and province vessels commissioned by colonial 
governors. The Royal Navy had been an Old World problem but as England increased its 
imperial presence in the colonies through Royal Navy station ships and convoys, the 
accompanying impressment practices met fierce resistance from colonial seafarers.4
Impressment was not foreign to Bostonians or the larger Massachusetts Bay colony. 
During times of crisis, town militias frequently turned to impressment to defend frontier 
communities. King Philip’s War (1675-1676) saw the use of impressment on a large scale. In 
1688, Boston authorities once again resorted to impressment to defend the Maine frontier when 
Captain John George of the Rose instigated war with the Abenaki. In September of 1688, Judge 
Samuel Sewall observed town constables converted into press gangs seizing at least 54 men, all 
of whom were subsequently shipped off to Maine. This form of impressment was generally 
accepted as necessary for the defense of the colony but even under dire circumstances 
impressment met resistance and outright defiance. During King Philip’s War, young men went to 
great lengths to evade constables on impressment errands. At other times, impressed men took 
matters into their own hands and deserted. For example, in April of 1689, the impressed soldiers 
serving in Maine and New Hampshire deserted en masse and marched on Boston, leaving 
frontier communities virtually defenseless. Violent resistance to local impressment, however, 
was exceedingly rare.5
4 Edward Barlow, Barlow's Journal of His Life at Sea in King's Ships, East and West Indiamen, and Other 
Merchantmen, 1659–1703, ed. Basil Lubbock, 2 vols. (London, 1934), 2: 426. 
5 M. Halsey Thomas ed., The Diary of Samuel Sewall, 2 vols. (New York, New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 
1973), 1:176-178; For King Philip’s War see, Kyle F. Zelner, A Rabble in Arms: Massachusetts Towns and 
Militiamen during King Philip’s War (New York and London: New York University Press, 2009), 58-60. 
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Impressment into the Royal Navy exacted a far more hostile response from Boston’s 
seafaring population. Sailors knew that service in the navy would carry them far from loved ones 
and into a harsh, sometimes deadly, maritime world with limited freedom. Remarking on the 
Royal Navy’s urgent need for sailors in 1711, Thomas Hutchinson declared that “This could be 
done in no other way than an impress,” he continued, “The inhabitants [of Boston], it must be 
owned, would not have submitted to it but, in general, would have preferred a prison on shore to 
a man of war at sea.” The same held true for those Boston seafarers who faced large scale 
impressment practices for the first time during the early to mid-1690s.6
Unlike Captain George and the H.M.S. Rose, the Royal Navy vessels stationed in Boston 
in the 1690s had wartime crews derived in large part from impressed seafarers in England. These 
men frequently deserted upon arriving in the American colonies, oftentimes with the 
encouragement and aid of local merchants and ship captains. As Edward Randolph commented 
in 1695, “it is a common practice of masters and owners of merchant-ships to hire at 
extraordinary wages the sailors in the King’s ships in the Colonies (as for example in New 
England), whereby those ships are incapacitated to perform their service, and the King’s captains 
are compelled to press men from vessels trading to and from those plantations.”7
Boston merchants had a difficult time finding enough sailors even without competition 
from the Royal Navy, which took a two-year hiatus from Boston after the Rose departed in May 
of 1690. Consequently, when two Royal Navy ships, H.M.S. Conception and H.M.S. Nonesuch,
arrived in early spring 1692, merchants could not resist signing eager deserters. The Nonesuch
6 Thomas Hutchinson, The History of the Province of Massachusetts-Bay from the charter of King William and 
Queen Mary (Boston, 1767), 192 
7 Memorial of Edward Randolph to Lords of Trade and Plantations, December 13, 1695 in Public Record Office: 
Calendar of State Papers, Colonial: America and the West Indies, 45 vols. (London: Her/His Majesty's Stationery 
Office, 1860-1994), vol. 14 (1693-1696), no. 2198 (hereafter cited as CSPC).
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lost enough men from desertion that the captain, Richard Short, immediately began impressing 
local seafarers. Maritime laborers reacted by fleeing Boston or militantly defending themselves. 
Joshua Brodbent commented in June of 1692 “that most of the seamen are now away, and that 
when the press goes round for more the press-masters are knocked down at broad noon.” 
Bostonians viewed the Royal Navy as a foreign entity that threatened their prosperity and young 
men but at the same time, sought the navy’s protection from potential French invasions. 
Merchants, seafarers, and townsfolk all expected the new governor to look after their interests 
and suppress the worst abuses stemming from the Royal Navy’s presence.8
Governor Phips knew the maritime world was unforgiving. Initially, he sympathized with 
Captain Short out of “respect to his commission.” Phips had earned his fortune and knighthood 
by pillaging the remains of shipwrecked Spanish vessels in the Caribbean. He understood what it 
was like to be a commissioned Royal Navy officer disrespected by colonial authorities. In 
December of 1683, he brought a London-based “crew of cutthroats and unemployed 
privateersmen” to Boston where their riotous behavior outraged the local inhabitants. According 
to Joseph Phillips, an acquaintance lured him into a room with Phips’s treasure-seeking 
seafarers, at which point the villains “constrained” Phillips and he was “forced to drink contrary 
to his desire or inclination.” Without his knowledge, the frolicking sailors managed to cut his 
coat pocket and steal forty shillings. Phips’s men caused such a commotion that the town 
constables ordered them back on board the ship, receiving taunts and a beating for their efforts. 
Phips defended his men, boasting to the constables that his commission gave him more authority 
than the Governor and council. Phips, in turn, received the stinging rebuke of then-governor 
Simon Bradstreet. In 1692, Phips confronted a similarly defiant and disrespectful Royal Navy 
8 Governor Sir William Phips to Lords of the Admiralty, February 28, 1693, CSPC, vol. 14 (1693-1696), no. 131; 
Joshua Broadbent to Lieutenant-Governor Francis Nicholson, June 21, 1692, CSPC, vol. 13 (1689-1692), no. 2283.  
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ship captain who angered the merchant and maritime communities, as he threatened Phips’s 
interests.9
Like any good ship captain, Phips handled Short’s disobedience with a boisterous show 
of force. As circumstances regarding impressment deteriorated over the course of 1692, Phips 
“forbade” Short “to press at all without my warrant.” He became further incensed when he 
discovered that even as the Royal Navy captain impressed local men, he profited from hiring out 
his regulars to serve “on board Private vessels to saile into other parts.” On January 4, 1693, 
Phips felt compelled to defend the honor of Boston’s seafaring men and, as we shall see, his own 
interests. He confronted Captain Short on Boston’s waterfront and, after a testy exchange, Short 
“provoked the Governor to strike him.” In dramatic fashion, the governor and ship captain 
brawled as dumbfounded spectators looked on. Phips emerged from the affray victorious. He 
promptly had Captain Short removed from command, arrested, and tossed into “the Common 
goal [sic] of Boston.” When he wrote to inform the Lords of the Admiralty of Short’s dismissal, 
Phips justified his decision as a defense of Boston’s seafaring men because Short, through 
impressment, had “used his power to make a prey of the King’s subjects.” Sir William Phips, to 
put it bluntly, was the worst sort of hypocrite.10
Sixth months prior to beating Short for impressing sailors and “lending” their services to 
merchants, Phips likewise harassed and abused Boston’s maritime community. Perhaps smarting 
from his failed Quebec assault in 1691, Phips spent the summer of 1692 planning a naval 
9 Viola F. Barnes, “The Rise of William Phips,” The New England Quarterly, 1(July, 1928): 271–94, quote at 274; 
Suffolk County Supreme Judicial Court Files (hereafter cited as SCSJCF), Massachusetts State Archives (hereafter 
cited as MSA), case no. 2274.   
10 Governor Sir William Phips to Lords of the Admiralty, February 28, 1693, CSPC, vol. 14 (1693-1696), no. 131; 
Depositions of Nathaniel Hatch and Francis Foxcroft,  August 14, 1694, Massachusetts Archives Collection, 328 
vols. (hereafter cited as Mass. Arch.), 61: 463-464 and 466. For evidence that Short hired out his men to Boston ship 
captains see, Deposition of Benjamin Emes, August 17, 1694, Mass. Arch., 61: 468-471.  
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adventure into French waters. According to Boston merchant Nathaniel Oliver, Phips strong-
armed Oliver and fellow merchants Andrew Belcher and Timothy Clarke into providing the ship 
Swan captained by Thomas Gilbert and the brig Elizabeth and Sarah for the expedition. Contrary 
to customary practice, the governor refused to pay the merchants but instead offered a share 
(5/16) of the plunder from the expedition. Oliver saw no choice but to consent to the governor’s 
demands.11
Phips now had vessels for his expedition but no sailors. Nathaniel Oliver skeptically 
questioned Phips “what he would doe for men” whereupon Phips arrogantly responded that “was 
his business and none of ours.” Phips had an easy solution. He did exactly what Captain Short 
would do, ordering the town constables to scour Boston’s taverns, boarding houses, and the 
waterfront to impress any sailors that might be found. As one of the constables noted, “he 
received such a warrant [to impress sailors] and by virtue thereof he impressed men but did not 
see them put on board either of the said vessels.” One of those sailors, William Snowton, related 
the abuses he and his compatriots suffered at the hands of Phips’s men. The town constables 
dragged Snowton from William Huff’s house and delivered him on board the ship Swan where 
he was held for three weeks. Snowton and two other impressed men managed to escape with a 
canoe but not without drawing the attention of the Swan’s crew who, after a warning, began 
firing on the fleeing sailors. One of the shots wounded Snowton and another one of the men but 
through perseverance they managed to get ashore at Noddles Island. Phips’s men followed in 
pursuit, eventually capturing “them at said Noodles Island & after beating them Carried them on 
board the said Ship Swan, & there put them all in Irons, this Deponent lay in Irons about a dayes 
time, the other two persons lay in Irons above a week.” According to Snowton, “There was also 
11 Deposition of Nathaniel Oliver, August 22, 1694, Mass. Arch., 61: 485.  
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at the same time on board the said Ship nine other men in Irons for endeavoring to run away.” 
Nathaniel Oliver confirmed that Phips was employing impressment as a means to fill his 
complement, as he “was an eye witness to one that was prest out of sloop Coming up when I was 
on board Ship Swan nere Long Island.” He was convinced “that halfe the men on board would 
have left the vessell if they could butt being forced to goe chose Rather to signe.”12
Phips had a good understanding of seafaring men: after weeks of poor treatment, he 
proposed that the men should volunteer for the voyage and receive a share of the spoils. If they 
did not sign his articles “they should then goe as pressed men & have the King’s pay.” Left with 
only bad choices, many of the seafarers, including Snowton, signed the articles. Phips’s illegal 
treatment of the pressed men underscored a growing trend in Boston. When brought before a 
council to answer for his actions, the governor declared that although “several men were 
imprest” by his warrants, in the end “the men that served in said vessells were such as went 
voluntarily.” This, too, was a falsehood, as both Snowton and Nathaniel Oliver noted that a few 
of the men resisted signing the articles. Even the merchants understood that Phips had mistreated 
Boston’s maritime community. Oliver asserted that “wee often told his Exelencey [sic] with 
Submission that it seemed very unreasonable to press men to Serve on a private Interest.”13 Far 
more than Captain Short, the governor had “used his power to make a prey” of sailors. From the 
elites examining the case to the calculating merchants to the constables impressing the sailors to 
exploited seafarers themselves, everyone understood that the governor’s actions broke the rules 
regarding maritime labor, and if the governor could break the rules why not the Royal Navy, 
privateers, or the merchant community? 
12 Depositions of Nathaniel Oliver, Constables John Coomes, William Everden, William Paine, and William 
Snowton, Mass. Arch., 61: 465, 467, and 485.  
13 Deposition of William Snowton and Nathaniel Oliver, Mass. Arch., 61: 465 and 485.  
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Thomas Gilbert of the Swan learned valuable lessons under Phips’s tutelage. In 
November 1693, Gilbert, once again employed by Boston merchant Andrew Belcher, boarded 
the H.M.S. Conception seeking men for his West Indies trading voyage. The Conception’s
captain, John Anderson, knew the game, offering the services of Joseph Sibley, an illegally 
impressed, married Salem fisherman. Sibley declared to Gilbert “that he was no Seaman” but the 
captain replied “that he carried men to Sea that never were at Sea before and he [Sibley] would 
doe well enough.” Sibley continued his protests but Anderson threatened to “chaine him to the 
deck” all winter, “breake his head,” and “hoist him out with the Tackle.” Sibley was then 
“carried aboard the Ship Swan in Capt. Gilbert’s Boat” and the West Indies voyage resumed. 
Sibley was yet another forcibly internationalized seafarer.14
Sibley’s wife, Susanna, discovered his unhappy fate six days later when fellow fishermen 
George and Henry Harvey escaped their captivity on the Conception. The news was devastating. 
Gilbert had torn Sibley from his “four Small Children” and left Susanna “bereaved of her 
husband.” He had done so not for the protection of the English Empire but rather for the profits 
of Boston merchants. New England maritime families had just recently become acquainted with 
the terror of large-scale naval impressment but now they faced the same threat from their own. 
All knew Gilbert’s and Anderson’s actions “to be contrary to the just liberties of the Subject 
[Sibley] granted by their most Gratious Majesties and the laws of this province.” The family was 
left “in a miserable … distressed condition,” compelling Susanna to petition Governor Phips to 
“have satisfaction for this great Injury.”15 Sibley’s fate is unknown but based on Phips’s past it is 
doubtful the fisherman or his family received justice. Phips was removed from power in 1694 but 
14 Depositions of George and Henry Harvey, November 28, 1693, Mass. Arch., 61: 415.  
15 Petition of Susanna Sibley, November 28, 1693, Mass. Arch., 61: 414. 
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his handling of Boston’s seafaring men left a lasting impression on both the mercantile and 
maritime communities.    
The impressment of sailors in Boston once again became the prerogative of the Royal 
Navy under Phips’s replacement, William Stoughton. The new governor attempted to reduce the 
impressment irregularities under Phips. He ordered Royal Navy captains to employ only “some 
careful diligent officer” to impress men and warned them not to “demand or receive any money, 
gratuity, reward or other consideration whatsoever for the spareing exchanging or discharging 
any person or persons impressed.” He also reminded captains to make sure any homeward bound 
vessels had “a sufficient number [of sailors] be left on board” to bring “them safe into Harbour.” 
His instructions, however, had no power behind them. Stoughton had a vastly different 
background than the seafaring Governor Phips, who demanded respect through force and 
violence. He had trained as a minister at Harvard and Oxford and spent a number of years 
preaching in England. Upon his return to New England in 1662, Stoughton became a lifelong 
and successful politician, managing to wheedle his way into all the various Massachusetts 
governments, including the Andros administration. He therefore approached Royal Navy 
captains, the problem of impressment, and the maritime world with a degree of naiveté, which 
savvy captains fully exploited.16
Stoughton tried to manage the escalating conflict over maritime labor between local 
merchants, ship captains, and the Royal Navy just as England had committed to bolstering New 
England’s defense against the French and providing a means to protect the Mast Fleets. From 
early 1696 through the remainder of the war, at least three rated Royal Navy frigates were 
16 William Stoughton to Captain Fleetwood Emes, June 4, 1695, Mass. Arch., 62: 21; On Stoughton see, Ricahrd S. 
Dunn, Puritans and Yankees: The Winthrop Dynasty of New England, 1630-1717 (New York: W.W. Norton & 
Company INC., 1962), 264.  
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stationed in Boston. These ships needed a total of 515 men to have full complements – an 
ambition Royal Navy officers aggressively pursued but rarely met during wartime. Boston 
additionally maintained a ship of thirty-six guns, a fire ship, and the Province Galley, 
commanded by the Bostonian Cyprian Southack. Stoughton also had to consider the needs of 
Boston’s merchant fleet, which required at least another 1,000 men to man, to safeguard the 
port’s economy.17  With so many elites clamoring for maritime labor, Stoughton came to 
consider most seafarers as numbers to fill quotas.  
The state of Boston’s maritime labor market was especially tight during the winter and 
spring of 1697. Captain Robert Hancock and the fourth rate H.M.S. Falkland with a crew 
requirement of 260 men had just arrived on the New England coast following a deadly, storm-
filled voyage. After settling the ship at Newport, Hancock informed Stoughton that the crew and 
the ship were “in very bad condition having buried Twenty Men since I came into the Country 
and now fifty sick and lame.” He asked permission to sail to Boston in order to fill his 
complement of men and repair his ship. Stoughton, however, told Hancock to remain in Rhode 
Island because he had a better “opportunity to make good your complement of men, Seamen 
much resorting thither of late to avoid his Majesties Service, it will be more difficult to be 
supplied here.” Stoughton had strategically considered Hancock’s request, and his final analysis 
brought him to the conclusion that Boston’s merchant community could not sustain another 
Royal Navy vessel, especially not one that needed to impress forty men like the Falkland. The 
governor had little sympathy for the seafarers fleeing to Rhode Island to avoid press gangs 
because they had already harmed Boston’s shipping, even as they hurt the Royal Navy prospects 
17 Phillip Haffenden, New England in the English Nation, 1689-1713 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1974), 97; For 
merchant fleet see, Curtis P. Nettels, The Money Supply of the American Colonies before 1720 (1934: reprint, New 
York: A.M. Kelley, 1964), 102.  
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to fill their crews. Keeping Hancock in Rhode Island would help alleviate Boston’s merchants 
and deter seafarers from fleeing to Rhode Island.18
Royal Navy captains and the press gangs in Boston, meanwhile, ignored Stoughton’s 
directives and impressed men with impunity. In March of 1697, Stoughton wrote to Captain 
James Jesson of the H.M.S. Orford, complaining about the “great irregularities and disorders 
committed by your officers and company in the execution of the impress warrant lately granted 
you.” Jesson had seized men on shore “to the very great disturbance of his Majesties Subjects” 
and interfered with Boston’s extensive coasting trade, which brought necessary provisions and 
supplies into the town. Stoughton had frequently spoken to Jesson about the matter but, like so 
many officers in the colonies, Jesson disregarded the authority of the governor. Stoughton 
demanded Jesson release these useful and essential men but he clearly lacked the ability and 
wherewithal to challenge the Royal Navy captain. Three weeks later, Jesson again angered 
Stoughton by impressing the mate and boatswain of the ship Blessing, creating unnecessary 
delays for a ship that was already “laden & cleared outward for Barbados.” More importantly, 
the impressment of mates was illegal under English law, and therefore another brazen violation 
of Stoughton’s orders regarding impressment.19
Captain William Kiggings of the H.M.S. Arundel also provoked the ire of the acting 
governor during the spring of 1697. Stoughton commanded Kiggings to cruise the New England 
coast to deter French privateers. The captain, however, refused on the grounds that he did not 
have enough men. Stoughton had a hard time believing Kiggings because of the large scale 
impressment taking place in Boston. He skeptically noted, “I suppose the number [of sailors] is 
18 Robert Hancock to William Stoughton, February 5, 1697, William Stoughton to Robert Hancock, February 15, 
1697, and Robert Hancock to William Stoughton, April 6, 1697, Mass. Arch., 62: 135-136 and 144.  
19 William Stoughton to Captain James Jesson, March 26, 1697 and April 17, 1697, Mass. Arch., 62: 143 and 148.  
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not since diminished but rather increased, tho’ you now represent them to be much shrunk of 
what they were in Winter.” Kiggings may not have been lying. His crew may have suffered 
serious losses by death and desertion during the course of the winter. In response to the 
governor’s criticisms, Kiggings expanded his impressment efforts. In so doing, they ensnared 
Samuel Thaxter from Hingham who “never was in any sort belonging to the Sea” and had been 
summoned to Boston to serve as a juryman on the Superior Court of Judicature. Stoughton was 
furious and demanded his release numerous times for over a week. He personalized the seizure 
of Thaxter, which, “looks too like an intent to put contempt on me and the power that his 
Majesty hath vested in me, which I will by the help of God in no way suffer from any person 
whatsoever.” He demanded Kiggings and his officers come ashore and answer for his men’s 
actions and his own delay in releasing Thaxter, who had subsequently missed his jury duty.20
The contrast in Stoughton’s language and action vis-à-vis other impressment cases are 
striking. Irregularities involving seafaring men received minor rebukes but when a respected 
landsman was captured, Stoughton brought down the full force of his authority. Stoughton was 
not opposed to impressment. In his letter of April 19, 1697, the governor actively encouraged 
Kiggings to have his ship sit at the mouth of Boston’s harbor and seize sailors from incoming 
ships. He even berated Kiggings for not impressing more men from the locally-owned ship, St. 
William, commanded by the Marblehead ship captain Aaron Beale. This would have been 
possible had Kiggings followed Stoughton’s advice to monitor the mouth of Boston’s harbor. 
Stoughton further assured Kiggings that “I shall not be wanting in utmost Endeavours by all 
proper methods to make up the complement of men appointed to be borne on board both his 
Majesties sd Ships.” In other words, as long as Kiggings, Jesson, and Hancock impressed only 
20 William Kiggings to William Stoughton, April 19, 1697 and William Stoughton to William Kiggings, April 19, 
1697 and April 27, 1697, Mass. Arch., 62: 149-150 and 152.    
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common sailors, preferably foreigners but locals, too, if necessary, then Stoughton would support 
their efforts with the full weight of the law.21
Massachusetts did not exempt local seafarers from impressment. Stoughton regularly 
aided and abetted naval commanders and their efforts to impress men he considered dispensable. 
He had no tolerance for common men deserting the Royal Navy, regardless of origin. If men 
were to be released, it would be by his order alone. For instance, in July of 1697, Hancock wrote 
to Stoughton to complain that four Massachusetts men, two from Boston, had “Swam from his 
Majesties Shipp Falkland,” disappearing into the New Hampshire woods. Two of the deserters 
were quickly retaken in Piscataqua. Stoughton sympathized with Hancock and wrote warrants to 
apprehend the other two who “were in these parts [Boston].”  Hancock proceeded to impress two 
Piscataqua men “in the room of Smith & Johnson [the deserters]” without permission from 
Stoughton. When it came to seafarers and impressment, local authority mattered little because 
most Royal Navy commanders believed they had a right to the labor and lives of all English 
seafaring men.22
Sailors, however, hated impressment and went to great lengths to avoid capture. At sea, 
they hid with the cargo, presented press gangs with bribes and fake exemption passes, or 
declared themselves underage. If all else failed, at times seafarers would attempt to dissuade 
press gangs through physical violence. On shore, sailors, sometimes with local aid, fled inland, 
dressed as women or in other ingenious disguises, and formed mobs to threaten press gangs. As 
Denver Brunsman notes, it was common for sailors to desert within the first year of being 
impressed; they were even more likely to jump ship when they still had the ability to return 
21 Lieutenant Governor Stoughton to William Kiggings, April 19, 1697, Mass. Arch., 62: 150.  
22 Robert Hancock to William Stoughton, July 12, 1697 and William Stoughton to Robert Hancock, July 22, 1697, 
Mass. Arch., 62: 197-199.  
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home.23 Without the support of Stoughton and the local government, Boston’s common seafarers 
had to fend for themselves during the 1690s. As previously mentioned, many fled to Rhode 
Island. Those who remained in Boston relied on other forms of resistance to hinder the efforts of 
Jesson, Higgings, and Hancock, including violence.   
Higgings’s particularly aggressive impressment schemes on both land and sea brought 
forth equally aggressive resistance. When called before Stoughton to answer for the impressment 
of Samuel Thaxter, he noted that his doctor was “not in a condition to appear” because “he is soe 
beaten & bruised by the people on shoare” who feared impressment. He also complained of 
mistreatment at the hands of Captain Abraham Hill at sea: “he purposefully run me on board in 
the midShip with a stout gale of wind & twas through the providence of God he had not drowned 
me & my boates crew.” Hill and his crew then sailed away from the furious captain, in spite of 
calls to “putt his Helm on Starboard” so that Higgings and his press gang could board. This may 
have been Higgings’s response to Stoughton’s suggestion to focus his impressment efforts on 
incoming vessels.24
Captain Robert Hancock’s press gang from the H.M.S. Falkland also experienced 
resistance and challenges to their authority even though they consented to Stoughton’s directive 
to search incoming vessels only. Hancock employed a pinnace under the command of Lieutenant 
James Dunbarr to search newly arrived vessels for men. The West Indies fleet typically arrived 
in late May and early June, providing ample opportunity to impress men. Late spring also 
brought numerous provision and coasting vessels from the Carolinas and Chesapeake into 
Boston. These vessels “of considerable import and value” were convoyed into Boston by 
23 Brunsman, The Evil Necessity, 191 and 202-203. 
24 William Kiggings to William Stoughton, April 30, 1697, Mass. Arch., 62: 153.  
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Cyprian Southack and the government-owned Province Galley. Consequently, all the seafarers in 
the convoy had protection from press gangs. Nevertheless, on May 19, 1697, Hancock’s press 
gang challenged the men of the Province Galley, firing shots at the Galley’s pinnace. The press 
gang then attacked “with cutlashes [sic] and other weapons assaulted, wounded, and evilly 
mistreated the Lieut. of the Galley and his company.” The record is unclear whether Hancock’s 
men impressed any of the Province Galley or provision fleet’s men but shortly thereafter the 
governor ordered Hancock to provide him with a list of the men he had impressed. Over a two-
week span from May 17, 1697 to June 1, 1697, Hancock’s press gangs had successfully captured 
twenty-four men, including local men who later deserted. Even if Hancock had impressed men 
Stoughton deemed off limits, the ambiguity regarding impressment in the colonies would have 
allowed Hancock to keep the sailors.25
In September of 1697, orders arrived from London that supposedly resolved Stoughton’s
and other colonial governor’s impressment woes. Throughout the 1690s, complaints had poured 
into Parliament from the West Indies that Royal Navy commanders and their impressment 
practices were destroying local economies and trade by scaring away sailors and laying up ships. 
In Barbados, the assembly blamed “the pressing and ill-using of the seamen” for “the decay of 
the Island’s trade proceeds.” In Jamaica, the merchants wrote Whitehall to suggest that “men-of-
war … be strictly ordered to press no men at or near the Island, for by pressing the seamen they 
disable the ships, which has been the ruin of many of them, some being eaten by the worm from 
long lying, while those that adventured home half-manned have been lost from want of hands.” 
Parliament saw the damage to the West Indies trade as completely unacceptable. It concluded 
that the only way to control Royal Navy commanders was to place the “sole power of impressing 
25 William Stoughton to Robert Hancock, May 19, 1697 and List of Men’s Names Prest on Board his Majesties Ship 
Falkland, June 1, 1697, Mass. Arch., 62: 166 and 170.  
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seamen in the Colonies” into the hands of the governors. Stoughton was elated to receive the 
news, writing London, “Your orders for placing the Captains of the King’s ships sent to the 
Colonies under the direction of the Governors and for regulating impressment were very 
acceptable to us here, who have heretofore been much harassed and oppressed by some of the 
Commanders.” He then taunted Royal Navy commanders with his newly acquired authority, 
berating Captain Hancock in October, “And I [find it] somewhat strange that my Advice is now 
become of any Esteem and seems so necessary unto you whereas hitherto since your coming to 
this Country in so many things for his Majesties Service you have slighted and disregarded it, 
and Expressed yourself unto several Gentlemen that you were not under my direction.”  He 
believed, wrongly, that Royal Navy commanders would obediently relinquish their control over 
impressment.26
Royal Navy captains, press gangs, and sailors had little patience for politics or waiting on 
impressment warrants. They acted with an urgency bred by a life at sea. This was especially true 
for ships and men intending to return home to England. We have seen the lengths that both the 
officers and men of the Rose went to in 1689 in order to return to England. In late May of 1698, 
after a long voyage protecting Boston’s West Indies salt fleet, Captain Kiggings of the Arundel
had orders to return to England and only waited “for want of men.” He ignored the king’s order 
and began impressing men from inward bound vessels without a warrant from Stoughton. He 
apparently managed to take quite a few men before seizing the Boston-based brigantine, 
Friendship, returning from London. He impressed four men, “all which are Inhabitants of this 
Province and most of them having Wives & Families here.” The captain of the Friendship
26 Minutes of Council of Barbados, January 29, 1696, CSPC, vol. 14 (1693-1696), no. 2251; Proposals of the 
Jamaica Merchants for the better carrying on and securing of that trade, September 18, 1696, Order of the King in 
Council, December 3, 1696, and Lieutenant Governor Stoughton to Council of Trade and Plantations, September 30, 
1697, CSPC, vol. 15 (1696-1697), nos. 233, 455, and 1354; William Stoughton to Robert Hancock, October 13, 
1697, Mass. Arch., 62: 212.   
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immediately complained to Stoughton whereupon the governor wrote two scathing letters to 
Kiggings to halt his “high Contempt of his Majesties Royal authority,” release all the men he had 
seized without warrant, and attend him in Boston. Stoughton further ordered that “Hereof you 
may not saile as you will answer your neglect.” If Kiggings had hoped to quickly and quietly sail 
away after impressing men without a warrant, he was sadly mistaken. Stoughton, meanwhile, 
expressed concern for the impressment of local men but objected far more to Kiggings’s 
continued disregard for his authority. In the minds of colonial governors and Royal Navy 
captains, sailors served as pawns to measure power-relations.27
Another, more dramatic, battle occurred during the summer of 1702, just as news of 
Queen Anne’s War arrived in Boston. Like Captain Higgings, Captain Robert Jackson of the 
Royal Navy sloop, Swift, had orders to return home but lacked the men. He subsequently 
impressed so many men from a few Boston merchant vessels that he “left not so much as one 
person,” and he did so “without having made application for any order or warrant.” The acting 
governor, Thomas Povey, ordered Jackson to return the men to their ships. Unlike Higgings, 
Jackson ignored his superior’s command and attempted to sail away. Povey commanded the 
soldiers on Castle Island to fire on the ship, which resulted in the death of one man and the 
wounding of five others. Jackson was irate and once back in the harbor he supposedly said to 
Povey, “You are the murderer.” 
This was indeed an odd state of affairs. On one hand, Jackson began the crisis by 
stripping the freedom of sailors as they worked on board their vessels in the port of Boston. 
Povey, on the other hand, felt compelled to defend his honor by threatening the lives of those 
27 For Kiggings orders to protect the West Indies fleet see, William Stoughton to William Kiggings, November 20, 
1697. For Stoughton’s angry rebuke of Kiggings for impressing without permission see, William Stoughton to 
William Kiggings, June 1, 1698 and William Stoughton to William Kiggings, June 2, 1698, all in Mass. Arch., 
62:229 and 251-252.  
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impressed men. In further justifying his deadly assault on the Swift’s sailors, the acting governor 
declared his true intent, “I thought it my duty to give relief to the merchants in that matter.” 
Mercantile prerogatives of sailing schedules and trading goods, therefore, took precedence over 
the very lives of maritime laborers. The impressed sailors must have felt comforted by the 
concern shown by their supposed leaders and employers as the cannon balls fell on their vessel. 
Considering the small crew size of the Swift and the scale of impressment in Boston, it is quite 
possible that the man murdered “to give relief to the merchants” had been one of the men 
impressed by Jackson. Those odds only increased for the five injured men. The hero of the fiasco 
was the mate of the Swift, Edward Storey, who acted sensibly and “without any order” to anchor 
the sloop before more shots were fired from the Castle.28
Historian Denver Brunsman, notes, “American colonial elites had long shown that they 
did not object so much to impressment as to their inability to control it.” Brunsman, however, 
also argued that Boston had a culture of impressment that protected its local seafarers because it 
“was loathe to sacrifice its young, part-time seafarers to naval service.” Phips, Stoughton, and 
Povey exemplified Brunsman’s assessment of colonial elite attitude towards impressment but 
each man had various, and overlapping, reasons for their desire to halt or hinder the impressment 
efforts of Royal Navy press gangs. Phips saw them as outright competition for the maritime labor 
he required for clandestine privateering missions. Stoughton firmly believed in following the 
rules of impressment and respect for the chain of command. He desired to protect Boston’s 
coasting trade and any groups exempt from impressment but refused to guard common seafarers 
from impressment until Royal Navy officers broke the new rules established by the King in late 
1697. Like Stoughton, Povey demanded respect and obedience from Royal Navy officers. He 
28 Thomas Povey to The Council of Trade, July 20, 1702, CSPC, vol. 20 (1702), nos. 768-768xix. 
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also strongly attended to the interests of Boston’s transatlantic commercial elite, not hesitating to 
put the lives of seafaring men at risk. Under all three governors, the general welfare of common 
seafarers, regardless of age or origin, collapsed before personal, local, or imperial needs for 
maritime labor. The fictitious notion that Boston political or mercantile elites were “loathe to 
sacrifice” local sailors lasted only until merchants managed to outfit and man their vessels to 
send them forth into the Atlantic.29
Heavy impressment in Boston and around the Atlantic during the 1690s caused 
Massachusetts sailors, particularly those of Boston, to lose local connections and change 
culturally as they spent years away from home. The self-interest of merchants seeking to fill 
crews pressured governors to act on the behalf of some sailors, such as the three men Stoughton 
ordered Captain Jesson of the Orford in September of 1697 to release so a merchant could have 
his vessel continue its outward bound voyage, but the vast majority of pressed men entered long-
term service in the Royal Navy. Furthermore, once vessels departed Boston, sailors had to rely 
on the ship captain or their own instincts to stave off press gangs. The many who failed also 
became unmoored from their local community.30
After the conclusion of King William’s War in September of 1697, Sir Henry Ashurst, 
Massachusetts’s agent in London, was asked by the Council of Trade if discharged soldiers 
would find welcome in New England. He answered in the affirmative, surmising from 
observation that impressment had taken its toll on Massachusetts’s male population: 
Many ships have been built and manned of late years in New England, which has drained 
the country of men, for, having no sea-commanders nor seamen in proportion to their 
29 Brunsman, The Evil Necessity, 129 and 222.  
30 William Stoughton to James Jesson, September 16, 1697, Mass. Arch., 62: 203.  
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shipping, they have been forced to take land-men. On their arrival here both the one and 
the other were pressed into the King’s service, which prevented them from returning.31
In the late 1740s, an anonymous Bostonian, perhaps Samuel Adams, upheld Ashurst’s 
assessment of the impact of impressment on Boston seafarers, noting, “when the inhabitants of 
the Plantations, are impress’d on board the King’s Ships, and carried away from their Families, 
and Friends, there is scarcely, One in a Hundred ever returns.” He also confirmed the dangers of 
England to local seamen, arguing that new ships in Boston sold to England are “chiefly 
navigated by Seamen of our own breeding” but “very few of whom, escape being impress’d as 
soon as they arrive Europe.”32
Boston seafarers bore the brunt of these losses, as its trade with England and the West 
Indies far exceeded other North American port cities during the late seventeenth century. Plus, 
Boston relied heavily on ships, pinks, or brigs with larger crews, rather than smaller sloops or 
ketches, for its transatlantic trade. Press gangs targeted these larger vessels because larger crew 
sizes made their jobs easier and, oftentimes, smaller vessels were considered coasters, regardless 
of their trade circuit. As Jeremiah Dummer noted in 1721, “New-England is a good Nursery of 
Seamen for the Navy. I believe I may affirm, that there was hardly a Ship, during the last War 
[Queen Anne’s War], in the Royal Navy without some of their Sailors on Board.” Dummer 
hinted that this arrangement benefitted the Royal Navy but that New England suffered as a 
consequence. He observed that the Royal Navy’s advantage, likely impressment, in competing 
for local sailors “so distress’d the New England merchants, that they were oblig’d to man their 
Ships with Indians and Negroes.”33
31 Sir Henry Ashurst to Council of Trade and Plantations, October 29, 1697, CSPC, vol. 16 (1697-1698), no. 7.  
32 Anonymous [Samuel Adams?], An Address to the Inhabitants of the Province of the Massachusetts-Bay (Boston, 
1747), 5 and 7.  
33 Jeremiah Dummer, A Defence of the New-England Charters (London: W. Wilkins, 1721), 12.  
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We cannot know exactly how many Boston seafarers were impressed into the Royal 
Navy during King William’s and Queen Anne’s War but a careful look at the few completed 
portledge bills and shipping papers remaining for the period suggest impressment probably had a 
negative impact on most voyages and crews. It is important to note that in 1708 Parliament 
issued the Sixth of Anne, which banned impressment in colonial waters and ports, drastically 
decreasing the likelihood of impressment for Boston sailors. I have therefore only considered 
nine portledge bills and the letterbook of John Foye with corresponding shipping papers and 
accounts for the period 1692 to 1708. Four of these ten vessels experienced direct impressment 
of its sailors, described either in the portledge bills, letters to employers, or shipping accounts. 
Meanwhile, the ship Hopewell (1693-1694) lost Thomas Norcott in Antigua and failed to pay his 
full wages but noted that they were still owed. Norcott likely had been pressed into the Royal 
Navy because it was one of the few reasons merchants were still obligated to pay wages after the 
disappearance of a sailor. If he had been discharged due to illness or agreement with the captain 
his wages would have been paid in full at Antigua. If he deserted or failed to show when the ship 
sailed his wages would have been forfeit. A similar situation occurred for two sailors serving on 
board the pink Richard.34
Short, direct voyages to the West Indies and back to Boston lessened the likelihood of 
impressment or desertion for a few obvious reasons. First, turnover in the West Indies could be 
completed swiftly, especially if merchant partners made arrangements in advance, supplied 
provisions in Boston for the entire voyage, and the vessel escaped major damage en route. 
Second, ship captains in the West Indies frequently joined Royal Navy convoys returning to 
34 Based on portledge bills and shipping papers in Account book of John Foye, Mss C 5037, R. Stanton Avery 
Special Collections, New England Historic Genealogical Society (hereafter cited as NEHGS); Mass. Arch., 62:51; 
Ships' Papers, Jeffries Family Papers, box 15, vol. 16 and boxes 17 and 18, Massachusetts Historical Society 
(hereafter cited as MHS).   
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England, exposing their men to the dangers of impressment but protecting the goods of the 
merchants. The 1705-1706 voyage of the Unity and the 1706-1707 voyage of the Society
experienced no impressment or desertion and lasted roughly five and three months respectively. 
Similarly, the voyage of John Foye from Boston to Jamaica to Boston in 1694-1695 lasted four 
months and the entire large crew of thirty men safely returned to Boston. Foye’s voyage is also 
noteworthy because he brought his son, John Foye Junior, and likely another relative, Benjamin 
Foye, suggesting he knew this shorter voyage would not be as difficult or dangerous as his 1692-
1694 voyage. Sailors, too, knew shorter and less complex voyages bettered their chances of a 
safe voyage and return. As we will see in Chapter 4, Ned Low, prior to becoming pirate, decided 
to switch vessels to avoid a complicated voyage that may have hindered his chances of returning 
to Boston and marrying his future wife. Low’s voyage in 1712 lasted just four and half months, 
went from Boston to the West Indies and back to Boston, and safely returned the entire crew.35
London press gangs during wartime terrified Boston sailors and sent them scurrying for 
safety, even if that meant deserting the voyage. According to Daniel Vickers, Barry Levy, and 
Denver Brunsman, desertion on Boston-owned ships should have been minimal at best, as the 
local, young, and part-time seafarers happily completed full voyages so they could maintain their 
reputations and return home. Tables 3 and 4 in the appendix underscore the low retention rates of 
sailors on Boston-based ships and sloops, suggesting that Boston had a highly mobile maritime 
community. Sailors, regardless of origin, had to look after their own interests. Many voyages 
experienced desertion right before sailing for London where laws governing impressment 
changed and press gangs had far more authority than in the colonies. For example, the pink 
35 Account book of John Foye, Mss C 5037, R. Stanton Avery Special Collections, NEHGS; Ships' Papers, Jeffries 
Family Papers, box 15, vol. 16 and boxes 17 and 18, MHS. For Low see, Ships’ Papers, pink Francis, Jeffries 
Family Papers, box 17, MHS.  
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Richard (1693-1694) only lost two men to desertion, likely because prior to the 1697 directive 
placing Royal Navy captains and press gangs under the control of colonial governor impressment 
practices were similar. During Queen Anne’s War, however, the ships Bifrons and Unity
experienced large-scale desertion right before setting sail for London. The Bifrons had six men 
runaway at Barbados, almost a third of the crew. The Unity, meanwhile, kept all but one of its 
crew for a voyage to Kinsale, Ireland where the Royal Navy and press gang presence was low. 
When it came time to depart for London, however, five men deserted, including three sailors 
who had served with the Unity’s captain, John Miles, for at least three years and over the course 
of multiple voyages. 36
Sir Henry Ashurst’s perceptive appraisal of the dire state of impressment for New 
England sailors in England held true for the voyages of John Foye and Elias Hasket. Shortly after 
Foye’s European arrived in Bristol from Cadiz in early 1693, press gangs ravenously claimed the 
lives and labor of seafaring men in the port in what was called “hot press.” Foye’s entire crew, 
except for the boatswain, either ran away or fell victim to the press gangs. With his New England 
crew dispersed, Foye wrote to his employers’ merchant partner in London to complain that “here 
is no keeping of any man nor will any man be Shipt without a protecktion [sic] to Keep the men 
from the press for they com down into Hungrod and Kingrod [Hung Road and King Road] 
Everyday & press all that they can find in the ships and likeways a Shoare.” For over two 
months, press gangs thwarted Foye’s attempts to return to Boston. Finally, in mid-May of 1693, 
Foye received an order from the Council in London “for leave to the ship European of New 
England, 200 tons, John Foy master, to proceed to Boston in New England, she being built and 
36 See aforementioned Brunsman, The Evil Necessity, Vickers, Young Men and the Sea, and Levy, Town-born; 
Appendix, tables 3 and 4; Ships’ Papers, pink Richard and ship Unity, Jeffries Family Papers, box 15, vol. 16 and 
box 18, MHS.  
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wholly belonging to inhabitants of Boston.” This order helped protect his crew from 
impressment, as outward bound ships generally received protections.37
A year later, Elias Hasket’s impressment-plagued voyage aboard the Prudent Kitty
suffered the loss of six sailors, the entire crew excluding the captain, mate, and a boy, to press 
gangs in Plymouth, England. Like Foye, Hasket’s experience illustrates that sailors from Boston 
could no longer be protected from joining the ranks of England’s transatlantic seafaring 
community. Also like Foye, the voyage completely stalled without enough hands to sail the ship 
to London. Hasket desperately wrote to London for help but none was forthcoming. After weeks 
of delay, Hasket successfully completed his voyage to London but then smallpox struck the 
beleaguered captain and the Prudent Kitty was seized by authorities on behalf of the replacement 
sailors for unpaid wages. The blame for this second disaster rested with Hasket’s employer’s 
London merchant partner, Stephen Mason, who refused to give Hasket the money to pay off the 
sailors. Hasket’s voyage, as we shall see, led to lengthy recriminations that suggest Boston 
merchants cared little about who manned their vessels.38
Indeed, Boston merchants knew sailors dreaded the London voyage. In 1709, the owners 
of the ship Neptune advised to Thomas Holland, previously the captain of the Bifrons, to pay “as 
much wages as you can [in Barbados] with safety that your men don’t run from you” before 
setting sail for London. The scheme was to hold wages hostage until the voyage to the press 
gang-ridden metropolis could be completed. Holland knew the dangers of London, purchasing 
two protections for 10 shillings a piece for favored sailors a year earlier. The portledge bill for 
37 Account book of John Foye, Mss C 5037, R. Stanton Avery Special Collections, NEHGS; For Foye’s clearance 
see, William Shaw ed., Calendar of Treasury Books, January 1693 to March 1696, v. X part I (London, 1935), 201. 
38 Deposition of Timothy Burbank, July 1, 1695, Prudent Kitty Portledge Bill, The ship Prudent Kitty London 
Account, and  Stephen Mason to Captain Barachiah Arnold, December 25, 1694, Mass. Arch., 62: 39-41, 51, 49, 
and 16.   
87 
Neptune’s 1707-1708 voyage from the West Indies to London is not complete but in all 
likelihood the majority of sailors were impressed. Upon leaving London for Boston, Holland 
employed the services of crimps, waterfront labor agents, for the “shipping of thirteen Men.” 
Either he discharged his crew in London or lost the majority of his crew to desertion or press 
gangs seized them. Thirteen outsiders now entered Boston’s maritime labor market and those 
sailors previously employed by Holland either entered London’s maritime labor market or the 
Royal Navy – a far more common occurrence than historians of maritime New England have 
allowed.39
Impressment in the West Indies never reached the same intensity as in England but prior 
to 1697 Boston sailors confronted a level of impressment comparable to their homeport. As 
previously mentioned, West Indies governors saw impressment as a threat equal to or greater 
than the French enemy. In particular, they worried that impressment would scare away the 
vessels from North America. In late 1693, the governor of Jamaica sent forth desperate pleas for 
sailors but they would “not come for fear of being pressed.” More importantly, “No vessels will 
come from North America for the same reason.” Three years later, Jamaican agents in London 
continued to petition “that the men-of-war be ordered not to bring off debtors, nor to impress 
freehold inhabitants nor seafaring men from the provision-ships from North America.” Terrified 
West Indies merchants protested that “The dearness of such provisions as used to be brought 
from New York and New England is caused by the pressing of seamen from the ships that bring 
them.” This calamity had the potential to incite “a rebellion of negroes.” Whitehall acceded to 
the demands of the sugar plantations, giving the power of impressment to colonial governors in 
1697. This was good news for Boston seafarers and ship captains but the law did nothing to help 
39 Owners of Neptune to Captain Thomas Holland, March 21, 1709 and Neptune Disbursements, July 15, 1708, 
Jeffries Family Papers, box 18, MHS.  
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those taken before 1697, and West Indies governors still allowed the Royal Navy to press some 
seafarers from North American ships.40
Elias Hasket’s voyage to Barbados in 1694 illustrates the threat impressment posed to 
Boston’s seafarers in the West Indies trade but also hints at the extraordinary lengths seamen 
and, at times, ship captains went to fight back. Shortly after the Prudent Kitty arrived in 
Barbados, beaten and battered by Atlantic storms, two man-hungry Royal Navy vessels, the 
H.M.S. Mermaid and Tiger, began hounding its sailors. The two ships had permission from the 
governor to seize a staggering sixty-seven seamen from incoming ships but “News that a press 
was coming leaked out, and in some the ships they found nothing but officers.”41 The Mermaid’s 
press gangs struck the Prudent Kitty’s crew first, snatching Matthew Enderby and creating 
anxiety among the rest of the seamen. After allowing his sailors to escape into the Barbadian 
countryside to protect them “from the press,” Hasket hired a small boat and crew to chase down 
the Mermaid, presumably to save Enderby. His effort failed, and Enderby became another 
unwilling victim of England’s imperial ambitions. Paradoxically, Hasket utilized slave labor to 
unload and load the vessel for London in lieu of his hiding sailors. In attempting to challenge one 
form of coerced labor, the ship captain reinforced a far more pernicious, racially-based system of 
exploitation.42
Hasket acted rationally in protecting his New England crew from impressment. The 
Royal Navy’s robust presence and disease in Barbados made finding skilled maritime labor 
during wartime difficult and costly. Hasket still had to sail to London and hiring a new crew 
40 Lieutenant Governor Sir William Beeston to the Earle of Nottingham, July 28, 1693, CSPC, vol. 14 (1693-1696), 
no. 479; Memorial presented by the Agents for Jamaica, December 7, 1696 and Memorial of several Jamaica 
Merchants to Council of Trade and Plantations, July 27, 1697, CSPC, vol. 15 (1696-1697), nos. 470 and 1207.   
41 Governor Russell to the Lords of Trade and Plantations, August 30, 1694, CSPC, vol. 14 (1693-1696), no. 1266.  
42 Prudent Kitty Portledge Bill and Prudent Kitty Sundry Disbursments and Charges for fitting out sd. ship from 
Barbados, Mass. Arch., 62:51 and 53-55.   
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would cost his employers increased wages. Luck, and his sailors’ misfortune and rash behavior, 
however, did not favor Hasket. Three members of the crew returned from the countryside sick or 
became sick shortly after returning to their ship. They required immediate attention from doctors 
and nurses. The sailors expected, as was custom during wartime, to have Hasket pay for their 
medical expenses. The captain complied with their wishes. Fully loaded and ready to sail, the 
Prudent Kitty only waited on the sick sailors.43
Perhaps sensing easy prey, the press gang from the other Royal Navy ship stationed at 
Barbados, the Tiger, zeroed in on the Prudent Kitty’s beleaguered sailors. A press gang 
apprehended George Thomson, who had been sick and had to receive attention from a doctor. 
Unlike poor Enderby, Hasket successfully managed to clear “Geo. Thomson from the Tyger” by 
paying two pounds and one shilling. As in Boston, Royal Navy officers were not beyond bribes, 
especially if the sailor they released was sick. Thomson’s reprieve, however, was relatively 
short-lived, as the Royal Navy caught up with him in Plymouth roughly two months later. 
Shortly after seizing Thomson, the Tiger’s press gangs used their pinnace to board the Prudent 
Kitty. John Armitage, the Prudent Kitty’s chief mate, jumped to the defense of his crewmates. He 
single-handedly “abused and beat” several of the press gang and “threw” the coxswain 
overboard. Armitage had, at least momentarily, successfully protected his crewmates from forced 
servitude.44
Considered skilled and essential to voyages, mates like Armitage were strictly protected 
by English law from impressment. In protecting his fellow seafarers, Armitage likely knew he 
potentially faced punishment but also felt secure that he could not be impressed. When word of 
43 Prudent Kitty Sundry Disbursments and Charges for fitting out sd. Ship from Barbados, Mass. Arch., 62: 53-55.   
44 Prudent Kitty Portledge Bill, Prudent Kitty Sundry Disbursments and Charges for fitting out sd. Ship from 
Barbados, Deposition of Timothy Burbank, July 1, 1695, Mass. Arch., 62: 51, 53-55, and 39-41.  
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Armitage’s action reached the captain of the Tiger, he ordered the chief mate to attend him. 
Armitage swiftly obeyed and upon his arrival confessed to resisting the press gang. The captain 
had Armitage “whipt several lashes.” But then he vindictively and illegally impressed the chief 
mate. Despite supposed state protections, Royal Navy captains consistently operated in colonial 
waters with impunity. Hasket petitioned the Tiger’s captain to obtain Armitage’s release but was 
adamantly denied. To placate Hasket and perhaps obtain a promise to not press charges in 
London, the Royal Navy captain released another skilled seaman to replace Armitage. The 
Tiger’s press gang still was not finished with the Prudent Kitty’s crew. Just prior to setting sail, 
the gang poached another of Hasket’s sailors, Wesley Perkins, who, after receiving some of his 
pay, went ashore to find “a whore” but instead landed a berth in the Royal Navy. Hasket had no 
sympathy for this reckless seafarer, leaving him to serve his time.45
 We do not know what became of Enderby, Armitage, or Perkins but impressment and 
desertion could lead New England sailors down dangerous, even deadly paths. As some 
historians have noted, a ship became a floating incarnation of the homeport when it set sail. For 
the sailors on board, the ship provided a thin, comforting tendril, linking them back to their 
family, friends, and community in an otherwise watery and hostile world. Impressment broke 
that connection, and as Sir Henry Ashurst noted, it frequently “prevented them from returning.”46
The story of one nameless New England sailor demonstrates the harrowing experience of 
losing that connection. This particular young man fled to sea from his father in 1707, “ingulfing 
himself into the Temptations of a Wicked World.” Upon arriving in Jamaica, “he was soon 
45 Deposition of Timothy Burbank, July 1, 1695, Mass. Arch., 62: 39-41; For chief mate exemption status see, 
Brunsman, The Evil Necessity, 65.  
46 For the ship’s connection to home see, Lauren Benton, “Legal Spaces of Empire: Piracy and the Origins of Ocean 
Regionalism,” Comparative Studies in Society and History 47 (2005): 700–24; Sir Henry Ashurst to Council of 
Trade and Plantations, October 29, 1697, CSPC, vol. 16 (1697-1698), no. 7.  
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pressed aboard a Man of War; from whence after diverse Months of Hard Service, he obtained a 
release, tho’ with the Loss of all the Little he had.” Impoverished and displaced by his forced 
time in the Royal Navy, the seafarer jumped at his first opportunity for employment. He joined a 
privateer but, after a few naval engagements, was taken captive by the French, along with fifteen 
other English privateers. Soon thereafter, the French commander, rather than taking them to a 
French prison, released them ashore in the Bay of Honduras. In the Bay, “Spanish Indians” fell 
upon the hapless New Englander and his compatriots and, “Having their Hands now tied behind 
them, and Ropes about their Necks,” they were led 600 miles inland, toward the dreaded Spanish 
mines. The New England seafarer was spared the mines but the Spanish imprisoned him for over 
eight months, during which time he suffered from malnutrition and small pox.47
Incarceration during wartime was a fact of life for many seafaring men in the West 
Indies. Even when at peace, seafarers from Boston frequently fell afoul of the Spanish in the 
Bays of Campeche and Honduras and Saltertuda when exploiting those lands for logwood and 
salt. They could lose months or years of their lives attempting to obtain a release, and getting 
home once free could be an equally difficult task. For this young man, release meant months of 
travelling to the coast where he was put on board a Spanish galleon. He then had to wait “till the 
Plate fleet went home” to Cadiz. Left to his own devices upon arrival to Cadiz, the New England 
seafarer found passage to Portugal where it would have been possible to find a New England 
vessel. With the help of strangers, including a Boston man, the travails of this seafaring man 
47 For the story of this New England seafarer see, Cotton Mather, Repeated Warnings: Another Essay to Warn 
Young People against Rebellions that must be Repented of (Boston, 1712), 27-33. Other New England sailors and 
fishermen had similar remarkable and harrowing stories after being forced or choosing to leave the vessel 
connecting them to their homeport see, the story of Philip Ashton (impressed by pirates) in John Barnard, Ashton’s 
Memorial: An History of the Strange Adventures and Signal Deliverances of Mr. Philip Ashton (Boston: Samuel 
Gerrish, 1725) and Ashley Bowen (deserted) in Philip Chadwick Foster Smith, ed.,  The Journals of Ashley Bowen
(1728-1813) of Marblehead, 2 vols., Collections, (Boston: Publications of the Colonial Society of Massachusetts, 
1973), 1:24-27.       
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came to an end roughly three and half years after the Royal Navy impressed him that fateful day 
in Jamaica.48
The demand for maritime labor, and the difficulties ship captains confronted to keep that 
labor once obtained, during wartime increased the bargaining position of all seafaring men. Most 
seafarers were not shy about pressing their advantage. They knew their wages during peacetime 
did not constitute an honest wage. According to Marcus Rediker, English sailors only received 
an average peacetime monthly wage of £1.46 whereas during wartime a sailor could expect an 
average monthly wage of £2.20. Boston seafarers during King William’s War earned even higher 
wartime wages, averaging £2.78 per month. In comparison, sailors on board the Boston-owned 
Dolphin in 1686 averaged a mere £1.42 per month, or roughly fifty-percent less. Higher wages 
could put a serious dent in merchants’ profits but typically increased shipping costs were 
transferred to buyers and consumers through higher commodity prices.49
Sailors also bargained for increased advance wages, clothing, or cargo space, protection 
from impressment, and medical attention when sick. Elias Hasket’s experience with his sailors in 
Barbados exemplifies the agency sailors had in demanding these perquisites. John Foye 
complained bitterly that the advanced wages of “one and two months pay” demanded by sailors 
in Bristol would “swell the accompt of the outset.” Furthermore, the sailors he met with “ask 
great wages & greater privilig [sic].” “Privileges” granted sailors space aboard the ship to 
transport goods on their own account to trade. In a sense they became partial owners in the 
48 Mather, Repeated Warnings, 27-33.  
49 Rediker, Between the Devil and the Deep Blue Sea, see appendix C, 304-305. Average wages for Boston seafarers 
during King William’s War are based on fifty-one sailors and five voyages see, Ships’ Papers, Jeffries Family 
Papers, box 15, vol.16, MHS; Prudent Kitty Portledge Bill, Mass Arch., 62: 51; and Account book of John Foye, 
Mss C 5037, R. Stanton Avery Special Collections, NEHGS. For the Dolphin’s wages see, Dolphin Portledge Bill, 
Jeffries Family Papers, box 14, MHS. For increasing prices of commodities during wartime and merchant 
profiteering see, Nash, Urban Crucible, 175-177.   
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voyage, which generally fostered a more cooperative spirit between the sailors and officers. This 
practice became increasingly rare on English vessels during the eighteenth century. Foye 
strategically offered to “give them the more privilig” because he believed “they will be prest 
when they com to” regardless, and he would therefore lose his investment if he offered to 
advance wages.50 It was customary to give sailors advance wages so they could purchase 
necessities for the voyage or provide some money to their families.  
Some sailors, however, saw in advance wages a great opportunity to get back at greedy 
merchants and ship captains through their mobility. For instance, in January of 1695, John 
Walker signed on board the ship Newcastle for a voyage from Boston to Barbados to Boston. He 
received advance wages of a month’s pay at £3 but then “deserted the voyage and left the ship 
and did not sail with the Company.” The captain of the pink Richard (1694-1695) similarly 
bought a seamen clothes in Antigua but then the man ran “away afterwards.” Wartime demand 
for maritime labor gave seafarers’ confidence that their deceit and desertion would go 
unpunished.51
Impressment drove some sailors to more extreme forms of resistance than tough 
negotiating and desertion – they became pirates. This was an extraordinary occurrence: wartime, 
as historian Peter Earle notes, “was usually pirate-free, as former pirates flocked to sign up on 
legally commissioned privateers.” Sailors, according to the pamphlet Piracy Destroy’d, blamed 
“The hard usage they met with at home during the War, by being press’d, and haled from their 
Families like Dogs on board Men of War” and “being turned over into other ships” for their 
piratical turn. These newly created pirates left behind the Europeanized Atlantic and found 
50 Account book of John Foye, Mss C 5037, R. Stanton Avery Special Collections, NEHGS. 
51 Newcastle Portledge Bill and Account of pink Richard, Jeffries Family Papers, box 15, vol. 16, MHS; For more 
on the custom of advance pay see Ralph Davis, The Rise of the English Shipping Industry in the 17th and 18th
Centuries, 143-144.    
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refuge in the Indian Ocean with its rich, relatively unguarded, Mughal and European prizes. 
Jamaican Governor Sir William Beeston also linked Indian Ocean pirates and naval 
impressment: “the press for the King’s ships frightens away many [sailors], and many go to the 
Northern Plantations, where the Red Sea pirates take their plunder, are pardoned and fit out for a 
fresh voyage, which makes all kinds of rogues flock to them.”52
Many Boston seafarers also joined the ranks of the Indian Ocean pirates likely owing to 
their fear of impressment and poor treatment by elites at home. The Council of Trade confirmed 
this disturbing trend, noting “we find frequent mention of New England as the place from 
whence they [Indian Ocean pirates] too generally Spring.” The author of Piracy Destroy’d
believed merchants could reduce these pirates by hiring ship captains who used “their Men like 
fellow Christians” because “Seamen being zealous abetters of Liberty, will admit no arbitrary 
force, and may be easily led, but not drove.” Boston merchants decided on a different course of 
action – a course that punished “courteous” captains who tried to “gain the affections of their 
Men.”53
Impressment and competition over maritime labor during King William’s War created a 
divide between Boston ship captains and their merchant-employers regarding the treatment and 
privileges of seafarers. Merchants instructed ship captains to complete voyages cheaply and with 
efficiency. Ship captains, however, required leeway, especially during wartime, in their 
negotiations with sailors to follow the latter order. With the exception of wages, ship captains 
and seafarers informally agreed upon any extra perquisites. Ship captains then debited the 
52 Peter Earle, The Pirate Wars (New York: Thomas Dunne Books, 2003), 113; Piracy Destroy’d: Or, A Short 
Discourse Shewing the Rise, Growth and Causes of Piracy of Late; with a Sure Method How to put a Speedy Stop to 
That Growing Evil (London, 1701), 3 and 11; Lieutenant-Governor Sir William Beeston to the Earl of Nottingham, 
July 28, 1693, CSPC, vol. 14 (1693-1696), no. 479. 
53 For Boston seafarers as Indian Ocean pirates see, Whitehall to Lieutenant-Governor Stoughton, 20 January 1697, 
Mass. Arch., 62: 154-163, quote at 162; Piracy Destroy’d, 12-13. 
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merchants or ship’s account for these added expenses. They hoped their employer/s would either 
overlook the added expenses, which were trivial to the overall costs and profits of the voyage, or 
recognize the necessity of maintaining good crew morale to successfully complete a voyage 
during challenging times. Some Boston merchants, encouraged by their London partners, 
however, had little tolerance for these gestures of goodwill. They desired to limit seafarers to 
their, preferably low, wages to maximize their profits and thus increase their remittances to 
London.54
This brewing conflict of interests climaxed in May 1695 when shipping mogul Samuel 
Lillie hauled Elias Hasket, captain of the ship Prudent Kitty, into court for refusing to “render” 
“a just and true accompt [account]” of his voyage and pay Lillie and his partners their expected 
profits. But Lillie’s true agenda was to punish Hasket for protecting his sailors. Hasket had set 
sail from Boston for Barbados and then to London in December of 1693 with detailed orders 
from Lillie to sell the cargo for “good bills of Exchange for London made payable to Mr. 
Stephen Mason,” Lillie’s partner and creditor. He commanded Hasket to refrain from spending 
any money on victualing or outfitting the ship in Barbados unless absolutely necessary. This was 
an unusually strict order because ship captains typically obtained fresh food and other supplies in 
the West Indies, and ships almost always required small repairs. Lillie, however, believed he had 
sufficiently supplied the Prudent Kitty for the entire voyage and submitted his bill for victuals as 
evidence to the court.55
All merchants hoped that voyages would face few obstacles and limited expenditures but 
reality almost always required flexibility and patience when dealing with the vicissitudes of 
54 Samuel Lillie versus Elias Hasket (1695), Suffolk County Court of Common Pleas Record Books, 1692-1701 
(hereafter cited as SCCCPRB); Stephen Mason to Captain Barachiah Arnold, December 25, 1694, Mass. Arch., 62: 
16. 
55 Samuel Lillie Orders to Elias Hasket, December 6, 1693, Mass. Arch., 61: 422-423.  
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maritime commerce. Hasket’s voyage was no different. Almost immediately his voyage 
encountered ill-fortune when a storm battered the Prudent Kitty, requiring ship repairs in 
Barbados. The storm also caused considerable damage to the cargo, which meant a smaller 
remittance to Stephen Mason. We have seen the litany of other problems Hasket’s voyage faced 
due to impressment and disease. Despite these difficulties, the Prudent Kitty’s voyage was not a 
disaster for Lillie. He suffered a small loss in the Barbados leg of the voyage, mostly due to the 
added expenses due to impressment and disease, but the voyage to London was profitable for 
him and his merchant partners. Nevertheless, the merchant brought forth a litany of protests 
against Hasket: the spendthrift captain had hired slaves in Barbados to help unload and load the 
ship; repaired the vessel in Barbados and London; charged Lillie’s account for damaged goods 
when the sailors “ought to sustain the loss;” kept the sailors in pay after Lillie believed the ship 
should have been discharged; subtracted “for his own sickness att London of the Small Pox.” 
Lillie’s most pressing issue with Hasket, however, was his generosity towards his sailors in 
Barbados. He prioritized recouping the £33:7:6 spent on doctors and nurses for sick seafarers and 
Hasket’s efforts to protect his sailors from impressment. He also disliked how impressment and 
demand for maritime labor in Barbados drove up wages in Barbados, a common and necessary 
practice during wartime.56
Lillie’s court case against Hasket generated an important discourse in Boston about the 
responsibilities of merchants and ship captains to their maritime labor force. On one hand, 
Puritanism demanded a paternalistic relationship between employers and their workers, or, as 
historian Stephen Innes put it, “the rule of love as well as the rule of law.” On the other hand, 
Puritans considered a covenant or contract sacred. Sailors signed a contract stipulating their 
56 Prudent Kitty Account, 1694, Mass. Arch., 62: 49. 
97 
itinerary, wages, and possibly a small share in the cargo – an increasingly rare privilege for those 
employed in the lower deck. Did merchant employers or ship captains owe them further 
consideration? Should Bostonians in foreign ports follow Puritan guidelines and protect 
threatened seafarers from impressment and provide medical care and quality food to those 
unfortunate enough to become desperately ill while serving the interests of merchants who, to 
paraphrase the Reverend Cotton Mather, has ventured his estate but not his person?57 Or should 
the written contract take precedence? Lillie and his cohort of allies firmly believed the latter, and 
hoped to change the rule of custom to the rule of contract when it suited their agenda.58
Lillie enlisted Andrew Belcher, Giles Fifield, Barachiah Arnold, and Benjamin Emmes, 
all prominent ship captains or ex-ship captains connected to the London trade, to testify on his 
behalf. With the exception of Arnold who also related his experience in London with Hasket, the 
four deponents focused their testimonies exclusively on supposedly unwarranted perquisites for 
the seafarers and captain. Arnold began the proceedings on July 2, 1695, arguing,  
I have used the West Indies several voyages since the sickness has been there and the 
Custom to our men is that if any of them be taken sick on board the Ship and they be putt 
on shoar and be maintained with fresh diet and lookt after by a Doctor or Nurse than the 
master pays for the same but att pay table it is deducted out of their wages without any 
objection by them and I farther say that if men desire to go ashore to save themselves 
from the press or any other danger, for what men are hired to do the work on board in 
their roome, then they allow it out of their wages, nor I never knew any other custome but 
the sailors allow for Doctors, Nurses, Dyets etc. as above which I always had allowed to 
me by them out of their wages. 
In a voyage from New London to Barbados to London in 1690, Giles Fifield “never charged 
anything” to the owners for his seafarers’ sickness or fresh diet ashore even though, he proudly 
57 Cotton Mather, The Sailours Companion and Counsellor (Boston, 1709), 62. 
58 Stephen Innes, Creating the Commonwealth: The Economic Culture of Puritan New England (New York and 
London: W.W. Norton & Company, 1995), 41; For importance of contracts see, Perry Miller, Errand Into the 
Wilderness (Cambridge, Mass., 1956), chap. 3; For a good discussion of merchants’ and sailors’ conflicting 
interpretations of customs and contracts see, Rediker, Between the Devil and the Deep Blue Sea, 150-151.   
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declared, “I had severall of my men that were Sick and Three dyed.” Belcher and Emmes, 
meanwhile, reiterated Arnold’s statement although Belcher took the perspective of both an ex-
ship captain and a prominent merchant.59
None of the deponents favoring Lillie’s side were impartial. Belcher and Fifield had 
strong ties to Lillie through investments in vessels and transatlantic trade. Lillie employed 
Arnold and Emmes, and their participation in the London trade placed them one step below 
merchant status. Like Belcher before them, the two ship captains likely hoped to retire from the 
sea to join the growing merchant-elite of Boston.60 The court clearly knew the bias of these men 
and called upon ship captains Thomas Gilbert, Stephen Day, Thomas Graffort, and Jacob Green 
to testify. The court asked one simple question: was “it customary in time of war for Masters of 
Ship’s to allow the men a Doctor and the owners to pay the Doctor, Provision, & nurses if any be 
sick.” The four captains replied, “it is of late made a custome upon necessity.” The court also 
ordered three prominent merchants, Thomas Foxcroft, Nathaniel Oliver, and Timothy Clarke, to 
examine Hasket’s accounts for inaccuracies. The merchants found the accounts to be “rightly 
drawne” but refrained from commenting on whether or not the charges were “just,” as “the said 
order” did not direct them “to give our opinion.” After reviewing the evidence, the jury decided 
in favor of Hasket, fair treatment of seafarers, and maritime custom.61
The court’s decision did not negate the fact that Lillie, Mason, and their compatriots won 
an important victory in their efforts to change Boston’s commercial culture to reflect that of 
59 Depositions of Barachiah Arnold, July 2, 1695, Andrew Belcher, July 6, 1695, Giles Fifield, July 5, 1695, and 
Benjamin Emmes, July 4, 1695, Mass Arch., 62: 56, 61-62, and 195.   
60 For collaboration in building and outfitting ships see, Lloyd Vernon Briggs, History of Shipbuilding on North 
River, Plymouth County, Massachusetts (Boston: Coburn Brothers, 1889), 337.  
61 Testimony of Thomas Gilbert, Stephen Day, Thomas Graffort, and Jacob Green, undated, Mass. Arch., 62: 60; 
Francis Foxcroft, Nathaniel Oliver, and Timothy Clarke to the Honorable Kings Justices of the Inferior Court of 
Common Pleas, July 5, 1695, Mass. Arch., 62: 194; Samuel Lillie v. Elias Hasket (1695) SCCCPRB, 1692-1701.  
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London’s. They had successfully made Hasket’s life miserable for negotiating with his sailors 
and considering their well-being when threatened by impressment and disease. In London, 
Stephen Mason refused to aid Hasket because of the shortfall in remittances, hindering the 
captain’s attempts to finish his voyage and pay his crew. Mason then sent a letter to Barachiah 
Arnold before he left London for Boston, insinuating that Hasket had financially “abused” Lillie 
and Mason. He informed Arnold that he had a writ against Hasket and directed him to “assist 
what you can in getting him [Hasket] on shore & discerning where he is that the writ may take 
place.” Lillie sued Hasket in May of 1695. For the next two months, the peak of Boston’s 
outbound shipping, the lawsuit forced Hasket to remain unemployed while awaiting trial. By this 
point, Hasket may have regretted his efforts on behalf of his crew. With so many high profile 
merchants and ship captains involved, details of the case likely spread across the waterfront 
community. Ship captains now understood that they, too, would face similar treatment from 
some Boston merchants if they succumbed to the wartime demands of seafarers for protection 
from impressment and doctors.62
* * * 
 Impressment in Boston, England, and the West Indies during the late seventeenth and 
early eighteenth centuries tore many Boston seafarers from the comfort of home, relatives, and 
friends. They suffered the loss of liberty and great hardships to protect the interests of political 
and merchant elites in England and at home – an “Evil Necessity” as it has been called. If they 
made it home at all, these impressed men shared in the common experience of transatlantic 
seafarers. Some maritime historians have been too quick to overlook the cultural and social 
62 Stephen Mason to Captain Barachiah Arnold, December 25, 1694, Mass. Arch., 62: 16; Lillie v. Hasket (1695) 
SCCCPRB, 1692-1701.   
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ruptures caused by impressment for New England’s alleged young and part-time seafarers. More 
importantly, seafarers in Boston knew that local elites had no qualms with legal impressment or, 
as was the case of Governor Phips, illegal impressment. Their labor and bodies instead 
represented a commodity for which the Royal Navy, colonial governors, and merchants 
competed and used.  
 Like all Atlantic seafarers, Boston sailors did their utmost to resist impressment and 
cooperated to turn difficult wartime conditions to their advantage. They fought press gangs 
ashore and in the harbor of Boston and foreign ports. They sought refuge in nearby Rhode Island. 
In the West Indies or England, Boston seafarers fled into the countryside and hid. From ship 
captains and merchants, Boston seafarers negotiated higher wages, medical treatment, and 
protection from press gangs. They deserted en masse when the prospect of impressment at the 
end of a voyage increased. Or they deserted to receive higher wages by the run rather than a 
monthly wage. Some of Boston’s most elite merchants countered these costs by harassing ship 
captains who allowed seafarers increased perquisites during King William’s War. Although 
unsuccessful, these repugnant tactics encouraged ship captains to look after the interests of 
merchants rather than the interests of their crews.    
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4.0 BOSTON AND PIRATES 
For much of the seventeenth century, pirates and privateers confidently sailed into Boston rich 
with Spanish or Portuguese gold and silver and found a warm welcome. They outfitted their 
ships, enlisted additional crew members, sold stolen goods, and rubbed elbows with Boston’s 
political and economic elites. Boston, like many North American and West Indies ports, relied 
heavily on the pirates’ gold and silver. It allowed Boston to escape from a specie-scarce 
economy and reliance on cash flows from newly arrived immigrants from England. This was 
especially important during that later half of the seventeenth century when immigration declined 
drastically. Boston’s 1689 revolution, King William’s War and the subsequent widespread use of 
English credit arrangements, the ship outfitting and building industries, expansion of trade routes 
and shipping, and the wage-based logwood trade, however, transformed the port’s relationship 
with Atlantic and Indian Ocean pirates and privateers. With these major economic, political, and 
social changes, Boston became the New World’s torchbearer of England’s strategy to eradicate 
piracy and limit the opportunities of common seamen.  
Historians of piracy have underestimated Boston’s importance in producing the 
emergent capitalist economic system that led to the alienation of seafarers and the eruption of 
piracy in 1716.1 Boston, even more than the sugar and tobacco planters of the West Indies and 
Chesapeake, required stable, predictable trade routes with a docile maritime labor force. 
Furthermore, Boston had by far the largest merchant fleet in the Americas and had the most to 
1  Hugh Rankin, The Golden Age of Piracy (New York: Holt, Rhinehart and Winston, INC., 1969); Robert C. 
Ritchie, Captain Kidd and the War Against the Pirates (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 
1986); Peter Earle, The Pirate Wars (New York: Thomas Dunne Books, 2003); Marcus Rediker, Villains of all 
Nations: Atlantic Pirates in the Golden Age (Boston: Beacon Press, 2004); Joel Baer, Pirates (Great Britain: 
Tempus, 2007); Colin Woodard, The Republic of Pirates (New York: Harcourt, 2007); For a study that focuses on 
pirates in New England but does not distinguish Boston’s unique relationship with pirates and privateers, see, 
George Francis Dow and John Henry Edmonds, The Pirates of the New England Coast (1923: reprint, New York: 
Dover Publications, 1996).   
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lose when pirates began attacking English shipping. Beginning in the mid-1690s, political and 
religious authorities in the port swiftly moved to prosecute pirates and their benefactors in 
Boston. By the early 1700s, they sought to capture and hang pirates as a warning to the entire 
seafaring community. Pirates retaliated by singling out Boston and its vessels out for special 
vengeance. Indeed, the infamous pirate Ned Low, a direct product of Boston’s shipbuilding 
industry and Boston’s Bay of Honduras logwood trade, terrorized the port for two years, 
hindering trade and greatly damaging the economy. This chapter traces Boston’s journey from 
enthusiastically supporting a lawless Atlantic where English pirates commanded respect to their 
union with the “forces of law and order.”2
* * * 
Prior to the 1689 revolution, Boston was a haven for the Atlantic’s smugglers and pirates. 
Bostonians, like most Englishmen at the time, saw pirates and privateers like Francis Drake, 
John Hawkins, Walter Raleigh, or Henry Morgan as maritime heroes. These men had earned 
fame, knighthood, and wealth from their daring expeditions against and plunder of the Spanish in 
the New World. Religious leaders on both sides of the Atlantic sanctified their pillage and 
plunder, considering them God’s Protestant soldiers against Catholic nations in the West Indies 
and North America. Many English seafarers dreamt of becoming the next Drake or Morgan 
rather than laboring in the brutal and inglorious conditions on board Royal Navy, East India, 
Royal African Company, and merchant vessels.3
Seafarers in colonial waters had ample opportunity to escape such exploitative 
employment by deserting their previous employment or joining in privateering ventures. During 
2 Earle, The Pirate Wars, xi.  
3 Earle, The Pirate Wars, chap. 2; Rediker, Villains of all Nations, chap. 3.    
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wartime in the seventeenth century, colonial governors issued privateering commissions to 
anyone with a vessel promising to attack foreign shipping and willing to pay the governor’s fee. 
This commission, or letter of marque, constituted the primary difference between legal 
privateering and piracy. Many privateers simply ignored the contents of their commissions, 
conveniently looting any foreign nation’s vessel. Most, however, refused to attack English 
shipping and remained loyal to their homeland.4
The English Parliament, however, began to retreat from its swashbuckling heroes during 
the 1670s. England stationed warships in the West Indies and Chesapeake to hunt down pirates 
and privateers, chasing many of them into the lagoons of the Bay of Campeche. The rise of the 
Atlantic slave trade and English plantations in the West Indies and Chesapeake slowly changed 
the perspective of the restoration kings and English colonial policymakers. The future, as they 
began to see it, rested in stable trading lanes, English ships and seafarers, and the exchange of 
colonial commodities such as, sugar, tobacco, lumber, and fish for English textiles and 
manufactured goods. The growing merchant-planter class in the West Indies and Chesapeake 
also clamored for safer seas and a controlled maritime population to transport their goods. In 
response, parliament passed the Jamaica Act of 1683. This law outlawed trade with pirates and 
gave colonial governors and the Royal Navy greater incentives to hunt them down. These initial 
steps began a long campaign to turn colonial land and waters into a vehicle for English 
expansion and wealth for its political and mercantile elites.5
4 For desertion as a form of resistance see, Marcus Rediker, Between the Devil and the Deep Blue Sea: Merchant 
Seamen, Pirates, and the Anglo-American Maritime World, 1700-1750 (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Cambridge 
University Press, 1987); for privateering see, Carl E. Swanson, Predators and Prizes: American Privateering and 
Imperial Warfare, 1739-1748 (Columbia, SC: University of South Carolina Press, 1991), chap. 2.  
5 For policy shifts in London and rise in plantation slavery see, Edmund S. Morgan, American Slavery, American 
Freedom: The Ordeal of Colonial Virginia (New York: W.W. Norton, 1975), chap. 1 and Philip Curtin, The Rise 
and Fall of the Plantation Complex: Essays in Atlantic History (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998); for 
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Boston resisted England’s efforts to change the status quo in the Americas. Laws and 
decrees issued from faraway England had little impact on local sentiment. Many local politicians 
and religious leaders scoffed at threats from England and its blustering customs agent, Edward 
Randolph. When the Jamaica Act of 1683 was passed, the town blatantly ignored it, preferring to 
support the maritime predators that brought gold and silver into the port. In so doing, Boston 
ironically became a beacon for the Atlantic’s motley crew rather than England’s Godly Puritans.6
English officials in and around Boston desperately cast the wayward port in the worst 
possible light. During the summer of 1684, Governor Cranfield of New Hampshire wrote to 
William Blathwayt to complain about Boston’s disregard and disdain for the Jamaica Act of 
1683. Cranfield noted that Boston had received numerous visits from foreign privateers carrying 
Spanish gold and silver since the act had passed. Indeed, he argued that without action from 
England, “Boston would have been a receptacle for all the pirates in these western parts.” He 
desired the King to station a frigate permanently on the New England coast to apprehend these 
pirates/privateers and confiscate their cargoes. Cranfield regretted that he had no Man of War on 
hand to sail into Boston and seize the French privateer Michel Andreson, who had been invited 
by the Massachusetts governor, Simon Bradstreet, to outfit his storm-battered, leaking ship, La 
Trampeuse.7
 Andreson's arrival in Boston in 1684 set off a political firestorm and involved the port in 
complex, ambiguous international maritime affairs. Several Spanish prisoners fled the privateer, 
passage of the Jamaica Act see, Journal of Lords of Trade and Plantations, February 17, 1683, Public Record Office: 
Calendar of State Papers, Colonial: America and the West Indies, 45 vols. (London: Her/His Majesty's Stationery 
Office, 1860-1994), vol. 11 (1681-1685), no. 946 (hereafter cited as CSPC).  
6 For a good overview of the conflict between Boston and England, see, Richard R. Johnson, Adjustment to Empire: 
The New England Colonies, 1675-1715 (United States of America: Rutgers University Press, 1981), 17-36. 
7 Governor Cranfield to William Blathwayt, 29 August 1684, and William Dyre to Sir Leoline Jenkins, 12 
September 1684, CSPC, vol. 11 (1681-1685), nos. 1851 and 1862. 
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spreading news of its arrival and the wealth taken from Spanish and Dutch ships as far as New 
Hampshire and Rhode Island. Some reports indicated the ship held over 100,000 pieces of eight. 
Like Governor Cranfield, Boston’s newly appointed customs agent, William Dyre, drooled over 
the prospect of seizing La Trampeuse’s cargo. When the ship docked in Boston, he accosted one 
of the Spanish prisoners, Augustino Gonsalvo, and acquired a written testimony that Andreson 
had committed piracy in the West Indies. Dyre then seized La Trampeuse “as a pyrate, & 
presented a large libell against said Capt.” In so doing, Dyre infuriated local merchants who 
undoubtedly saw great opportunities for wealth in repairing and supplying the vessel. The 
prominent Boston merchant, Samuel Shrimpton, threatened to have Dyre’s “brains beat out.” He
also aided Andreson in removing the ship to Noodles Island, “the place and receptacle of all 
piratical and uncustomed goods,” far from the greedy hands of the customs agent. Shrimpton’s 
assistance did not go unrewarded. Andreson gave him gold, silver, jewels, and cacao for his 
willingness to defy Dyre.8
Dyre’s contention that Andreson had committed piracy, however, rested on shaky 
ground. France and Spain were at war and Andreson had a valid French privateering 
commission, which made Gonsalvo’s accusation suspect. Aggrieved parties commonly 
considered privateers lawless and merciless pirates even though all the maritime nations relied 
on them to disrupt their enemies’ merchant shipping and help pay for the war effort. Dyre 
therefore accused Andreson and his crew of being Dutch and seizing two Dutch slave ships 
trading with the Spanish, a clear act of piracy. The customs agent also believed Andreson had 
stolen two or three hogshead of sugar from English ships he met near Havana. Andreson’s exotic 
8 Deposition of Alonzo Lopez, Suffolk County Supreme Judicial Court Files (hereafter cited as SCSJCF), 
Massachusetts State Archives (hereafter cited as MSA), case no. 2251; Simon Bradstreet to Edward Randolph, 
December 8, 1684, Robert Toppan, ed., Edward Randolph: Including His Letters and Official Papers from the New 
England, Middle, and Southern Colonies in America, 7 vols. (Boston, 1898), 3:336-340; William Dyre to Sir 
Leoline Jenkins, September 12, 1684, CSPC, vol. 11 (1681-1685), no. 1862.  
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crew also drew the attention of the customs agent. Dyre sent a list of the 198 man crew to 
London, which included, he pointedly noted, “French, Scotch, Dutch, English, Spaniards, 
Portugals, Negroes, Indians, Mullattos, Swedes, Irish, Jersey men, and New Englanders.” 
Boston’s leading men, however, warmly welcomed this dangerously motley crew for the 
economic benefits they provided the local community. These worldly privateers also handled 
Boston’s local legal and religious customs well and thus behaved with dignity while in port. The 
colonies had far more to fear from England’s beacons of order – the arrogant and unruly officers 
and crews of the Royal Navy.9
To delay Dyre and separate reality from fiction, Boston's Court of Assistants interrogated 
crew members and three Spanish seafarers/prisoners about Michel Andreson’s actions in the 
West Indies. The court questioned Augustino Gonsalvo about his written claim that Andreson 
was a pirate. They asked the basic but difficult question: “What is the difference between a 
Privateer and a Pirate?” to which the Spanish prisoner this time truthfully replied, “I was never 
upon any such designs and know not well the difference but have heard say Capt. Michael was a 
privateer.” Gonsalvo also confessed that his sworn testimony for Dyre had been written for him 
and that he did not know its contents. The court then asked all deponents if Andreson had fired 
shots at or stolen any goods from English vessels. They answered the first part of the question in 
the negative; however, they verified that two hogsheads of sugar came on board La Trampeuse
from an English ship but failed to speculate on whether or not Andreson paid for the sugar. For 
his part, Andreson claimed the English captains presented the sugar as a gift after the privateer 
captain had entertained them. It seems unlikely Andreson would have pirated two hogsheads of 
9 Deposition of William Dyre, September 15, 1684, SCSJCF, MSA, case no. 2251; William Dyre to Sir Leoline 
Jenkins, 12 September 1684, CSPC, vol. 11 (1681-1685), no. 1862.  
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sugar from the English when he already had legally looted over 100,000 pieces-of-eight from the 
Spanish and Dutch.10
The porous line between pirate and privateer enabled men like Andreson to enter Boston 
and confidently declare himself “innocent of the breach of any of the laws of this place.” His 
diverse crew had knowledge of the various locations around the Atlantic and his New England 
crew members undoubtedly informed him of Boston’s open policy towards pirates/privateers. 
Boston maintained the facilities, materials, and specialists necessary to outfit a badly damaged 
and large vessel like La Trampeuse. They also needed Spanish pieces of eight, which served as 
the primary means of exchange for the growing port town. Most importantly, Boston, for the 
moment, retained its independence from a permanently stationed Royal Navy vessel. Unlike 
Dyre, a Royal Navy ship captain could have seized La Trampeuse prior to its docking in Boston. 
The Royal Navy frigate could have then exerted military pressure on Boston’s merchant 
community and political leaders – hence, Governor Cranfield’s wistful desire for a stationed 
frigate in Boston. Happily for Andreson, Dyre lacked authority and Cranfield lacked a frigate. 
The decision therefore rested in the hands of Boston’s governor and the Court of Assistants. The 
court saw “no ground to put said Andreson upon trial for Piracy but do allow him liberty to 
proceed with his business.”  Once again, Boston upheld an Atlantic world favorable to free 
maritime workers rather than accede to customs officials and England’s laws.11
Andreson’s release added to the chorus of complaints from English officials about 
Boston’s hospitality to pirates, privateers, and smugglers. As Governor Cranfield intimated in his 
10 Depositions of Michel Andreson, David Evans, Charles Fayerweather, Claes Symonson, Alonzo Lopez, 
Augustino Gonsalvo, and Miguel de la Torre, September 19, 1684, SCSJCF, MSA, case no. 2251.  
11 Michel Andreson’s Address to Simon Bradstreet and Court of Assistants, September 19, 1684 and the Court’s 
Judgment, September 25, 1684, SCSJCF, MSA, case no. 2251; For more on privateers and pirates in Boston, see, 
Curtis P. Nettels, The Money Supply of the American Colonies before 1720 (1934: reprint, New York: Augustus M. 
Kelley, 1964) 87-89 and 87n.93.  
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letter to William Blathwayt, England would no longer tolerate Boston’s independent decision-
making regarding the Atlantic maritime world. Even before La Trampeuse departed, rumors that 
Boston’s beloved Charter of 1629 had been annulled crossed the Atlantic. Reports also indicated 
that Boston would serve as a way station for frigates travelling to the West Indies and, even more 
ominously, host one or two Royal Navy frigates. Edward Randolph, Boston’s customs agent 
from 1678-1683, had lobbied Parliament and the King for years to subdue Boston through a 
show of naval force. He maintained that Bostonians would not submit to English authority 
“unless they have Some awe upon them,” which, he continued, “a first rate frigott or any vessel 
under his Majesties flag will sufficiently answear.” Randolph was therefore delighted to learn in 
October of 1685 that he would be returning to Boston on board the fifth-rate frigate H.M.S. Rose
Frigate. He finally had the means to suppress Boston’s trade with pirates and smugglers. All 
annoying complaints from merchants could be silenced with a show of force. The unfortunate 
customs official failed to realize that the officers and crew on board the H.M.S. Rose had more in 
common with pirates than haughty colonial officials.12
From 1690 onward, Boston’s interactions with privateers and pirates became increasingly 
guarded and hostile. After the 1689 revolution, Boston elites sought approval from King William 
III’s government to obtain a new charter with limited restrictions on their local power. This 
entailed whole-heartedly joining William III’s crusade against the French and shunning the 
maritime community it had long supported. It also meant alienating its young men through 
approval and adoption of Royal Navy impressment practices discussed in the previous chapter. 
Boston’s new economic foundation would rest in English credit and commodities, the Atlantic 
logwood trade, and the ship outfitting and building industries. The port shifted its legal 
12 Randolph to Jenkins, July 26, 1683, Edward Randolph, 3:249.  
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institutions from supporting privateers and pirates like Michel Andreson to prosecuting them to 
the fullest extent of the law. As the last decade of the seventeenth century came to a close, 
Boston meticulously and dutifully enacted the new tools England provided to destroy piracy 
even as other colonial ports such as New York, Newport, and Philadelphia actively competed to 
replace Boston as “the common receptacle of pyratts of all nations.”13
The arrival of the Rose in 1686 and the formation of the Dominion Government under 
Edmund Andros thwarted Boston’s trade with privateers and pirates, forcefully disconnecting 
Boston from its suppliers of gold and silver. John Palmer noted after the revolution, Andros 
“diligently obstructed” Boston’s “constant and profitable correspondence with Foreigners and 
Pyrates … which was very disagreeable to many Persons who had even grown old in that way of 
Trade.” Edward Randolph further remarked, “They are restrained from setting out privateers who 
for many yeares together robbed the Spanish West Indies and brought great bootyes to Boston; 
and also they durst not during the Governour's time, harbour pyratts.” Palmer and Randolph 
maintained that the economic duress many in Boston faced from the end of this trade to be a 
“chief cause of the Revolution.” Of course, such petty reasons for the revolution suited their 
agenda to mock Boston’s claims that it supported English law and order. Nevertheless, the 
pervasive discourse and ample evidence connecting Boston to pirates plagued the port’s 
defenders. Boston’s elites made the easy decision to do their utmost to halt blatant political and 
mercantile ties with pirates, as continuing to consort with them would only reinforce their 
enemies’ position.14
13 Edward Randolph to the Lords of Trade, May 29, 1689, in Edmund B. O’Callaghan, ed., Documents Relative to 
the Colonial History of the State of New York (Albany: Weed, Parsons and Company, 1854), 3: 578-583. 
14 Ibid.; John Palmer, An Impartial Account of the State of New England: Or, the Late Government there, Vindicated 
(London, 1690) in The Andros Tracts, ed. W. H. Whitmore, 3 vols. (Boston, 1868-74), 1: 41; Anonymous, A Short 
Discourse Shewing The great Inconvenience of joyning the Plantation Charters with those of England in The Andros 
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Boston turned away from piracy at its most lucrative moment. Colonial officials 
estimated that the Indian Ocean pirate crews under the command of Thomas Tew and Henry 
Every returned to American colonies with £1,000 to £1,500 pounds each. Some of this wealth 
found its way to Boston through Newport, Rhode Island, where Boston merchants had 
connections, but New York, Newport, and Philadelphia benefitted the most from the Indian 
Ocean pirates. As the 1690s progressed, New York in particular dominated the Indian Ocean 
pirate trade. Governor William Fletcher welcomed pirate crews and granted privateering 
commissions, which eventually led to his recall by parliament and the installation of the anti-
pirate governor, the Earl of Bellomont. Meanwhile, powerful New York merchants such as 
Frederick Philipse and Stephen Delancy sent their ships to St. Mary’s in Madagascar, where the 
pirates had a base of operations. They supplied the pirates with guns, powder, clothes, and, most 
importantly, alcohol. In return, they received stolen gold, silver, and precious commodities from 
Mughal and European ships. They also acquired African slaves captured by the pirates. Historian 
Robert C. Ritchie contends that New York’s economic stability and growth during the last 
decade of the seventeenth century was driven by this illicit trade with pirates.15
American pirates’ migration to the Indian Ocean and the coast of Portuguese Brazil had 
unfortunate consequences for England’s political and mercantile elites. Portugal had recently 
become a staunch ally of England and the East India Company had important but tenuous trade 
relations with the Mughal Empire. The new breed of pirates, however, presented Boston elites 
with an opportunity to demonstrate to London politicians and trade partners that their economic 
Tracts, 2: 137-147. Samuel Shrimpton may have continued to trade with pirates see, G.B. Warden, Boston: 1689-
1776 (Boston and Toronto: Little, Brown and Company, 1970), 9.  
15 Rankin, The Golden Age of Piracy, 56; James G. Lydon, “New York and the Slave Trade, 1700 to 1774” The 
William and Mary Quarterly vol. 35 no. 2 (Apr., 1978): 375-394, 376; James S. Leamon, “Governor Fletcher’s 
Recall,” The William and Mary Quarterly vol. 20, no. 4 (Oct., 1963), 527-542; Deposition of Adam Baldridge May 
5, 1699 in John Franklin Jameson ed., Privateering and Piracy In the Colonial Period: Illustrative Documents (New 
York, New York: Augustus M. Kelly, 1970), 183-186; Ritchie, Captain Kidd, 37.  
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reliance on pirates and smugglers had ended. For example, in May of 1693, Boston chased local 
privateer, smuggler, and future Indian Ocean pirate, Thomas Wake, out of the community for 
smuggling indigo from the Bahamas. Wake fled to Newport, Rhode Island in a sloop with five 
others after threatening to “pistol” any man that tried to “stop her.”16
In their quest to win Parliament’s approval, Boston authorities had turned a smuggler into 
a pirate. At Newport, Wake outfitted his sloop and gathered a large crew before setting sail for 
the Indian Ocean. Once there, he joined a large pirate fleet under the command of Henry Every 
with roughly 440 men. Every had glorious plans to attack the gold and silver-laden Mughal 
pilgrimage fleet sailing from Mocha in present day Yemen and returning to Surat, India. The 
pirates waited for over a month but the Mocha fleet slipped by them during night. Every and his 
compatriots gave chase for two weeks before finally catching their prize. They seized two 
vessels from the pilgrimage fleet, one of them, the Ganji-i-sawai, was owned by the Mughal 
emperor. The actions of Every, Wake, and the other Indian Ocean pirates involved in the assault 
detonated a political explosion that had significant consequences for future Indian Ocean pirates 
and the American colonies. Boston, because of Wake, found itself a primary target of 
Parliament’s wrath.17
Ironically, contemporary English politicians and historians today have frequently pointed 
to Wake as an example of a Boston pirate in the Indian Ocean and therefore the town’s continued 
support of and responsibility for Indian Ocean piracy. In January 1697, the Council of Trade 
erroneously informed Lieutenant-Governor Stoughton, “One [pirate ship] Commanded by 
Thomas Wake was fitted out from Boston. They Build their Ships there. The money they bring is 
16 Depositions of John Foster, Nathaniel Byfield, and Robert Shelton, August 22, 1694, Massachusetts Archives 
Collection, 328 vols. (hereafter cited as Mass. Arch.), 61: 476-477, 480-481, and 483.     
17 Baer, Pirates, chap. 4.   
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Current there.” Many Indian Ocean pirates may have originated in Boston but not with support 
from elites. As Stoughton responded to the Council, “They [pirates] find more countenance and 
better entertainment in other places. Pirates know that they are obnoxious to the Government 
here, which has passed an Act against piracy, and to the people in general.” In a back-handed 
chastisement of the Council, Stoughton continued, “Nevertheless I thank you for your incitement 
to watchfulness on such occasions as may wipe off any reflections unjustly cast upon 
Massachusetts in that regard [supporting pirates].” The Council had offended Boston’s political 
elites who had worked hard to erase their town’s poor reputation. Boston’s harsh dealings with 
pirates in the future may have been, in part, influenced by the Council’s mistaken beliefs.18
In late October 1698, Boston proved their zealous support of the suppression of piracy 
when authorities seized John Devin, Every’s surgeon, who had bravely travelled to Boston, his 
home. Devin had already been through a farcical trial in the Bahamas for piracy and received a 
certificate declaring his innocence. The pirate therefore knew he had little to fear in Boston 
where the court could not charge Devin twice for the same crime without new evidence. There 
was no option but to recognize the certificate because “in the sd Court at Providence, 
Proclamation was made, and nothing of further charge or Evidence appearing against the sd Jno. 
Devin.” Captain Every, as A General History of the Pyrates noted, may have also entertained the 
notion of making Boston his home but its politicians’ hostile stance towards pirates put him off 
the idea: “because a great deal of his Wealth lay in Diamonds; and should he have produced 
18 Whitehall to Lieutenant-Governor Stoughton, January 20, 1697, Mass. Arch., 62: 154-163, quote at 162-63; 
Lieutenant Governor Stoughton to Council of Trade and Plantations, September 30, 1697, CSPC, vol. 14 (1693-
1696), no. 1354.   
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them there [Boston], he would have certainly been seiz’d on Suspicion of Pyracy.” Hence he 
settled in Ireland.19
Every wisely understood that power in Boston had shifted to politicians and merchants 
with links to England. The infamous pirate hunter turned pirate, Captain William Kidd, however, 
was not so prudent or fortunate. Kidd had followed in Every’s footsteps, seizing vast fortune in 
the Indian Ocean and infuriating the Mughal Emperor. In the summer of 1699, he mistakenly 
believed he would find succor in Boston even though he had been warned in the West Indies to 
avoid the port. Bostonians lured Kidd into capture with false promises. He remained incarcerated 
for nine months as he awaited transportation to London. Once in London, Kidd endured a highly 
public trial, further imprisonment, and a hanging at Execution Dock. Parliament and East India 
Company officials hoped that Kidd’s death would appease the “Great Mogull” Emperor and 
normalize trade relations.20 Shortly thereafter, in 1701, the English navy attacked St. Mary’s, the 
pirate base on Madagascar, and successfully destroyed it. The Lords of Trade committed 
additional warships to New York to aid the governor, Lord Bellomont, in suppressing the pirate 
trade there. With the Kidd affair, Boston had admirably fulfilled its duty in punishing seafaring 
men for disrupting lucrative trade routes, further distinguishing itself from other North American 
port cities.21
19 Certificate for John Devin (Bahamas), September (?) 20, 1698 and Certificate for John Devin (Massachusetts), 
October 25, 1698, in Jameson ed., Privateering and Piracy, 178-179; Daniel Defoe (Charles Johnson), A General 
History of the Pyrates, Manuel Schonhorn ed.,  (New York: Dover Publications, 1999), 55-56. 
20 Ritchie, Captain Kidd, chap. 8 and 9; P. Bradley Nutting, “The Madagascar Connection: Parliament and Piracy, 
1690-1701,” The American Journal of Legal History Vol. 22, No. 3 (Jul., 1978): 202-215; Diary of Cotton Mather, 
vol. 1: 1681–1709; vol. 2: 1709–24, ed. Worthington Chauncey Ford (New York: Frederick Ungar Publishing Co., 
1957), 1:331; Paul Lorrain, A True Account of the Behavior, Confession and Last Dying Speeches of Captain 
William Kidd (London, 1701); London Post, 23–26 May 1701.  
21 Lords of Trade to Lord Bellomont, Whitehall London, January 5, 1700 and Bellomont to the Board of Trade, 
November 28, 1700, in Docs. Rel. Col. Hist. N-Y., 4: 454 and 792.  
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Boston’s support of London-based policies aimed at controlling a wayward maritime 
population represented a significant realignment for the entire Atlantic World. Prior to this shift, 
the English American colonies lacked a strong beacon of law and order. This enabled many 
seafarers the opportunity to earn a higher standard of living than when operating in European 
waters, using to their own advantage piracy, privateering, smuggling, the logwood trade, and 
higher wages on colonial merchant vessels. Boston’s transition to a credit and commodity-based 
economy reliant on the goodwill of English merchants signified the end of such opportunity. 
Common seamen in Boston now faced new policies, laws, institutions like the vice-admiralty 
court, and profit-seeking attitudes that mirrored experiences in London. Cotton Mather, however, 
blamed seafarers for the growing animosity, noting in 1711, “SAILORS who ought to be the 
Best men in the World, how Bad are very many of them! And it is now generally said, That tho’ 
all the World knows they have had cause little enough, they have in the Last Ten years 
notoriously grown worse and worse [my emphasis].” Mather correctly identified the turn of the 
century as the origin of differences between Boston and common sailors but failed to recognize 
that Boston had changed far more than had sailors.22
In the early eighteenth century, Boston seafarers continued to act under previously 
accepted norms that recognized ambiguity in maritime affairs and benefited both colonial 
officials and the maritime community. They expected decent treatment and pay for fighting the 
enemies of England and Massachusetts. With the declaration of war against France in 1702, 216 
Boston sailors readily volunteered to join three privateer vessels preparing to support English 
efforts in the West Indies. Two of the ship captains, John Halsey and Thomas Larrimore, were 
well-known figures in the maritime community, having gained a good reputation among sailors 
22 Cotton Mather, Compassions Called For: An Essay Occasioned by Some Miserable Spectacles, (Boston, 1711), 
41-42.  
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as successful privateers during King William’s War. In a truly patriotic act, Larrimore and his 
crew agreed to serve in the West Indies as an English military company. Governor Dudley 
remarked that Larrimore’s reputation drew in the best crew available. Many of the volunteers 
who joined Larrimore’s and Halsey’s crews lived in Boston and some had participated in the 
logwood trade prior to the war. These volunteers undoubtedly expected rich rewards for their 
service, similar to their experience during the last war. The privateer ventures, however, did not 
go forward in the manner that the Massachusetts government, privateer captains, or the enlisted 
men envisioned.23
Once they arrived in Jamaica, the Boston privateers learned that loyalty to country and 
being “good Englishmen” required service without pay. Larrimore’s crew served in the West 
Indies and then Newfoundland for over a year and received nothing but food and drink. They 
suffered disease, hunger, injury, and a death rate of 67%. Governor Dudley sympathized with 
their plight but also refused to pay the crew when they returned to Boston in December of 1703. 
He claimed the English government owed them their wages and made a symbolic gesture by 
writing London to request the money. Larrimore loathed the injustice wrought upon his crew. He 
gathered his remaining men, angered Boston authorities by smuggling aboard seven pirates from 
John Quelch’s crew, and set sail from Boston with the intent to recoup their wages through 
piracy. Boston rewarded Larrimore’s service by capturing and packing him off to London for 
trial. Perhaps they feared a trial in Boston due to Larrimore’s popularity. Disillusionment with 
Boston did not end with Larrimore’s crew. In 1706, John Halsey’s New England-based crew 
turned pirate in Indian Ocean waters. Halsey’s brigantine appears to have been hijacked by the 
23 Crew Lists of the brigantine Hannah and Mary (Thomas Waffe, Master), brigantine Adventure (John Halsey, 
Master), and sloop Flying Horse (Thomas Larrimore, Master), Mass. Arch., 62: 416-418; “Thomas Larrimore’s 
Company” in Publications of the Colonial Society of Massachusetts, Transactions, vol. 18 (Boston: Colonial 
Society of Massachusetts, 1917), 84-93.  
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rambunctious crew but he figuratively remained captain and was much beloved by his crew until 
his death on St. Mary’s, Madagascar. Larrimore’s and Halsey’s crews represented the 
dissatisfaction and resistance of Boston seafarers towards new imperial policies enacted by the 
port and the politicians and merchants who treated them with disdain. 24
Boston authorities revealed to the seafaring community the full extent of their agreement 
with England’s new maritime policies in May of 1704 when the privateer captain, John Quelch, 
sailed into Marblehead laden with Portuguese silver and gold. Initially circumstances in 
Marblehead and Boston favored Quelch and his crew. The Boston News-Letter reported on May 
15, 1704 that “Captain Quelch in the Brigantine that Captain Plowman went out in, are said to 
come from New-Spain & have made a good Voyage.” The crew dispersed, with those from New 
England making their way home and English sailors headed to their favorite ports of call.25
Boston’s legal and mercantile community, however, delved into Quelch’s story and found that 
the silver and gold came from Portuguese ships, England’s new ally. Authorities acted 
decisively, apprehending and jailing Quelch and many of the footloose crewmembers. The vice-
admiralty court condemned Quelch and six others to hang as an example to the entire seafaring 
community but pardoned an unspecified number of pirates after they agreed to “join” the 
Queen’s Navy. This was one solution to Boston’s conflict with the Royal Navy over maritime 
labor and impressment. 26
Boston’s eminent religious leader, Cotton Mather, took center stage in leading the moral 
condemnation of the seven pirates. On June 27, 1704 Mather visited the pirates in prison to 
24 Governor Dudley to [the Earl of Nottingham?], December 19, 1704, in Publications of the Colonial Society of 
Massachusetts, Transactions, vol. 18, 91-92; Boston News-letter 24 July 1704; Defoe, A General History of the 
Pyrates, chap. 5, 465-471.   
25 Boston News-Letter, 15 May 1704. For a retraction of this statement see, Boston News-Letter, 22 May 1704. 
26 Dow and Edmonds, The Pirates of the New England Coast, chap. 7. 
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“Pray, preach, and Catechise” them in the hope of redeeming their souls before their hanging.27
Three days later the first legally sanctioned hanging of pirates under the Piracy Act of 1700 in 
North America occurred. Mather led the pirates in a public spectacle meant to demonstrate the 
united front of Boston’s legal, commercial, and religious leaders in persecuting unruly seafarers. 
The party walked “on Foot through Town, to Scarlets Wharff, where, the Silver Oar being 
carried before them, they went by Water to the place of Execution, being Crowded and thronged 
on all sides with Multitudes of Spectators.” Boston’s populace, including the many maritime 
laborers necessary to control the 100 to 150 boats in the Charles River, turned out to see the 
sordid exhibition. The boat carrying the pirates and Mather stopped “midway between Hudson’s 
point and Broughton’s Warehouse” and the pirates ascended the scaffold onto the gallows where 
executioners placed nooses around their necks. 28
These men objected under the older understanding of piracy and its place in the 
Massachusetts economy.29 Quelch, in his last words, conveyed his surprise and dismay that 
Boston had joined the imperial agenda to the detriment of the common seafarer: “When Lambert 
[one of Quelch’s fellow pirates] was Warning the Spectators to beware of Fal[se]-Company, 
Quelch Joyning [rejoined], ‘They should also take care how they brought Money into New-
England, to be Hanged for it.’” Another sailor, Erasmus Peterson, “cried of injustice done him; 
and said, it is very hard for so many mens Lives to be taken away for so little gold.” Some in 
Boston, probably sailors and other waterfront workers, agreed with the pirates. Governor Joseph 
27 M. Halsey Thomas ed., The Diary of Samuel Sewall, 2 vols. (New York, New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 
1973), 1: 509.    
28 Massachusetts, An Account of the Behaviour and Last Dying Speeches of the Six Pirates (Boston, 1704), 1; For a 
detailed account regarding the location and turn out for the execution see Sewall, Diary, 1: 509; For more on 
Mather’s role in Quelch’s execution, see, Steven J.J. Pitt, Cotton Mather and Boston’s ‘Seafaring Tribe’” New 
England Quarterly 85.2 (June, 2012): 232-235.     
29 Historian Marcus Rediker makes the argument that “a dialectic of violence” and “terror” occurred between the 
British Empire and pirates during the Golden Age of Piracy see, Rediker, Villains of all Nations, 13-16.  
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Dudley remarked to the Lords of Trade, “I should not have directed the printing of them 
[pamphlets] here, but to satisfy and save the clamour of a rude people, who were greatly 
surprised that any body should be put to death that brought in gold into the Province.” 
Nevertheless, Boston authorities showed no pity and the “scaffold was let sink.” The six bodies 
were left hanging over the Charles River as a visual warning to all sailors.30
Governor Dudley and Cotton Mather applauded the executions. Dudley boasted to the 
Council of Trade that the pirates’ “suffering will be long and hard” and he hoped the executions 
would “forever be a warning to such evill men here.” Mather, meanwhile, wrote in a sermon: 
“That a principal Person among the pirates now going to Dy, upon the Gallows, was in one of his 
former Voyages, Flouting and Railing against a Minister [likely Mather] in this place who had 
never deserved it.” In their public hanging of Quelch and his crew and in their subsequent 
defense of the act, Boston merchants, officials, and religious leaders resolutely demonstrated to 
the Atlantic seafaring community that orderly trade routes, cheap maritime labor, and English 
credit had their full allegiance. With this important and symbolic shift, Boston became the 
principal port in English America disciplining common seafarers to England’s new commercial 
order.31
 Boston had a unique responsibility for the eruption of Atlantic piracy that began in 1716 
and lasted until 1726. The port worked closely with London to stabilize trade in the American 
colonies for the benefit of merchants and plantation owners. From Newfoundland to the Bay of 
30 The seventh pirate, Francis King received “a reprieve from his Excellency” at the gallows; see Massachusetts, An 
Account of the Behaviour and Last Dying Speeches of the Six Pirates, 3; Governor Dudley to the Council of Trade 
and Plantations, July 25, 1705, CSPC, vol. 22 (1704-1705), no. 1274.  
31 Governor Dudley to the Council of Trade and Plantations, July 13, 1704, CSPC,  vol. 22 (1704-1705), no. 455; 
Cotton Mather, Faithful Warning to Prevent Fearful Judgments: Uttered in a brief Discourse Occasioned by a 
Tragical Spectacle in a number of miserables under a sentence of Death for PYRACY (Boston, Massachusetts: 
Timothy Green, 1704). 
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Campeche, Boston vessels, seafarers, and merchant capital drew frontier communities into 
England’s Atlantic network of credit and commodities. The economic basis of this system 
required cheap and controlled maritime labor. It also sought to limit the opportunities common 
seafarers gained from participating in privateering, the logwood trade, and piracy. Seafarers 
knew from Boston’s treatment of earlier English pirates and privateers like Wake, Kidd, 
Larrimore, Halsey, and Quelch that the port had fully committed to England’s vision of Atlantic 
commerce. This vision – and Boston’s implementation of it – turned many previously loyal 
seafarers into bitter enemies of Boston and the British Empire.  
In 1713 Boston merchants began sending large fleets of twenty or more large vessels into 
the Bay of Campeche, in modern-day Mexico, to obtain logwood to repay large debts to English 
merchants. They could not have foreseen that within three years their pursuit of a “cash crop” 
would ignite a decade of piracy. Historians have often argued that the end of Queen Anne’s War 
created massive unemployment among seafarers, generating the necessary conditions for the 
large pirate fleets of the Golden Age of Piracy. This chronology does not fully explain the 
eruption of piracy in 1716 and into 1717. As Chapter 5 describes in more depth, Boston’s 1714-
1715 logwood season armada led to a shortage of food in the Bay of Campeche that drove the 
local inhabitants to piracy. They launched an easily defeated attack on the nearby Spanish town 
of Campeche. The Spanish counterattacked throughout 1716, eventually destroying Triste and 
forever closing the Bay of Campeche to the English.32
Contemporaries recognized the end of this trade as one of the most important factors in 
the rise of piracy. One official noted that “most of them that first turn'd pirates” had “always 
sailed in these parts [American colonies] in privateers and lived in the Bay of Campechia.” Two 
32 Rankin, The Golden Age of Piracy, 82; Rediker, Villains of all Nations, 23. 
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other colonial officials recommended swift negotiation with the Spanish to reopen the Bay of 
Campeche to the English because it was “the most likely thing to divert them [the pirates] from 
their piratical courses” and it would help “to bring the pyrates to become good subjects.” 
Jeremiah Dummer of Boston remarked, “the Spaniards have at several times fallen upon our 
people whom they found cutting wood in the Bays beforementioned, and seiz'd their ships, 
whereby we have lost that trade; and the mariners who were employ'd in it to the number of 
3000, have since turn’d pirates and infested all our seas.” Dummer’s noteworthy assessment 
came from a position of authority, having lived in the major centers of the logwood trade, 
Boston, the Netherlands, and London. Interestingly, Dummer’s report on the 3,000 seamen who 
lost employment due to the end of the logwood trade closely matches the historians’ best 
estimates for how many pirates operated in the Atlantic during the first six years of the Golden 
Age. This is not to suggest all pirates were ex-logwood cutters or involved in the logwood trade 
– they were not – but rather that contemporaries understood how important unemployment was 
to the rise of Atlantic piracy and believed the logwood trade would solve the crisis.33
Boston’s intense exploitation of the Bay of Campeche logwood trade not only created 
favorable conditions for the rise of piracy in the West Indies but also provided pirates with 
recruits. The 200 Baymen who turned pirates due to food shortages and poverty in 1715 were 
some of the first willing or desperate enough to attack British shipping. Their subsequent actions 
led the Spanish to seize over 600 seafarers and logwood cutters in the Bay of Campeche, many 
of them from Boston ships. The Spanish disarmed the English seafarers and unleashed them on 
33 Extracts of several letters from Carolina, August 19, 1718, CSPC, vol. 30 (1717-1718), no. 660; Thomas Bernard, 
a Councillor of Jamaica, to John Chetwynd, a Commissioner for Trade and Plantations, Nicholas Lawes to Council 
of Trade and Plantations, December 6, 1719, and Jeremiah Dummer to the Council of Trade and Plantations, 
February 25, 1720, CSPC, vol. 31 (1719-1720), nos. 548, 479, and 578; Jeremiah Dummer, A Defence of the New 
England Charters (London: W. Wilkins, 1721), 11; For number of pirates see, Rediker, Villains of all Nations, 29-
30.    
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an unsuspecting Atlantic community. Governor Alexander Spotswood immediately recognized 
the potential threat the men posed, writing to England in July of 1716, “A nest of pirates are 
endeavouring to establish themselves at Providence and by the addition they expect of loose 
disorderly people from the Bay of Campeachy, Jamaica and other parts, may prove dangerous to 
British commerce, if not timely suppressed.”34
Spotswood’s concerns became a reality when many of the liberated seafarers and 
Baymen settled in the Bahamas where, as he related from depositions from men fleeing the 
islands, they helped populate the pirate base at Nassau. Their arrival in the Bahamas coincided 
with a major ideological shift among the freebooters. Ex-privateers like Benjamin Hornigold, 
John Jennings, and Philip Cockram refrained from attacking British and Dutch shipping and 
spent their energies on looting Spanish and French vessels. As news from London conveyed in 
early March 1717, “There’s Advice that several Pirates which have a Deaths Head at the Stern of 
their Ships, continue to infest the Spanish West Indies, and Pillage all Ships they meet, except 
the English, from whom they only take Provision.” At roughly the same time of this account, 
however, Sam Bellamy overthrew the command of Hornigold with promises to attack vessels 
from all nations. Desperate seafarers previously engaged in the exploitative logwood trade and 
Baymen turned pirate due to Boston’s overbearing presence in the Bay of Campeche had good 
reason to spurn national and imperial loyalties. Their presence in the pirate crews may have been 
a deciding factor in Bellamy’s success. John Brown, previously employed in the logwood trade, 
verified that vessels engaged in that trade provided pirates with many recruits. Shortly after 
departing Hornigold, Bellamy seized two ships heading to the Bay of Honduras. The two 
34 Boston News-letter 19 September 1715; Boston News-letter 10 October 1715; Boston News-letter 25 June 1716 
and 1 October 1716; Boston News-letter 1 April 1717; Boston News-letter 8 April 1717; Lt. Governor Spotswood to 
the Council of Trade and Plantations, July 3, 1716, CSPC, vol. 29 (1716-1717), no. 240; Earle, The Pirate Wars, 
161. 
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logwood ships provided twenty-seven new volunteers, bringing the total size of his crew to 120. 
In comparison, a Bristol ship trading with Jamaica only provided Bellamy with three new 
recruits.35
Bellamy’s multinational but primarily English crew represented the dispossessed 
seafaring men of the Atlantic economy: they were unemployed privateers, abused merchant 
seafarers, young men seeking adventure and fortune, ex-logwood cutters, and twenty-five ex-
slaves. The liberated crew “pretended to be Robbin Hoods Men” and, at least initially, “forced no 
Body to go with them, and said they would take no Body against their Wills.” Bellamy and his 
consort Paul Williams quickly acquired a notorious reputation in the West Indies by seizing 
English ships laden with precious commodities and bullion. Recognizing the danger of 
remaining in hostile waters, the two pirates designed to sail for Williams’ home of Rhode Island. 
Undoubtedly they expected to sell their stolen loot to some of Newport’s entrepreneurial 
merchants. Once on the North American coast, however, the waters abounded with colonial 
coasters and thus potential prizes. Bellamy had promised to allow the crew to seize English 
vessels and his position of authority would have been compromised if he failed to honor his 
pledge.36
The pirates immediately began seizing colonial vessels, many of them connected to or 
owned by Boston merchants. Bellamy and Williams captured a Rhode Island man, Captain Beer, 
in a Boston sloop. Although Bellamy desired to return the sloop to Beer, his crew objected and 
35 Lt. Governor Spotswood to the Council of Trade and Plantations, July 3, 1716, CSPC, vol. 29 (1716-1717), no. 
240; “London, March 19” Boston News-letter 22 July 1717; Examination of John Brown, May 6, 1717 in Jameson, 
Privateering and Piracy, 293-295; For the three major transitional phases during the Golden Age of Piracy see, 
Rediker, Villains of all Nations, 35-36.   
36 Trial of Simon Van Vorst and Others, October 1717 and Deposition of Ralph Merry and Samuel Roberts, 11 and 
16 May 1717 in Jameson, Privateering and Piracy, 303-306 and 301-302.  
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proceeded to sink the sloop. According to Captain Charles Johnson, Bellamy apologized to Beer 
for sinking the sloop but also berated the captain for serving his Boston masters:  
damn ye, you are sneaking Puppy, and so are all those who will submit to be governed by 
Laws which rich Men have made for their own Security, for the cowardly Whelps have 
not the Courage otherwise to defend what they get by their Knavery; but damn ye 
altogether: Damn them for a Pack of crafty Rascals, and you, who serve them, for a 
Parcel of hen-hearted Numskuls. They vilify us, the Scoundrels do, when there is only 
this Difference, they rob the Poor under the Cover of Law, forsooth, and we plunder the 
Rich under the Protection of our Courage. 
Bellamy’s crew members that had been employed in the logwood trade and certainly the 
enslaved Africans could attest to how the laws of England protected the mercantile thieves. 
Meanwhile, Newport, rather than trade with Bellamy, outfitted two vessels to seize his ship.37
Yet Bellamy’s crew caused their own demise. In late April 1717, shortly after releasing 
Captain Beer on Block Island, the crew “got themselves Drunk and Asleep,” which resulted in 
their ship’s, Whydah, disastrous shipwreck off the coast of Cape Cod. Bellamy had ordered 
seven seamen and a captured pilot to guide the Whydah through Cape Cod’s treacherous waters 
on board a captured pink. Bellamy followed with his drunken crew. The pilot of the pink was a 
locally born forced man. He saw that the pirates on the pink had also fallen into a drunken stupor 
and fatefully decided to guide the pink into the shoals. The entire crew abandoned the vessel and 
found refuge on a small island nearby. The seven pirates most responsible for the leading the 
Whydah to the gloomy depths of the Atlantic survived the “Breakers” but only two men out of 
the Whydah’s crew of 130 made it ashore alive. Boston authorities managed to seize and 
incarcerate all nine surviving pirates but one died in prison shortly thereafter.38
37 Boston News-letter, 6 May 1717; Defoe, A General History of the Pyrates, 586-587, quote at 587.     
38 Boston News-letter, 6 May 1717. 
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The depredations of Bellamy and other pirates now willing to attack English shipping 
triggered a flurry of terrified complaints to Parliament from merchants in the West Indies, North 
America, and England. By early summer of 1717, London politicians began planning the best 
course of action to deal with the growing threat. They decided the carrot-and-stick approach 
would be the most effective. As the stick, the Council of Trade and Plantations prepared a 
squadron of Royal Navy vessels for the express purpose of pirate hunting. They also approved a 
plan by Woodes Rogers to reduce Nassau and the Bahamas to a state of subservience to the 
English Crown. As the carrot, Council recommended that the king issue a general pardon to all 
the pirates operating in the Atlantic if they would surrender to colonial governors. The conditions 
for the pardon allowed the pirates to keep their stolen loot and included clemency for murder: 
“That where the murther is comitted in the pyracy, it was H.M. intention to pardon the murther 
so committed.” Rumors of this general pardon circulated the English Atlantic even as Boston and 
other major port cities held incarcerated pirates.39
Colonial governors and parliament faced another problem with their imprisoned pirates. 
The 1700 Act for the More Effectual Suppressing Piracy had expired with the death of Queen 
Anne. The colonies therefore technically no longer had the power to try and execute pirates. 
Governors in Barbados and New York sought to clarify how to deal with their prisoners with the 
Council of Trade. Governor Shute of Boston contacted the “Judge of the Court of Admiralty at 
home.” This common knowledge gave confidence to pirates held by colonial governments that 
life and freedom was a good possibility. Governor Lowther of Jamaica remarked that “their [the 
pirates] not being lyable to be try'd out of Great Britain for any robberies, murthers, or piracy's 
39 Mr. Burchett to Mr. Popple, March 4, 1717, Mr. Secretary Addison to the Council of Trade and Plantations, July 
15, 1717 and Mr. Secretary Addison to the Council of Trade and Plantations, July 19, 1717, CSPC, vol. 29 (1716-
1717), nos. 489, 649, 657, and 657i-vii.  
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they have or shall commit at sea” which “animates them to persist in their execrable villany’s.” 
Pirates reasonably concluded that the hassle involved with prosecuting pirates would discourage 
any action by colonial governments. In time, imprisoned pirates could be released or escape their 
confinement.40
The ambiguity of piracy laws in the colonies emboldened pirates to threaten colonial 
governments holding their brothers. The pirates correctly singled out Boston as the most likely 
colonial port exceeding its authority by prosecuting the pirates held there. According to Captain 
Thomas Fox, in July of 1717 pirates captured his vessel and “they Questioned him whether 
anything was done to the Pyrates in Boston Gaoll.” The captain replied that he did not know, to 
which the pirates countered “if the Prisoners Suffered they would Kill every Body they took 
belonging to New England.” In October of 1717, Edward Teach, also known as Blackbeard, 
made a similar threat, which circulated in the colonial newspapers: “One of our Pilates that was 
on board Teach the Pirates says that they very much threaten New-England men, in case any of 
their fellow Pirates suffer there, that they will revenge it on them.” Some historians have 
speculated that Teach left his long-time partner Benjamin Hornigold in Nassau to sail for North 
America with the sole purpose to attack Boston and rescue Bellamy’s crew from prison.41
Governor Samuel Shute and Boston authorities disregarded the pirates’ threats. In 
October of 1717, Shute received a tentative opinion from an Admiralty judge in London that he 
could prosecute the Bellamy’s crew under the old Piracy Act. Without waiting for confirmation 
or permission from the Council of Trade, he appointed a trial date, summarily found six of the 
40 Governor Lowther to Council of Trade and Plantations, July 20, 1717 and Governor Hunter to Council of Trade 
and Plantations, July 1717, CSPC, vol. 29 (1716-1717), nos. 661 and 690; Mr. Attorney and Mr. Solicitor General to 
the Council of Trade and Plantations, November 14, 1717 and Governor Shute to the Council of Trade and 
Plantations, June 26, 1718, CSPC, vol. 30 (1717-1718), nos. 201 and 575. 
41 Trial of Simon Van Vorst and Others, October 1717 in Jameson, Privateering and Piracy, 303-306; Woodard, The 
Republic of Pirates, 197.  
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pirates guilty, and sentenced them to death. The judgment must have come as surprise for the 
Bellamy’s crew because they, like most early pirate crews, they had very little English blood on 
their hands. Indeed not one of the testimonies against Bellamy’s crew in Boston accused the 
pirates of murder and often remarked that captured crews and captains were well-treated. More 
importantly, the legality of the trials and execution rested on questionable authority, which the 
pirates knew well. Nevertheless, on 15 November 1717, Boston raised the stakes in a high risk 
game of terror by publicly hanging the six members of Bellamy’s crew – the first pirates 
executed in a colonial port during the Golden Age. The hanging of these six pirates in Boston 
once again transformed the pirate community and politicized their subsequent actions.42
The murder of their brethren inflamed active pirate crews and, in particular, incited 
Edward Teach to seek vengeance. Teach sought out Boston-owned vessels and, after the 
execution of Bellamy’s crew, may have actively positioned his ship to hurt Boston’s most 
lucrative trade routes in the Bay of Honduras and North Carolina. In November of 1718, he 
seized a “great Ship” from Boston near St. Lucia commanded by Christopher Taylor. Teach 
locked Taylor in chains for twenty-four hours and allowed his crew to whip him in order to 
extract a confession about “what Money he had on board.” Afterwards, Teach burned the ship. 
Then, instead of sailing to Nassua to rejoin his old compatriot and leader Benjamin Hornigold, 
Teach along with his consort Stede Bonnet voyaged to the Bay of Honduras. Unlike later pirates 
that fled to the Bay of Honduras to avoid the Royal Navy vessels hunting them, Blackbeard had 
very little reason to enter the Bay unless he desired to further devastate Boston’s economy. As 
42 Governor Shute to the Council of Trade and Plantations, 26 June 1718, CSPC, vol. 30 (1717-1718), no. 575; Trial 
of Simon Van Vorst and Others, October 1717 in Jameson, Privateering and Piracy, 303-306.  
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will be discussed in Chapter 5, the Spanish fortification of Trist forced Boston merchants still 
willing to hazard the logwood trade to send their crews to the Bay of Honduras to cut wood.43
William Wyer, captain of the 400-ton ship Protestant Caesar, was one of the first 
Boston-owned vessels to re-engage in the logwood trade, setting sail from Boston in October 
1717.44 On the March 28, 1718, Wyer arrived on the outskirts of the Bay where he “espied a 
large Sloop which he supposed to be a Pirate.” Wyer and his crew mounted a valiant defense of 
the Protestant Caesar, which sent the pirate, Stede Bonnet, scurrying away for reinforcements. 
Wyer believed his bravery had ended the threat to his voyage and continued into the Bay of 
Honduras to cut his logwood. Roughly a week later, a pirate fleet of one large ship and four 
sloops sped towards the Protestant Caesar, which was anchored and loading logwood. Wyer 
“call’d his Officers and Men up on Deck asking them if they would stand by him and defend his 
Ship, they answered, if they were Spaniards they would stand by him as long as they had Life, 
but if they were Pirates they would not Fight.” When the crew discovered the pirate fleet 
included the sloop they had engaged the week prior, they, along with their officers and brave 
captain, deserted the ship without a fight.45
In 1716, the Protestant Caesar had been extremely lucky. It escaped the Spanish 
destruction of Trist and was the last vessel from the Bay of Campeche ever to enter Boston in 
April of 1717.46 Blackbeard, angry that Wyer would “brag when he went to New-England that he 
had beat a Pirate,” looted his ship for three days but released Wyer and his crew. He also “said 
he would burn his Ship because she belonged to Boston, adding he would burn all Vessels 
belonging to New-England for Executing the six Pirates at Boston.” Blackbeard understood that 
43 Boston News-letter, 18 August 1718 and 18 November 1717.   
44 “Entrances and Clearances,” Boston News-letter, 14 October 1717.  
45 Boston News-letter, 18 June 1718.  
46 “Entrances and Clearances,” Boston News-letter 22 April 1717 
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the loss of a 400-ton ship and its cargo of logwood hurt Boston and its merchant elites far more 
than killing or terrorizing the seafaring men employed by those merchants. To further 
demonstrate his point, Teach gave a captured Rhode Island captain, Thomas Newton, his sloop 
back “because she belonged to Rhode Island.” The massive ship, a testament to Boston’s wealth 
and power in the Atlantic World, however, could not escape the retribution of the people of the 
sea.47
Boston earned the wrath of not only Atlantic pirates but also the Council of Trade in 
London. Unlike the governments of Barbados and New York, Boston moved ahead with the trial 
and execution of its imprisoned pirates without full authority to do so. Governor Shute wrote the 
Council on November 9, 1717 to inform them that Bellamy’s crew had been tried and an 
execution planned. The Council did not read the letter until late February 1718 and their response 
suggested immense disapproval, “We take notice that eight pirates have been tryed, upon which 
we desire to know by virtue of what power those tryals have been.” Like pirates, the Council 
operated under the notion that the American colonies could no longer execute pirates under the 
Piracy Act of 1700.48
Boston’s actions threatened a year’s worth of planning on the Council’s part. Those 
schemes began to materialize just as Boston hanged Bellamy’s crew. On 5 September 1717, part 
of the Council’s plan to end piracy went into effect when King George I issued the Act of Grace. 
This proclamation pardoned all piracies before 5 January 1718 and gave the pirates until 5 
September 1718 to surrender. The pardon covered the piracies of Bellamy’s crew, which 
undoubtedly raised the ire of pirates like Blackbeard when they learned of the Act of Grace. 
47 Boston News-letter, 18 June 1718.  
48 Governor Shute to the Council of Trade and Plantations, November 9, 1717 and Council of Trade and Plantations 
to Governor Shute, March 6, 1718, CSPC, vol. 30 (1717-1718), nos. 193 and 419.   
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Boston likely knew about the pardon before they executed the six pirates.49 The Council of Trade 
therefore intended to play the carrot first but the stick was not far behind. Additional Royal Navy 
station ships began arriving in the colonies during the late fall and early winter of 1717. Then, on 
30 January 1718, the Council revived the Act for the More Effectual Suppressing of Piracy and 
began the process of sending commissions to colonial governors with the purpose of legalizing 
the trial and execution of pirates. London’s message to the pirates – accept the pardon or face 
increased force from the Royal Navy and the potential of death in colonial ports. With Boston’s 
preemptive and quasi-legal execution of Bellamy’s crew, pirates already had to fear death in 
colonial ports.50
Word of the general pardon arrived in Nassau near the end of December 1717. Colonial 
governors reported that news of the pardon delighted the pirates and there were many promises 
to accept. This was especially true of those pirates serving under Henry Jennings, Benjamin 
Hornigold, and Philip Cockram, who had discouraged their peers and refrained from attacking 
English vessels. Despite their enthusiasm, few pirates actually surrendered to colonial governors 
49 Some historians have argued that word of the pardon did not arrive in the colonies until 9 December 1717 with the 
publication of the king’s proclamation in the Boston News-letter; however, the rationale that this was “because no 
Royal Navy vessels” made the journey is faulty, see, Woodard, The Republic of Pirates, 358. Merchant vessels 
carried the vast majority of correspondence and brought the most current issues of London newspapers. The 
proclamation was published on September 5, 1717, which meant Boston could have easily received notification of it 
prior to executing Bellamy’s crew on November 15, 1717. Indeed the noted ship captain and writer Nathaniel Uring 
sailed from London in mid-September and arrived in Boston by November 4, 1717, see, Nathaniel Uring, A History 
of the Voyages and Travels of Captain Nathaniel Uring (London, 1726), 322-323 and “Entrances and Clearances,”
Boston News-letter, 4 November 1717. Thomas Lithered, a well-known and respected ship captain in the Boston to 
London trade, arrived with Uring. Lithered often carried “the latest News” from England and Europe, for example 
see, Boston News-letter, 18 June 1718. Additional vessels from England and London arrived the following week, 
see, “Entrances,” Boston News-letter, 11 November 1717. Cotton Mather’s execution sermon also hints that Boston 
officials were well aware of London’s plans for pirates: “and the Methods now taking by the British Crown for the 
Suppression of these Mischiefs [piracy] may be prospered,” see, Cotton Mather, Instructions to the Living, from the 
Conditions of the Dead (Boston, Massachusetts: John Allen, 1717), 37.     
50 For the Council of Trade’s plans regarding general pardon and King’s Proclamation thereof, see, Mr. Secretary 
Addison to the Council of Trade and Plantations, July 15, 1717, CSPC, vol. 29 (1716-1717), no. 649 and Post Boy 
(1695) (London, England), 14 September 1717; For renewal of the Act for the More Effectual Suppressing of Piracy
see, Council of Trade and Plantations to the King, September 18, 1717 and Order of Council, January 30, 1718, 
CSPC, vol. 30 (1717-1718), nos. 91 and 338.  
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because the power to pardon rested solely with the king. The pirates would therefore have to wait 
for their pardon from England and, after hearing about the fate of Bellamy’s crew, they were 
suspicious. Others, like Charles Vane and Edward England, had no intention of accepting the 
pardon and actively undermined the efforts of Jennings, Hornigold, and Cockram. Vane spent the 
month of May 1718 terrorizing Bermudians perhaps because Governor Bennet of Bermuda was 
among the most active governors attempting to persuade the pirates to accept the pardon.51
Still, pirates slowly began to surrender, entering most major colonial ports including 
Bridgetown, Barbados, Kingston, Jamaica, Charleston, South Carolina, Philadelphia, New York, 
and Newport. Conspicuously and for good reason, not a single pirate surrendered in Boston. In 
mid-March 1718, Peter Haywood of Jamaica conveyed optimism to the Council that the pardon 
had the desired effect, noting, “A considerable no. of the pyrates have come in and surrendred 
upon H.M. proclamation and more they assure me will as they find opportunities of vessels.” 
Governor Bennet also presented a hopeful assessment but warned the Council of Trade that 
many pirates from Nassau required an immediate pardon by colonial governors rather than King 
George I in order to surrender. Bennet feared if the Council did not act quickly the pirates would 
once again begin their depredations. Vane’s actions in the subsequent months strengthened those 
fears. The Council of Trade eventually heeded Bennet’s advice and provided commissions to 
colonial governors to pardon pirates.52
Governor Shute, meanwhile, painted a much bleaker picture than his counterparts in the 
West Indies. He received the letter from the Council of Trade questioning his authority to 
51 Lt. Governor Bennett to the Council of Trade and Plantations, February 3, 1718, Peter Heywood, Commander in 
Chief of Jamaica, to the Council of Trade and Plantations, February 7, 1718, and Capt. Hornigold and other pirates
to Peter Heywood, C. in C. of Jamaica, February 7, 1718, CSPC, vol. 30 (1717-1718), nos. 345, 357, and 357i.  
52 Peter Heywood, C. in C. of Jamaica, to the Council of Trade and Plantations, March 17, 1718 and Lt. Governor 
Bennett to the Council of Trade and Plantations, March 29, 1717, CSPC, vol. 30 (1717-1718), nos. 447 and 474.  
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execute Bellamy’s crew in June 1718 shortly after news arrived that Teach had burned Taylor’s 
“Great ship” and the 400-ton Protestant Caesar. With these captures in mind, Shute wrote to the 
Council defending his prosecution of the pirates. He also enlightened the Council that “The 
King's gracious Proclamation has not produced the hoped for effects; for the pirates still continue 
to rove on these seas; and if a sufficient force is not sent to drive them off our Trade must stop.” 
Shute’s assessment of the proclamation’s effectiveness sought to justify his proactive use of 
state-sponsored terror. Of course, without Boston’s execution of Bellamy’s crew the pardon may 
have been more successful. Boston’s trade certainly would not have suffered the vengeance of 
Blackbeard’s pirate fleet.53
Shute’s defense surprised the Council of Trade. They began an investigation into his 
claims, perhaps hoping to lay blame for the pardon’s apparent failure at his feet. The Council 
first contacted the admiralty judge, Sir Henry Penrice, whose opinion had led to Bellamy’s 
execution. The Council told Penrice in advance that they “do believe” that the execution of 
Bellamy’s crew “may be a mistake, because Sir E. Northey was of the opinion that all the 
Commissions sent to the several Governors in the Plantations impowering them to try pirates in 
King William’s time” were null and void. Penrice told the Council that he had informed 
Governor Shute that the Act for the More Effectual Suppressing of Piracy was “still in force.” 
However, the judge shrewdly deflected responsibility for the execution back to the 
Massachusetts Bay governor, claiming, “I am very certain it was never proposed to me to report 
my opinion whether the Commission issued by the late Queen for the trial of pirates” transferred 
authority to execute pirates to Governor Shute. Penrice’s letter to New England, however, 
53 Governor Shute to the Council of Trade and Plantations, June 26, 1718, CSPC, vol. 30 (1717-1718), no. 575.  
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suggests he advised the pirates could “most properly and legally” be “proceeded against,” 
thereby implicating the judge in Boston’s decision.54
During the late summer and fall of 1718, the Council of Trade kept digging into the 
legality of Shute’s actions and laid their case against Shute before the Solicitor General. 
Fortunately for Shute, more bad news of continued pirate depredations in the West Indies and 
South Carolina poured into London. Then word arrived from South Carolina in October that 
Stede Bonnet had been captured. The colony was in the process of prosecuting the pirates and 
intended to execute them. Likewise, Governor Rogers from the Bahamas informed the Council 
that he had five pirates in custody and anticipated hanging them before Christmas as examples to 
Nassau’s unruly population. Soon Governor Shute and Boston would not be alone in executing 
pirates.55
 In light of these developments, which clearly indicated that the carrot had failed and 
colonial governments expected the authority to use violence in suppressing pirates, it seemed 
unwise to continue to hound Governor Shute. On 5 March 1719, after word arrived of the pirate 
executions in South Carolina and the Bahamas, the Solicitor General, William Thomson, made 
his decision:  
I have considered the tryal of the pirates before Governor Shute etc., and I conceive they 
had authority to hold that Court etc., for that the proclamation of the first of King George 
did continue the Commission to try pirates which was granted in the third year of the 
Queen, that Commission being subsisting at the time of the said proclamation. 
54 Mr. Popple to Sir Henry Penrice, August 14, 1718, Sir H. Penrice to Mr. Popple, August 16, 1718, and Copy of 
Sir H. Penrice to Mr. Burchett submitted to Council of Trade, letter written August 16, 1717 Council of Trade 
received August 22, 1718, CSPC, vol. 30 (1717-1718), nos. 656, 658, and 669ii.   
55 Governor and Council of South Carolina to the Council of Trade and Plantations, October 21, 1718 and Governor 
Rogers to Mr. Secretary Craggs, November 11, 1718, CSPC, vol. 30, no. 807. 
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Thomson further explained his decision, noting that even if Governor Shute proceeded illegally it 
would be a simple matter to “indemnify” him and any others who acted similarly. The Solicitor 
General’s decision signaled an end to inquiries into Shute’s execution of Bellamy’s crew. It also 
reflected London’s growing intolerance of Atlantic pirates and willingness to use violence to 
eradicate them. Henceforth, Boston and the capital stood side-by-side in their commitment to 
consider pirates “as Common Enemies of Mankind” and, as Boston’s famous minister, Cotton 
Mather, encouraged to “Extirpate them out of the World.” In the words of Marcus Rediker, the 
“tit for tat” terror that defined Boston’s relationship with pirates from very early on became 
commonplace for the rest of the Atlantic world.56
The Atlantic rulers received a short reprieve from pirates in 1719 when England declared 
war on Spain. The king extended his pardon to pirates in order to entice them onto English 
privateer vessels. The tactic proved more successful than in early to mid-1718 and the Boston 
News-letter reported that English privateers gained much experience by having ex-pirates on 
board “well accustomed to Fighting.” Nevertheless, pirates continued to operate near South 
Carolina and some, like Edward England, vacated the Atlantic to follow in the footsteps of 
Henry Every and attack Mughal shipping in the Indian Ocean. Some English pirates also joined 
the Spanish to fight against their homeland although it seems unlikely that many ex-logwood 
cutters made that decision. News that England and Spain had settled their differences arrived in 
the colonies on 9 May 1720. Once again, the ex-pirates/now-privateersmen found themselves 
expendable to their nation and unemployed. From the ashes of the war with Spain arose a new 
breed of pirates embodying the “grievances of the lower deck.” Ex-privateer captains and 
officers like Hornigold, Jennings, Cockram, and Blackbeard no longer commanded the pirate 
56 Mr. Solicitor General to the Council of Trade and Plantations, March 5, 1719, CSPC, vol. 31 (1719-1720), no. 88; 
Mather, Instructions to the Living, 17; Rediker, Villains of all Nations, 13.    
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fleets. In their place, enraged seafarers and mutineers like Bartholomew Roberts, George 
Lowther, and, most importantly for our story, Edward Low, directed renewed and increasingly 
violent efforts against England’s maritime commercial empire.57
 The years 1717-1719 had been tough on Boston’s shipping. Pirates plundered, 
commandeered, and burned at least sixteen Boston-owned vessels, including seven large ships, 
brigs, and snows. The 400 ton Protestant Caesar alone was worth roughly £4000 sterling not 
including its cargo. In this regard Boston suffered more than other colonial ports because pirates 
more often than not burned the port’s vessels in revenge for hanging Bellamy’s crew. Pirates also 
had disrupted Boston’s most lucrative trade routes, including the essential naval stores trade with 
the Carolinas and the logwood trade in the Bay of Honduras. The port was inundated with 
terrifying reports from all over the Atlantic, some of which described pirates’ burning hatred of 
Boston. In 1718 alone, two of every three issues of the Boston News-letter issues referenced the 
terror sown by Atlantic pirates and the ineffective steps the colonies and London took to 
suppress them. In December 1718, Edward England plundered the last Boston vessel before the 
port had a pirate-free eighteen months. But then ominous word arrived in July 1720 that 
Bartholomew Roberts had taken the ship Samuel, commanded by Samuel Cary, in its voyage 
from London to Boston.58
Pirates had finally targeted Boston’s most important and expensive import trade. Samuel 
Cary was a well-respected and trusted Boston ship captain who was responsible for overseeing 
the importation of English manufactured goods and the luxury items of Boston’s merchant-elite. 
57 Boston News-letter 30 November 1719 and 9 May 1720; Earle, The Pirate Wars, 166-167.  
58 Boston News-letter 6 January 1718 – 29 December 1718; For Edward England’s capture of a Boston vessel see, 
Deposition of Jonathan Bull, December 19, 1718, CSPC, vol. 30 (1717-1718), no. 797 iv; For Cary’s capture see, 
Boston News-letter 22 August 1720.   
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The Boston News-letter ran an entire page on the “the dismal Account” of the attack. It described 
in detail the pirates’ “madness and rage” as they tore through the precious trinkets and trunks of 
Boston’s elite men. Any item they did not want to keep “they threw them over board into the 
Sea” instead of politely “Tossing them into the Hould [hold].” The pirates then turned their 
attention to “some Hampers of fine wines that were either presents, or sent to some Gentlemen in 
Boston” even though the gluttonous freebooters had “near 20 Tuns of Brandy” on their own 
vessels. In the most unrefined manner, the pirates “would not wait to unty them and pull out the 
Corks with Skrews” but rather “each man took his bottle and with his Cutlash cut off the Neck, 
and put it to their Mouths and drank it out.” From the perspective of the News-letter and 
Boston’s gentile culture, this blasphemous behavior towards property reinforced their perception 
of seafarers as animals requiring control lest they drink fine wine and destroy expensive 
property. Roberts’s crew, meanwhile, enjoyed mocking the pampered lifestyle of merchants and 
politicians. Furthermore, the crew happily appropriated Cary’s cargo worth £9,000 to £10,000 
sterling or £90 to £100 per man. It was an excellent haul for men who had previously risked their 
lives and labored hard on board merchant vessels for roughly £25 to £35 per year.59
The pirates’ offensive action terrified and infuriated Boston’s elite merchants. Samuel 
Sewall expressed concern in his diary, noting, “Cary arrives who had been pillaged by the Pirats; 
which put me in fear respecting Judith’s [Sewall’s wife] Memorandums: but blessed be GOD, 
before the week was out Dumaresque arrived and brought them safely to the joy of all. The 
miscarriage of them would have distress’d me.” Sewall bemoaned the potential loss of his own 
property worth £50 sterling, which included “Curtains and Vallens for a bed,” “good black 
Walnut Chairs,” “A True Looking Glass of Black Walnut Frame of the newest Fashion,” and 
59 Boston News-letter 22 August 1720; for wages see, Rediker, Between the Devil and the Deep Blue Sea, appendix 
C. 
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“four handsome Glass Sconces to set Candles in.” He failed to express any concern or remorse 
for Cary or his crew, four of whom the pirates impressed at gunpoint. This sort of self-absorbed 
interest in property and money over human lives infuriated the Reverend Cotton Mather and 
impelled him to call on Boston merchants to “make Poor Seamen, and their Destitute Families, 
the Object of your Liberality. The Merchant concerned in the Harvest of the Voyage, may do 
well to bear a part in such Alms. His Estate has been ventured, when his person has not.” 
Although Mather would not have approved of their methods, Roberts’s crew and other pirates 
ensured that merchants paid their due. The actions of pirates, however, did not mollify Boston 
merchants’ pursuit of profit at the expense of maritime laborers. Indeed, losses like Cary’s 
£10,000 cargo put greater pressure on Boston ship captains to extract the most from their men. 
Boston merchants may have also felt pressure to make the fateful decision to revive their 
languishing and labor intensive logwood trade.60
The end of the Bay of Campeche logwood trade in 1716 damaged Boston’s economy and 
it made good sense for the town’s merchants to revive the trade. Boston’s brief attempt in 1718 
to enter the unpredictable and remote Bay of Honduras to extract logwood failed miserably at the 
hands of Blackbeard. In 1719 not a single vessel entered or cleared for the Bay of Honduras and 
only one entered in 1720. After the war with Spain concluded in May 1720 and Roberts’s 
audacious ransacking of the Samuel, Boston merchants slowly began to send smaller vessels into 
the Bay of Honduras. In 1721, six vessels entered from the Bay and two cleared. In 1722, 
another six vessels entered from the coast of Belize. One of these six vessels had likely departed 
Boston in 1721 with a recently unemployed Boston rigger named Edward Low.61
60 Sewall, Diary, 2: 954-955 and 954, note 37; Cotton Mather, The Sailours Companion and Counsellor (Boston, 
1709), 62. 
61 See “Bay of Honduras Logwood Trade” appendix, graph 2. 
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“Ned” Low was born in Westminster, London. He lived there in impoverished conditions 
and spent much of his youth picking pockets and gambling. When Low reached an appropriate 
age, his elder brother enticed him to make a living at sea. Low’s employment eventually took 
him to Boston where he likely settled in 1711. According to Boston-based portledge bills, 
Edward Low signed a contract with Captain Thomas Porter for an intended voyage from Boston 
to Jamaica to the Bay of Campeche and finally to Oporto, Portugal where the ship’s owner, 
English merchant Timothy Harris, resided. While waiting for the Content to set sail, Low 
probably encountered his future wife, Elizabeth Marble of Boston. Like Ramblin’ Jack Cremer 
who fell for a “Red headed,” “well-Riged” Boston girl and Cremer’s Chief Mate who “got 
married” in Boston “god help him,” Elizabeth transformed Ned Low’s watery world.62
Fortunately for Low, the Content required major repairs and although he was hired 
October 4, 1711 the ship did not sail until May 2, 1712. He decided the voyage with Porter, 
which would have taken close to two years and had a final destination in Portugal, was too long 
to be away from his newfound love. He also knew that seafarers faced danger in the Bay of 
Campeche. He, along with friend Edward Rumley, received permission from the Content’s
supervising merchant, Charles Shipreeve, to ship out on board the pink Francis instead. The 
Francis was commanded by Samuel Foye who came from a long line of respected Boston ship 
captains. This ensured that Boston would be Low’s home port. In a little less than a year, Low 
was back in Boston with £16:02 Massachusetts currency in his pocket after an uneventful voyage 
to Barbados and Saltertuda to obtain salt. Afterwards, Low joined a growing multitude of 
waterfront laborers in Boston as a rigger. As will be discussed in Chapter 6, Low’s new 
62 Portledge Bills for Content, Jeffries Family Papers, box 17, Massachusetts Historical Society (hereafter cited as 
MHS); Boston, Records Relating to the Early History of Boston, Volume 28 (Boston: Municipal Printing Office, 
1898), 53; R. Reynell Bellamy ed. Ramblin’ Jack: The Journal of Captain John Cremer, 1700-1774 (London, 
England: Jonathan Cape LTD., 1936), 112-114.  
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profession allowed him to benefit from stable employment based on the exploitation of foreign 
resources and maritime labor. He also would have developed local credit relations with Boston’s 
merchant elite. In other words, Low was now settled and ready to marry a local girl.63
On August 12, 1714, Low’s hard work and commitment finally paid off when he married 
his sweetheart, Elizabeth. In late 1719, the couple joyfully welcomed a baby girl into their lives. 
Low’s happiness, however, abruptly ended when Elizabeth died shortly after delivering their 
daughter due to post-pregnancy complications, a common occurrence in the early modern era. 
Elizabeth’s death could not have come at a worse time for Low both emotionally and 
economically. As historian Elaine Crane has demonstrated, Boston’s waterfront women 
contributed significantly to the financial success of the household. Low’s family almost certainly 
relied heavily on Elizabeth for financial resources due to the decline of Boston’s shipbuilding 
industry after the collapse of the Bay of Campeche logwood trade. The downturn of 1717 also 
triggered new laws targeting the credit economy on which so many merchants, waterfront 
tradesmen, and laborers relied. Low, like many other waterfront tradesmen and laborers in 
Boston, likely suffered from sporadic employment, reduced wages, and limited access to credit. 
Together, these local and international factors would have compelled Low to return to seafaring 
in 1721 in order to support his motherless daughter. He signed a contract in the high paying but 
brutal Bay of Honduras logwood trade.64
Low’s experience in the Bay of Honduras mirrored many other Boston mates and seamen 
in the logwood trade. The captain placed Low in charge of the woodcutting crew. It appears that 
63 Ships’ Papers, Content and Francis, Jeffries Family Papers, box 17, MHS; Dow and Edmonds, The Pirates of the 
New England Coast, 141-142.  
64 Johnson notes that Low “being to apt to disagree with his Masters, he left them.” If he disagreed with his Masters, 
it was likely because he needed more work or wages to support his daughter see, Defoe, A General History of the 
Pyrates, 319; Elaine Forman Crane, Ebb Tide in New England: Women, Seaports and Social Change 1630- 
1800 (Boston: Northeastern University Press, 1998), 17-18.          
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because the crew only had to supply enough wood for a sloop they simply jumped off the vessel, 
began cutting, and then loaded the logwood. They did not enter the woods and set up camp. The 
unknown sloop’s captain desired to load his logwood quickly and leave the Bay of Honduras 
behind. The trade was especially dangerous with both the Spanish and pirates preying on British 
logwood vessels. The captain therefore pushed Low’s crew hard. One evening just before dinner, 
after Low and his crew had finished loading a bundle of logwood, Low “desired that they might 
stay and Dine; but the Captain being in a Hurry for his Lading, ordered them a Bottle of Rum, 
and to take t’other Trip.” Famished after a hard day of labor, Low became enraged, firing his 
musket “at the Captain, but missing him, shot another poor Fellow thro’ the Head.” Although we 
cannot possibly know what happened after this accidental killing, it seems likely that the captain 
commanded the crew to seize Low and imprison him aboard the sloop. The crew, who had spent 
weeks laboring with Low, refused and joined Low in mutiny.65
Some historians have speculated that Low and his men had planned to become pirate 
prior to this incident but that is mere speculation based on flawed logic.66 Like the sailor David 
Wallace in Boston, who killed a ship’s cook over the insult of raw meat in 1713, it is far more 
likely that Low acted impulsively and in response to the captain’s provocation. As the realization 
of what he had done dawned on him, perhaps Low grasped that his only chance of returning to 
Boston and seeing his daughter was to turn pirate. From living and working on the Boston 
waterfront, Low would have been well aware of King George I’s multiple pardons for pirates, 
which were broadcasted in the Boston News-letter and other proclamations. Low’s turn to piracy 
and subsequent actions makes far more sense in this context, as he hoped that another pardon 
65 See Chapter 5 for Boston mates and seamen in the logwood trade; Defoe, A General History of the Pyrates, 319. 
66 Dow and Edmonds, The Pirates of the New England Coast, 143; Gregory N. Flemming, At the Point of a Cutlass: 
The Pirate Capture, Bold Escape, and Lonely Exile of Philip Ashton (New England: ForeEdge Press, 2014), 10-11.  
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that included murder on the high seas would be issued. The first-person account of impressed 
Marblehead fisherman, Philip Ashton, supports the notion that Low believed or hoped he may 
eventually be reunited with his daughter in Boston, as he frequently told the forced Marblehead 
fisherman that Ashton “should go home when he did and not before.” 67
Historians have demonized Ned Low as the most bloodthirsty pirate of the Golden Age 
but none have thoroughly examined his experiences prior to becoming pirate and motivations 
during his time as a pirate. Low’s sanity may have been compromised after the death of his wife, 
separation from his daughter in Boston, poor treatment in the Bay of Honduras, and realization 
that he may never see his daughter again. Ashton’s narrative reflects a man tortured by his past 
but also humanized the beleaguered pirate. According to Ashton, Low refused to take any 
married sailor despite relying heavily on impressment to fill his crew. His past played an 
important role in that decision:  
It seems his design was to take no Married Man away with him, how young soever he 
might be, which I often wondred at; till after I had been with him some considerable time, 
and could observe in him an uneasiness in the sentiments of his Mind, and the workings 
of his passions towards a young Child he had at Boston (his Wife being dead, as I learned 
some small time before he turned Pirate) which upon every lucid interval from Revelling 
and Drink he would express a great tenderness for, insomuch that I have seen him sit 
down and weep plentifully upon the mentioning of it.   
Low’s humanity asserted itself in other ways. He willingly risked his own life to save an 
impressed ship’s doctor, John Kencate, when his vessel, the pink Rose, suffered a careening 
accident near Guiana. Low had already escaped the sinking vessel when he noticed Kencate 
67 Cotton Mather, The Sad Effects of Sin: A True Relation of the Murder Committed by David Wallace, on his 
Companion Benjamin Stolwood (Boston, 1713), i – x; John Barnard, Ashton’s Memorial: An History of the Strange 
Adventures and Signal Deliverances of Mr. Philip Ashton (Boston: Samuel Gerrish, 1725), 16.  
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trapped by the water rushing in through the portholes. He managed to grab the doctor by the 
shoulder and drag him to safety.68
Low also recognized the paradox of impressing sailors and treating them poorly to serve 
his interests. At one point, Ashton and a few other impressed men designed to murder the small 
pirate crew under the command of Low’s quartermaster, Francis Spriggs, and escape to New 
England on board a stolen schooner. Spriggs learned of their plot and told Low who, in response, 
humorously “said he did not know, but if it had been his own case, as it was ours, he should have 
done so himself.” Low did not punish Ashton and his compatriots even though most ship 
captains in the merchant marine or Royal Navy would have certainly beaten mutinous crew 
members bloody. Upon uncovering a potential mutiny on board his vessel, Nathaniel Uring, 
another veteran of the logwood trade, “chastiz’d” crew members “very handsomely” by 
thrashing them with a cane. He gave one sailor “two or three such Strokes with a Stick I had 
prepared for that purpose, that he soon changed his Note, the Blood running about his Ears, he 
pray’d for God’s sake that I would not kill him.” Pirates did not hold a monopoly on torture, 
violence, and murder on the high seas. Nevertheless, Low became increasingly violent as his 
crew suffered losses at the hands of the Royal Navy and colonial port cities and the days and 
months went by without a new pardon issued by the king.69
Low and his crew employed terror far more frequently and with greater violence than 
many other pirates. Predominantly Catholic, Portuguese, Spanish, and French seafarers received 
Low’s most ruthless treatment. In one instance, he and his crew slaughtered dozens of Spaniards 
in the Bay of Honduras. This massacre, however, likely had its roots in the bloody frontier 
68 Barnard, Ashton’s Memorial, 3 and 10.  
69 Ibid., 15; Uring, A History of the Voyages and Travels of Captain Nathaniel Uring, 260-261.  
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warfare between English logwood cutters and the Spanish in the Bay of Honduras logwood 
trade. Many of Low’s crew had been employed in that trade and probably felt justified 
considering the atrocities committed by the Spanish on English Baymen and seafarers. Low also 
took revenge upon New England ship captains and merchants through torture and destruction of 
property because, as the General History relates, he had an “irreconcileable Aversion to New-
England Men.”70
Boston’s logwood trade had produced another pirate and once again the port would suffer 
for it. Low and his compatriots soon joined another mutineer pirate, George Lowther, who had 
worked in conditions far worse than the logwood trade on board a slave ship. Low was appointed 
a lieutenant and the two men began cruising around the Bay of Honduras for potential prizes. 
Boston’s reinvigorated logwood trade suffered disaster at the hands of these two determined 
pirates. In January 1722, they seized a 200 ton Boston-owned ship called the Greyhound, 
commanded by Benjamin Edwards. After a brief resistance, Edwards struck his colors but the 
pirates, according to the Boston Newsletter, savagely beat the men on board the ship and 
impressed others. Some of the impressed, however, like the second mate Charles Harris, soon 
recognized that their own interests coincided with the pirates and willingly cooperated. The 
pirate crew set the Greyhound ablaze undoubtedly at Low’s insistence. Low and Lowther then 
seized two more Boston-based brigantines in the Bay of Honduras and like the Greyhound
burned them with their cargoes of logwood.71
Low continued to damage Boston’s shipping throughout his career as a pirate. He seized 
at least eleven Boston-based vessels, which more than doubles the total of any other single 
70 American Weekly Mercury 2 May 1723; Defoe, A General History of the Pyrates, 326.  
71 Boston News-letter 7 May 1722.  
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pirate. Low, like Edward Teach before him, burned or sank most of these vessels in revenge. 
Unlike Teach, Low tortured Boston ship captains and crews. From May through September 
1723, Low menaced the New England coast as he had done in 1722 when he captured the 
Marblehead schooner that employed Philip Ashton. The 1723 voyage, however, was different for 
two reasons. First, Captain John Welland of Boston, master of the Amsterdam Galley, had likely 
arrived in Boston in late May with a terrifying story of his experiences at the hands of Low. 
After seizing and pillaging the Amsterdam Galley near Bermuda, Low brought Welland aboard 
his sloop “where he was very much abused, having several Wounds with a Cutlass, and at last 
they cut off his right Ear.” The pirates then sank the Amsterdam Galley, placing Welland and his 
crew on board another captured vessel from Piscataqua. Welland’s earless appearance 
undoubtedly horrified Boston’s merchants and ship captains. Second, as Low sailed toward 
Block Island, he was met by New York’s station ship, the H.M.S. Greyhound and its commander 
Peter Solgard. A naval engagement ensued, ending with Low fleeing and his quartermaster, 
Charles Harris, of the logwood ship Greyhound captured with the sloop Ranger by Solgard. The 
prisoners were taken to Newport where they had a quick trial with the aid of Boston lawyers and 
witnesses. On July 19, 1723, one of the largest mass executions of pirates took place in a port 
that had long been a friend to the pirate community. Six years after Boston, Rhode Island had 
finally chosen sides.72
Boston merchants and ship captains became extremely cautious of Low with Welland’s 
gruesome experience ringing in their ears and word from captured fishermen that Low sought 
revenge for the execution of Harris and his crew. In mid-July, an abandoned and ransacked 
Boston sloop arrived from New Hampshire; it was assumed that Low had killed the entire crew 
72 Court of Vice-Admiralty for Rhode Island, Tryals of Thirty-Six Persons for Piracy (Boston: Kneeland, 1723).  
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and captain, William Clark. The terror induced by Ned Low reduced Boston’s entrances and 
clearances by over 50% from the previous year from May through September. In June 1723 only 
32 cleared out, typically one of the most active months for shipping. Even when Boston issued a 
seven day embargo in June 1717 due to the presence of pirate Paul Williams, clearances in June 
and July equaled 71 and 78 respectively. Boston merchants also willingly increased the number 
of vessels and men sent into North and South Carolina when it was infested by Boston-hating 
pirates in 1718, further demonstrating that pursuit of profit frequently trumped pirate threats. 
Boston’s clearances returned to normal in October 1723 only after word arrived that Low had 
abandoned the New England and Newfoundland coasts to sail for the Western Islands. Unlike 
other pirates, Low had terrified Boston’s merchants and ship captains and his presence on the 
coast decreased Boston’s clearances by almost 20% from the previous year. Many merchants and 
ship captains appear to have waited till the subsequent year to set sail because clearances went 
from 485 in 1723 to 731 in 1724, an increase of 34% and the greatest increase recorded in 
Boston during the colonial period.73
Boston continued to worry about Low after he departed the New England coast in late 
1723. The Boston News-letter published every rumor of his whereabouts, tracking him to the 
Western Islands, the coast of Africa, and back to the West Indies. The town undoubtedly read 
with delight the story of Low being captured by a fellow pirate and marooned on a West Indies 
island. But shortly after this tale, the News-letter reported that Ned Low was once again haunting 
the West Indies. More reliable sources arrived in New England indicating that most of Low’s 
crew had abandoned him on account of his violence. Reports of Low continued unabated into 
1726, three years after Low had last been on the New England coast. One such report noted that 
73 Boston News-letter 27 May 1717; “Entrances and Clearances,” Boston News-letter 7 January 1717 – 29 December 
1718 and 1 January 1722 – 31 December 1724; see also appendix, graph 1.  
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“Low and Spriggs were both Marooned, and were got among the Musketoo Indians” in the Bay 
of Honduras. In late June 1726, Low’s legend appeared to influence fellow pirates with William 
Fly’s crew teasing the captured seafarers of the sloop Rachel of Connecticut by telling them that 
“both Low & Spiggs were upon the Coast & waited to take Capt. Sterlings great Ship built at 
New London.” Alarmed, navy and merchant captains from New York to Boston began scouring 
the coast for the two infamous pirates, but they found nothing. A final rumor suggested that Low 
had been captured and executed in 1724 by the French, but the pirate’s end is shrouded in 
mystery.74
Boston’s Atlantic world created Ned Low and vice versa. During Boston’s meteoric rise 
from 1700 to 1717 the port offered security for seafaring men like Low to settle down, work in 
the shipbuilding industry, marry, and have children. When these opportunities vanished after 
1717, Boston’s waterfront laboring community quickly began to feel the effects. Low in 
particular was at a disadvantage. His status in Boston’s community rested on his wife and his 
wife’s family. His social connections in Boston evaporated with her death and, in addition to the 
decline in shipbuilding, likely led to his unemployment. He became rootless, and rootless men 
were well-suited for toiling in the lagoons and logwood groves of Belize to support the 
merchant-elites and the shrinking middle-class of waterfront artisans. In the Bay of Honduras, 
Low shed his respectable Boston identity and began ferociously attacking the Boston Atlantic 
economic system that no longer offered him a place. Piracy, ironically, also presented his only 
hope of reuniting with his daughter. Although Low earned Boston’s undivided attention and fear, 
the town’s leaders never recognized or acknowledged him as their creation. Yet the Reverend 
74 For reports on Low after he departed the North American coast see, Boston Newsletter, 18 October 1723 and 31 
October 1723 and 19 March 1724 and 27 March 1724 and 7 May 1724 and 1 October 1724 and 8 October 1724 and 
15 October 1724 and 11 February 1725; Boston Gazette 25 April 1726 and 27 June 1726; see, also Dow and 
Edmonds, The Pirates of the New England Coast, 216-217.  
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Cotton Mather, however, after many years of preaching to and talking with seafarers and pirates, 
began to comprehend the systemic injustices that led men like Low to eschew national and local 
ties.   
Boston’s relationship to the Golden Age of Piracy was reflected in the life of the port’s 
most famous minister, Cotton Mather. In 1709, Mather called seafarers an “Ungodly & Vicious 
Generation” yet early during the Golden Age of Piracy he downgraded his assessment to “A 
wicked, stupid, abominable Generation.” For the better part of his ministry, Mather had exerted 
great energies to inspire piety among sailors but his efforts proved futile. He lacked the 
experiences and knowledge that would have allowed him to sympathize with sailors’ plight. 
Sailors in turn expressed discontentment with Mather’s aggressive conversion tactics, and his
joint efforts with the vice-admiralty courts to punish sailors for turning pirate. In the maritime 
world, Mather’s name became infamous, mocked, and cursed. As Mather became more involved 
in the execution of sailors condemned for piracy during the period 1716-1726, their willingness 
to listen to his message decreased exponentially. Still, in his final sermon on and to the 
“Seafaring Tribe,” Mather came to an important understanding about pirates and seafarers that 
eluded other elites around Atlantic – the violence of ship captains and the apathy of merchants 
encouraged sailors to turn pirate and inflict violence in return.75
Mather’s involvement with the seafaring tribe increased significantly in the last decade of 
his life due to the incarceration and trials of pirates. Mather found that there was a robust market 
for sermons filled with excitement, adventure, terror, and death. Naturally, tales of sailors turning 
75 This section on Cotton Mather and pirates is revised and used with permission from my article “Cotton Mather 
and Boston’s ‘Seafaring Tribe,’” The New England Quarterly, vol. LXXXV, no. 2 (June 2012). © 2012 by The New 
England Quarterly. All rights reserved; The Sailours Companion and Counsellor, A2; Mather, Diary, 2: 528. For a 
more detailed study of Mather’s involvement and relationship with seafarers see, Pitt, “Cotton Mather and Boston’s 
‘Seafaring Tribe,’” 222–252.   
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into vicious, murdering thieves caught the attention of booksellers in Boston, and around the 
Atlantic. Boston’s status as a principal location for the execution of pirates only increased 
demand in the port city. Of course, Mather had already played a vital role in the creation of 
Boston’s morbid literary culture with the executions of John Quelch and David Wallis.76 He 
knew how well he could employ the drama of death as an instrument to reach the public, and in 
1717, after capture and execution of sailors of Sam Bellamy’s crew, he remarked, “May not I do 
well to give the Bookseller, something that may render the Condition of the Pirates, lately 
executed, profitable?”77
Mather began work on a sermon that showed little sympathy for the audience he 
supposedly intended to aid. He was skeptical that merchant sailors had the will, or even desire, to 
resist becoming pirate. For instance, he berated the pirates of the Whydah who claimed to have 
been “Forced Men.”  For Mather, most sailors already had been corrupted by the abhorrent 
culture of seafaring. Pirates epitomized that culture. If sailors had pure hearts they would “have 
died a Martyr by the cruel Hands of your [their] Brethren [rather] than have become one of their 
Brethren.” Sam Bellamy’s crew had few forced men, validating Mather’s cynicism. Seafaring 
men who constantly faced danger from physical injury, natural elements, foreign privateers, and 
now marauding pirates, however, had no desire to be lectured by a pious elite. Shortly after 
publishing the sermon, Mather complained bitterly that despite “All the Prayers, and all the Pains 
I have employ’d in a distinguishing Manner for their Good” seafarers “requite with making me 
76 David Hall, Worlds of Wonder, Days of Judgment: Popular Belief in Early New England, (United States: Alfred 
A. Knopf, Inc., 1989), 180-186; See Mather, Faithful Warning to Prevent Fearful Judgments and Mather, The Sad 
Effects of Sin.  
77 Mather possibly used the term “profitable” to mean spiritually profitable but without question tales of piracy 
provided the minister with a healthy income, as he knew well from past experience see, Mather, Diary, 2: 490; For 
the published sermon see, Cotton Mather, Instructions to the Living, from the Conditions of the Dead (Boston, 
Massachusetts: John Allen, 1717).   
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above any Man living the Object of their Malignity.” This did not dissuade the minister. He 
increased his outreach to – and chastisements of – seafarers and pirates.78
If anyone had a right to fear pirates it was Cotton Mather. He involved himself in their 
business and prayed for their destruction as no other minister did during the Golden Age of 
Piracy. Even when pirate executions took place in ports other than Boston, Mather wrote the 
accompanying sermon.79 And in May 1724, as the pirate captain John Phillips plagued New 
England waters, Mather led his congregation in prayer deploring “the glorious One do some 
remarkable Thing for the Destruction of the Pyrates, by which our Coast has been lately 
infested.” According to Mather, these prayers helped to instigate an uprising aboard John 
Phillips’ ship, the outcome of which was the capture of four pirates, John Rose Archer, William 
White, William Taylor, and William Phillips.80
 Pirates’ hatred of Mather undoubtedly grew from their hatred of Boston. After a visit 
with these pirates in their prison cells, Mather learned that his reputation among the maritime 
community extended to all corners of the Atlantic:   
One of the first Things which the Pyrates, who are now so much the Terror of them that 
haunt the Sea, impose on their poor Captives, is; to curse Dr. M - [Mather]. The Pyrates 
now strangely fallen into the Hands of Justice here, make me the first Man, whose visits 
and Counsils and Prayers they beg for. Some of them under Sentence of Death, chuse to 
hear from me, the last Sermon they hear in the World. 
The irony of this statement was lost on Mather. From the pirates’ perspective, Mather’s 
figurehead position in Boston executions strongly allied him with the British efforts to annihilate 
78 Mather, Instructions to the Living, from the Conditions of the Dead, 17-18. The Boston News-Letter bolstered the 
perception that sailors were unwilling to fight “their Brethren.” See Boston News-Letter, 16 June 1718; Mather, 
Diary, 2: 528.  
79 In 1723 twenty-six pirates where hanged in Newport, Rhode Island. Due to his reputation and experience in the 
execution of pirates, Mather was asked to write a sermon for the occasion see, Cotton Mather, Useful Remarks: An 
Essay upon Remarkables in the Way of Wicked Men: A Sermon on the Tragical End, unto which the way of Twenty-
Six Pirates Brought Them; At New Port on Rhode-Island, July 19,1723 (New London, Conn., 1723).    
80 Mather, Diary, 2: 722; Defoe, A General History of the Pyrates, 341-351.  
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them through violence. Pirates, and many sailors, despised him for that involvement, and cursing 
and mocking him constituted a rejection of his authority; however, when captured, imprisoned, 
and facing the hangman’s noose the only person in Boston that pirates knew to call on was 
Cotton Mather. The prospect of death, in addition to the loneliness of being far from family and 
friends, encouraged pirates to find solace in the conversation of the minister. In those final days 
before “The poor condemned Pyrates” stood before the gallows, Mather eased their anxiety by 
offering them his time and comfort. In so doing, he provided a charitable act for those individual 
sailors; yet any tangible influence Mather gained by his good deed died with the pirates.81
 Mather had an agenda for living sailors and pirates, which he passed on through the last 
words of the pirates as they stood on the scaffold, looking out on the mass of spectators awaiting 
their death. Mather found the two condemned pirates from Phillips’ crew, William White and 
John Rose Archer, especially pliable and apt conveyors of his message to both the maritime and 
terrestrial communities. Archer and White impressed the minister with their heartfelt 
confessions, seemingly sincere repentance, and willingness to accept uncritically Mather’s 
fervent beliefs about corrupt maritime culture. Of course, the pirates hoped for a pardon due to 
good behavior, but apparently that did not enter Mather’s mind. 
For almost a month, Mather met with Archer and White. He filled their heads with the 
propaganda that he desired them to spout to the mass of people during the spectacle of their 
death. They did not disappoint. On the day of their execution, June 2, 1724, Archer and White 
stood penitently on the gallows before the large crowd. Together they warned “all People, and 
particularly young People” against committing the many sins they participated in as sailors and 
pirates. According to the Boston News-Letter, “One of ’em desired, That those that follow the 
Sea would take warning; and if any should be taken by Pirates, rather Dye than Consent to be of 
81 Mather, Diary, 2: 729.  
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their Number.” Lastly, as Mather undoubtedly directed them, the two pirates articulated their 
aspiration that “the Sea-faring [tribe], may get Good by what they see this day befalling of us.” 
These directives could easily have come directly from the mouth of Mather, and most sailors 
observing the execution were savvy enough to realize it.82
White and Archer also had particular life experiences that warranted individual 
comments from them. White was twenty-one and an inexperienced sailor/fisherman when he 
joined Phillips and three others to become pirate on August 29, 1723. Of the five men, he was 
“the only private Man in the whole crew,” meaning non-officer. Upon his capture in May of 
1724, White expressed his remorse for disobeying his parents by going to sea. White’s parents 
tried to provide the rebellious young man with a good religious education. But instead White 
escaped to the sea where he learned to neglect “the publick Worship of God,” curse “the Name 
of God,” and drink excessive amounts of liquor. White’s experience led him to warn young men 
not to disobey their parents by joining the seafaring tribe.83
Meanwhile, Archer was an older, more experienced sailor who served in Blackbeard’s 
pirate crew and worked as quartermaster in Phillips’ crew.  Archer’s experience during the 
Golden Age of Piracy mirrored that of many other sailors who shifted between legitimate 
business and piracy, including the pirate Captain Phillips. In 1718 he left Blackbeard’s crew 
through what he deemed “the act of Graces.” Afterwards he worked aboard a fishing vessel off 
Newfoundland for six or seven years; however, when Phillips captured that vessel he “was easily 
drawn into the old Trade again.” Archer understood the maritime world that he had toiled in for 
many years, and that understanding allowed him to step outside the scripted lines Mather 
provided for him. Subsequently, with his final words Archer challenged captains to treat sailors 
82 Defoe, A General History of the Pyrates, 341-342 and 351; Boston News-Letter, 4 June 1724.  
83 Defoe, A General History of the Pyrates, 351; Cotton Mather, The Converted Sinner: The Nature of Conversion to 
Real & Vital PIETY (Boston, Mass., 1724), 38.  
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humanely in order to prevent sailors from becoming drunks and turning pirate: “I could wish that 
Masters of Vessels would not use their Men with so much Severity, as many of them do, which 
exposes us to great Temptations.”84
Despite Archer’s unscripted remarks, Mather remained inspired by the two pirate’s 
performance on the scaffold. In particular White impressed the minister by quoting a proverb 
from the Bible. According to Mather, when White learned that “his Dead Body was to be kept 
and hung in Iron in a Gibbet” he declared in reference to his disobedience to his parents, “Now a 
Righteous GOD is going to fulfil that Word; THE EYE WHICH DESPISES TO OBEY THE 
MOTHER, THE RAVENS OF THE VALLEY SHALL PICK IT OUT, AND THE YOUNG 
EAGLES SHALL EAT IT.”85 With these remarks, White may have earned his “Dead Body” a 
reprieve from the iron gibbet. After the execution, the Boston News-Letter reported of Archer 
and White, “After their death they were in Boats conveyed down to an Island, where the 
abovesaid Quartermaster was hung up in Irons, to be a Spectacle, and so a Warning to others.” 
There was no mention of what became of White’s body.86
Mather may have interceded on White’s behalf, as hinted at in his execution sermon, The 
Converted Sinner: The Nature of Conversion to Real & Vital PIETY.  Mather believed the pirates 
had sincerely repented, and that his efforts had turned them to God. He proudly noted, 
 MANY Entertained Apprehensions, That the Pains that had been taken, with these  
Prisoners, (A Charity and Compassion in which New England, by the Report of  
Strangers, comes not behind any Country!) were not Lost upon them; and that these poor 
men may after all, be found among the Elect of GOD, in this Wondrous way brought 
home to Him.   
84 Mather, The Converted Sinner, 39; Defoe, A General History of the Pyrates, 351; Rediker, Villains of all Nations, 
45 and 93.  
85 Mather, The Converted Sinner, 48-49.  
86 Boston News-Letter, 4 June 1724.  
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For twenty-five years sailors had disappointed Mather time and again. Their culture had 
infiltrated his home, causing his son to reject him in favor of an ungodly life at sea. The maritime 
world cursed, mocked, and threatened him. Yet in these two pirates Mather found hope. Archer 
and White listened to the minister, delivering his intended message for the young men of Boston 
and the seafaring tribe. Mather, in turn, acknowledged the challenge that Archer issued to vicious 
captains before his death, and when pirates found their way to Mather’s doorstep again in 1726 
he did not shy away from placing blame on those who deserved it.  
 On July 6, 1726 Mather arrived at the Boston gaol to meet with four pirates recently 
captured off the New England Coast, including William Fly, the captain of the pirate crew. He 
carried with him books of piety, including his own recent addition to the “The Mariners 
Library,”87 The Converted Sinner. Buoyed by his success two years earlier with Archer and 
White, Mather contrived to use that experience to convince the newly arrived pirates that they 
needed to repent their crimes and provide a God-inspiring show for the mass of onlookers on the 
day of their execution. Fly, however, had a different script planned for his execution, although it 
was geared towards the same audience – sailors. 
Mather entered the prison confident in his ability to manipulate the pirates into an 
admission of guilt. The pirates, he believed, had provided him with a delicious and useful irony. 
When William Fly and his followers mutinied against their previous captain, John Green, they 
dragged him up onto deck with the intent of throwing him overboard. Captain Green pleaded for 
his life declaring, “for God’s sake don’t throw me over-board, if you do, I am for ever lost; 
Hell’s the Portion of my Crimes.”88 Fly had little pity for the man and he mockingly stated, 
87 Mather, Sailours Companion and Counsellor, x.  
88 It is not hard to speculate why the Captain Green believed hell was his final destination, as he was the captain of 
slave ship, literally hell on earth see, Marcus Rediker, The Slave Ship: A Human History (New York: Viking Press, 
2007).   
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“since he’s so devilish godly, we’ll give him Time to say his Prayers, and I’ll be the Parson. Say 
after me. Lord, have Mercy on me. Short Prayers are best, so no more Words, and over with 
him, my Lads.” The pirates followed Fly’s order and threw Green overboard but he managed to 
grab hold of the mainsheet, according to Mather “to prolong his Time.” One of the “merciless 
Monsters” picked up a Cooper’s broad Ax to chop” off the unhappy Master’s Hand” and the 
slave ship captain “was swallowed up by the Sea.”89
 Mather exploited this gruesome tale to take the moral high ground with the pirates, 
beginning his discussion with them by asserting, “The poor men, whom you murdered, You 
hurried out of the world; You allow’d them no Space to repent. They begg’d at least for little 
Time if you would not be dissuaded from Killing them,” he continued by noting the irony that, 
“A Gracious GOD has not hurried you out of the world, but given you some time to prepare for 
your Deaths.” In addition to God’s clemency, Mather noted the generosity of the courts and 
Boston ministers in allowing the pirates time before their death, creating a distinction between 
the barbarous pirates and the “civilized” society. A recalcitrant Fly saw circumstances in a 
different light; for him dead was dead, and he had no intention of submitting to the authority of 
the courts that had sentenced him to death or to the ministers who badgered him to repent his 
sins.90
As Daniel Williams argues, “Fly was more dangerous as a prisoner than he had been as a 
pirate. His refusal to repent represented a much greater refusal to recognize the sacred world that 
Boston had been established to protect.”91 Fly challenged Mather in a way that no other 
imprisoned pirate had before. For instance, when Mather asked Fly how he viewed the 
89 Defoe, A General History of the Pyrates, 608; Cotton Mather, The Vial Poured Out upon the Sea: A Remarkable 
Relation of Certain Pirates (Boston, 1726), 1.  
90 Mather, The Vial Poured Out upon the Sea, 6-7.  
91 Daniel E. Williams, “Puritans and Pirates: A Confrontation between Cotton Mather and William Fly in 1726,” 
Early American Literature 22 (1987): 232-251, quote at 234. 
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government’s decision to have them executed, Fly responded “GOD reward them according to 
their Deserts.” A thoroughly annoyed Mather retorted, “You must not go on in this Impiety,” as 
if by submitting to the government’s decision, Fly accepted God’s will.92
Even more troubling for Mather was Fly’s declaration that he was innocent in the murder 
of Captain Green and the first mate, despite the overwhelming evidence that he had ordered their 
deaths. Furthermore, Fly refused to express any remorse for his actions. Indeed he blamed the 
captain and mate for their own untimely death: “I shan’t own myself Guilty of any Murder – Our 
Captain and his Mate used us Barbarously. We poor Men can’t have Justice done us. There is 
nothing said to our Commanders, let them never so much abuse us, and use us like Dogs. But the 
poor Sailors …” At this point Mather interrupted Fly, deeply offended that the sailor aimed to 
justify the murder of the slave ship captain and his first mate. Yet Fly’s justification echoed that 
of John Rose Archer, a fact Mather would have found difficult to ignore.93
Still, Mather responded harshly to Fly’s obstinacy, at one point stating, “Fly, I am 
astonished at your stupidity. I cannot understand you. I am sure, you don’t understand yourself. I 
shall be better able, another time to reason with you.” Fly aptly retorted, “It is very strange that 
another should know more of me, than I do myself.” If we extrapolate these two statements into 
the larger framework of Mather’s relationship with the seafaring tribe, we catch a glimpse of the 
gulf between Mather and the maritime world. Although Mather correctly noted that he could not 
understand the experiences that led Fly to resist “civilized” society and the possibility of 
redemption with God, he arrogantly assumed that with time he could control the responses of the 
pirate. In Mather, sailors saw a pompous, sheltered man, who knew nothing of the hardships of 
92 Mather, The Vial Poured Out upon the Sea, 20.  
93 Ibid., 21.  
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their existence, telling them how to live their lives. And for the first time, a sailor, in plain words, 
called Mather out for his overbearing presumptions.94
Mather may have provided Fly with the tools and knowledge necessary for him to 
effectively resist and ridicule the minister and court. As Mather’s first visit with the pirates came 
to a conclusion, he brought to their attention that he had brought books of piety with him, 
including his own The Converted Sinner. He told the pirates that The Converted Sinner “was 
occasion’d by the last Predecessors you had in the state and place you are now brought into” to 
which Mather records Fly smugly stating “I read that Book before ever I was brought hither!” It 
is conceivable that Mather fabricated this story to make it seem as though his work was widely 
read among sailors, but Fly’s ability to irritate the minister and mock the proceedings against him 
suggests a concrete understanding of how pirate executions worked in Boston.95 Fly may have 
even deliberately acted in direct opposition to the example set by Archer and White in The 
Converted Sinner. Mather certainly characterized him as their antithesis.96
Mather’s altercation with Fly had only one possible ending – Fly’s dead body hanging in 
a gibbet as a grisly “Spectacle for the Warning of others, especially Sea-faring Men.”97 Yet 
Mather’s increased exposure to sailors and pirates during the Golden Age of Piracy led to a 
profound change of heart in regards to his perception of the seafaring tribe. In 1709 Mather, 
heavily influenced by Josiah Woodward’s declaration that sailors were irreligious savages, 
advocated violence as a means to control sailors behaviors and beliefs. However, by 1726 
Mather’s personal experiences with pirates such as Archer and Fly made him question captains’ 
94 Ibid., 9.  
95 One piece of evidence that may suggest that Mather invented this story is Charles Johnson’s claim that Fly was 
illiterate; however Mather personally knew Fly and would have known his literacy level. It is also equally possible 
that Mather’s The Converted Sinner was read aloud on board one of the vessels Fly worked see, Defoe, A General 
History of the Pyrates, 606.    
96 Mather, The Vial Poured Out upon the Sea, 16-17.  
97 Boston News-Letter, 14 July 1726 
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use of violence and their overall treatment of sailors.  Subsequently, Mather returned to the 
position he supported in The Religious Marriner (1699), when he reprimanded captains for their 
cruel treatment of sailors. In his sermon The Vial Poured Out upon the Sea (1726), after 
admonishing sailors in his usual fashion, Mather turned his fiery attention to ship captains, 
emphatically stating, “I would presume upon an Address to the Masters of our Vessels, that they 
would not be too like the Devil in their Barbarous Usage of the Men that under them, and lay 
them under Temptations to do Desperate Things.” Mather continued his rebuke of captains by 
sarcastically remarking, “The Men must be used as Rational Creatures. Yea, Master you must 
Remember your MEN, - Don’t you call ‘em so?”98
Mather’s critique of ship captains in The Vial Poured Out upon the Sea drew heavily –
and ironically – from the words and complaints of both Archer and Fly. He noted Archer’s 
insistence that poor treatment by captains led sailors to “great Temptations.”99 Meanwhile, he 
appropriated Fly’s words that Captain Green and his first mate “used us Barbarously.” Mather 
also addressed Fly’s challenge that no one was willing to take the side of poor sailors in an 
attempt to stop captains from treating their men “like Dogs.” By acknowledging the pirates 
grievances and putting them in print, Mather changed his previous position that sailors and 
pirates were inhuman savages that warranted violent control. By 1726 he also realized that 
without fundamental changes in the treatment of sailors by both merchants and captains “a Pious, 
a Sober, a Serious, and a Prudent Generation” of sailors would never develop.100
* * * 
98 Mather, The Vial Poured Out upon the Sea, 44-45.  
99 Defoe, A General History of the Pyrates, 351. 
100 Mather, The Vial Poured Out upon the Sea, 21 and 44; for Mather’s avocation of violence see, Mather, Sailours 
Companion and Counsellor.    
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Mather’s last sermon to pirates and sailors came at the end of an era of violent upheaval 
on the Atlantic Ocean. By 1728 the well-ordered world of profit-seeking merchants, protected 
shipping lanes, cheap maritime labor, private property, and plantation slavery eclipsed the 
unruly, opportunistic, egalitarian, and commons-working vision of the seafarers and pirates. 
These men had built the Atlantic, and especially Boston’s economy, through their hard labor on 
ships and in the lagoons of the Bays of Campeche and Honduras. For much of the seventeenth 
century, Boston had actively supported seafarers’ vision for the Americas. Shortly after the 1689 
revolution, however, the port shifted strategies, developing closer ties with London. From the 
perspective of merchants, shipbuilders, and politicians it was a brilliant move, at least in the short 
term. Boston became the vehicle whereby English goods and capital spread to underdeveloped 
frontier communities throughout the English Atlantic. Merchants developed networks of debtors 
up and down the North American coast and into the West Indies. Meanwhile, in Boston, the ship 
outfitting and building industries flourished, creating a strong middling-class of waterfront 
tradesmen tied to the merchant-elites through credit arrangements. Some of Boston’s waterfront 
workers traded independence for this arrangement. Yet the town’s lavish consumption of English 
commodities and importation of expensive materials for shipbuilding constantly kept Boston 
merchants indebted to London benefactors. The shortage of gold and silver required Boston to 
make remittances in naval stores and logwood, generating the exploitative conditions in the Bay 
of Campeche that helped cause the eruption of piracy in 1716.  
Pirates and transatlantic seafarers understood Boston’s role in the Atlantic economy 
better than most. After the hanging of Quelch and his crew in 1704 and probably before, they 
knew the port envisioned turning America into Europe, actively seeking to decrease 
opportunities for seafarers to earn a better living in order to earn better profits for its merchants 
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and shipbuilders. They also knew that Boston, unlike most other North American ports, would 
punish them for stepping beyond the hardened legal lines regarding quasi-privateering and 
piracy. After the hanging of Sam Bellamy’s crew in 1717, pirates sought to exact a measure of 
revenge by burning and sinking Boston-owned vessels and terrorizing Boston ship captains. 
Boston likewise terrorized pirates by hunting them down and hanging them, leaving the corpses 
hanging in gibbets as examples to all seafarers. Although Cotton Mather had a contentious 
relationship with pirates, he abhorred the treatment sailors received at the hands of ship captains 
and merchants. He understood Boston’s activities in the Atlantic world enough to see that the 
port’s merchants and ship captains were complicit in the creation of pirates. He too lamented the 
profit-seeking, and in his eyes irreligious, culture that developed through closer ties to London 
after the 1689 revolution.   
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5.0 THE ATLANTIC LOGWOOD TRADE 
The growth of Boston’s Atlantic logwood trade coincided with the port’s turning away from 
trade with pirates, poor treatment of its seafaring population, increased credit arrangements with 
London, and the rise of the shipbuilding industry. The logwood trade represented a monumental 
breakthrough in Boston’s commerce with London. Almost from its founding in 1630 through the 
seventeenth century, Boston and its merchants had sought an acceptable balance of trade with 
England to reduce the flow of silver and gold leaving the colony. England had little use for New 
England’s staple commodities, fish and timber. Boston merchants therefore created complicated 
arrangements with merchants in Newfoundland, West Indies, and Iberian Peninsula to direct 
remittances derived from those staples to their English creditors. Logwood, however, could be 
directly shipped to England and make an immediate impact as a dyewood capable of producing 
brilliant red, purple, and black dyes and stains for the emergent textile and furniture industries of 
Europe. 
In the late 1690s, merchants, primarily from Boston, began employing their wage 
laboring seafarers as logwood cutters. Officers worked the men hard and had little sympathy for 
their illnesses or injuries. Their approach drastically reduced the labor costs of producing 
logwood, increasing profits for Boston merchants and ship captains. Those profits also 
subsidized Boston’s consumption of English manufactured goods and spurred the port’s 
shipbuilding industry. Boston sailors, however, experienced first-hand through the logwood trade 
the callousness of Atlantic commerce directed by ruthless, profit-seeking transatlantic merchants 
and ship captains.  
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Logwood’s significance in England and Europe created value in Boston. Merchants 
began trading it locally to settle debts and exporting it to nearby colonial ports in payment for 
goods. Like sugar and tobacco, logwood became a viable currency. At various times during the 
eighteenth-century, Spanish attacks, pirates, local natives, and politics disrupted the logwood 
trade. At other times, the Atlantic market for logwood became glutted and the price dropped 
precipitously. These disruptions and price drops reverberated around the Atlantic, creating 
economic and social hardships in Boston and setting in motion political and military conflicts 
between empires. This chapter seeks to address a significant gap in our understanding of the 
Atlantic economy by focusing on the changing nature of maritime labor in the logwood trade and 
its connection to the economic rise of Boston as a major port city in the late seventeenth and 
early to mid-eighteenth centuries.1
* * * 
 The English logwood trade began in earnest during the 1660s when privateers discovered 
that logwood would sell in Europe for £90 to £110 per ton. Initially, few English privateers 
actively cut logwood, preferring instead to steal it from Spanish vessels. By the early 1670s, 
1 The most significant studies on the logwood trade are Arthur M. Wilson, “The Logwood Trade in the Seventeenth 
and Eighteenth Centuries,” in Douglas McKay (ed.), Essays in the History of Modern Europe (New York, 1936), 1–
15; A. P. Thornton, “The English at Campeachy,” The Jamaican Historical Review, 2 (1953): 27-38; Alan Craig, 
“Logwood as a Factor in the Settlement of British Honduras,” Caribbean Studies, 9:1 (1969): 53-62; Gilbert M. 
Joseph, “British Loggers and Spanish Governors: The Logwood Trade and its Settlements in the Yucatan Peninsula: 
Part I,” Caribbean Studies 14:2 (1974): 7-37; Gilbert M. Joseph, “British Loggers and Spanish Governors: The 
Logwood Trade and its Settlements in the Yucatan Peninsula: Part II,” Caribbean Studies 15:4 (1976): 43-52; O. 
Nigel Bolland, Colonialism and Resistance in Belize: Essays in Historical Sociology (Barbados: University of West 
Indies Press, 2003), chap. 1 and 2; Daniel Finamore, “A Mariner’s Utopia: Pirates and Logwood in the Bay of 
Honduras,” in Russell K. Skowronek and Charles R. Ewen, X Marks the Spot: The Archaeology of Piracy
(Gainesville, Florida: University Press of Florida, 2006): 64-78; Jesse Cromwell, “Life on the Margins: (Ex) 
Buccaneers and Spanish Subjects on the Campeche Logwood Periphery, 1660-1716,” Itinerario, 33 (2009): 43-71; 
Michael Jarvis, In the Eye of All Trade: Bermuda, Bermudians, and the Maritime Atlantic World, 1660-1783 
(Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2010), 218-225. All of these studies neglect to identify the 
importance of Boston in the Atlantic logwood trade. Ross A. Newton’s, “‘Good and Kind Benefactors’: British 
Logwood Merchants and Boston’s Christ Church” Early American Studies 11(1): 15-36 highlights the Boston 
connection with the logwood trade during the late 1720s to the 1740s but does not explore the economic importance 
of logwood for Boston or its impact on the seafaring community. 
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active persecution by West Indies governors, pirate hunters, and the Royal Navy drove many 
pirates and privateers into the mosquito – and alligator – infested lagoons of the Bay of 
Campeche to chop logwood for a living. Still, the riches of the logwood trade represented a place 
of opportunity whereby common men could earn a decent living from their hard labor. 2
William Dampier, an English privateer, explorer, logwood cutter, and naval officer, 
noted, the English logwood trade “had its Rise from the decay of Privateering.” Most of the 
privateers “thought it a dry Business to toil at Cutting Wood” in comparison to their previous 
employment. Nevertheless, these hardened, independent seafaring men preferred the dangerous 
and intense labor of logwood cutting over employment in the English merchant marine or Royal 
Navy. By 1675, the primary English settlement in the Bay of Campeche on the Island of Trist 
(modern day Isla del Carmen) had over 250 inhabitants, primarily ex-privateers.3 Trist provided 
an excellent central location for exchange. Large ships from Boston and England and sloops 
from Jamaica, Bermuda, and other West Indies locations anchored on the Northwest-side of the 
island whilst smaller vessels such as barks, pirogues, and canoes traversed the Laguna de 
Términos to the Southeast, carrying logwood from the mainland to the larger vessels.  
The logwood cutters relied primarily on Jamaican and Boston seafarers and merchants to 
connect them to the wider Atlantic economy. Jamaican captains traded rum, sugar, and bills of 
exchange for logwood. Boston, meanwhile, traded all the aforementioned commodities in 
addition to important necessities such as food, tools, gunpowder, and naval stores for logwood 
and hides. Boston ship captains also sold the logwood cutters Indian slaves taken during King 
Phillip’s War (1675-1676). Very little cash exchanged hands in this informal trade, which 
2 Wilson, “The Logwood Trade,” 3-5. 
3 John Masefield, ed., Captain William Dampier: Dampier's Voyages, 2 vols. (Edinburgh and New York, 1906), 2: 
149 and 155-156.  
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currency-deprived Boston merchants favored. Jamaican sloops carried their small cargoes of 
logwood back to Jamaica where it was sold to English ships for roughly £10 per ton. Bostonians, 
meanwhile, typically transported their logwood back to Boston and used their own ships to make 
transatlantic voyages to England, Amsterdam, Venice, and Leghorn, thereby cutting out the 
middleman and earning greater profits.  
The lagoons and logwood groves of the Bay of Campeche provided an excellent frontier 
location for the seafarers to escape from serving on merchant vessels or Royal Navy ships. They 
formed a fairly egalitarian society, emulating life on board a pirate or privateer vessel. During 
the dry season (September to April/May), small crews of cutters entered the logwood groves and 
constructed huts raised on stakes and platforms above the two to three feet of water left from the 
wet season. As Dampier remarked, “the Land where the Logwood grows is so overflowed, that 
they step from their Beds into the Water perhaps two Foot deep, and continue standing in the wet 
all Day, till they go to bed again.” The labor of cutting logwood was separated into tasks: some 
men chopped down the densely knotted trees; others sawed and cut the felled trees “into 
convenient Logs;” and, finally, the most skilled men chipped the sap off the logs. According to 
Dampier, logwood crews typically labored Monday through Friday and took Saturday and 
Sunday off. They often hunted in their free time for meat and hides, which could also be sold to 
passing ships.  
The logwood cutters earned shares of logwood based on the tasks they performed and 
their experience. The aforementioned chippers generally received a larger share. Boat owners 
also received larger shares, as the logwood crews required canoes or pirogues to traverse the 
swampy lagoons. The crew Dampier joined had already chopped, sawed, and chipped a hundred 
tons of logwood for a Boston ship captain. He therefore only earned a ton of logwood per month 
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to help carry the logwood to a nearby creek. Generally, in a democratic fashion, “every Man is 
left to his choice to carry what [logwood] he pleaseth, and commonly they agree very well about 
it: For they are contented to labour very hard.” As historian Michael Jarvis notes, individuals 
from the rest of the crew earned “at least £83 for nine months’ work,” more than quadruple the 
typical monthly wages of a common seaman.4
After harvesting their logwood and carrying it to Trist for the eagerly awaiting ship 
captains, the crews disbanded much like a ship’s company. There was one important exception –
the power-relations between the ship captain and logwood cutter favored the latter. Prior to 
selling their logwood, the cutters expected a free day of punch at the ship captain’s expense. 
Afterwards, “every Man will pay honestly for what he drinks.” If the ship captain neglected this 
hallowed tradition, he would potentially receive substandard wood, or, even worse, “hollow 
Wood filled with dirt in the middle and both ends plugg’d.” The logwood cutters expected 
respect from ship captains for their hard labor and, unlike their seafaring brethren, they 
controlled a desirable commodity besides their labor. After receiving payment, most logwood 
men spent their earnings on weeks of debauchery in Trist before heading back into the lagoons 
with empty pockets. Even the rare “well-bred” logwood cutter would “squander away their Time 
and Money in Drinking and making a Bluster.” Despite the harsh working conditions of logwood 
cutting, the idea of accumulating wealth for a happy retirement rarely crossed the minds of these 
hardy men. They enjoyed freedom from oppressive ship captains, profit-seeking merchants, and 
controlling politicians on the margins of the Atlantic economy.5
4 Dampier, Voyages, 2: 178-182; Jarvis, In the Eye of All Trade, 222.  
5 Dampier, Voyages, 2: 179 and 186.  
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The logwood cutters’ way of life came at a price for the surrounding inhabitants. The 
logwood cutters attacked and plundered nearby Indian villages, enslaving the women to serve 
them in their crude huts and sending the men to Jamaica to work the sugar plantations. They also 
continued to harass nearby Spanish settlements and vessels in the bay. In 1678, French and 
English privateers attacked and captured the nearby Spanish town of Campeche. The Spanish 
believed the logwood men in the Bay guilty by association and reputation. They took decisive 
action by increasing their naval presence in the Bay, protesting the English presence on Trist to 
Parliament, and preparing plans to launch a major assault against the logwood cutters.6
Even as the Spanish made preparations to destroy the logwood cutters’ camps, Lord 
Carlisle, the English governor in Jamaica, sought to seize control of the logwood trade from the 
unruly ex-privateers. As extensions of the pirates and privateers England desired to eradicate 
from the West Indies, the logwood cutters represented a new head of the “Many-Headed Hydra”
that required immediate suppression. These former maritime men fashioned their own 
communities and hierarchies, thereby resisting control from typical sources of authority – the 
English navy, merchants, and ship captains. In January 1679, Carlisle wrote to London to explain 
that he “had many complaints from Trist in the Bay of Campeachy of the disorders owing to 
want of some government for the security of life and property; which once secured would profit 
this Island and settle the logwood trade.” In effect, Carlisle desired to colonize Trist, its 
surrounding environs, and its inhabitants to constrain the freedom and profits of the logwood 
cutters. Planter and merchant elites, presumably from Jamaica, could then safely privatize the 
commons currently worked by the logwood cutters.7
6 Ibid., 2: 148 and 156-157.  
7 Governor Lord Carlisle to Secretary Coventry, January 26, 1679, Public Record Office, Calendar of State Papers, 
Colonial: America and the West Indies, 45 vols. (London: Her/His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1860-1994), vol. 10 
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King Charles II denied Carlisle’s request to form a government in Trist but he also 
viewed the logwood cutters as a potential threat to England’s imperial agenda. He ordered 
Carlisle to “discourage logwood-cutting in the Spanish dominions so far as you can, and 
endeavor to induce the privateers to plant in Jamaica.” Carlisle offered logwood cutters in the 
Bay of Campeche and privateers “a double proportion of land if they would plant.” England 
needed settled sugar planters, not independent laborers. The majority of logwood cutters appear 
to have ignored Carlisle’s proposition only to fall victim to a major Spanish assault in April 
1680. The Spanish captured more than 80 prisoners and killed many others. On May 2, 1680, one 
Spanish officer boasted to a captured Boston ship captain that he had seized twenty-two English 
vessels in the Bay of Campeche and the Spanish held 500 English prisoners. The Spanish had, 
for the moment, successfully eliminated the English logwood cutters from the Bay of 
Campeche.8
Boston’s early involvement in the Bay of Campeche logwood trade in the 1670s and 80s 
extended naturally from the port’s close connections with West Indies pirates, privateers, and 
Jamaican merchants. Boston and Trist developed a mutually beneficial and profitable 
relationship based on complementary deficiencies and shared interests. Boston’s hinterland had 
failed to produce a desirable “cash crop” for English and European markets, which put its 
merchants at a great disadvantage in comparison to the planters and merchants in the Chesapeake 
and the West Indies. Boston merchants also faced chronic labor shortages and paid high wages 
so, unlike Jamaican merchants; they happily allowed the ex-privateers their fair asking price for 
(1677-1680), nos. 869 (hereafter cited as CSPC); Peter Linebaugh and Marcus Rediker, The Many-Headed Hydra: 
Sailors, Slaves, Commoners, and the Hidden History of the Revolutionary Atlantic (Boston, Massachusetts: Beacon 
Press, 2000).    
8 The King to Governor Lord Carlisle, March 29, 1679, Governor Lord Carlisle to Secretary Coventry, August 13, 
1679, and Deposition of Robert Oxe, December 30, 1680, CSPC, vol. 10 (1677-1680), nos. 950, 1094, and 1624; 
Journal and Narrative of Jonas Clough, November 23-24, 1681 and Memorial Delivered to Don Pedro Ronquillo, 
November 1681, CSPC, vol. 11 (1681-1685), nos. 303 and 307. 
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labor and logwood. Trist, despite having been settled by ex-privateers, lacked a waterfront 
community of skilled tradesmen and port facilities capable of building and maintaining a 
merchant fleet. Furthermore, they had no desire to have strong financial arrangements with 
English merchants/creditors, hence their preference for Jamaican bills of exchange. The logwood 
cutters also could not produce the tools and equipment required to chop down the dense logwood 
trees. Boston supplied all of these needs for the logwood cutters. Finally, both Bostonians and 
logwood cutters/ex-privateers resented England’s increased meddling in colonial and maritime 
affairs.9
Dampier’s journal reveals Boston’s dominance of the Bay of Campeche logwood trade 
and close connections with the logwood cutters. Boston and New England ketches and ships 
accounted for twelve of the seventeen vessels Dampier identified by their homeport during his 
time in the Bay of Campeche. He mentioned four additional vessels without identifying their 
home port.10 Boston vessels’ frequent stops at Trist ensured constant exchange and 
communication between the logwood cutters of Trist and the merchants and ship captains of 
Boston. Meanwhile, sick or injured logwood cutters often preferred Boston over Jamaica as 
location to recover. For instance, Dampier recalled an unfortunate Irish logwood cutter who 
voyaged all the way to Boston for treatment after an alligator bite mangled his leg. He spent the 
better part of a year healing there before returning to the Bay. He recovered “but went on limping 
ever after.”11
Logwood cutters also travelled to Boston for commercial reasons. One of Dampier’s 
fellow crew members, a Scotsman named Duncan Campbell, departed the Bay of Campeche on a 
9 Boston’s poor hinterland is discussed in Darrett Rutman, Winthrop's Boston: A Portrait of a Puritan Town, 1630- 
1649 (New York: Norton, 1965), 189-191. 
10 Dampier, Voyages, 2: 114, 125, 132, 142-143, 177, 183, 189-190, and 225.  
11 Ibid., 2: 177.  
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Boston ship with orders from the rest of the crew to sell forty tons of the crew’s logwood to 
procure “Flour, and such other Commodities that were proper to purchase Hides and Logwood in 
the Bay.” Campbell, trained as a merchant, happily voyaged to Boston to avoid another grueling 
season of logwood cutting.  
In an unusual twist of events, Campbell found the comforts of Boston far too compelling 
and never returned to the Bay of Campeche. He likely used the crew’s 40 tons of logwood to 
enrich himself and make Boston his home. In short order, he became a prominent bookseller, 
joined the Scots’ Charitable Society in 1684, and married into a wealthy Boston family. In 1686, 
the English traveler, John Dunton, described Campbell as “a brisk young Fellow, that dresses 
All-a-mode, and sets himself off to the best Advantage; and yet thrives apace.” Campbell’s 
connections to the radical side of the maritime community remained even after most Boston 
elites had turned away from trade with pirates. He befriended the infamous pirate, William Kidd, 
and, in 1699, when Kidd was captured in Boston, Campbell worked tirelessly on the pirate’s 
behalf in exchange for a portion of his loot. In return, the governor, Lord Bellomont, ransacked 
Campbell’s house and apprehended the stolen gold and silver. Undoubtedly, very few ex-
logwood cutters had a career like Duncan Campbell but it seems possible that many of them 
settled in Boston and labored in the maritime trades, especially after the Spanish destroyed Trist 
in 1680.12
The economics and harsh environment of the logwood trade empowered logwood cutters 
in negotiating with Boston merchants and ship captains, creating common interests and 
12 Ibid., 2: 186; The connection between Duncan Campbell the logwood cutter and Duncan Campbell the Boston 
bookseller has not been made before. Dampier mentions that Campbell had been trained as a merchant before 
coming to the Bay of Campeche, explaining his sudden transformation and success upon arriving in Boston.  George 
Emery Littlefield, Early Boston Booksellers 1642-1711 (Boston: The Club of Odd Volumes, 1900), 131-136; John 
Dunton, Letters from New England, 1686, (Boston: Prince Society, 1867), 80; Robert C. Ritchie, Captain Kidd and 
the War Against the Pirates (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1986), 177, 180-181, and 231.  
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cooperation. In the 1670s and 80s, Bostonians had no desire to toil at logwood cutting and their 
few experiences off their ships in the Bay of Campeche taught them caution. Through hunting 
excursions, Boston ship captains and sailors discovered that the logwood cutters inhabited a 
treacherous environment that required experience, knowledge, and skill to navigate. Some 
Boston mariners never returned from those hunting excursions while others suffered from severe 
dehydration and would have died without aid. Boston ship captains therefore arranged mutually 
beneficial long-term contracts with logwood crews to cut large cargoes of wood. As previously 
mentioned, Dampier joined a crew that was indebted in bonds to cut one hundred tons of 
logwood for a Boston ship captain. The fact that the ex-privateers/logwood men honored their 
obligations suggests they had received an agreeable payment in advance for their labor and 
hoped to maintain positive financial arrangements with the Boston ship captain and his backing 
merchant. In 1678, however, a Captain Gibbs from Boston contrived to undermine typical 
arrangements with the ex-privateers by forcing twenty Indian slaves taken during King Philip’s 
War to cut logwood for him in the Bay of Campeche. After a week, the experiment abruptly 
ended when the Indians killed Gibbs “and marched off, designing to return to their own Country 
by Land.” For almost twenty years thereafter, Boston’s merchants and seafarers were content to 
leave the logwood cutting to the ex-privateers.13
Boston’s reliance on the logwood trade far exceeded that of the logwood cutters other 
trade partners, thereby ensuring fair dealings. For Jamaica, logwood supplemented the far more 
important trade in sugar. Lord Carlisle may have been slightly disappointed when the king 
refused to allow official colonization of Trist in 1679 but the decision had very little economic 
impact on the increasing wealth of the sugar colony. Conversely, the logwood trade transformed 
13 Dampier, Voyages, 2: 183-185 and 225.   
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Boston’s commerce with London. For decades, New England had sought an acceptable balance 
of trade with England to reduce the flow of silver and gold leaving the colony and freedom from 
debt. As historian Bernard Bailyn observed, “Debts to English merchants represented to them a 
mortgage on their hopes for a free life in the New World.” They dabbled in the fur trade; built 
ironworks to remove their dependency on English manufacture goods; and grew hemp to lessen 
demand for English textiles. All of these efforts failed to generate the desired results.14
The logwood trade, at least temporarily, enabled Boston merchants to escape their trade 
imbalance with England. For example, in 1678, John Usher, one of Boston’s most prominent 
transatlantic merchants, had fallen behind on his accounts with London business partner John 
Ive. In March 1678, he owed Ive £373. According to merchant custom, he allowed Ive to charge 
interest because the debt had been outstanding for beyond the agreed upon terms, generally six to 
twelve months. During March 1679, however, three of Usher’s vessels arrived carrying 2166 
sticks, roughly 25-35 tons, of logwood. These rather small cargoes of logwood amounted to £258 
and, in addition a large bill of exchange, more than balanced Usher’s account with Ive. The 
destruction of Trist by the Spanish put a halt to Usher’s short-lived prosperity based on the 
logwood trade. Usher therefore once again owed Ive over £300 in 1685. Usher, in desperation 
and without a viable commodity to trade, had his dear old mother pay Ive £312 to settle his debts 
in 1686. John Usher, along with many of Boston’s most eminent merchants, would reenter the 
logwood trade in the mid-1690s to once again help alleviate Boston merchants’ massive debts to 
London merchants.15
14 Bernard Bailyn, The New England Merchants in the Seventeenth Century (Cambridge, Mass and London: Harvard 
University Press, 1979), chap. 3, quote at 61.  
15 “John Ive accounts with John Usher, 1678-81 and 1685-1686,” Jeffries Family Papers, box 2 and box 15, vol. 16, 
Massachusetts Historical Society (hereafter cited as MHS).  
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 Privateers resettled Trist in 1682 but the logwood trade continued to suffer from Spanish 
depredations and political upheaval in the English Atlantic world. Boston’s logwood trade
likewise dwindled as the Andros government and Edward Randolph imposed restrictions on 
trade and merchants attempting to ship logwood directly to European ports outside of England. 
King William’s War (1689-1697) further disrupted the logwood trade. Many logwood cutters 
abandoned Trist to pursue privateering opportunities. On the positive side, however, England’s 
alliance with Spain during the war alleviated attacks on the remaining logwood cutters. Still, 
Boston shippers faced a swarm of French privateers in the West Indies and considered the 
logwood trade too risky. Indeed, French privateers seized an estimated 4,000 English vessels 
during King William’s War, far more than their English counterparts.16 With the end of the war 
in 1697, Boston’s elite merchants such as Samuel Lillie, Penn Townsend, Andrew Belcher, 
David Jeffries, and John Usher entered the logwood trade with new purpose and, more 
importantly, new strategies. These strategies depended on increased exploitation of Boston’s
seafaring community. 
 In the late 1690s, Boston merchants began to wring greater profits out of the logwood 
trade by employing their maritime laborers as logwood cutters rather than purchasing logwood 
from the ex-privateers settled at Trist. Crews ranged from just 6 to 30 men and they were paid at 
the standard rate of a common seafarer in Boston, roughly £3 per month Massachusetts currency.  
Boston’s elite merchants favored larger ships with twenty-five to thirty men and frequently sent a 
sloop or a brig as a tender with an additional six to ten men. Once the crew had filled the ship’s 
hold with wood they would sail for Europe, generally Amsterdam, where logwood sold at high 
prices for most of the eighteenth century. The tender often returned to Boston with its smaller 
16 Ralph Davis, The Rise of the English Shipping Industry (London: Macmillan &CO LTD, 1962), 315.  
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load of logwood to pay local debts and re-export to the London market. This new approach to the 
logwood and European trade compelled Boston merchants to invest heavily in the construction 
of larger ships, from 120-400 tons. Shipbuilding, as is discussed in the next chapter, transformed 
Boston’s local economy and favored stable credit relationships with waterfront tradesmen.   
The logwood trade required strict oversight by ship captains and mates to manage their 
crews for extremely long and arduous voyages that combined months of logwood cutting with 
months of sailing. Boston merchants rewarded officers for their efforts. Mates received a high 
wage of £4 per month and a one ton privilege of logwood. Ship captains received a typical wage 
of £6 per month but also a lucrative one ton out of every twenty tons of logwood sold in Europe. 
Through this incentive merchants ensured ship captains’ cooperation in working their seafarers 
hard to complete the full cargo of logwood. These large scale operations involving large sums of 
money, however, caused conflict between seafarers, officers, and their merchant employers, 
resulting in a rash of court cases from 1699 to 1707.  In particular, three Bay of Campeche 
voyages which made their way into the Suffolk County Court, Faneuil v. Beale (1704)/Beale v. 
Townsend and Co. (1705), Minot v. Miles (1702), and Kemble v. Lillie (1704), uniquely detail 
Boston’s new and changing labor arrangements in the logwood trade and the conflict arising 
from those arrangements.17
In the fall 1699, two Boston ship captains, Aaron Beale and John Miles, prepared their 
vessels for their nearly identical intended voyages of Boston to the West Indies (Antigua and 
Jamaica) to the Bay of Campeche to Amsterdam and back to Boston. They were both loaded 
with cargoes of fish, wood, saws, and axes meant for both the West Indies and Bay of Campeche 
17 For the wages of mates and ship captains see, Penn Townsend and Co. Orders to Aaron Beale, October 3, 1699, 
Massachusetts Archives Collection, 328 vols. (hereafter cited as Mass. Arch.), 62: 322 and Josiah Minot v. John 
Miles (1702), Suffolk County Court of Common Pleas Record Books, 1701-1706 (hereafter cited as SCCCPRB),  
Massachusetts State Archives (hereafter cited as MSA). 
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markets. Both had large crews and intended to cut their own logwood for the Amsterdam market. 
Both voyages took over a year to complete and included at least two months in the Bay of 
Campeche. The results of the voyages, and the subsequent court cases, however, differed greatly. 
Beale’s case reflected the high expectations of Boston merchants for their new arrangements in 
the Bay of Campeche while Miles’s case highlighted the new potential for conflict and 
disagreements between captain and crew in harvesting logwood. 
Beale set sail in the ship St. William from Boston on October 2, 1699 with a crew of 25 
men and in company with a consort sloop crewed by 6 men. The owners intended for the sloop 
to shuttle supplies from Jamaica for the men cutting logwood and to freight and sell possible 
surplus logwood to other ships trading near Trist. Boston merchants knew the harsh conditions of 
chopping logwood in the Bay of Campeche and the very real possibility of sickness, injury, or 
death to their seafaring men. Beale therefore had permission from his owners to draw bills of 
exchange on their account with Jamaican merchant Charles Hobby to purchase logwood “if 
through sickness or death of your men, you cannot cut your full loading of wood.” The 
merchants’ carefully laid schemes lasted until the ship and sloop set sail. A severe storm 
separated the two vessels within a few days of their departure. The sloop was thrown off course 
and eventually seized by the French near San-Domingue. Beale, meanwhile, continued to 
Jamaica where he unloaded Charles Hobby’s commissioned goods. Further disaster struck the 
voyage when five crew members deserted rather than spend months chopping logwood. Indeed, 
the common seamen may have only just discovered Beale’s intention to cut logwood in the Bay 
of Campeche upon arrival in Jamaica.18
18 Penn Townsend and Co. Orders to Aaron Beale, October 3, 1699, Mass. Arch., 62: 322; Depositions of Richard 
James and Benjamin Girdler, Suffolk County Supreme Judicial Court Files (hereafter cited as SCSJCF), MSA, case 
no. 6112.  
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The deserters perhaps made a poor decision; upon arrival at Trist, according to seafarer 
Richard James, the entire crew suddenly fell sick, “which rendered it impossible to load the said 
ship ourselves.” Suspiciously, none of the crew died from the illness nor does it appear the men 
from the ship ever entered the lagoons to cut wood. For decades merchants and Royal Navy 
captains complained that seafarers feigned illness to shirk their duties to the detriment of 
pocketbooks and security. It is difficult for historians to discern the accuracy of these 
accusations; however, in this case, the Boston seafarers had strong motivation to resist 
merchants’ new ploy to exploit their labor in logwood cutting. Captain Beale’s difficulties with 
desertion in Jamaica may have also forced him to inform the remaining crew members that he 
had permission to purchase logwood if sickness befell them. Such courtesy did not extend to the 
men of the sloop who had managed to extract themselves from the French and make their way to 
Trist. According to the sloop’s commander, Benjamin Girdler, Beale, contrary to the sloop’s 
orders, “forced” him and his men “into the Laggoons” to cut logwood upon their arrival at Trist. 
Girdler made no mention of illness among Beale’s ship crew in his deposition, further suggesting 
the St. William’s crew feigned their illness to remain on board their ship.19
With the St. William’s crew too “sick” to work, Beale used the authority granted to him 
by his employers to purchase logwood from the local cutters. In so doing, he set in motion a 
series of complicated economic exchanges, which resulted in lengthy recriminations and legal 
action. Beale’s court cases underscore the precariousness of newly developing credit 
arrangements in the Atlantic world. To complete his load of logwood, Beale drew a bill of 
exchange on Charles Hobby and his employers account with him for £137:7 Jamaican currency 
to pay a Thomas Ashendon in Trist. Ashendon, meanwhile, owed a debt to Boston merchant 
19 Depositions of Richard James and Benjamin Girdler, SCSJCF, MSA, case no. 6112.  
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Andrew Faneuil and instead of wasting months sending the bill to Hobby and waiting for a return 
response, he endorsed it, made the bill payable to Faneuil, and sent it Boston. Faneuil then sent 
the bill to Hobby for payment or credit. Hobby promptly refused to honor the bill. Faneuil 
subsequently sued Beale in 1704 as the drawer of the bill and won the case.20
Beale, in turn, sued his merchant employers, Penn Townsend, Samuel Lillie, Samuel 
Checkley, and John Ballantine. He maintained in his prosecution that he followed orders in 
purchasing logwood on their account with Charles Hobby. The court agreed and awarded Beale 
the money he had been forced to pay Faneuil. Beale’s employers appealed the case, undoubtedly 
hoping to convince the court that Beale had failed to do his utmost to have the crew cut the 
logwood instead of rely on local cutters. The court once again disagreed, citing the merchants’ 
orders as the primary justification for their decision.21
These four powerful merchants did not take kindly to Beale’s victory. In particular, 
Samuel Lillie appears to have exacted a measure of revenge. In 1701, right after Beale’s return to 
Boston, Lillie had hired Beale to return to the Bay of Campeche in his ship Dolphin. At Trist, 
Beale drew a bill of exchange on Lillie to pay for supplies from fellow Boston ship captain, 
Thomas Gwin. Lillie refused to honor this common commercial practice, remarking that “he 
would neither accept nor pay said Bill.” The court hauled Beale back into court. In this case, 
Beale did not have direct orders to purchase supplies for his ship or men and lost the case. He 
failed to pay Gwin and court costs of £19:8:8 in the allotted time frame. The court had him 
arrested and committed to jail as Gwin’s debtor. Boston merchants in the logwood trade swiftly 
20 Bills of Exchange and Bill Protest, SCSJCF, MSA, case no. 6112; Andrew Faneuil v. Aaron Beale (1704) and 
Aaron Beale v. Penn Townsend and Co. (1704-1705), SCCCPRB, 1701-1706, MSA. 
21 Andrew Faneuil v. Aaron Beale (1704) and Aaron Beale v. Penn Townsend and Co. (1704), SCCCPRB, 1701-
1706, MSA; Andrew Faneuil v. Aaron Beale (1704) and Aaron Beale v. Penn Townsend and Co. (1705), SCSJCF, 
MSA, case nos. 6112, 6321, and 6750.  
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learned to write vague orders to ensure that their ship captains and seafarers could not escape the 
lagoons so easily. Furthermore, despite losing their initial case to Beale, the logwood merchants 
indicated to their ship captains that failure would result in years of litigation.22
Boston’s logwood merchants also sought out hard-driving masters who could manage 
their large crews effectively and ensure obedience in the lagoons. In December of 1699, shortly 
after merchants began using Boston sailors as logwood cutters, Reverend Cotton Mather 
remarked on ship captains’ mounting ill-treatment of Boston seafarers: “Alas, Alas, How hardly 
have they [sailors] been used? What Cruelties have many of them suffered; not only from the 
Hands of cruel Enemies abroad, but also from some of their own Commanders and Officers in 
their own Ships at Home?”23 John Miles, who made his first voyage to the Bay of Campeche a 
month after Aaron Beale, exemplified the sort of ship captain that Mather reproved. Miles ruled 
his men with a combination of swagger, favors, and intimidation that inspired both fear and 
loyalty. In 1707, his overzealous use of violence landed him in prison when he murdered his 
boatswain, George Barley, in Kinsale, Ireland.24 Miles’s violent and controlling temperament 
perfectly suited Boston merchants’ Bay of Campeche logwood scheme.    
In contrast to Aaron Beale’s voyage, Miles’s 1699 adventure to the Bay of Campeche on 
board the ship Swallow satisfied Boston merchants’ new expectations for the logwood trade. 
Miles understood that Boston seafarers had little motivation to chop logwood for the wages of 
common seamen. He therefore ensured his own success by employing Indian and “negro” slaves 
22 Thomas Gwin v. Aaron Beale (1704) and Thomas Gwin v. William Beale (1704), SCCCPRB, 1701-1706, MSA; 
Thomas Gwin v. Aaron Beale (1704) and Thomas Gwin v. William Beale, SCSJCF, MSA, case nos. 6118 and 6341. 
23 Cotton Mather, The Religious Marriner: A Brief Discourse Tending to Direct the course of Seamen In those points 
of Religion which may bring them to the port of Eternal Happiness (Boston, Massachusetts, 1700), 37.  
24 Miles escaped Kinsale but found his own violent death in 1710 during Boston’s naval assault of Port Royal, Nova 
Scotia see, Unity Papers, Jeffries Family Papers, box 18, MHS.  
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in addition to his crew. He even owned some of the slaves. The slaves were assigned the most 
unpleasant tasks of logwood cutting, rendering the lagoons tolerable for the seafarers.25
Once in the lagoons, the chief mate, Josiah Minot, took charge of operations. He had the 
logwood crew build their “barkudeer,” or barracks, adjacent to two other Boston-based crews led 
by John Viall, Captain John Stevens’s mate, and Captain William Ball. The barracks was a large 
building assembled to house the entire crew rather than the small, individually inhabited huts that 
William Dampier describes in his account of the ex-privateers logwood camps. The change was 
significant; the barracks mirrored conditions on board a merchant vessel. The command 
hierarchies remained. The cramped space and lack of privacy reminded the men that their sole 
purpose was to extract logwood and return to the ship to carry out their duties as common 
seamen. Also like vessels at sea or in port, the proximity of other logwood crews helped ease 
tensions, as crews frequently interacted, shared news, supplies, and merriment.  
For Minot, these neighborly interactions allowed him to further his Boston and maritime 
contacts and reputation. He freely gave John Viall’s crew food when their own ship captain 
neglected to send them supplies. When Miles sent turtles to his crew, Minot would “Invite the 
adjacent Lagooners to eat of the same and deprive the said Miles men.” The ambitious chief 
mate made unequal trades to curry favor with Captain William Ball, including giving the captain 
one hundred biscuits for one bottle of rum. In addition to food and supplies, Minot exploited his 
power over the Swallow’s slaves to employ them in filling Captain Ball’s quota of logwood at 
the expense of cutting wood for Miles. One resentful crew member testified that Minot also used 
the slaves for his own advantage: “the said Minott did cause Indian Joseph and Mr. Phillips’ 
negro to cut wood for him the said Minot on Saturdays in the afternoon.” Despite these self-
25 Deposition of John Jones, March 18, 1701, Mass. Arch., 62: 367. 
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serving actions, Minot managed to secure the support of the majority of the crew and his fellow 
Bostonians. They complimented Minot for working hard alongside his men, observing that “In 
the Bay of Campeche he [Minot] used his best endeavours to promote the good of the voyage.” 
Viall, meanwhile, expressed gratitude for Minot’s kindness, even as he noted that Boston 
logwood cutting crews customarily practiced such “neighborly kindness” in the unforgiving 
lagoons of the Bay of Campeche.26
Captain Miles’s actions, inactions, and words further cemented the crew’s endorsement 
of Minot. Even with a cadre of slaves to support them, the chief mate and most of the crew 
became increasingly embittered towards their captain. Miles never shared in the discomforts of 
the lagoons to oversee the crew’s activities. He instead spent much of his time hunting for beef 
and turtles, some of which he sent to the men cutting logwood. He managed supplies, directed 
the ship’s tender, the sloop Dolphin, and sent from the comfort of his cabin on board the Swallow
lofty orders up into the lagoons to increase the production of logwood. One such order infuriated 
the crew; Captain Miles directed Peter Cutler “to go into the Lagoons and tell the sd Minott to 
cause our people to work on Saturdays, in the afternoon, which I did.” In the 1670s and 80s, the 
ex-pirates and privateers typically took Saturday’s to hunt. Boston’s new logwood regime forced 
the crews to work on Saturday mornings as well. John Viall confirmed that “Saturdays in the 
afternoon were always allowed our gang and all others that I knew being a Custome.” Still not 
satisfied with the production of Minot’s crew, the pampered Miles entered the lagoons to 
verbally chastise the overworked crew. One crew member heard Miles say “we were Lazy 
rogues and did not Earne our Victualls.” Minot defended his crew, angrily telling the captain 
“That his men had Cutt as much wood or more than any men in the Lagoons.” Minot had reason 
26 Depositions of John Jones and John Viall, March 18, 1701, and Samuel Hart, May 26, 1701, Mass. Arch., 62: 
367-368 and 371.  
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to stand by his crew’s hard labor; they had managed to cut over 140 tons of logwood in ten 
weeks.27
Miles’s order for the crew to work on Saturday afternoons and disparaging words evoked 
the seafarers “Spirit of Rebellion.” Discontent in the lagoons grew and, in a blatant act of 
defiance, Minot “had drawn up a paper to oblige the men not to Cutt any Logwood for the 
Loading of sd. Ship after the fifteenth day of May: and would have persuaded the men to set 
their hands to sd paper.” One of the crew members claimed Minot called this paper a “Round 
Robin” and noted “some of the cutters had subscribed.” Sailors employed round robins to plan 
and foment mutiny among crews. Participants would write or mark their names in circle to hide 
the identity of the leaders. Miles, however, succeeded in coercing his crew to fill the Swallow’s
cargo of logwood prior to the deadline, thwarting any outright rebelliousness. The ship set sail 
for Amsterdam in company with the sloop Dolphin, which would eventually break company and 
sail for Boston. Once at sea, Miles had Minot under his tyrannical and violent thumb. The two 
men engaged in a heated debate in front of the crew over transactions in the lagoons. Crew 
members observed “the sd Myles strike the sd Minott severall blows with his Cane and 
thereupon bid the people take notice he [Minot] was no longer his mate” and “Grievously beat 
him [Minot] with his cane many blows.” In a second quarrel, Miles again called for his cane but 
Minot defended himself with a pair of pistols, remarking that no man would strike him again.
Miles stayed his hand for the moment.28
27 Depositions of John Viall, March 18, 1701, and Peter Cutler, March 20, 1701, Mass. Arch., 62: 368-369; 
Deposition of Ephraim Nichols, SCSJCF, MSA, case no. 4992. 
28 Marcus Rediker, Between the Devil and the Deep Blue Sea: Merchant Seamen, Pirates, and the Anglo-American 
Maritime World, 1700-1750 (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Cambridge University Press, 1987), chap. 5; Deposition of 
Peter Cutler, March 20, 1701, Mass. Arch., 62: 369; Deposition of Ephraim Nichols, SCSJCF, MSA, case no. 4992. 
For “Round Robin” see, Deposition of John Scott, March 10, 1702, Mass. Arch., 62: 435-36.  
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Minot’s life might have ended as abruptly as George Barley’s in 1707 had Miles not 
feared his powerful family connections in Boston, which included Stephen Minot, a well-
connected and wealthy merchant. Nevertheless, Miles had no intention of letting Minot continue 
to challenge his authority unpunished. He forced Minot off of his ship and onto the Dolphin as 
the two vessels parted. As the seafarers carried Minot off the ship, he screamed at Miles to pay 
his wages and transfer his ton of logwood off the ship. Miles foolishly failed to listen to Minot. 
Upon his return to Boston, Minot immediately enlisted his brother Stephen to safeguard his own 
reputation and initiate a lawsuit. Miles returned from Amsterdam with the gratitude of his 
merchant employers but he faced three separate charges relating to his treatment of Minot. With 
the exception of one crew member, the crew’s depositions supported Minot’s account and the 
chief mate won every verdict. Minot’s connections undoubtedly played a role in his victory but, 
more importantly, Boston courts still sympathized with “neighborly kindness” and fair 
treatment.29 The court cases Faneuil v. Beale/Beale v. Townsend and Co. and Minot v. Miles
originated from opposite parties but both reflected Boston merchants’ desire for their ship 
captains to focus on the profits of the logwood trade rather than the customary treatment of the 
Boston’s seafaring community. 
By employing their seafarers as logwood cutters, Boston merchants managed to decrease 
labor costs for producing logwood almost seventy-five percent from the pre-war period; 
however, they still remained unsatisfied. During the interwar period of 1697-1702, production of 
logwood skyrocketed due to the new tactics employed by Boston merchants, driving down prices 
in England and Europe. In 1703, John Ive of London wrote John Usher of Boston to explain that 
“Logwood is exceedingly low” at “about £13 per Tun.” Logwood sold for roughly £10 per ton 
29 Josiah Minot v. John Miles (1702), SCCCPRB, 1701-1706, MSA.  
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Mass. currency in Boston, which meant, with the cost of shipping, the sale of logwood in 
England failed to settle debts in the same manner as it had in the past. Direct shipment from the 
Bay of Campeche increased profits but many Boston logwood merchants continued to ship 
logwood to Boston in order to settle local debts and balance account books at home rather than 
using cash. Logwood’s ability to act as a currency in Boston rested on its value in London. 
Logwood merchants, therefore, had to find new solutions to maintain their power and status 
within the local community.30
As early as summer 1701, Boston merchants began forming new labor arrangements for 
the logwood trade to secure lower labor costs and risks. Instead of employing relatively high paid 
and skilled sailors in cutting wood, merchants sought to harness Boston’s growing multitudes of 
unskilled and impoverished labor. King William’s War had displaced many woodsmen and 
farmers on the Maine and New Hampshire frontier and, as Sir Henry Ashurst noted, created a 
multitude of unemployed English soldiers suitable to replace New England’s loss of manpower 
during the war. Maritime men, generally ship captains, familiar with the logwood trade saw 
opportunity in organizing these desperate men into logwood cutting crews in Boston and forming 
agreements with logwood merchants. The articles of agreement for these new ventures read like 
an indentured servitude agreement, laying out time of employment and respective 
responsibilities. For example, Joseph Kemble and William Lane, both identified as mariners, 
agreed to terms with merchant Samuel Lillie to work in the Bay of Campeche for eight months 
and give him half of the logwood their crew produced. In return, Lillie provided free 
transportation to the Bay of Campeche and back to Boston for Kemble, Lane, and twelve 
“hands.” He also supplied the crew with saws, axes, and “materials” necessary to cut logwood 
30 John Ive to John Usher, November 11, 1703, Jeffries Family Papers, box 2, MHS; Ship Two Brothers Account of 
the Bay Voyage, 1701, Jeffries Family Papers, box 15, MHS.  
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along with their provisions while working in the Bay of Campeche. Kemble and Lane were 
responsible for paying their crew’s wages, freight on their one-half share of the logwood, and for 
provisions during the voyage to-and-fro.31
This arrangement appeared to be a win-win situation for Lillie, Kemble, and Lane. Lillie 
reduced his overhead costs by not paying wages to captains and ship crews to cut logwood. 
Captains Kemble and Lane, meanwhile, received the capital in tools and transportation that they 
required. Kemble and Lane hired their twelve man cutter crew for an average wage of 31.5 
shillings or £1:11:6 Massachusetts currency (£1:4:6 pounds sterling) per month, roughly half the 
wage of a common seaman sailing out of Boston at the time. These low wages reveal that 
Kemble and Lane drew their crew from outside of the maritime community, or at least outside of 
skilled seamen who could easily find employment for much higher pay. The major losers in this 
arrangement were the laborers Kemble and Lane hired and the self-employed logwood cutters in 
the Bay of Campeche who now had to compete with wage labor even cheaper than seafarers.32
The low wages of Kemble’s and Lane’s crew drastically cut the per ton cost of producing 
logwood despite their poor results. If Kemble and Lane’s accounts are accurate, their twelve man 
crew only managed to cut 36 tons of logwood during their seven month stint in the Bay of 
Campeche. This paltry number is undoubtedly false, and Kemble and Lane took advantage of 
their distance from Lillie to ship additional logwood on their own account. Samuel Lillie 
certainly doubted Kemble and Lane’s crew cut only 36 tons of logwood when 100 tons should 
have been easily possible with a twelve-man crew. He refused to honor his agreement and kept 
the entire 36 tons Kemble and Lane shipped to him in Boston. The ensuing litigation, however, 
31 See Articles of Agreement in Joseph Kemble v. Samuel Lillie (1704), SCSJCF, MSA, case nos. 5557 and 5760.    
32 Joseph Kemble and William Lane Accounts and Joseph Kemble v. Samuel Lillie (1704), SCSJCF, MSA, case no. 
5557.    
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favored Kemble. Even if Kemble and Lane accurately represented their production numbers, the 
labor costs of Kemble and Lane’s crew amounted to a rate of £3:9:0 Massachusetts currency 
(£2:14:0 sterling) per ton of logwood. This was far lower than other forms of labor in the 
logwood trade.33
In 1675, the five man crew William Dampier worked for managed to cut 100 tons of 
logwood in almost the same amount of time as Kemble’s and Lane’s crew. They individually 
earned close to £10 sterling per month, or 88% more than Kemble’s and Lane’s cutters, and sold 
a ton of logwood for between £5 and £25 sterling. Granted, individual logwood cutters during 
the 1670s and 80s had far more independence and experience than these newly formed Boston 
crews. They also had monetary incentive to work hard. Meanwhile, a Boston ship with a 27 man 
crew, similar to John Mile’s crew in 1699, produced logwood for approximately £1 sterling per 
ton more than Kemble’s cutter crew.34 With labor costs so drastically reduced, Boston logwood 
merchants could continue importing logwood into Boston to settle debts whilst re-export 
merchants could tolerate the £13-14 sterling per ton that logwood sold for in England.35
For much of Queen Anne’s War (1702-1713), competing forms of labor coexisted in the 
lagoons surrounding Trist. Enough English and West Indies vessels voyaged to the Bay of 
Campeche to enable a small contingent of self-employed cutters to compete with Boston’s 
seafaring wage and slave laborers. After the war, an armada of Boston vessels entered the Bay of 
Campeche. The lagoons swarmed with Boston woodcutting crews and their “Barkudeers” 
33 Ibid.,; Joseph Kemble v. Samuel Lillie (1704), SCCCPRB, 1701-1706, MSA. 
34 Dampier, Voyages, 2: 178-182. The rough estimate for the labor cost per ton of logwood for a Boston ship crew 
derives from the average monthly wages of a 27 man crew in 1700, including officers (roughly £160 Mass. 
currency), a three month timespan in the Bay of Campeche, and a 125 ton ship (assumes 100 tons of logwood). 
Average Monthly Wage divided by Logwood/Time = Labor Cost per ton of Logwood. The use of slaves by Boston 
ship captains in the logwood trade may complicate the per ton average of logwood but seafaring slaves generally 
received a wage comparable to white common seafarers that was paid to their masters.      
35 For price of logwood in London in the early 1700’s see, John Ive to John Usher, November 11, 1703, Jeffries 
Family Papers, box 2, MHS.  
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occupied many of the prime locations for easily gathering logwood. During the 1713-14 and 
1714-15 logwood cutting seasons at least fifty-seven different Boston-based ship captains and 
their crews entered the Bay of Campeche to cut logwood. Many of these captains participated in 
both seasons. In March of 1714, the Boston News-letter reported that at least thirty-four New 
England ship captains, twenty-seven of which I have identified as Boston-based captains, had 
taken up residence in the Bay of Campeche. The Boston News-letter’s shipping section also 
indicates an additional 9 Boston vessels returned from the Bay during the spring and summer of 
1714, bringing the total number of known Boston-based vessels in the Bay of Campeche to 
thirty-six.36
 The Boston News-letter’s entrances and clearances provide important insights into the 
types of vessels involved in the logwood trade. I have identified the vessel types of twenty-six of 
the thirty-six Boston-based vessels in the Bay of Campeche: ten ships (39%), five brigantines 
(19%), and eleven sloops (42%).37 If we assume those percentages hold for all thirty-six vessels 
then Boston had fourteen ships (estimate 120 tons and twenty-five man crew), seven brigantines 
(estimate 70 tons and ten man crew), and fifteen sloops (estimate 50 tons and six man crew) in 
the Bay of Campeche during the 1713-1714 logwood cutting season. The estimated total tonnage 
amounts to 2920 tons of logwood, which would have amounted to 60% of the 4878 tons of 
36 The total number of Boston vessels in the Bay of Campeche during the 1714 logwood cutting season is probably 
higher. Many Boston vessels voyaged directly from the Bay of Campeche to Europe, which meant upon their arrival 
in Boston their last port of departure would not have reflected their time in the Bay of Campeche. Fortunately, the 
March 1714 report covered some of those captains. Boston News-letter 21 March 1714; “Entrances and Clearances,”
Boston News-letter 3 January 1714 – 27 December 1714.  
37 If I include the entrances and clearances of the 1712-13, 1713-14, and 1714-15 logwood seasons, I find 13 ships 
(37%), 9 brigantines (26%), 11 sloops (32%) involved in the trade so the percentages are fairly similar with 
brigantines being the only outlier. Of course, many of the ship captains and vessels are repeated each season.  
“Entrances and Clearances,” Boston News-letter 4 January 1713 – 28 December 1713, 3 January 1714 – 27 
December 1714, and 28 March 1715 – 19 December 1715. Note: The Boston News-letter in 1715 is missing a 
number of issues but those important to the logwood trade in the late spring and summer months are complete.  
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logwood imported into Great Britain in 1714. Meanwhile, we can estimate that close to 500 
Boston seafarers participated in the 1713-14 logwood cutting season.38
Boston merchants’ zealous involvement in the Bay of Campeche logwood trade provoked 
anger and distress among the settled inhabitants. In the past, Boston vessels had provided the ex-
privateers with most of their provisions but now Boston ship captains employed their own crews 
to obtain logwood. The sheer number of Boston sailors further strained local food supplies. In 
mid to late 1714, twenty-eight Boston vessels departed directly for the Bay of Campeche. Many 
others probably arrived from Jamaica. By June 1715, the local Baymen faced starvation, 
“Provisions being very scarce and extraordinary dear.” In desperation, “near Two Hundred Men” 
turned pirate, causing widespread panic among the Boston crews. One Boston ship captain 
reported “that all Persons that can get away, carry what they have with them, and desert the 
Place, there was but one ship in the Bay when he came away.” Boston ship captains scurried 
home after their new labor practices had kicked up a hornet’s nest.39
The famished Baymen turned pirates threatened all shipping in the Bay of Campeche but 
their primary target was the Spanish town of Campeche, which they promptly attacked. Their 
assault failed but they succeeded in once again drawing the attention of Spanish officials to the 
dangers posed by English logwood cutters in Trist and its surrounding lagoons. The Spanish 
mustered their naval strength to halt the Bay of Campeche logwood trade once and for all. In 
1716, the Spanish allowed crews to enter the lagoons but after the dry season began attacking 
English vessels attempting to leave. According to one observer, “the Spaniards had taken several 
English Ships and Sloops, and cut off the most part of the Bay,” another complained that the 
38 “Entrances and Clearances,” Boston News-letter 4 January 1713 – 28 December 1713, 3 January 1714 – 27 
December 1714; Wilson, “The Logwood Trade,” 5.  
39 “Entrances and Clearances,” Boston News-letter 3 January 1714 – 27 December 1714; Boston News-letter 19 
September 1715.   
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“Bay has been Three times cut off this Summer.” On the last day of November, the Spanish 
orchestrated a massive assault similar to the one in 1680 that drove the logwood cutters from 
Trist for two years. This attack crippled Boston’s logwood trade, as “most of English Vessels 
taken in the Bay belong’d to Boston.” Boston merchants lost a minimum of eleven vessels and at 
least five of those eleven were large ships. The losses amounted to tens of thousands of pounds 
sterling. The Spanish swiftly moved to fortify Trist and blockade the lagoons. They moved 
twenty-four cannons ashore and “brought all things necessary for the settling of the same 
[Trist].” With the Spanish settlement of Trist, Boston merchants permanently lost access to the 
Bay of Campeche and its rich logwood trade.40
News of the catastrophe reached Boston in early April 1717. The Reverend Cotton 
Mather sorrowfully reflected that “The grievous Losses and Sorrowes my Neighbors have lately 
suffered by the Way of the Sea, oblige me to Meditations peculiarly adapted for them.” As more 
bad news poured in the following week, he pronounced, “The late Calamities on our Vessels and 
Neighbours abroad, afford me Objects enough to engage my Compassions at home.” On April 
15, 1717, the attack in the Bay of Campeche became personal for Mather when he learned that 
some of his seafaring relatives had been captured by the Spanish: “It is a very dark Time with 
many of the Flock. Especially in regard to Relatives and Interests abroad.” Fortunately for 
Mather, none of his relatives were killed or held in lengthy captivity. Mather’s family was well-
connected, and most likely his relatives held positions as ship captains or officers. In late May, 
40 Boston News-letter 10 October 1715; Boston News-letter 25 June 1716 and 1 October 1716; Boston News-letter 1 
April 1717; Boston News-letter 8 April 1717; List of vessels Surrendered in the Bay of Campechia, November 30, 
1716 and Masters of Vessels in the Bay of Campeachy to John Cample, December 10, 1716, CSPC, vol. 29 (1716-
1717), nos. 484iii and 484x.    
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he happily reported that his “Relatives returned from a Captivity among the Spaniards.” Boston’s 
economic woes would not be so easily remedied.41
From 1697 to 1717, Boston merchants and ship captains had increasingly appropriated 
the logwood trade by reducing logwood cutters to mere wage laborers. Production of logwood 
skyrocketed and its price drastically declined, creating difficult economic conditions for 
independent logwood cutters. In 1721, Jeremiah Dummer, a well-educated and privileged Boston 
politician, trumpeted the “Industry of the people of New England” in managing to reduce the 
cost of logwood from “30 and 40£ per Ton” to “12£ per Ton.” Of course, Dummer failed to 
acknowledge that this great “success” was accomplished on the backs of exploited, wage 
laboring seamen and logwood cutters. By the end of Queen Anne’s War, the logwood trade no 
longer represented a place of opportunity where common men, if they had desired, “might have 
gotten an Estate.” The consequences of these changes essentially fulfilled Lord Carlisle’s plan in 
the late 1670s to privatize the Bay of Campeche logwood trade. The profits derived from the 
trade fueled Boston’s war efforts, ship outfitting and building industries, a middle class of 
waterfront tradesmen, and, most importantly, a growing merchant-elite focused on lavish 
lifestyles similar to London merchants.42
The economic impact of losing the logwood trade rippled through Boston’s local 
economy; shipbuilding faltered, debt litigation soared, and bankruptcies multiplied among ship 
captains and waterfront laborers.43 Thus, in a roundabout way, the Baymen exacted a measure of 
41 Diary of Cotton Mather, vol. 1: 1681–1709; vol. 2: 1709–24, ed. Worthington Chauncey Ford (New York: 
Frederick Ungar Publishing Co., 1957), 2: 446-448 and 455.  
42 Jeremiah Dummer, A Defence of the New England Charters (London: W. Wilkins, 1721), 11; Dampier, Voyages, 
2: 157.  
43 For examples of increased litigation among of waterfront laborers in 1717, see, Joshua Marriner, shopkeeper v. 
Kettle (shipwright), Fadre (mariner), Mutchmore (sailmaker), Robertson (shipwright), Gill (shipwright), Hodgden 
(shipwright), Sherman (blacksmith), Young (mariner), and Vail (baker), SCCCPRB, 1715-1721 (July 1717), MSA; 
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revenge on Boston’s merchants when their piratical actions in 1715 prompted the Spanish to
attack the Bay of Campeche and seize Boston’s vessels in late 1716. The Baymen had stubbornly 
refused to conform to the new socio-economic conditions created by Boston merchants and ship 
captains. As described in Chapter 4, they instead joined with the many other outraged maritime 
laborers around the Atlantic in their battle against poor working conditions, low wages, and 
limited opportunity for those at the bottom.44
The end of the Bay of Campeche logwood trade disrupted Boston’s economy and began 
the port’s downward spiral. This is not to say Boston did not maintain its dominance over 
competing North American port cities. For decades to come, Boston merchants continued to hold 
an advantage in the English manufactured goods, naval stores, fish, wine, and shipbuilding 
trades. It retained a roughly three to one advantage in vessel clearances and entrances in 
comparison to other North American ports until the late 1740s. Still, the port and its inhabitants 
suffered greatly with the loss of the logwood trade. Already heavily indebted to London 
merchants in 1717, Boston merchants further mortgaged the port’s future through debt to stay 
afloat from 1717 to 1725. When the logwood trade revived in the Bay of Honduras during the 
mid-1720s, Boston merchants eagerly reentered the trade but they no longer held their position 
of power. More importantly, Boston merchants failed to transplant their methods for keeping 
labor costs low in the Bay of Campeche, paving the way for new political, social, and economic 
relationships between local baymen and European and North American merchants and seafarers.    
For more on Boston’s economic decline in 1717, see, James A. Henretta, “Economic Development and Social 
Structure in Colonial Boston,” The William and Mary Quarterly 22 (1) (January, 1965): 75-92; Gary B. Nash, The 
Urban Crucible: Social Change, Political Consciousness, and the Origins of the American Revolution (Cambridge, 
Mass,; Harvard University Press, 1979), 79-88. 
44 See chap. 3 on the connection between logwood cutters and pirates. 
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Boston’s decline after 1717 became a major concern for all of New England. Rampant 
lawsuits overwhelmed Boston’s “middling sort” and generated new laws that stifled local credit 
arrangements. Meanwhile, depreciating paper currency, issued during wartime to fund 
government debt, plagued all of New England and many wanted a return to gold and silver. In 
early 1720, Boston merchant John Colman published The Distressed State of the Town of Boston, 
setting off a firestorm of conflicting visions for New England’s future economy. Hidden amidst 
the fiery debates was a quiet acknowledgement from Boston merchants that the loss of their 
“cash crop,” logwood, had initiated much of the economic pains felt by Bostonians and New 
Englanders. As Oliver Noyes argued in defense of his fellow Boston merchants, “The Gentleman 
tells us, That the Silver and Gold will always be Bought up and Shipp’d off while we have such 
plenty of Bills [paper currency]. As if the plenty of Bills were the cause thereof, no my Friend, it 
is the scarcity of Returns is the cause. He does not consider we have lost our Bay Trade 
[logwood trade], which was a great Article in our Returns.” For merchants like Noyes, logwood 
represented the greatest single commodity New England could directly exchange with England 
for manufactured goods.45
On May 24, 1720, the Reverend Edward Wigglesworth challenged Noyes assessment in 
his A Vindication of the Remarks of one in the Country: “Our author thinks the Scarcity of 
Returns to be Real, and tells me I don’t consider we have lost our Bay Trade. I confess I did not 
consider it, for I knew we had had several vessels from the Bay this Year already; and One of 
them was in Harbour but Last Week.” Wigglesworth correctly identified the schooner Mary and 
Abigail commanded by George Burchan, which arrived in Boston from the Bay of Honduras on 
45 John Colman, The Distressed State of the Town of Boston (Boston: Kneeland, 1720); For quote see, Oliver Noyes, 
A Letter from a Gentleman, Containing some Remarks upon the Several Answers Given unto Mr. Colman…
(Boston: Kneeland, 1720), 7.  
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April 25, 1720. Boston merchants, however, had just begun to test the waters in the Bay of 
Honduras. According to customs records, Burchan’s vessel was the only vessel to arrive with 
logwood in 1720 and the first since 1718, which supported Noyes’s argument that their logwood 
trade had, for all intents and purposes, been lost. Wigglesworth naively forged ahead: “But I 
consider’d that the Bay Trade was no such mighty Article as he pretends. The Spaniards have 
always in time of Peace, as well as War, given us all the Disturbance they could in it.” During 
the course of these debates, Wigglesworth shed important light on how Boston merchants 
manipulated economic circumstances to their advantage by paying waterfront laborers in 
commodities but he had very little understanding of Boston’s place in the Atlantic economy.46
Merchants like Noyes, and even educated residents like the Reverend Cotton Mather, 
knew the devastating impact of losing the Bay of Campeche logwood trade. The numbers 
support their appraisal. In 1714 alone, Boston vessels carried home 1,434 tons of logwood, 
which would have then been re-exported to England. This logwood had a market value in 
London of roughly £18,642 - £22,944 or an estimated range of 37% - 45% of exports from all of 
New England to England that year. As previously mentioned, many other Boston vessels, 
typically larger ships of 200 to 400 tons, sailed directly from the Bay of Campeche with their 
cargoes of logwood to London. Additional ships smuggled logwood to Amsterdam, Hamburg, 
Lisbon, and Leghorn, the proceeds of which were generally remitted to London merchants. My 
previous calculations suggest that Bostonians harvested or shipped an estimated 2920 tons of 
logwood in 1714. That same year New England imported £121,288 worth of goods from 
England. Their harvest of logwood would have therefore paid for 31% to 39% of these imports. 
Such large remittances gave Boston merchants the necessary confidence to invest at home in 
46 Edward Wigglesworth, A Vindication of the Remarks of one in the Country (Boston, 1720), 9-10; “Entrances and 
Clearances,” Boston News-letter 25 April 1720; see also, appendix, graph 2.  
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capital intensive shipbuilding and expand their growing network of debtors in North America by 
re-exporting English commodities. The loss of the logwood trade and that confidence brought an 
abrupt end to Boston’s prosperity, leading Colman to lament to his friend in the countryside, 
“Truly Sir, This which was within these Ten years, one of the most Flourishing Towns in 
America, in the Opinion of all Strangers who came among us, will in less than half so many more 
years be the most miserable Town therein.”47
Boston merchants began to reestablish a presence in the logwood trade during the mid-
1720s by shifting their attention to the dangerous Bay of Honduras. Spaniards, pirates, and local 
natives constituted significant threats to Boston vessels and men. The lawless nature of the Bay 
of Honduras also emboldened common seamen from Boston to mutiny and turn pirate when 
treated poorly, as was the case with the Bostonian Ned Low. Pirates in the Bay of Honduras 
destroyed or captured at least seven Boston vessels during the Golden Age of Piracy. 
Nevertheless, Boston’s entrances from the Bay of Honduras steadily grew from six vessels in 
1722 to an incredible forty-four vessels after Atlantic piracy had diminished in 1727.48
Boston’s logwood trade in the Bay of Honduras differed from the Bay of Campeche trade 
in a number of important ways. The most significant change was Boston merchants’ decision to 
begin using smaller and faster brigs, sloops, and schooners rather than large ships. Another 
noteworthy development arose when merchants from Amsterdam and London began to exert 
47 For 1714 imports of logwood, see “Imports of foreign and enumerated commodities imported into Boston in New 
England,” September 17, 1717, CSPC, vol. 30 (1717-1718), no. 85i. The price of logwood in London 1703 was at 
the “exceedingly low” price of £13 per ton, John Ive to John Usher, November 11, 1703, Jeffries Family Papers, box 
2, MHS. Meanwhile, in 1717 the price was £16 per ton, see Wilson, “The Logwood Trade,” 13. I have used these 
prices to develop the most likely range for the price of logwood in 1714. New England exports to England amounted 
to £51,541 in 1714, Sir Charles Whitworth, State of the Trade of Great Britain in its Imports and Exports, 
Progressively from the Year 1697 (London, 1776), 63; Colman, The Distressed State of the Town of Boston, 1.  
48 See appendix, table 5; For more on pirates in the Bay of Honduras see, chap. 3 above and Daniel Finamore, “A 
Mariner’s Utopia: Pirates and Logwood in the Bay of Honduras,” in Russell K. Skowronek and Charles R. Ewen, X 
Marks the Spot: The Archaeology of Piracy (Gainesville, Florida: University Press of Florida, 2006): 64-78.  
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more influence over the logwood trade during the 1730s and 40s. Similarities, however, 
remained. Boston continued to employ a variety of methods to obtain logwood, including 
purchasing from local merchants and baymen and using their sailors as logwood cutters. Even 
though Boston merchants employed smaller vessels with smaller crews, sailors continued to 
resist the trade. And finally, the Spanish threat remained a constant and pervasive. All these 
factors influenced the nature of the logwood trade and Boston’s place in that trade.   
 Boston merchants learned from their losses at the hands of the Spanish in the Bay of 
Campeche to minimize risk through downsizing the vessels in their logwood fleets from ships to 
brigs, sloops, and schooners. Pirates further hammered home this critical lesson during Boston’s 
first forays into the Bay of Honduras after 1717. For example, Blackbeard captured and burned 
the massive 400 ton Protestant Caesar in 1718, George Lowther and Ned Low the 200 ton 
Greyhound in 1722, and one of Low’s protégés, Captain Richard Shipton, hijacked the Boston-
owned John and Mary in 1724. The loss of a sloop damaged a merchant’s economic condition 
but the loss of a ship had the potential to ruin careers. Sloops and schooners also had the added 
benefit of speed and a shallower draught, which helped Bostonians evade the Spanish Guarda 
Costas. For example, in 1732, Bostonian John Dutch’s sloop successfully fled from a large 
Spanish galley with 190 men, as the Spaniards found “they could not come up with him” and 
“left the Chase.” But when the Guarda Costas predictably managed to capture Boston vessels, 
ransoming a sloop cost far less than a ship.49
If timed correctly, the use of fast sloops and schooners vessels enabled ship captains and 
their smaller crews to make two voyages per year between Boston and the Bay of Honduras. 
John Erving’s large 80-100 ton sloop Sarah managed to accomplish this feat in both 1742 and 
49 Weekly Rehearsal 16 April 16 1733. 
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1743. Regulars in the logwood trade, such as Captains Joshua Underwood, Ebenezer Kent, 
William Makken, and John Dutch, also succeeded in entering Boston twice per year with their 
cargoes of wood. Merchants either sold the logwood in Boston to pay local debts or re-exported 
it to London or Amsterdam. Some Boston merchants, intent on breaking the English Navigation 
Laws, continued to ship logwood directly from the Bay of Honduras to European ports outside of 
England. The overall pattern, however, had shifted to direct voyages between Boston and the 
Bay of Honduras.50
European merchants provided critical advice to Boston merchants seeking to make 
inroads into the logwood trade but they charged for their aid. Boston merchants had acquired two 
generations worth of knowledge in the Bay of Campeche logwood trade but the Bay of Honduras 
was relatively new territory. New York and Newport merchants and ship captains had equal or 
more experience. London, Amsterdam, and Leghorn merchant houses, such as William and John 
Hodshon, Thomas and Adrian Hope, and Aikman, Marshall & co., competed for Boston’s share 
of the logwood trade by offering information and incentives.  
John Hodshon, for instance, received a cargo of logwood from Boston merchant Jacob 
Wendell, a newcomer into the logwood trade, in March 1744. The logwood was of poor quality 
because it was not chipped properly. As a favor to Wendell, Hodshon employed a chipper in 
Amsterdam to redo the job and thus increase the value of Wendell’s logwood. He then lobbied 
Wendell to “keep an eye” on Boston merchants involved in the logwood trade. He wanted to 
know the vessels, masters, and tonnage of all “vessels from your place to the Bay” and “whether 
they are to return to Boston or bound to another part.” If the vessel returned to Boston, he wanted 
50 Journal of John Erving of Boston, Mass., 1733-1745, Baker Library, Harvard Business School (hereafter cited as 
HBS).  
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Wendell to check “what sort of wood they bring, unchipt or Bay Chipt wood.” In addition to 
these requests, Hodshon had other questions: if the wood arrived unchipped, was it chipped in 
Boston? How much wood did Boston merchants place in storage? Where was Boston’s logwood 
reshipped? Hodshon wanted the same information, if possible, on the activities of Rhode Island 
and New York merchants. He was “pretty well assured” that Wendell would “reap a good 
benefit” by agreeing to this mutually beneficial arrangement of shared knowledge and benefits. 
Hodshon adamantly desired Wendell to “get all these intelligences without the knowledge of 
others and that such may be a secret between us.”51
Hodshon appealed to Wendell three times to keep the contents of his letter secret. He 
undoubtedly worried that his relationship with other Boston logwood merchants, like John 
Erving, would be hurt by his employment of Wendell as something of a spy. Some inexperienced 
Boston logwood merchants, such as William Blair Townsend, found their European partners 
equally knowledgeable but not so willing to help if they received subpar wood. Thomas 
Hancock, meanwhile, sought to use the competitive nature of the logwood trade to his advantage, 
writing to his merchant partner Adrian Hope, “I have been advised by a good friend to consign 
this cargo [of logwood] to a certain house in Amsterdam, but my principle is not to exchange 
houses while I have justice and good treatment, which I depend upon from you.” Hancock 
insinuated that their business dealings were at an end if he believed Hope cheated him.52
The changing conditions of the European market diminished the usefulness of employing 
sailors as logwood cutters. As Hodshon’s letter to Wendell indicated, Europeans demanded 
51 John Hodshon to Jacob Wendell, March 31, 1744, R. Stanton Avery Special Collections, New England Historical 
Genealogical Society (hereafter cited as NEHGS). 
52 John Hodshon to Jacob Wendell, March 31, 1744, R. Stanton Avery Special Collections, NEHGS; William Blair 
Townsend to Captain Waffe Rand, October 10, 1748, William Blair Townsend Letter-book, Baker Library, HBS. 
Thomas Hancock to Thomas and Adrian Hope, April 12, 1742, box 1, Hancock Family Papers, Baker Library, HBS.  
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“choice” or “very clean chipt” logwood. Hancock made sure to note to Adrian Hope that his 
logwood was “Choice Good New River Chipt wood & I Expect will yield me a Better price then 
commonly wood is Sold at.”53 When laboring in the logwood groves and lagoons of the Bay of 
Honduras, most Boston sailors simply did not have the time or expertise to produce such 
logwood. Rather, most Boston merchants ordered their ship captains to buy highly sought after 
chipped logwood from local factors.54 As one English writer noted, however, the practice of 
using sailors to cut wood continued in the Bay of Honduras and into the 1730s: “our People … 
go on Shore to cut logwood: that is to say, land upon the Spaniard’s Country, cut down their 
Wood, kill their Cattle, and come freighted with the logwood.” John Erving likely employed his 
sailors as logwood cutters, as his logwood arrived unchipped in Boston. His daybook also 
indicates that he did not have long-term financial arrangements with local Baymen, which 
differed from his West Indies and European trades. His cargoes of food, clothing for harsh 
environments, and tools, all of which seemingly had no buyer, also suggest that his sailors cut 
the logwood. When Erving’s uncut logwood arrived in Boston, he hired waterfront laborers and a 
few select sailors to chip his logwood before sending it to Europe.55
 The increased use of African slave labor in the logwood trade also diminished the need 
for employing sailors as logwood cutters. Slaves, both Indian and African, had been used 
sparingly in the Bay of Campeche. John Myles’ crew of roughly thirty men had only a handful of 
slaves, including “Indian Joseph and Mr. Phillips’ negro.” African slavery, however, eventually 
53 John Hodshon to Jacob Wendell, March 31, 1744, R. Stanton Avery Special Collections, NEHGS; Thomas 
Hancock to Thomas and Adrian Hope, April 12, 1742, box 1, Hancock Family Papers, Baker Library, HBS; William 
Blair Townsend to Aikman, Marshall, & Company, January 15, 1749, William Blair Townsend Letter-book, Baker 
Library, HBS.  
54 Thomas Hancock to Captain Simon Gross, September 11, 1741 and December 14, 1741, box 1, Hancock Family 
Papers, Baker Library, HBS; William Blair Townsend to Captain Waffe Rand, October 10, 1748, William Blair 
Townsend Letter-book, Baker Library, HBS.   
55 British Journal 27 June 1730; Journal of John Erving of Boston, Mass., 1733-1745, Baker Library, HBS.  
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became the predominant form of labor in the Bay of Honduras logwood and mahogany trades. 
According to one estimate, slaves accounted for 71% of the population in 1745. More reliable 
figures put the number of slaves at 2,177 or 75% of the population in 1790. Most of the slaves 
arrived via the West Indies and with few direct imports from Africa. For example, in 1741, 
Thomas Hancock directed his ship captain, Simon Gross, to procure a cargo of “eight or ten 
Good Negro Slaves” from Jamaica or St. Eustatius and sail for the Bay of Honduras. He believed 
the slaves would do well with the logwood cutters, estimating they would fetch between “sixteen 
to Twenty tons [of logwood] per head” as was “the Custom at the Bay.”56
Belize, like the North American colonies, acquired Africans that regularly fought against 
their enslavement. According to O. Nigel Bolland, slaves working in the logwood trade “were 
distributed in small groups, with little supervision but great knowledge of the terrain.” This gave 
the slaves ample opportunity to escape. Some fled into the woods to form maroon communities 
but many more sought asylum with the Spanish. Although outside the purview of this study, 
slave resistance took a more violent turn in the 1760s with the arrival of veterans from the 
Jamaican slave revolt of 1760-1. At least three violent uprisings took place between 1765 and 
1773. According to historian Jennifer Anderson, however, Belize saw far fewer slave revolts 
than the Caribbean Islands, in part, because slaves had greater agency “through information 
brokering, mastery over their environment, and taking advantage of personal political, and 
military upheavals in the Bay.”57
56 Deposition of John Jones, March 18, 1701, Mass. Arch., 62: 367; For slave population figures see, O. Nigel 
Bolland, Colonialism and Resistance in Belize: Essays in Historical Sociology (Barbados: University of West Indies 
Press, 2003), table 1: Slave Population of Belize, 1745-1832, 54; Thomas Hancock to Captain Simon Gross, 
September 11, 1741, box 1, Hancock Family Papers, Baker Library, HBS. 
57 This paragraph draws on Bolland, Colonialism and Resistance in Belize, 22-30, quote at 24 and Jennifer 
Anderson, Mahogany (Cambridge, Mass. and London: Harvard University Press, 2012), 168-183, quote at 182.  
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Despite the modifications to Boston’s logwood trade when it shifted from the Bay of 
Campeche to the Bay of Honduras, sailor resistance and frontier violence remained a constant. In 
many cases, trouble typically began when sailors learned that their voyage had changed in the 
West Indies to include the Bay of Honduras. In September of 1741, Thomas Hancock ordered 
the captain of his brig Charming Lydia, Simon Gross, to sail to the Bay of Honduras. Gross’ 
sailors immediately protested, most likely because they were not receiving Bay of Honduras 
wages. In subsequent letters, Hancock apologized to Gross, “am very sorry you have meet with 
so much Trouble with your men,” and he advised him to “keep good Orders on board & Good 
Terms with your men, which is very necessary in Voyages of this Nature.” Once in the Bay, 
however, more violent dangers lurked. For instance, in its April 12, 1739 issue, the Boston News-
letter reported that “We have Advice from the Bay, That a Sailor belonging to a Vessel of this 
Town was shot thro’ the Head by one of the Men there after a Dispute about some Logwood, 
which he was carrying off. And also, That a Master of a Vessel belonging to this Place had shot 
one of the Bay-Men upon some Provocation.” Later that year, sailors mutinied on board the King 
George, one of the few Boston ships remaining in the Bay of Honduras trade. The captain, 
Andrew Woodbury, “beat with uncommon severity” Francis de Quitteville, even though the 
sailor took no part in the mutiny. The greatest threat Boston and New England vessels and 
seamen encountered in their illicit trade, however, came from the prowling Spanish Guarda 
Costas.58
 Sailors had good reason to ask for higher wages or desert Bay of Honduras voyages 
during the 1730s and early 40s. American and English newspapers regularly recounted tales of 
58 Thomas Hancock to Captain Simon Gross, September 11, 1741, December 14, 1741, and April 12, 1742, box 1, 
Hancock Family Papers, Baker Library, HBS; Boston News-letter 12 April 1739; Francis de Quitteville v. Andrew 
Woodbury, April 11, 1740, Massachusetts Vice-Admiralty Court Record Book.  
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Boston vessels seized by the Spanish and the long imprisonment or death of the port’s 
mariners.59 If Boston ship captains participated in more than one voyage to the Bay of Honduras 
they were almost certain to be captured at some point. The Spanish seized the abusive ship 
captain Andrew Woodbury at least two times. The second time he was taken, Woodbury, “rose 
upon them [the Spaniards] and killed several.” Joshua Underwood, another regular in the Bay of 
Honduras trade, spent at least thirteen months in a Spanish prison.60
In a concentrated campaign from 1729 to 1731, paradoxically right after signing a treaty 
with England to end the Anglo-Spanish War (1727-1729), the Spanish hounded the English out 
of the Bay of Honduras. They seized the majority of vessels gathering logwood during that span 
and, in 1731, destroyed the logwood cutters’ settlements near the Old River and New River.  
According to one Spanish report, “in the Space of two Years, it is computed, he [the Governor of 
Campeche] has taken about 140 Vessels of one sort or other, burnt upwards of 300,000 Quintals 
of Logwood, ready cut and piled upon the Shore, and made a great many of the English and their 
Negroes prisoners.” By the end of this campaign only “eight or nine” Baymen remained and they 
were seeking aid from the Spanish to depart. News of the Bay settlements’ destruction arrived in 
Boston in 1732, which subsequently led to only three vessels from the Bay entering Boston in 
1733. This was lowest number of entrances in thirteen years. The English repopulated the 
59 As one ship captain reported in 1730, “when he was in the Bay, in February last;the Spaniards had taken Seven 
sail of Vessels, most of them New England and Rhode Island Men,” American Weekly Mercury 18 June 1730. For 
other English and American reports on Boston vessels seized and crew deaths and imprisonment see, Daily Post 28 
March 1728; Daily Journal 8 May 1729; London Journal 11 October 1729; Grub Street Journal 13 May 1731; 
Boston News-letter 11 October 1731; Weekly Rehearsal 16 April 1733; New York Weekly Journal 24 February 
1734; Boston News-letter 10 October 1734; Weekly Rehearsal 3 February 1735; Boston Gazette 15 December 1735; 
Boston Evening Post 8 March 1736; American Weekly Mercury 2 June 1737; Boston Gazette 6 June 1737; Boston 
Evening Post 12 September 1737; Pennsylvania Gazette 21 February 1737; Boston Evening Post 20 March 1738; 
Boston Evening Post 12 March 1739; Boston News-letter 17 May 1739; New York Weekly Journal 5 May 1740; 
Boston Evening Post 28 December 1741; American Weekly Mercury 29 April 1742; American Weekly Mercury 16 
March 1743; Boston News-letter 26 April 1744; American Weekly Mercury 3 May 1744; Boston Evening Post 25 
June 1744.          
60 For Woodbury see, Boston Evening Post 8 March 1736; For Underwood see, Weekly Rehearsal 3 February 1735.  
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settlements, however, within two years and Boston’s entrances from the Bay quickly returned to 
the typical average.61
In 1737, the Spanish once again mounted a major assault on the vessels in the Bay, 
seizing at least twenty-eight. Boston’s logwood fleet suffered major losses; however, one man’s 
loss is another man’s gain. Re-export merchants like James Bowdoin saw great opportunity in 
the destruction of the logwood trade and the subsequent death and imprisonment of many New 
England seafarers. In the comfort of his home, Bowdoin confidently wrote to his partners in 
London that “Loggwood will come to a good market by reason the Spaniards have taken so 
many Vessels in the bay this summer” and “the Price [of logwood] will Raise when they here 
[hear] the bay Is Taken.” In the Bay, meanwhile, a number of Boston sloops had escaped the 
Spanish onslaught “by going up the River.” The men built a fortification to defend against 
recurrent Spanish attacks but, like the rest of the Baymen, suffered greatly from disease and lack 
of provisions. The combination of Spanish attacks, starvation, and disease caused an “abundance 
of Bay Men” and “those belonging to the vessels” to die. The Boston Evening Post, however, 
proudly noted that some Boston vessels, free of Spanish harassment, continued to scour the Bay 
for that precious commodity – logwood.62
It is fitting that logwood had a dark red heartwood that could produce dyes the color of 
blood. For much of the eighteenth-century, Boston merchants willingly sacrificed young, 
impoverished seafaring men at the altar of profit to supply Europeans with colorful textiles and 
61 “Extract of a Letter from Campeche in the Province of Yucatan, Nov. 24, 1731,” Boston News-letter 5 October 
1732; For reporting on the 1731 destruction of the logwood trade in England see, Read’s Weekly Journal 27 May 
1732 and The Political State of Great Britain, 44, (London, 1732); “eight or nine”: Universal Spectator and Weekly 
Journal 22 July 1732.      
62 Boston Gazette 6 June 1737; James Bowdoin to Storke and Gainsborough, September 21, 1737 and October 21, 
1737, Storke and Gainsborough Papers, vol. 6, New York State Library Manuscripts and Special Collections; Boston 
Evening Post 12 September 1737.  
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elegantly stained furniture. The mid-1720s to 1739, however, when no formal war was declared 
between the Spanish and English, was the most violent period of the trade. The Bay of Honduras 
stood beyond the pale of “civilization.” The English operating there did so without the 
protections of their government and the Spanish intended extermination. They frequently 
referred to logwood cutters and seafarers participating in the Bay trade “as Thieves and Pirates.”  
Sometimes, as discussed in the previous chapter, the Spanish were correct in that assumption.63
Violence, torture, rape, and massacres became hallmarks of the Bay of Honduras 
logwood trade with seafaring men on both sides seeking revenge for recurring atrocities. For 
example, in 1729 the Spanish seized a Boston-owned vessel and “cut all the sloop’s Company to 
pieces in cold blood, only the cabin boy escaped.” The informant further noted, “this is not a 
singular instance, but a late one.”64 Shortly thereafter, the London-owned ship John and Jane, 
“having on board some Women for the Logwood Cutters,” fell victim to a Spanish sloop, which 
“lately belong’d to Boston.” After five hours of fierce resistance, the captain of the John and 
Jane surrendered. The Spanish agreed to give quarter but John Cockburn, a sailor on board the 
John and Jane, recounted that “they immediately boarded us, which they had no sooner done, 
than, with Sword in Hand, they laid about them on all Sides, cutting and slashing us in a most 
barbourous Manner.” The Spanish then found a pregnant woman whose husband died in the 
engagement and “in a most brutal Manner, fell to tearing the Cloaths off her back.” The captain, 
Pedro Polias, proceeded to rape her violently. Worried about possible retribution, the decision 
was made to maroon the English “on some desolate Country.” After a fascinating and difficult 
63 A Letter from a Merchant at Amsterdam to his Correspondent in London (London, 1718), 1. 
64 Galfridus Gray to the Council of Trade and Plantations, June 9, 1730, CSPC, vol. 37 (1730), no. 280.  
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journey in Central America, Cockburn returned to England where he published a firsthand 
account of the John and Jane’s terrible fate in 1735.65
Cockburn’s story arrived on the market just as the Boston and other English vessels 
began to earnestly defend themselves and retaliate in kind for depredations suffered at the hands 
of the Spanish in the Bay of Honduras. In March of 1736 the Boston Gazette reported that 
Captain Willis of Jamaica had seized a Spanish sloop, killing eight of the crew in the attack. 
Willis had the head of Philip Ackling, “a noted Pilot in the Bay,” cut off and “sent the same for a 
Present to Jamaica.” The mutilation of Ackling’s body and the symbolic present of his head to 
Jamaica represented a clear escalation in the Bay of Honduras’s ongoing, unofficial conflict. 
Like the Spanish, the English were now willing to treat their enemies in the Bay of Honduras as 
pirates and accord them the same disrespect. That escalation, however, was not lost on Willis and 
Benjamin Eggleston, who had arrived after the battle in a sloop from Boston. The two captains, 
“fearing the consequence of their staying longer in the Bay” decided to flee the Bay of Honduras 
rather than face possible Spanish retribution. Eggleston had only loaded nine tons of logwood 
before fleeing the Bay, surely a disappointment for his investors back in Boston.66
New Englanders increasingly realized the need to protect the logwood fleets. Prior to 
1735, most New England ship captains meekly allowed the Spanish to seize their vessels. The 
smaller craft and crews employed by New England ship captains were almost always outgunned 
and outmanned. Occasionally, heavily armed English and Dutch ships with large crews would 
come to their aid. In 1734, however, Rhode Island took the initiative and reassessed their 
strategy. They decided to outfit a large ship, the Papillion commanded by Richard Dursey, to 
65 London Evening Post 23-25 September 1731 and 19-21 October 1731; John Cockburn, A Journey Over Land 
From the Gulf of Honduras to the Great South-Sea (London, 1735), 1-10, quotes at 4, 7, and 6. 
66 Boston Post-Boy 8 March 1736; Boston Evening Post 8 March 1736; American Weekly Mercury 1 April 1736.  
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convoy and protect the smaller sloops and brigs in their logwood fleet. Dursey had a reputation 
for bravery. In 1723, he had been captured by pirates in the Bay of Honduras but managed a 
daring escape. With the pirates hot in pursuit, “Dursey & Company gave them so warm a 
Reception that they were glad to betake themselves to their Vessel again.” Dursey had similar 
success against the Spanish. He successfully secured the release of two sloops, including Captain 
Edmonds of Boston, by defeating a large Spanish Guarda Costas with a crew of 120 men in “a 
close and warm Ingagement.” Happy with the results, in 1735 Rhode Island again sent a fleet to 
the Bay of Honduras protected by “a fine large Ship,” commanded by the former governor’s son 
John Cranston. Like Dursey, Cranston successfully defended his fleet by recapturing a Rhode 
Island sloop that had fallen into Spanish hands.67
Boston seems to have had a singular dearth of heroes and brave seafarers. This became a 
major embarrassment in 1737 when the Spanish once again wrought havoc on Boston’s logwood 
fleet. News circulated that when the Spanish attacked the logwood fleet only the 400 ton, 
London-owned Harle, Captain Hall of Bristol, and a Jamaican sloop took part in the ensuing 
engagement. During the battle, the Spanish hoisted the king’s colors to inform the English that if 
they did not surrender they “should be treated as Pirates when taken.” The Harle and company 
nevertheless fought on “like gallant Englishmen.” The Boston sloops and men lying nearby 
remained indifferent. The Boston Evening Post lamented that fighting “would have been more 
glorious to themselves, and profitable to their Owners, than their lying idle Spectators, and 
contenting themselves with a base and neutral Behavior.” Although the paper did not explicitly 
mention that many of the “idle Spectators” were from Boston-owned sloops, it was common 
knowledge that the majority of vessels seized after the fight originated from the New England 
67 Dursey: Boston Gazette 11 March 1723 and New York Weekly Journal 24 February 1734/5; Cranston: Weekly 
Rehearsal 2 June 1735 and Boston Gazette 15 December 1735.  
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port. The Evening Post continued to lambast the honor of the men who did not fight, heartlessly 
declaring, “’tis hoped they … who were over careful of their Lives, are either murdered by their 
barbarous Enemies, or subjected to a Captivity, in many respects worse than Death it self.”68
Between 1734 and 1737, accounts from the Bay of Honduras lauded the bravery of Rhode 
Island, Jamaica, London, and Bristol vessels but Boston, which typically had triple to quadruple 
the number of vessels in the Bay as Rhode Island, had no valiant actions to speak of. This sense 
of shame may explain why local newspapers crowed with pride two weeks after the Harle report 
when word arrived that some Boston sloops had fled up river and set up barricades to fight the 
Spanish.69 Evidently, all of Boston’s honor had not been lost.  
The negative press had the desired effect on Boston ship captains and sailors. In 1738, 
they entered the Bay of Honduras ready to fight for logwood. In May, word arrived that a Boston 
sloop had successfully repelled a Spanish attack. The captain had “encouraged his Men to defend 
themselves and the Vessel, setting before them the wretched Captivity they would suffer, if 
taken, and the probability of beating off their enemies, if they behaved as Englishmen used 
formerly to do.” The sailors killed many of the men that boarded their sloop and then, as the 
Spanish fled, “fired their Swivel Guns into their Pettiaugers, and kill’d them abundance of men.”
The Boston Evening Post extolled this violence for logwood, calling it “a brave and bold 
Defence” undertaken by “gallant” men. The paper could not resist, however, remarking on the 
past “base Behaviour of our Countrymen, who have tamely given up their Vessels without firing 
a Gun, tho’ they were well provided for a Defence.” The Boston Evening Post failed to mention 
that most Boston vessels that easily surrendered were sloops with crews of six to eight men. The 
68 For the account of the Harle and inaction of other English vessels see, Boston Evening Post 29 August 1737; 
Boston had already received word of the vessels seized in the Bay of Archibald Blackador, a Bostonian, who 
embarrassingly “got clear of ’em [the Spanish], but without a stick of Logwood” see, Boston Gazette 6 June 1737.
69 Boston Evening Post 12 September 17.  
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Guarda Costas operated like privateers – heavily armed and manned. Their primary purpose in 
the Bay was to seize and terrorize English vessels involved in the logwood trade. Futile 
resistance from small crews could only mean death, torture, and long imprisonment in disease-
infested prisons generally located in backward towns like Campeche and Merida. Conversely, 
the Spanish often took vessels that surrendered without a fight to Havana where quick ransoms 
could be paid and the sailors liberated. For sailors, and even ship captains, engaging the Spanish 
under those conditions could be suicidal.70
Boston merchants must have recognized the poor odds their seafaring men confronted 
with their small vessels and crews. In 1738, likely in response to the devastating Spanish attacks 
the previous year, they followed Rhode Island’s example by outfitting at least two ships with 
crews of over forty men. By late summer, the town could proclaim a hero of its own. Like 
clockwork, the Spanish had arrived in the Bay of Honduras in spring to disrupt and attack 
English vessels and logwood cutters. They focused their attention on English operations on the 
New River, seizing two sloops and the flats bringing logwood down the river from the interior. 
Most of the confiscated wood belonged to a Boston-owned ship commanded by Edward 
Buckley, which currently rode at anchor at the Old River. Buckley and his men hired a sloop 
upon hearing of the Spanish attacks and “went directly after the Spaniards, retook the Flats and 
both the Sloops, and gave liberty to Twenty-five English Sailors whom Mr. Jack Spaniard had 
taken Prisoners.” This chivalrous Bostonian decided to kindly maroon the prisoners he took 
rather “than to hide them according to the Mosketo Fashion,” which we must assume meant 
skinning them alive. For the next few weeks, Buckley continued to protect the New River 
70 Boston Evening Post 1 May 1738; For Boston logwood trade vessels taken to Havana and the process of 
ransoming see, Daily Post 28 March 1728 and Deposition of Butler Chauncy, July 9, 1730, CSPC,  v. 37 (1737), no. 
323.  
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logwood trade, halting further attempts by the Spanish “to block up the Mouth of the New 
River.” 
Buckley’s incredible saga did not end there. He received a letter from “the famous 
Rigidore, who has ply’d in the Bay, and done so much Damage to the English” that threatened 
revenge for Buckley’s actions against the Spanish and demanded an answer. Buckley brought 
this letter to his crew “who all with one Voice cry’d out, Let us go and give him an Answer by 
Word of Mouth.” According the New England Weekly Journal, the crew was so eager to fight 
that squabbles erupted over who would stay and protect the ship. Buckley then armed a sloop 
and with forty men went to attack the “Famous Don.” They found the Spanish at “a Place where 
the Rogues usually fitted out their Craft for Mischief” with a vessel hauled on shore, likely for 
the purpose of careening, and a camp with eight large tents. The encampment was protected by 
six swivel guns and the Spanish fired upon the approaching vessel. Buckley responded by firing 
“his Cariage Guns, Swivells, and small arms” to cover his crew’s landing. The crew then charged 
the camp causing Rigidore and his men to flee into the surrounding landscape, leaving behind all 
their valuable equipment for the crew to pillage. 
The tales of Buckley’s daring exploits and the bravery of his men delighted Boston’s 
press and likely the merchant community. The Boston Evening Post, so critical of Boston’s 
seafaring men the previous year, now remarked “we cannot but look upon it as a pleasing 
Circumstance in this Affair, that the Head of those brave Men concern’d in it, is a Native of this 
Town.” The New England Weekly Journal, meanwhile, reminded readers of past weakness but 
heaped Buckley with praise: “If all the English Masters would thus exert themselves, we should 
not so often hear of Vessels being taken, for it is plain that they [the Spanish] are poultron 
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[poltroon] cowardly Rascals.”71 The message from the Boston press was unanimous. Acquiring 
logwood demanded sacrifice and bloodshed. Buckley not only protected his vessel and precious 
cargo but brought the fight to the Spanish doorstep. For those acts of courage, he had earned the 
town’s gratitude and respect. Conversely, Boston newspapers continued to mock and shame the 
majority of ship captains for meekly submitting to Spanish predations. Happily for Boston’s 
opinionated newspapers, Buckley’s account found a large audience with reprints published in 
Philadelphia and London, including the London Evening Post, Daily Gazetteer, and The 
Gentleman’s Magazine.72
Boston’s unequivocal praise and encouragement of Buckley’s violent actions against the 
Spanish would have met a certain amount of skepticism in England, where the topic of Spanish 
aggression in the Americas had long been hotly debated. For some politicians and merchants, the 
Spanish clearly wronged Britain. These men argued that the English had a right to cut logwood 
and settle the Bays of Campeche and Honduras under the Treaty of Madrid (1670) between 
Spain and England, which stipulated that all American territories currently settled by the English 
belonged to England. In 1670, the English had logwood cutters in both bays but were more 
firmly established at Trist in the Bay of Campeche. In late 1739, as Parliament justified its recent 
declaration of war against Spain, William Pulteney stood before his peers and condemned Spain 
for ordering “our ships concerned in the logwood trade to be seized.” He continued, “we justly 
contended that we had a right by the same treaty [The Treaty of Madrid (1670)] to that trade.”73
71 Boston Evening Post 28 August 1738 and New England Weekly Journal 29 August 1738. The Boston Gazette
does not appear to have printed an account of Buckley’s exploits but other Boston papers, including the Boston 
News-letter and Boston Post Boy, may have printed an account but those issues have been lost.   
72American Weekly Mercury 7 September 1738; London Evening Post 19-21 October 1738; Daily Gazetteer 21 
October 1738; Sylvanus Urban, The Gentleman’s Magazine and Historical Chronical, vol. 8 (London, 1738), 546.  
73 For Treaty of Madrid, also called the “American Treaty,” see, Wilson, “The Logwood Trade,” 4-5 and 9, Duke of 
Newcastle to the Council of Trade and Plantations, January 20, 1733, CSPC, v. 40 (1733), no. 20-20.x, and Great 
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Not everyone agreed with this assessment, believing the grounds for claiming territory on 
the Spanish American mainland to be flimsy. Some berated “our famous West-India Logwood 
Cutters, who in a piratical Manner, and in Violation of all Treaties, and the common Laws of 
Nations, enter into another Prince’s Country without any Leave, or paying Custom or Duties, but 
forcibly bring away what they have a Mind to.” Others defended Spain’s right to use of force 
against English interlopers in the Bays of Campeche and Honduras, claiming it was “no more 
than Just.”74 An anonymous author in the British Journal opposed the logwood trade on moral 
grounds. This author wrote an intriguing piece on smuggling whereupon he expanded his topic 
of inquiry “to the Honduras and the Bay of Campeachey, where our People as well from New 
England and New York, & as from Jamaica, go on Shore to cut Logwood.” He equated the 
logwood trade to “robbing a House” and outlined the pervasive bloodshed necessary to carry on 
the trade:      
When the Spaniards have come to drive them away [in the Bays of Honduras and 
Campeche], for the Spaniards are not ignorant of their own Rights, or insensible of the 
Injury done them, what has been the Consequence? The desperate Thieves (for they can 
be no better) have resisted, fired upon the Spaniards, and many times beaten them off, 
and killed a great many of their Men. There occurs a short Question in that Case, pray is 
this Killing no Murther? Is this a fair War, or is it a downright defending of Robbery, and 
murdering those that come to take Care of their own Goods?  
Again, at other Times the Spaniards have come in with a Force superior, have master’d 
them, and after an obstinate Resistance, and many kill’d on both Sides, the Thieves have 
been worsted, most of them kill’d or taken, and the rest fled into the Woods, where ‘tis 
very likely they would be starv’d, and perish with Hunger. 
He then asked of his readers “pray at whose Door must all that Blood be said to lye?” 
Britain. Parliament, A Collection of the Parliamentary Debates in England, from the year M,DC,LXVIII to the 
present time, vol. 18 (London, 1739-1742), 436-437.   
74 The Danverian History of the Affairs of Europe for the memorable Year 1731 (London, 1732), 35-36; A Letter 
from a Merchant at Amsterdam to his Correspondent in London (London, 1718), 1. 
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It was a good question. Were the lowly logwood cutters and English and Spanish sailors 
who actually bled at fault? Did the blood belong to their immediate commanders whether ship 
captains or Spanish colonial governors? Or, did it belong to the merchants of Boston, Newport, 
New York, Kingston, London, and Amsterdam who profited most from the trade? Our author 
believed that the logwood trade tainted “the Consciences of the Persons who not only have 
carry’d on these Trades, but justify’d others in the doing it, and call it honest.” 75 He therefore 
would have certainly condemned the cries for blood from Boston newspapers and elite men who 
sat in the comfort of their homes berating the courage of seafaring men who failed to bleed for 
logwood.   
* * * 
Logwood’s importance to Boston’s rise as an Atlantic port city cannot be understated. 
Boston’s poor hinterland, large seafaring population, and shipbuilding industry both propelled 
and enabled the port to become an early leader in the acquisition of logwood. Furthermore, the 
commodity’s low production costs and high value in Europe made it a perfect commodity for 
Boston’s indebted merchant-elite. It served as Boston’s “cash crop.” Despite the high revenues 
logwood generated, Boston merchants were not content to leave the harvesting of logwood to the 
men who lived in the Bays of Campeche and Honduras. They instead sent fleets of ships to Bays 
and their own seafarers and dispossessed laborers swarmed the logwood groves to cut wood at 
set wages. This system further drove down the per ton cost of logwood and increased merchants’ 
profits. It also essentially privatized a trade that had previously created opportunities for 
impoverished, laboring men.     
The logwood trade, however, was fraught with risk. Merchants suffered great economic 
losses at the hands of the Spanish and pirates. Many Boston ship captains and sailors spent 
75 British Journal 27 June 1730.  
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months and years in Spanish prisons. Many more died of disease, injury, and violence, all in the 
pursuit of a livelihood for themselves and their families. Probably unbeknownst to these 
seafaring men, their labor, sacrifice, and blood generated the surplus capital necessary for 
Boston’s local shipbuilding industry and thus local economy to thrive. 
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6.0 BUILDING AND OUTFITTING SHIPS IN COLONIAL BOSTON 
Boston’s waterfront flourished in the early eighteenth century, a scene of busy shipyards, 
wharves, warehouses, taverns, and shops of maritime specialists. The port had established its 
premier position among North American ports by internationalizing and deploying maritime 
labor, establishing credit relations with English merchants, abandoning support for pirates, and 
dominating the logwood trade. The port and its large maritime capabilities became the vehicle by 
which England’s imperial ambitions and system of Atlantic commerce were realized in the 
Americas. Boston’s transatlantic merchants took full advantage of their position within the 
Atlantic economy, acquiring large estates and power within the local community. They also 
actively invested their capital into the production and maintenance of ships.  Boston’s citizens
reaped the benefits through stable employment in building and outfitting ships, an abundance of 
English manufactured goods, and increased security from enemies.1
 Shipbuilding was the backbone of Boston's early entry into the wider Atlantic world and 
source of its employment for scores of local tradesmen. From 1697 to 1714, Bostonians 
constructed 406 vessels amounting to 28, 230 tons of shipping capacity. Seventy percent (284) of 
these vessels remained in the hands of Boston merchants, representing an impressive expansion 
in the city's maritime capabilities from the previous twenty-two years (1674 – 1696) when 
1 This chapter is slightly revised and used with permission from my forthcoming article “Building and Outfitting 
Ships in Colonial Boston,” Early American Studies 13.4 (Forthcoming, Fall 2015), 881-907. Copyright © 2015 The 
McNeil Center for Early American Studies. All rights reserved. Few historians have examined ship outfitting in 
depth and none have appreciated its significance to Boston’s local economy, social structure, and transatlantic 
networks. Cathy Matson’s examination of ship outfitting in eighteenth-century Philadelphia is the most well-
developed of these; see Cathy Matson, “On the Dock of the Bay: Outfitting a Voyage in Eighteenth-Century 
Philadelphia,” paper presented at The McNeil Center for Early American Studies Conference “On the Anvil of 
Labor History in the Revolutionary Era: Billy G. Smith and Fellow Artisans,” November 7 to 9, 2013. For 
shipbuilding in Boston, see Joseph A. Goldenberg, Shipbuilding in Colonial America (Charlottesville; University of 
Virginia Press, 1976); and Bernard and Lotte Bailyn, Massachusetts Shipping 1697-1714: A Statistical Study
(Cambridge, Massachusetts: The Belknap Press of Harvard University, 1959). 
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Bostonians produced only thirty vessels totaling 1,685 tons.2 Meanwhile, vessel entrances more 
than doubled over a seven year period, rising from 251 in 1707 to 525 in 1714. Vessel clearances 
also increased dramatically from 298 in 1707 to 550 in 1714. Over thirty years later in 1745, 
Philadelphia, Boston’s major North American competitor, reported only 310 entrances and 278 
clearances.3
 The steady construction of sloops, brigs, and especially ships, as well as the rise in vessel 
entrances and clearances, required a vibrant maritime community to build, repair, provision, and 
crew the vessels. By the early 1700s, the labor of waterfront tradesmen and the capital intensive 
ship outfitting and building industries became the foundation of Boston's local economy.  Each 
vessel built or outfitted in the port resulted in the multilateral exchange of bills, cash, 
commodities, and services, which enticed or obligated most Bostonians to participate in some 
capacity. Historians have estimated that twenty-five to forty percent of adult males were directly 
engaged in Boston’s maritime economy during the eighteenth century.4 These figures do not 
include the bakers, butchers, brewers, tallow chandlers, blacksmiths, gunsmiths, glaziers, 
painters, shopkeepers, and a variety of other producers employed in outfitting and building ships. 
Furthermore, historians have not explored the pervasive practice among merchants to create deep 
structures of credit and debt in the local community to construct and outfit their vessels.  
By the 1730s, a complicated but brilliant system of credit, barter, and book debts allowed 
the movement of goods and services to flow within Boston even without a stable currency, while 
2 Bailyn and Bailyn, Massachusetts Shipping 1697-1714, Appendix, tables XVII and XIX, 102, 105, 110. 
3 “Entrances and Clearances,” Boston News-letter, January 6, 1707 to December 29, 1707, and 3 January 1714 to 27 
December 1714; “Entrances and Clearances,” Pennsylvania Gazette, 1 January 1745 to 31 December 1745.  
4 Jacob M. Price, “Economic Function and Growth of American Port Towns in the Eighteenth Century,” 
Perspectives in American History 8 (1974): 123-86, appendix C, 177-183; Gary B. Nash, The Urban Crucible: 
Social Change, Political Consciousness, and the Origins of the American Revolution (Cambridge, Massachusetts; 
Harvard University Press, 1979), appendix, table 1, 387-391.   
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sterling accumulated in the hands of Boston’s transatlantic merchants to pay their ever-increasing 
debts to their counterparts in London.5 The economy of the ship had demanding labor and 
financial requirements that generated local and transatlantic credit networks tying together 
Boston merchants, ship captains, and waterfront tradesmen in a way of life that defined the 
waterfront.  
* * * 
Boston’s participation in the Atlantic economy depended on the ability of merchants, 
waterfront tradesmen, and seafarers to agree about acceptable arrangements to outfit and crew 
vessels. Merchants often convened in the coffeehouses or at their homes to discuss possible joint 
interests and ventures, as few merchants had the capital or appetite for risk to own vessels 
individually in the early 1700s. Together they decided whether to commission and outfit a new 
vessel, buy an old hull, or use an available vessel. Each merchant acquired a share or shares of 
the vessel; their financial contribution to the outfitting and cargo was defined by the number of 
shares they owned. Partnership agreements enabled merchants to pool the necessary capital to 
purchase a cargo, outfit a vessel, pay the captain and crew, and insure their risks.6
Partnership arrangements also allowed for a division of labor that reflected each partner's 
connections with the waterfront community. For instance, Thomas Cushing Jr. had few 
connections to ship outfitters. He therefore paid the majority of his share of the outfitting bill by 
supplying cargoes of fish, staves, and shingles. Cushing also relied on the bakers, butchers, and 
brewers who supplied his household to supplement ships' supplies. He rarely hired or had 
financial arrangements with the professions most closely related to repairing and building ships 
5 W.T. Baxter, The House of Hancock: Business in Boston, 1724-1775 (New York: Russell & Russell, Inc, 1965), 
chap. 2. 
6 Ralph Davis, The Rise of the English Shipping Industry (London: Macmillan & Co., Ltd., 1962), chap. 5.  
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such as ship carpenters, ropemakers, sailmakers, or joiners. In contrast, John Erving maintained 
extensive credit arrangements and personal relationships with waterfront tradesmen and laborers 
to outfit and repair his vessels yet depended on other merchants to arrange the majority of cargo 
purchases.7
In all cases, however, merchants, ship captains, and waterfront tradesmen had to reach a 
series of agreements about acceptable quality of goods, extent of credit, timing of labor, and 
more. Captains and craftsmen expected merchants to pay or credit their bills promptly. Merchant 
partners likewise desired smooth financial transactions and clean account balancing. And 
although ship outfitting often created conflict due to shoddy work or late payments, future 
business required quick, informal resolutions that rarely invoked litigation. All parties knew that 
public court cases would hurt their reputations and potentially decrease future business and 
employment.8 The collapse of one merchant empire in the early eighteenth century, made public 
by a highly visible court appearance, underscored just this. In 1703, William Clarke hauled 
Boston’s most powerful ship-owning merchant, Samuel Lillie, into court for failing to pay and 
properly account for his 7/16th share in the outfitting and cargo of the ship Neptune bound for 
Terceira, Portugal. In his efforts to force payment from Lillie, Clarke challenged Lillie’s 
gentleman status in biting words: “It is Like your Cheating Tricks, for you are a Cheating Knave, 
and I will Justifie and prove it.” Boston’s courts favored Clarke, and its merchant community 
agreed Lillie was a “Knave.”9 For the next five years, Clarke and his fellow merchants punished 
Lillie in the courts over financial issues stemming from ship outfitting, sales, and trade. Lillie 
7 Account Book of Thomas Cushing, Jr., 1739-1742, Baker Library, Harvard Business School (hereafter cited as 
HBS); Journal of John Erving of Boston, Mass., 1733-1745, Baker Library, HBS; Appendix, table 6.  
8 Cathy Matson has also found that litigation over outfitting disputes was rare, Matson, “On the Dock of the Bay,” 3.
9 William Clarke v. Samuel Lillie (1703), Suffolk County Court of Common Pleas Record Books, 1701-1706 
(hereafter cited as SCCCPRB), Massachusetts State Archives (hereafter cited as MSA); Depositions of Jeremiah 
Condy and Samuel Lillie, Suffolk County Supreme Judicial Court Files (hereafter cited as SCSJCF), MSA, case nos. 
5705 and 5714. 
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began liquidating his vast fleet of forty-two solely-owned vessels to pay his local creditors. In 
1708, discredited and insolvent, Lillie fled Boston for London to avoid debtors’ prison. 
Merchants considered ship outfitting serious business and had little tolerance for men like Lillie 
who disrupted customary practice.10
Boston's aspiring merchants not only needed trustworthy partners; they also relied on the 
maritime expertise of ship captains, whom merchants hoped to procure from a pool of local men 
with good families and reputations. As Boston merchant Thomas Fayerweather wrote to a 
potential partner, “I have a Master . . .  [who] is a Boston man and one I well know who you may 
be assured of from me to be a Person that will Answer our End.” 11  Merchants hoped local 
connections would keep ship captains honest and reliable. Some merchants took an active role in 
meeting with waterfront tradesmen and obtaining a cargo, visiting individual establishments to 
arrange for supplies and services. Others, such as John Erving, required waterfront tradesmen to 
meet at his counting house to conduct business.12 Meanwhile, any of the large merchant houses 
that owned or invested in multiple vessels, had little time to micromanage ship outfitting.  
Instead, they delegated the responsibility to skilled ship captains who knew how to manage 
seafarers, direct the work of laborers, and provide specifications for skilled tradesmen such as 
shipwrights, ropemakers, and joiners.  
10 Nathaniel Pickman v. Samuel Lillie (1704), Samuel Keeling and Charles Chauncey v. Samuel Lillie (1705), and 
Beamsley Perkins v. Samuel Lillie (1706), all in SCCCPRB,  1701-1706, MSA; and Andrew Faneuil v. Samuel 
Lillie (1707), John Wheelwright v. Samuel Lillie (1707), Jeremiah Allen v. Samuel Lillie (1707), and Edward 
Bromfield and Co. v. Samuel Lillie, 1707-1708, all in SCCCPRB, 1706-1715, MSA. The multiple lawsuits of 
Edward Bromfield and Co. finally drove Lillie to flee Boston.  
11 Thomas Fayerweather to Mr. Richards, July 27, 1749, Thomas Fayerweather Letterbook, 1749, Thomas 
Fayerweather Papers (Mss. 80), R. Stanton Avery Special Collections, New England Historic Genealogical Society 
(hereafter cited as NEHGS). 
12 Erving frequently noted when tradesmen came to his house to settle accounts, see Journal of John Erving of 
Boston, Mass., 1733-1745, Baker Library, HBS. 
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Owners of ships and cargo often granted ship captains a great deal of autonomy in 
preparing the vessel for a voyage and accompanying it to distant places. The ship captain met 
with most waterfront tradesmen to discuss the ship’s needs for repairs, modifications, provisions, 
and stores, but ship specialists such as shipwrights, ropemakers, riggers, sailmakers, 
blockmakers, and joiners received the majority of his attention. Merchants often permitted ship 
captains to draw bills on them to pay for the work of tradesmen. These transactions generated 
endless minor disputes between merchants and tradesmen when ship captains did not negotiate 
an agreeable price for goods and services. The ship captain had a separate bill of disbursements 
to pay for wages and food for day laborers, entertaining potential crewmembers, traveling to 
nearby ports to enlist men, and providing small necessities such as compass repairs or tar and 
pitch for graving. One Boston ship captain frequently referred to the waterfront tradesmen he 
hired to outfit his employers’ vessel as “my tradesmen.” This particular ship captain managed 
almost every aspect of preparing the ship while his merchant employers hunted for a cargo to 
haul to the West Indies.13
In addition to conducting business with tradesmen to outfit the vessel, the captain scoured 
the waterfront to hire seamen. This task took time and patience. One Boston ship captain spent 
every day, except Sundays, for three weeks “in Quest of Sailors,” referring to the undertaking as 
a “sport.” To his frustration, some sailors promised to sign on one day, and “failed” the next. The 
13 Ships’ Papers, Jeffries Family Papers, boxes 17 and18, Massachusetts Historical Society (hereafter cited as MHS). 
For a day-by-day account of a Boston ship captains’ experience in outfitting a ship, see, Anonymous Sailor’s Diary, 
1733-1735 (S-800), MHS. I recently discovered that the identity of this anonymous ship captain was Moses Prince, 
which is revealed in the papers of his employers Peter and Andrew Oliver at the New York State Library. For 
particular letters concerning the voyages outlined in Prince’s diary, see, Peter Oliver to Storke and Gainsborough,  
March 23, 1734 and  October 27, 1735, Storke and Gainsborough Papers, vol. 6, New York State Library 
Manuscripts and Special Collections. For a specific example of ship captain disbursements, see Captain Thomas 
Porter’s Bill of Disbursements for Content, Jeffries Family Papers, box 17, MHS. Historian Ralph Davis makes 
similar claims regarding ship captains in service of London-based merchants, in Davis, The Rise of the English 
Shipping Industry, 159-160. 
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ship captain generally had absolute control when hiring a crew but occasionally merchants 
intervened, requiring the captain to hire a relative or friend, typically at the rank of mate. These 
nepotistic arrangements had the potential to undermine the captain’s authority and rarely 
benefitted the voyage.14 Ship captains also had to be concerned about the honesty of their 
merchant employers to reimburse captains for their outlays of capital for supplies and wages for 
the crew.  
For much of the seventeenth century Boston merchants generally paid waterfront 
tradesmen immediately with cash – much of it silver flowing into Boston from smuggling or 
piracy – or with goods.15 This financial arrangement limited the number of vessels that could be 
built, the labor tradesmen could provide, and the ability to import English commodities. 
However, it also sustained a fairly equal relationship between tradesmen and merchants. The 
introduction of English credit and complicated account balancing during King William’s War 
changed how Boston merchants financed the shipbuilding industry. As English credit flowed into 
the community, Boston merchants in turn began creating long-term credit arrangements with 
waterfront tradesmen and other skilled laborers. At its simplest level, tradesmen received credits 
from merchants for their labor and debits for the purchase of goods or drawing notes on a 
merchant to pay others for goods and services. But in colonial Boston, as W.T. Baxter explained, 
financial arrangements often transferred labor, goods, and, to a lesser extent, cash among three, 
four, and possibly more different parties. The complicated nature of these multi-person 
transactions tied one individual’s assets and liabilities to many others. The lack of cash in the 
system required that when accounts were settled between parties it often meant transferring one 
14 Anonymous Sailor’s Diary, 1733-1735 (S-800), MHS; For example of nepotism gone awry, see Pyam Blowers to 
Thomas Fayerweather, April 27, 1763, box 9, Thomas Fayerweather Papers (Mss. 80), R. Stanton Avery Special 
Collections, NEHGS.  
15 Account book of Robert Sedgwick and Ebenezer Learned, 1647-1650, 1666-1677 (Mss C 4958). R Stanton Avery 
Special Collections, NEHGS.  
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person’s debt to another. Local labor and exchanges of goods could be sustained across scores of 
people linked with myriad small amounts of credit and debt without cash. But the ship outfitting 
and building industries generated the labor and capital necessary for merchants to create far 
larger and more intricate financial networks that solidified their position of power both within the 
local and Atlantic economy.16
The waterfront network and accounts of David Jeffries represent an early manifestation 
of this new labor economy based on ship outfitting and building. From 1706 to 1715, Jeffries 
maintained an extensive waterfront network of at least 137 tradesmen and laborers. He employed 
nine butchers, eight joiners, eight smiths, six bakers, and five ship carpenters (excluding 
shipwrights). Jeffries favored a few tradesmen such asThomas Lee, blockmaker, Alexander 
Sherrar, cooper, and John Greenough, ship carpenter, hiring them 75%, 65%, and 61% of the 
time, respectively, to outfit twenty-eight voyages. He had no hesitation, however, about hiring 
new tradesmen or strangers. Boston’s staggering economic and population growth during the 
early eighteenth century ensured the steady arrival of new shipbuilding artisans from England. 
Merchants happily employed these productive members of the town, generally paying them in 
one-half or two-thirds goods. Long-term, flexible credit arrangements helped make this system 
viable.17
16 Baxter, The House of Hancock, chap. 2. Baxter’s analysis of Boston’s local economy is enlightening, but he failed 
to recognize the central role of waterfront tradesmen and the substantial capital requirements of a ship. Thomas 
Hancock’s daybook, Baxter’s main source for his argument, reflects an economic system whereby waterfront 
tradesmen’s labor moved commodities and increased the merchant’s overseas credit. During the months of May and 
June 1738, 56% of Hancock’s daybook entries involved waterfront tradesmen or ship captains. That number jumps 
to 73% if we add merchants who were part of his ship outfitting and building network. These entries included debits, 
credits, and transfers of mostly goods or debts for labor provided on Hancock’s and his merchant partners’ vessels, 
see Hancock Family Papers, 1664-1854, volume TH-1 Daybook, 1737-1739, Baker Library, HBS. 
17 Jeffries Family Papers, boxes 14-20, MHS; For percentages see, appendix, table 6; For population and economic 
growth see, Carl Bridenbaugh, Cities in the Wilderness: The First Century of Urban Life in America, 1625-1742
(London, Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press, 1938), 143n1 and chap. 6; For influx of foreign tradesmen 
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A quick glance at Jeffries’ account with sailmaker, Adino Bulfinch, demonstrates the 
complex nature of paying for labor when little cash was available. From 1704-1713, Bulfinch 
provided sails and repairs for twenty-four vessels, for which he charged Jeffries £236. In return, 
Jeffries drew ten times on seven of his debtors to pay Bulfinch £115 in cash or goods for the 
sailmaker’s services. In particular, Jeffries called upon Jonathan Waldo, who owed him a little 
over £148 in 1714, three times to pay Bulfinch. Bulfinch also received from Jeffries duck, 
drugetts, and needles for making and repairing sails, as well as salt, butter, cheese, flour and 
wine for his household amounting to £121. Over fifty percent of Bulfinch’s labor for Jeffries was 
paid for with imported goods at their markup prices. Jeffries thereby reduced the true costs of 
Bulfinch’s labor through his privileged position as an importer. Bulfinch may have wanted this 
relationship, as he could potentially resell or export the goods at even higher prices. Bulfinch, 
however, miscalculated, purchasing more goods from Jeffries than his future labor covered. By 
1710, Bulfinch’s consumption and spending outpaced his labor for Jeffries and he became part of 
Jeffries’ network of debtors. For the next three years, Bulfinch worked on Jeffries’ vessels to 
balance their accounts. When the two men finally settled accounts in 1713, Bulfinch still owed 
Jeffries more than £13. Prior to falling into debt, Bulfinch’s labor had allowed Jeffries to shuffle 
debts off his books, move imported goods, and avoid paying cash in Boston for services 
rendered. The product of his and other waterfront tradesmen’s labor, the ship, could be sold in 
London for sterling or credit to purchase goods for the return voyage, thereby maintaining 
during the early eighteenth-century see, Barry Levy, Town-born: The Political Economy of New England from its 
Founding to the Revolution (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2009), 181.  
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Jeffries’ important credit connections abroad. Once Bulfinch fell into debt, Jeffries commanded 
the former's labor, all of which further contributed to Jeffries' rising merchant success.18
Bulfinch’s debtor status mirrored many other members of Jeffries’ waterfront network. 
John Ellis, ship chandler, owed Jeffries £306 in December 1714 for imported iron goods, 
cordage, and ship supplies. Benjamin Gerrish, a gunsmith who cleaned and repaired guns on 
Jeffries’ vessels, owed a little over £8 in October 1714 for imported iron, old weapons, and 
paying other creditors. By early 1714, Nathaniel Oliver, who supplied Jeffries’ vessels with 
bread and beer, had incurred a debt of £664 to Jeffries. This debt had been outstanding so long 
that the account only reveals Oliver’s attempts to repay it. When Jeffries and Oliver settled 
accounts in April 1717, Oliver had made a significant dent in his debt, primarily through 
providing bread and beer for Jeffries’ vessels, but he still owed £276.19  By the same token 
merchants gained greater control over the local economy because their access to London-based 
credit allowed them to manage debts creatively at home and leverage local relationships to create 
credits. As one Boston merchant explained to a London contact, “I am the most uneasy man on 
earth to be in Debt, especially at Home.” Debt at home indicated weakness, which hurt a 
merchant’s local reputation and therefore ability to act as financial authority in the community. 
Debt at home that could not be balanced through goods or outstanding debts on others meant the 
merchant was no better than a waterfront tradesman.20
18 “David Jeffries and Co. account current with Adino Bulfinch, 1713” Jeffries Family Papers, box 18, MHS; “John 
& David Jeffries Account with Jonathan Waldo” Jeffries Family Papers, box 20, MHS. 
19 Many of Jeffries’ most important accounts with waterfront tradesmen are missing or he paid in cash; of the ten 
waterfront occupations analyzed in appendix, table 6, only John Greenough, a ship carpenter, had a positive balance 
with Jeffries when they settled accounts in December 1716. The positive balance was £3:5:1, easily settled by 
Jeffries, see “David and John Jeffries accounts with John Greenough (1716), John Ellis (1714), Nathaniel Oliver 
(1717), and Benjamin Gerrish (1714),” Jeffries Family Papers, box 20, MHS. 
20 William Blair Townsend to Storke and Champion, May 1749, William Blair Townsend Letter-book, Baker 
Library, HBS.   
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With the end of Queen Anne’s War in 1713, Boston and London merchants decreased 
their orders for new vessels and it became increasingly difficult for waterfront tradesmen to 
balance their accounts. Then, to make matters worse, Boston merchants learned of the demise of 
their Bay of Campeche logwood trade in 1717.21 The end of this important remittance trade sent 
Boston’s economy into a downward spiral. Ship orders dwindled. Confidence in long-term credit 
arrangements plummeted, triggering unprecedented lawsuits. As Gary Nash and others have 
noted, the multitude of lawsuits from 1717 to 1723 further divided the haves and have-nots more 
deeply, as goods and cash traveled up the social ladder. Jails in and around Boston became 
overwhelmed with debtors. In early 1718 the government passed “An Act for the Ease of 
Prisoners for Debt” to create more room in jail to separate debtors from hardened criminals. 
Shipwrights, ropemakers, joiners, riggers, and many others lost employment. In desperation, 
some, such as future pirate Ned Low, turned to the sea to support their families but even there 
employment proved difficult to find and exceedingly dangerous due to the rising tide of Atlantic 
piracy.22
Boston’s economic catastrophe in 1717 led to the creation of new currency and credit 
laws that directly impacted how merchants and tradesmen in the ship outfitting and building 
industries conducted business. Many in the Massachusetts Bay colony blamed Boston’s 
difficulties on access to easy credit, over-consumption, and depreciating currency but few 
21 For decrease in Boston’s shipbuilding after Queen Anne’s War, see Goldenberg, Shipbuilding in Colonial 
America, 42-43; For Spanish attack on the Bay of Campeche see, Boston News-letter April 1, 1717 and April 8, 
1717.    
22 Boston shopkeeper Joshua Marriner brought nine waterfront tradesmen to court over debts in 1717 alone; see the 
cases of  Joshua Marriner, shopkeeper v. Kettle (shipwright), Fadre (mariner), Mutchmore (sailmaker), Robertson 
(shipwright), Gill (shipwright), Hodgden (shipwright), Sherman (blacksmith), Young (mariner), and Vail (baker), all 
in SCCCPRB,  1715-1721, MSA; James A. Henretta, “Economic Development and Social Structure in Colonial 
Boston,” The William and Mary Quarterly, 3d ser., 22 (January, 1965): 75-92; Nash, Urban Crucible, 79-88; “An 
Act for the Ease of Prisoners for Debt,” (October 1718) in Acts and Laws of His Majesty’s Province of the 
Massachusetts-Bay in New England (hereafter cited as Acts and Laws) (Boston: Green, 1718), 312-313; For Ned 
Low’s experience on the Boston waterfront and loss of employment, see George Francis Dow and John Henry 
Edmonds, The Pirates of the New England Coast (1923: reprint, New York: Dover Publications, 1996), chap. 10.     
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outside the merchant-class recognized the crucial external trade factors. The enacted solutions 
therefore focused entirely on local economic practices that generally favored the mercantile 
community.   
In early February 1718, the Massachusetts Bay government passed a law calling in 
province bills issued during Queen Anne’s war to pay for military expenses. These bills had 
quickly depreciated as merchants used them to purchase silver and gold at rates far higher than 
the face value of the bills. Merchants then exported the silver and gold to England to pay debts 
and import more commodities. Boston merchants worried that the end of paper money in Boston 
would lead to a predominantly barter-based economy. John Colman, a prominent Boston 
merchant, recognized that barter grounded in the labor of tradesmen building and outfitting ships 
had already allowed Boston to subsist by consuming and transferring food, goods, and services. 
In 1720, he noted “That which hath kept this Town alive the last Year is the Number of Ships 
which have been Built in it, which Employs great part of the Town. I wish those who Build them 
may find their Accompts [accounts] therein & be Encouraged to go on, it will be a great Mercy 
to us, & very much help us.” Colman continued, “but that alone will not do; There must be 
something to Pass from Man to Man by way of Exchange; it is a Vanity to talk that such a Town 
as this can subsist without Money, or some other Medium of Exchange.” He also greatly 
sympathized with waterfront tradesmen who had to accept one-half or two-thirds goods for their 
services.23
23 “An Act for Calling in of Province Bills of Credit” (February 6, 1718), Acts and Laws, (Boston, 1718), 298; John 
Colman, The Distressed State of the Town of Boston (Boston: Kneeland, 1720), 5. 
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Some outside the merchant community found Colman’s argument hypocritical. The 
Reverend Edward Wigglesworth challenged merchants like Colman to “tell the world the plain 
Truth:” 
That these poor People are paid in Goods for their Labour not for want of Province Bills, 
but because Factors saving their Province Bills to buy up Silver and Gold, as fast as it 
comes in, that they may ship it home to their Principals and so procure more Goods to 
pay Labourers and Tradesmen with: Let them tell the world, that it is by this mean that 
Honest, Industrious People in Boston are brought to such Extremities, as to sell their 
Pewter and Brass to buy Food.  
 As Wigglesworth argued, this system, exemplified in the example of Jeffries and Bulfinch 
above, benefitted merchants far more than tradesmen. The reverend, however, failed to mention 
that tradesmen’s complicity allowed this system to develop because it increased their 
consumption levels and therefore standard of living. And in all fairness to the merchants, 
Bostonians expected them to procure necessary and desired goods.24
Shortly after the recall of the province bills, the government passed “An Act for the 
Regulation and Limiting Credit in Trade,” which was necessary because “the long Credit in 
Trade of late Years given by Merchants, Shop-keepers, and Others, has by Sad experiences been 
found to occasion in a great measure the extravagance & excessive Consumption of unnecessary 
Commodities.” This law limited the extension of credit to just two years, drastically changing 
business as usual in Boston. If creditors failed to bring their debtors to court “after the Expiration 
of Two Years” then “no Action” could be taken against the debtor. The law specifically 
referenced the pervasive practice of book debts, which previously had undefined timeframes and 
allowed merchants and tradesmen flexibility in repayment. However, this same practice was 
responsible for the numerous and damaging lawsuits after the collapse of the logwood trade and 
24 Edward Wigglesworth, A Letter from one in the Country to his Friend in Boston, Containing some Remarks upon 
a late Pamphlet, Entituled, The Distressed State of the Town of Boston (Boston: J. Franklin, 1720), 17.  
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Boston’s subsequent economic woes. Although only in effect for five years before permanently 
changing the terms of credit to three years in 1723, this law had profound implications for the 
relationship between merchants and waterfront tradesmen. Colman and other merchants who had 
scores of indebted tradesmen found this law to be ill-suited to their needs “For, it obliges some 
who are naturally inclined to be favourable to their Neighbours, to be severer than else they 
would be; and others who are of a more cruel disposition, are glad of such an oppurtunity to 
Oppress them by turning their Book-Debts into Bonds, and Exacting Interest.” The law forced 
many merchants to make the hard decision to either forfeit repayment of their loans or sue the 
men working to build and outfit their vessels, potentially losing productive labor by sending 
tradesmen to jail.25
 Like politicians and economic pundits today, Colman and his compatriots recognized the 
importance of maintaining perceived notions of prosperity among the “middling sort,” even if 
debt was the primary vehicle propelling the system. They fought to limit economic solutions that 
hindered consumption and led to unemployment, such as moving to a limited supply of silver as 
the primary medium of exchange and decreasing the amount of time allowed for the repayment 
of debts. Most importantly, Boston’s elite transatlantic merchants knew the value of having good 
waterfront tradesmen to build and outfit their own vessels, for their own reputation in a 
competitive arena of Atlantic commerce relied on waterfront craftsmen's ability to repair, 
provision, and crew the growing fleet of vessels in a timely fashion. It therefore did not take long 
for merchants and tradesmen to form new arrangements after the dust settled on the law limiting 
credit. Merchants tightened their extension of credit to only trustworthy and known tradesmen 
25“An Act for the Regulation and Limiting Credit in Trade,” (May 28, 1718) Acts and Laws, (Boston, 1718), 306; 
“An Act for the Relief of Creditors,” (May 9, 1723) Acts and Laws (Boston, 1723), 381; Colman, Distressed State, 
2. 
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who could repay debts within two years. Meanwhile, waterfront tradesmen with good family 
reputations and assets linked their fortunes and future to transatlantic merchants like Colman 
who were generally willing to forgive debts rather than sue workers.26
These laws forced merchants to create smaller, more exclusive credit networks with 
waterfront tradesmen. These new arrangements decreased financial risk for both merchants and 
tradesmen. They also benefitted wealthier tradesmen by limiting competition from the foreigners 
and less affluent Bostonians that had hitherto found opportunities during Boston’s boom period 
between 1700 and 1717.27 Table 6 in the appendix illustrates this trend. This table was created by 
compiling data from voyage “outset accounts” for each individual merchant. These accounts tell 
us who the merchant employed to outfit their vessel, their occupation, and how much they were 
paid. To simplify matters, table 6 only traces the ten most important professions employed in 
building and outfitting vessels and merchant partners. The table includes the names and 
employment percentages of only the top two tradesmen in each category, but adds in the 
“Network Size” – how many others in that profession were employed at various times by the 
merchants. The “Entire Network” includes all tradesmen and merchants employed by each 
merchant, even those not included among the calculated ten professions. The differences 
between David Jeffries network (1706 to 1715) prior to the law limiting credit and those 
afterwards are striking. As previously noted, Jeffries had a large ship outfitting and building 
network of 154 tradesmen and merchants. Of the ten professions measured in table 6, Jeffries 
26 Colman, Distressed State, 1, 2-4, 8; Colman was a victim of the law limiting credit and it appears he decided to 
lose money rather than sue, see Oliver Noyes, A Letter from a Gentleman, Containing some Remarks upon the 
Several Answers Given unto Mr. Colman… (Boston: Kneeland, 1720), 6-7.   
27 Barry Levy draws similar conclusions regarding the exclusive nature of Boston’s labor force. Levy argues that 
waterfront tradesmen relied on the political-economy of the “town” to ensure high wages and protection from 
foreign competition; his generally positive view of a protective community in the early eighteenth century does not 
account for episodes of crisis in the Atlantic economy or variations in merchant-tradesmen relations; see Levy, 
Town-born, 2-4, 44-45, 189, and 198-205.  
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employed fifty-two different tradesmen to outfit twenty-eight voyages, and his ten primary 
tradesmen worked on his vessels only 48% of the time. From 1740 to 1745, John Erving 
employed only twenty-five tradesmen, and his ten primary tradesmen worked 66% of the time 
for forty voyages, a 40% overall increase over Jeffries. Despite Erving’s twelve additional 
voyages, he employed twenty-seven fewer tradesmen in the occupations measured than Jeffries, 
a testament to the increasing exclusivity of merchant-tradesmen relations after the law limiting 
credit. Similarly, from 1737 to 1739 Thomas Hancock’s ten primary tradesmen worked 71.4% of 
the time to outfit seven voyages. Tradesmen lucky enough to enter into these patronage networks 
found a measure of job security and indeed, depending on the merchant, attained a level of 
comfortable incomes. Even though Boston’s logwood trade recovered during the late 1720s and 
early 1730s, Boston’s laws and overall economy no longer offered the opportunities that had 
permitted David Jeffries to hire and maintain credit relationships with many different waterfront 
tradesmen from various family and economic backgrounds. By Hancock and Erving’s 
generation, individuals who lacked creditworthiness and good family reputations or connections 
had a difficult time establishing themselves in Boston’s tough labor market.28
Boston’s economic decline during the 1720s also impacted merchant wealth. With credit 
tightening, employment dropping, and consumption decreasing, merchants were left with full 
warehouses and a bad market. This led some enterprising merchants to compete with waterfront 
tradesmen to supply vessels with provisions and naval stores. Wealthier merchants, who 
typically included ship-owners, may have believed that other merchants were more creditworthy 
28 Percentages and data derived from appendix, table 6; David Jeffries frequently employed new tradesmen, mixing 
and matching companies to build and outfit his vessels, see Ships’ Papers, Jeffries Family Papers, boxes 17 and 18, 
MHS. Conversely, Hancock and Erving consistently hired the same people to work their vessels. Their account 
books attest to having a team of preferred tradesmen but when they had multiple vessels outfitting or building in port 
they had to hire a second team, see Hancock Family Papers, 1664-1854, volume TH-1 Daybook, 1737-1739 and 
Journal of John Erving of Boston, Mass., 1733-1745, Baker Library, HBS.  
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that tradesmen. As table 6 indicates, after the 1720s merchants took on a greater role in building 
and outfitting ships for their fellow merchants.  Partner merchants comprised only 11% of David 
Jeffries’ waterfront network during the early 1700s. They also typically did not supply provisions 
or naval stores for Jeffries' vessels; rather they sold old hulls and rented their wharves to him. In 
contrast, merchants comprised 22% of Thomas Hancock’s network, 28% of Thomas Cushing’s 
network, 38% of John Erving’s network, and 33% of Henry Bromfield’s network . The 
merchants in these later networks supplied cordage, duck for sails, anchors, nails, cables, beef, 
pork, ship’s bread, rum, and a variety of other necessities for vessels’ stores and repairs – items 
that had hitherto been supplied by tradesmen.29
  Sometimes merchants traded in the interstices between importers and local tradesmen, 
as when John Fayerweather built a merchant empire in the 1730s and 1740s by selling yarn and 
hemp purchased from Boston’s transatlantic merchants to local ropemakers, who paid 
Fayerweather with cordage. Fayerweather maintained financial arrangements with fifteen 
different ropemakers. He dispersed their cordage and rigging throughout the community, which 
included well-diggers, and sailmakers who accepted it in payment for their services. He also 
accepted cordage in payment for sugar, rum, and other commodities. Indeed, cordage, much like 
rum and sugar, became a viable currency in Boston but only because it had a local outlet in the 
ship outfitting and building industries. Hancock, Cushing, Erving, and Bromfield all relied on 
Fayerweather to provide cordage for their vessels at least once. Increased competition from John 
Erving in the 1740s, however, forced Fayerweather and his son Thomas to find new markets 
29 For merchants decreasing wealth during the period 1716 to 1736, see Nash, Urban Crucible, appendix, table 5, 
397; For percentages divide the total merchants “Network Size” by the “Entire Network,” see appendix, table 6. 
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outside of Boston and they began exporting their cordage to the growing shipbuilding ports of 
Philadelphia and New York.30
Daniel Henchman’s role in outfitting John Erving’s vessels provides a different example 
of merchants’ function in ship outfitting and building. Henchman was a prominent Boston 
bookseller. Outfitting ships and paying waterfront tradesmen allowed him to balance debts, as 
well as move goods he received in payment for his books and paper. From Erving’s daybook we 
can gather a great deal of information about the financial relationship between Henchman and 
Erving. We know Erving imported paper and books for Henchman from London and 
Amsterdam. When the two settled accounts in April 1743, Henchman owed Erving a sizable 
£2560 Massachusetts currency debt. Over the course of four years, Henchman paid the 
equivalent of £563 Massachusetts currency with pork, beef, cordage, and black oakum for 
outfitting Erving’s vessels. Henchman also on occasion paid Erving’s waterfront tradesmen and 
ship captains in corn, cheese, pork, and wheat to settle his debts.31
The predictable consequence of merchants' increased reliance on each other for outfitting 
old vessels was the decreased earnings for tradesmen, who suffered an eleven percent decrease 
over this period. This practice likely also led to decreased job opportunities for tradesmen. 
Compounding this problem, by the 1730s and 1740s many Boston merchants outsourced their 
shipbuilding to neighboring ports to take advantage of cheaper labor costs.32 John Erving, despite 
30 During the 1730s, Isaac Gridley and Abijah Adams supplied Fayerweather with most of his cordage. Thomas 
Hawding became Fayerweather’s primary supplier in the 1740s but by then John Erving undermined his monopoly 
on the cordage industry.  Account Books, 1729-1733, 1733-1736, and 1744-1747, John Fayerweather Papers (Mss 
79), R Stanton Avery Special Collections, NEHGS.     
31 In February 1743, Erving credited Henchman’s account £251 Massachusetts currency for providing provisions to 
Erving’s smith, cooper, mastmaker, blockmaker, and a ship captain; see  Journal of John Erving of Boston, Mass., 
1733-1745, Baker Library, HBS.  
32 From 1706-1715, tradesmen earned 62% or £3608 out of £5811 for outfitting old vessels, sample size: 21. From 
1737-1745, tradesmen only earned 51% or £9889 out of £19,295 for outfitting old vessels, sample size: 44. From 
1706-1715, tradesmen earned 67% or £7985 out of £11,903 for building and outfitting new vessels, sample size: 7. 
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the heavy involvement of other Boston merchants in outfitting his vessels, resisted the trend of 
outsourcing local shipbuilding. From 1742 to 1745, he ordered seven ships built on his own 
account and one sloop for a West Indies partner, pumping an extraordinary £61,003 
Massachusetts currency into the local economy. Erving, who had been a ship captain in the 
Boston-Amsterdam-London trade during the early 1730s, centered his entire Atlantic-based 
merchant empire on Boston’s local ship outfitting and building industries. Every year, Erving’s 
sloop Sarah made two voyages to the Bay of Honduras to acquire good quality, chipped logwood 
and carry it back to Boston. Meanwhile, the brig Yucatan and snow Thistle made direct voyages 
to Amsterdam, carrying Erving’s logwood, as well as freighting the logwood of other Boston 
merchants. The snow and brig returned from Amsterdam carrying yarn for the town’s 
ropemakers, duck for the sailmakers, and paper for Daniel Henchman so he could repay Erving 
in naval stores and provisions for his vessels. Finally, Erving employed the ship John Galley in 
the London trade. He sent naval stores, mostly tar, to London and the ship returned with hemp 
for ropemakers, coal for the smiths, and sail cloth, nails, and other necessities for his vessels. The 
John Galley also freighted a great quantity of goods for other Boston merchants, which partly 
explains Erving’s large network of merchant debtors.33
Erving managed to undercut Fayerweather’s monopoly among ropemakers and 
sailmakers by directly importing yarn, hemp, and duck for them at lower costs and on his own 
From 1737-1745, tradesmen earned 67% or £62,423 out of £93,856 for building and outfitting new vessels, sample 
size: 12. Merchant involvement in providing supplies for new vessels still seems much greater during the 1730s and 
1740s but perhaps the cost of tradesmen’s labor had increased, nullifying the greater involvement of the merchants. 
This issue could use further examination. Data compiled from “outset accounts” in Ships’ Papers, Jeffries Family 
Papers, Boxes 15-20, MHS; Volume TH-1, Daybook, Hancock Family Papers, Baker Library, HBS; Account Book 
of Thomas Cushing, Jr., 1739-1742, Baker Library, HBS; Journal of John Erving of Boston, Mass., 1733-1745, 
Baker Library, HBS. For outsourcing of shipbuilding, see Levy, Town-born, chap. 6.    
33 Erving kept a meticulous daybook with copies of invoices, sales of goods, full accounts with tradesmen, and, most 
importantly, separate outset and cargo accounts for voyages. Erving also solely owned all of his vessels with the 
exception of the schooner Whalebone, which he sold in 1742. See Journal of John Erving of Boston, Mass., 1733-
1745, Baker Library, HBS; see also, John Erving Logbooks, 1727-1730 (P-89, 1 reel), MHS.
228 
vessels. Furthermore, he provided an outlet for their substantial debts to him by constructing his 
ships locally.34 Erving then attempted to sell his new ships in London, usually at a loss, in order 
to balance his debts there. For instance, in March 1743 he happily sold his new ship Apollo in 
London for £1233 sterling. This same ship had cost about a third more than this to build and 
outfit just a few months earlier but Erving probably felt he had accomplished a great coup 
because much of the ship had been paid for with the outstanding debts of others at home. Once 
again we see merchants maintaining debt in London and adding debtors at home. Erving’s 
overall contributions to Boston’s local economy and waterfront tradesmen cannot be denied, 
especially when compared to his peers seeking investments elsewhere. His experience as a ship 
captain allowed him to envision an Atlantic economic system centered on providing 
indispensable services for local waterfront tradesmen and merchants. He understood that the ship 
and waterfront labor generated wealth for the merchant community. Erving’s efforts did not go 
unrewarded. In 1748, he was Boston’s highest taxed citizen, quite an achievement for a man who 
had still been a ship captain in 1730.35
 Some Boston merchants further secured their place in Atlantic commerce by 
collaborating on the repairs of foreign-owned and Royal Navy vessels docked in Boston 
temporarily. These opportunities allowed waterfront tradesmen to clear outstanding debts with 
their merchant employers with their earnings from outsiders. Tradesmen could have worked 
directly with foreign and Royal Navy ship captains to outfit their vessels if cash and not credit 
relationships had been the primary means of payment for outfitting and building vessels. By the 
34 Ropemaker Hugh McDaniels owed Erving £7230:4:3 in March 1743 but in August 1745 he provided £2510 worth 
of cordage for Erving’s new ship, Warren Frigate, Journal of John Erving of Boston, Mass., 1733-1745, Baker 
Library, HBS. 
35 During his long tenure as a merchant, Erving sued just one of his waterfront tradesmen, John Erving v. Jonathan 
Brown (1754), SCSJCF, MSA, case no. 73583;  For Erving’s tax status, see, Baxter, The House of Hancock, 
107n54. 
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1730s, however, merchant credit arrangements controlled the Atlantic commercial system, 
increasing the dependency of waterfront tradesmen and laborers on the goodwill of their 
merchant employers, who might recommend trusted local workers to strangers docked in the 
city. For Boston merchants, building or outfitting foreign vessels represented a high reward and 
high risk venture. In the reward column, they earned commissions, established credit in London 
or paid foreign debts, moved commodities locally at the expense of foreigners, and provided 
employment for their network of waterfront laborers. Simultaneously, they risked non-payment 
from their foreign merchant partners, prolonged attempts to receive payment, legal battles, 
shortages of exports or gluts of imports related to shipbuilding, and alienating foreign partners.  
The more they consolidated shipbuilding into their own hands as a commercial elite, the greater 
their chances for either profit or loss in equal measure.   
Thomas Hancock’s emergence as one of Boston’s foremost merchants can only be 
understood if we examine his efforts to build vessels on behalf of his network of foreign 
merchants. In 1738, Hancock employed his network of waterfront tradesmen to build two ships 
and one brig on behalf of London partners Katherine Forman and Henry Lang. Hancock’s 
business received a direct infusion of £300 sterling in commissions. He also oversaw the 
disbursement of £29,449 Massachusetts currency worth of goods, notes, debt repayments, and 
cash to compensate local waterfront tradesmen and merchants.36 For instance, Hancock’s 
primary blockmaker, Benjamin Snelling, used his credits with Hancock to purchase corn, rye, 
and flour. Ebenezer Bridge, Hancock’s primary smith, likewise used his credits to purchase food 
and rum but also directed Hancock to pay his outstanding debts, partly in goods and partly in 
36 The total cost for the three vessels amounted to £5890 sterling but Forman and Lang sent £1851 sterling worth of 
cordage, duck, and other supplies in order to reduce costs. Hancock therefore only handled payouts totaling £3739 
sterling.   
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cash, to Boston merchants David Mason and John Webster. Hancock’s business consequently 
became a commercial hub facilitating the financial and commodity transactions of nearly a 
hundred different waterfront tradesmen and prominent Boston merchants. In so doing, Hancock 
increased his local reputation and credit worthiness. For their part, Forman and Lang essentially 
capitalized Thomas Hancock’s local and transatlantic business, allowing him to build his own 
vessels and expand beyond his faltering Newfoundland trade into more profitable ventures in the 
West Indies sugar and rum and Bay of Honduras logwood trades.37
Fortune did not always materialize easily for Boston merchants engaged in outfitting and 
building vessels for foreign merchants. For example, in 1737, Boston merchant Peter Faneuil 
agreed to complete the financing for the construction and outfitting of two ships for the affluent 
French merchant houses of the Pascaud brothers, Griffon, and De Le Croix. Faneuil, despite 
warnings from his uncle, Andrew Faneuil, did so at the behest of the French ship captain, James 
Grenou, who assured Faneuil that his bills “would be honourably Discharged.” Faneuil pounced 
on the opportunity to marshal his network of waterfront tradesmen and move goods at the 
expense of foreigners. The considerable expenses associated with the new ships, however, 
required him to borrow money from his merchant friends in Boston. He therefore worried it 
would be a “Vast discredit to me and hurt to my Reputation” if the French merchants did not 
promptly honor the £5644:6:9 worth of bills drawn on them.38 To Faneuil’s dismay, the French 
merchants denied the bills outright, spurring protest charges from the London merchants Faneuil 
had hoped to pay. The French merchants explained in their correspondence that Faneuil had 
37 For tradesmen purchases see, Entries for April to December 1738, Daybook ,volume TH-1, Hancock Family 
Papers, Baker Library, HBS; For Hancock’s expanding trade see Letterbook, 1735-1740, volume TH-4 and box 1, 
Hancock Family Papers, Baker Library, HBS.    
38 Peter Faneuil to Thomas, Thomas, and Son, November 15, 1737, Peter Faneuil to Monsieur’s Pascauds Freres 
dela Rochella, May 22, 1738, and Peter Faneuil to Benjamin Faneuil, January 21, 1739, volume F-4, Faneuil 
Letterbook, 1737-1739, Hancock Family Papers, Baker Library, HBS.  
231 
acted without consulting them, and, perhaps rightly, believed Faneuil wished to fleece them. 
Faneuil’s swift drawing of bills in sterling and remittance of them to London suggests a gambit 
to pay creditors in London through outfitting foreign vessels in Boston.39 Nevertheless, the 
Boston merchant complained bitterly about the French merchants’ “unhandsome Usage” of him, 
and declared to Captain Grenou that had he known, he “would have let both the Ships have 
rotted by the walls before I would have Advanced my money to fit them to the Seas.” Faneuil 
immediately sent his brother, Benjamin Faneuil, to France with plans to seize the two French 
ships and pursue legal action against the French merchants. By the time Benjamin Faneuil 
arrived in France in July 1738, however, the Pascaud brothers had sent goods worth £1567:5:9 to 
pay down their debt rather than drain their accounts of specie. The bitter dispute between the 
Faneuil brothers and the French merchants continued into 1739 when Faneuil’s letterbook ends 
abruptly without a conclusion to the affair.40
The larger context of French Atlantic relations with Boston's traders played an important 
role in Faneuil’s trouble. The Faneuil family had powerful Boston, London, and West Indies 
connections but French merchants saw Boston as marginal to their extensive Atlantic networks. 
They could afford to offend Faneuil and potentially lose Boston as a market. But in other cases, 
Bostonians had the upper hand. Henry Bromfield apparently disregarded the request of West 
39 Faneuil attempted a similar ploy with the London merchant house of Lane and Smethurst when he quickly 
contracted a ship on their behalf with only a vague remark from them. As Faneuil later commented, “ship for 
Captain Buckley is now almost ready to raise and will be putt up in two or three days at farthest, everything being 
ready in the Yard for that purpose, I had contracted for her before I received your contrary order and so shall carry 
her on in whatever manner you may be interested as you see proper.” In this scenario, Faneuil’s debtor status to 
Lane and Smethurst required him to tactfully suffer the losses from his spoiled attempt to repay debts in London 
through building and outfitting a ship locally, see, Peter Faneuil to Lane and Smethurst, October 31, 1738 and Peter 
Faneuil to Lane and Smethurst, January 10, 1738, Faneuil Letterbook, 1737-1739, Hancock Family Papers, Baker 
Library, HBS.  
40 Faneuil also hoped to damage the French merchants’ reputations, noting to Captain Grenou, “This letter you may
shew to whom you please for I think such ungenerous acts as those should be made Publick to the world.” Peter 
Faneuil to Captain James Grenou, April 6, 1738, Peter Faneuil to Captain James Grenou, May 22, 1738, Peter 
Faneuil to Benjamin Faneuil, October 30,  1738,  and Benjamin Faneuil, January 21, 1739, volume F-4, Faneuil 
Letterbook, 1737-1739, Hancock Family Papers, Baker Library, HBS.  
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Indies merchant, Gedney Clarke, to draw only £100 sterling on his London account with 
Whitaker and Hannington for the outfitting and cargo of the schooner Escape. Bromfield racked 
up expenses doubling that amount, noting to Clarke, “I have now inclosed you invoice of her 
Cargo and account of cost and outsett, by which you'll see the amount is Considerable more than 
you expected, she wanted a great many things more than you Imagined and was much tore in 
pieces coming on the Coast.” Bromfield demanded prompt payment from Clarke and he 
requested London sterling rather than a drawn-out exchange of services and goods typical of a 
mutually beneficial commercial relationship.41
Clarke sought to decrease his unanticipated debt to Bromfield by disputing charges and 
commissions. Bromfield instructed the West Indies merchant on appropriate business practices, 
noting that he only did “what is done by everybody.” Clarke traded considerably with Boston 
and New England merchants. He could therefore ill afford to hurt his reputation by contesting 
Bromfield’s accounts. Bromfield, meanwhile, dealt primarily with Boston and London 
merchants, opting to re-export West Indies commodities and import English manufactured 
goods. He also operated a cannon foundry in Boston. He had few direct interests in the West 
Indies. Clarke’s desperate situation represented a profitable opportunity with limited negative 
consequences. Like Faneuil, Bromfield schemed to use the labor of local ship outfitters and the 
resources of foreign merchants to pay debts or establish credit in London. Ultimately, the West 
Indies merchant was compelled to honor Bromfield’s request to draw a further £100 sterling on 
41 Henry Bromfield to Gedney Clarke, December 13, 1743 and  January 8 1744, and Henry Bromfield to Whitaker 
and Hannington, December 22, 1743,  Henry Bromfield Letterbook, 1742-1743, Letterbooks, account books, and 
cash books of Henry Bromfield (Mss 664). R Stanton Avery Special Collections Department, NEHGS. 
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Whitaker and Hannington in London. Embittered and disillusioned, Clarke subsequently cut his 
business ties with Bromfield.42
Building and outfitting vessels for foreign merchants enabled Boston merchants to turn 
local labor into fluid capital overseas. Merchants acquired sterling balances in London even as 
they paid their waterfront tradesmen primarily in food and goods. Through their Atlantic 
connections, Boston merchants became the conduit by which food, commodities, and cash 
flowed. In the process, they acquired control of both labor and commodities. Waterfront 
tradesmen, desperate for stable employment and financial security through credit arrangements, 
validated merchants’ central position in the economy. For much of the early to mid-eighteenth 
century, Boston merchants likewise recognized the importance of waterfront tradesmen both as 
economic assets and consumers. They happily and eagerly sought opportunities to employ their 
network of waterfront tradesmen to outfit or build foreign vessels. The perception among Boston 
merchants of slim profits during the 1730s, or, as one Boston merchant put it, “there is nothing 
but Cutting and Shuffling in our trade,” led to a reconsideration of relying on local labor as an 
investment and major source of capital.43
In 1744, war with France opened the British government’s coffers and merchants on both 
sides of the Atlantic saw opportunities for quick and easy monetary gain. Many of Boston’s 
merchants were especially hopeful of breaking free of local patronage networks – labor for 
goods, goods for labor – in order to acquire sterling payments and wider Atlantic trading. Unlike 
42 Bromfield directed Whitaker and Hannington to pay his creditors in London, Lane and Caswall and Joseph Lee, 
with the sterling granted him by Clarke, see, Henry Bromfield to Whitaker and Hannington, December 22, 1743 and 
Henry Bromfield to Gedney Clarke, March 14, 1744, Henry Bromfield Letterbooks, 1742-1743 and 1744-1749, 
Letterbooks, account books, and cash books of Henry Bromfield (Mss 664). R Stanton Avery Special Collections 
Department, NEHGS. This March 14, 1744 letter was Bromfield’s last correspondence with Clarke. 
43 Peter Faneuil to Benjamin Faneuil, September 7, 1738, volume F-4, Faneuil Letterbook, 1737-1739, Hancock 
Family Papers, Baker Library, HBS. For the war profiteering of English merchants see, David Hancock, Citizens of 
the World: London Merchants and the Integration of the British Atlantic Community, 1735-1785 (United States: 
Cambridge University Press, 1995), chap. 7.  
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John Erving, these men on the make failed to realize the central importance of keeping 
shipbuilding and outfitting in Boston. Instead, when England declared war on France many of 
Boston’s prominent merchants immediately moved their capital out of shipping, including 
Thomas Hancock, Henry Bromfield,44 and Charles Apthorp, and into military supplying. They 
gleefully sold their vessels as quickly as possible and began buying local provisions and stores to 
supply a military expedition against Louisbourg. Once Louisbourg was captured in 1745, Boston 
merchants supplied the British regulars and navy stationed there. In return, they received bills of 
exchange in sterling, invaluable for dry goods importing. Those who had abandoned the local 
economy reaped the benefits in the short-term. In 1748, Henry Bromfield assessed the results of 
merchants abandoning waterfront tradesmen with a calculating eye, “We expect the Shipwrights 
and other Tradesmen on Ships must fall in their prices as at present there are but few of them 
Employed and no orders for any; Vessels have already been sold here at 20 and 30 percent loss, 
and indeed the price of vessels here was so high, that persons find it impossible to support them.” 
The incredible amount of personal wealth he, Hancock, Apthorp, and many other Boston 
merchants had amassed from war profiteering was not being reinvested into the local industries 
that had so long generated their own wealth, power, and status, and the employment of a great 
many artisans and laborers. When capital went elsewhere, underemployed tradesmen had no 
choice but to raise their charges to merchants.45
44 According to Bromfield’s daybook, he invested in only one vessel (1/4 share), the schooner Enterprise, and two 
voyages during the war, one in 1746 and another in 1747. Both voyages went to Gibraltar, undoubtedly to supply 
British troops and ships (the cargo consisted of tar, pitch, swivel guns, bullets, flour, and rice. Like Hancock, he 
freighted his other goods for the military in Cape Breton and Nova Scotia on coasting vessels; see Henry Bromfield 
Daybook, Volume 17, Letterbooks, account books, and cash books of Henry Bromfield (Mss 664), Avery Special 
Collections, NEHGS. 
45 Henry Bromfield to Thomas Goldthwait, November 30, 1748, Henry Bromfield Letterbook, 1744-1749, 
Letterbooks, account books, and cash books of Henry Bromfield (Mss 664), Avery Special Collections, NEHGS. 
For Hancock and Apthorp’s withdrawal from shipping and investment in war profiteering, see Baxter, House of 
Hancock, chap. 7. For a general overview of war profiteering during the colonial period, see Stuart D. Brandes, 
Warhogs: A History of War Profits in America (Lexington, Kentucky: University of Kentucky Press, 1997), chap. 1.  
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 For over fifty years, the ship outfitting and building industries had provided Boston with 
a local economic system to support its wider Atlantic ambitions. During the late 1690s and early 
1700s, the labor of waterfront tradesmen was a great vehicle for consumption, which in turn 
allowed Boston merchants to form crucial credit arrangements in London through importation 
earlier than other North American ports. This arrangement worked effectively until both Boston 
and London merchants stopped ordering new vessels during the peace after 1713. Work for 
waterfront tradesmen dried up and they could no longer balance their accounts. By 1717, it 
became apparent that debt had funded a great deal of consumption for tradesmen, ship captains, 
and merchants. Luckily for Boston merchants their outstanding debts resided in London, and 
when the lawsuits and insolvencies in Boston began, they stood above the fray and gathered in 
the debts owed to them. 
From the ashes of the old system, merchants and tradesmen had to negotiate a new 
arrangement. During the 1720s and 1730s, merchants formed smaller and more exclusive 
patronage networks in order to keep a closer eye on their tradesmen’s debt accumulation and 
ability to pay, as well as to protect them from outside competition. Merchants also began taking a 
larger role in outfitting ships at the expense of waterfront tradesmen because of their 
accumulation of naval stores and provisions. It was a good system for paying debts and 
balancing accounts. Even merchants like Thomas Cushing Jr., who preferred to freight his furs to 
London, had to maintain connections with the waterfront community.46 Waterfront tradesmen 
had little ability or even desire to challenge the new arrangements. Only reputable tradesmen 
from good families garnered a merchant’s favor and they benefited from a more stable system. 
46 Account Book of Thomas Cushing, Jr., 1739-1742, Baker Library, HBS. Of the merchants studied here, Cushing 
was the least involved with Boston’s waterfront community. In his daybook, Cushing only kept track of his portion 
of the outfitting bill, which was generally 1/4 or 1/8 share of a sloop. As his network indicates, he generally relied 
on other merchants, his baker, Nathaniel Thwing, or the brewer, Sampson Salter, to supply his portion of the 
outfitting bill; see appendix, table 6.  
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This system was based on long-term mutual obligations and trust. Merchants’ desire for fluid 
capital and easy remittances to London in bills of exchange, however, undermined the local ship 
outfitting and building industries. Waterfront tradesmen fully understood the significance of the 
merchants’ betrayal and many immigrated to other colonial ports, boosting shipbuilding in 
Philadelphia and New York. Boston’s outfitting and shipbuilding industries never fully 
recovered after King George's War and the port’s significance in the Atlantic economy 
necessarily declined, as did the long-term prosperity of its shortsighted merchants.47
47 Nash, Urban Crucible, 174-184. Nash places more emphasis on the creation of orphans and widows than the 
abandonment of the ship outfitting and building industries for the decline of Boston after King George’s War. He 




Throughout the 1740’s, Boston’s “low sort of people,”  which according to Governor William 
Shirley now included “Artificers [tradesmen]” along with “Seafaring Men,” simmered in anger 
at the growing disparity in wealth, lack of opportunity, and oppression by Royal Navy officers 
and leading Boston authorities through impressment. The latter abuse became increasingly 
volatile and reached heights beyond the 1690s. In March of 1744, Shirley issued impressment 
orders for at least 270 seamen in preparation for the assault on Louisbourg, which required the 
service of “more than three Thousand” seamen. The Royal Navy drew the impressed sailors 
primarily from Boston. Shirley sought to calm the growing storm over impressment by claiming 
he would “take effectual Care that whatsoever Men he [Captain Gayton of H.M.S. Bien Aimé 
Prize] may be supplied with, who are Inhabitants of this Province, shall be dismissed upon his 
Return … So that not one Inhabitant of the Province shall be carried off by him.” 1 As 
demonstrated in Chapter 3, Royal Navy captains rarely, if ever, willingly returned impressed 
seamen to their homes, regardless of threats by governors. 
Boston’s waterfront community suffered from the dual impact of the collapsing 
shipbuilding industry and economic consequences of elites’ support and allowance of large-scale 
impressment. Those most affected assembled a Town Meeting and hammered out a petition in 
1746 protesting the “late repeated Warrants to impress Seamen for his Majesty’s Ships.” This 
petition from the lower classes offended Governor Shirley and his Council: “the said Memorial is 
a bold Insult upon the Authority of the Governour and Council.” The petitioners, meanwhile, 
1 William Shirley to the Lords of Trade, December 1, 1747, in Charles Henry Lincoln, ed., Correspondence of 
William Shirley, Governor of Massachusetts and Military Commander of America, 1731 – 1760, 2 vols. (New York: 
Macmillan, 1912), 1: 418; Massachusetts Bay Colony, Journal of the House of Representatives (Boston: Kneeland 
and Green, 1745-46), 204; Governor Shirley Massachusetts Bay Colony, Journal of the House of Representatives
(Boston: Kneeland and Green, 1744), 213. The Journal of the House of Representatives shows impressment requests 
for mariners by the Royal Navy in 1740, 1741, 1742, 1744, 1745, 1746 and 1748 all of which were approved.  
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asserted that impressment had caused sailors to flee Boston for the safety of Newport, New 
York, and Philadelphia where the governments provided “Protection from Impresses.” They also 
condemned the murder of two local seafarers by the “lawless Rabble” press gangs who acted 
“like Ruffians.” Press gangs also threatened the town’s essential supplies by illegally seizing 
men from coasters. Even Governor Shirley recognized this as a considerable threat: “And I must 
here observe to your Grace, that impressing out of the Coasting Vessels trading to this Town, 
which receives great part of it’s supplies of Provisions, and almost all it’s Fuel by these Vessels.” 
The governor continued by noting that this practice was “mischievous to the Inhabitants by 
cutting ‘em off from these Supplies whilst any of the King’s Ships of War lie here, and in the 
Winter Season might endanger the starving of the poorer Sort.”  The price of food and wood 
increased sharply as a result of apprehensive coasters avoiding Boston and profit-seeking 
merchants hoarding and sending food and supplies to the soldiers and sailors at Louisbourg to 
satisfy their lucrative government contracts. Unemployed tradesmen and impoverished seafarers 
had difficulty making ends meet and the “once flourishing now sinking Town of Boston” had its 
avaricious elites to thank.2
On November 17, 1747, the simmering anger at impressment and Boston’s woeful 
economic disparities erupted into full blown riots after Admiral Charles Knowles ordered his 
press gangs to sweep the vessels then stationed in Boston harbor. Eerily recalling Boston’s 1689 
revolution, Bostonians, elite or otherwise, did not have the gumption to act first: rather the 
Knowles Riot began with “about three hundred Seamen, all Strangers, (the greatest part Scotch) 
with Cutlasses and Clubs.” These so-called “Strangers,” however, knew Boston through their 
2 Massachusetts Bay Colony, Journal of the House of Representatives (Boston: Kneeland and Green, 1745-46), 204; 
William Shirley to the Duke of Newcastle, December 31, 1747, Correspondence of William Shirley, 1; 420-423, 
quote at 422.  
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travels and experiences on Boston-based vessels. They swept through the streets, seizing Royal 
Navy officers and the local sheriff and his deputies to hold as hostages to obtain the release of 
their impressed brethren. The seafarers arrived at the governor’s house soon thereafter. When 
Shirley questioned their actions “one of ‘em arm’d with a Cutlass answer’d me in an Insolent 
manner it was caus’d by my unjustifiable Impress Warrant.” After the confrontation with the 
governor, Boston tradesmen and laborers joined the rebellious seamen. Together, they broke the 
windows of the Council House, the seat of power in Massachusetts, and shouted threats at town 
elites. They, too, challenged the governor, asking why justice had not been served to the Royal 
Navy seamen who killed the two Boston sailors in 1745. After this verbal altercation, Governor 
Shirley fled to the Castle Fort in the hopes of marshalling the county militia against the rioters. 
The Knowles Riot continued for two more days. For Bostonians, the outcome was positive –
Admiral Knowles released the roughly twenty local men he had impressed. As usual, the 
transatlantic seafarers remained in captivity.3
The many seafarers, waterfront tradesmen, and laborers who participated in the riot 
responded to the abuse of power and demonstrations of conspicuous wealth by elites at their 
expense. In retrospect, a discerning individual wrote with compassion “when its consider’d, that 
the immediate Sufferers [of impressment], were people of the lowest Rank, (though I think full 
as useful as their Neighbours, who, live at Ease upon the Produce of their Labour) it is not at all 
surprising, that their Resentment grew up into Rage.” This man appreciated that labor, whether 
3 William Shirley to the Lords of Trade, December 1, 1747, Correspondence of William Shirley, 1: 412 – 419; For 
other historical accounts and interpretations of the Knowles Riot see, John Lax and William Pencak, “The Knowles 
Riot and the Crisis of the 1740’s in Massachusetts,” Perspectives in American History 10 (1976): 163 – 214; 
Nicholas Rogers, Press Gang: Naval Impressment and Its Opponents in Georgian Britain (London: Continuum, 
2007), 86-89; Denver Brunsman, “The Knowles Atlantic Impressment Riots of the 1740s,” Early American Studies
5 (Fall 2007): 324-66 and The Evil Necessity: British Naval Impressment in the Eighteenth-Century Atlantic World 
(Charlottesville and London: University of Virginia Press, 2013); Marcus Rediker, Outlaws of the Atlantic: Sailors, 
Pirates, and Motley Crews in the Age of Sail (Boston: Beacon Press, 2014), 93 – 96. 
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as sailors or shipbuilders, created the capital for the luxurious homes and conspicuous 
consumption of Boston’s elites. Had he written this statement a decade earlier, he would have 
found that Boston’s waterfront tradesmen also benefitted from the labor and exploitation of 
seafaring men.4
Governor Shirley, conversely, had little appreciation for laborers. He felt entitled to his 
position, wealth, and power and too often the lower classes challenged his authority. Although he 
acknowledged the role of foreign seafarers in the Knowles Riot, Shirley explained the riot by 
hearkening back to the insult he received in 1746 when a Town Meeting resulted in a petition to 
end his impressment warrants. As he wrote to the Lords of Trade,  
What I think may be esteem’d the principal cause of the Mobbish turn in this Town, is 
it’s Constitution; by which the Management of it is devolv’d upon the populace 
assembled in their Town Meetings; one of which may be called together at any time upon 
the Petition of ten of the meanest Inhabitants, who by their Constant attendance there 
generally are the majority and outvote the Gentlemen, Merchants, Substantial Traders 
and all the better part of the Inhabitants; to whom it is Irksome to attend at such meetings, 
except upon very extraordinary occasions; and by this means it happens, as it would do 
among any other Community in a Trading Seaport Town under the same Constitution, 
where there are about Twenty thousand Inhabitants, consisting among others of so many 
working Artificers, Seafaring Men, and low sort of people, that a factious and Mobbish 
Spirit is Cherish’d. 
Shirley clearly believed that the “Gentlemen, Merchants, Substantial Traders” or the “better part” 
of Boston’s community had a right to the labor and lives of the “many working Artificers, 
Seafaring Men, and low sort of people.” There was no sense of joint aspirations for the benefit of 
the entire community, only long-standing attitudes of superiority against those with a “Mobbish 
4 Anonymous [Samuel Adams?], An Address to the Inhabitants of the Province of the Massachusetts-Bay (Boston, 
1747), 4 (my emphasis in the quote).  
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Spirit.” Boston had become nearly as rigidly stratified as London with its merchant-elite 
embracing equally bankrupt morals. 5
 On April 18, 1689, foreign seamen of the H.M.S. Rose Frigate mutinied in Boston’s 
harbor against the abuse of power by their commander, Captain John George. Their actions 
triggered a riot that resulted in a revolution that generated closer political and economic ties 
between Boston and London. Boston elites felt compelled to prove their loyalty and control over 
the town. They launched ill-advised attacks against the French in Canada and allowed their 
governors and Royal Navy captains to impress and abuse the local maritime community. They 
eschewed trade with pirates who had fallen out of favor in England due to the Indian Ocean 
exploits of Henry Every, William Kidd, and others.  
The consequences of the revolution and turning away from pirates further linked Boston 
merchants to English credit and increasingly complicated Atlantic trade networks. Boston’s 
transatlantic traders accrued large debts to their London counterparts as they imported an ever-
growing quantity of English manufactured goods. These same merchants developed their own 
network of debtors in North America and the West Indies. During the early eighteenth century, 
they built a large merchant fleet to sustain their growing commerce. They built smaller sloops for 
the coasting trade and large ships to trade with England and harvest logwood in the Bay of 
Campeche. In their quest for remittances to England, Boston merchants began employing 
seafaring men as logwood cutters to increase the proceeds of that harsh but profitable trade. This 
in turn allowed them to build more vessels and support the vibrant ship outfitting and building 
industries that generated increased consumption.  
5 William Shirley to the Lords of Trade, December 1, 1747, Correspondence of William Shirley, 1: 412 – 419.  
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The labor of seafaring men created wealth, stability, and security in colonial Boston but, 
paradoxically, merchants and ship captains increasingly saw them as adversaries to mistreat. The 
Reverend Cotton Mather commented on this oppression numerous times after 1690. He 
remarked on the “Cruelties” sailors suffered at hands of their “Commanders and Officers in their 
own Ships at Home?” and admonished “the Masters of our Vessels, that they would not be too 
like the Devil in their Barbarous Usage of the Men.” He also reprimanded merchants to “make
Poor Seamen, and their Destitute Families, the Object of your Liberality. The Merchant 
concerned in the Harvest of the Voyage, may do well to bear a part in such Alms. His Estate has 
been ventured, when his person has not.” The minister knew sailors suffered economic hardships 
and, in part, blamed merchants’ greed for it. Mather, unlike Shirley and his fellow Boston elites, 
considered seamen, tradesmen, and other laborers his fellow man and appreciated their hard 
labor. He never could, however, reconcile the radical actions sailors took to resist their 
oppressors with his pious worldview. Perhaps that was because Mather knew from direct 
experience that Boston transformed when sailors’ resistance turned into action.6
Most historians of colonial America have likewise failed to reconcile the significance of 
the seafaring and waterfront communities to Boston’s political, social, and economic 
development. Furthermore, few historians of the Atlantic have appreciated how the “Citty upon a 
Hill” helped create and maintain the Atlantic economy and networks during the eighteenth 
century. Without delving into the depositions of the Rose’s seafarers and comparing those 
accounts with the ship log and Captain George’s fallacious letter, it would be impossible to 
discover how these seafaring men transformed Boston through their mutinies in 1689. Without 
6 Cotton Mather, The Religious Marriner (Boston, 1700), 37; Cotton Mather, The Vial Poured Out upon the Sea
(Boston, 1726), 44-45; Cotton Mather, The Sailours Companion and Counsellor (Boston, 1709), 62. For more on 
Mather’s complex relationship with sailors see, Steven J. J. Pitt, “Cotton Mather and Boston’s ‘Seafaring Tribe’” 
The New England Quarterly 85.2 (June 2012): 222–252.   
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monitoring the experiences of seafarers on Boston-based vessels in an Atlantic context through 
portledge bills, ships’ papers, merchant accounts, state papers, court cases, and newspapers, it 
would be difficult to comprehend Boston sailors’ internationalization due to impressment in the 
1690s, pirates’ hatred of Boston’s elites after 1717, and the magnitude of the Atlantic logwood 
trade for Boston’s economic growth. Without a clear understanding of Boston’s ship outfitting 
and building industries through qualitative and quantitative analysis of merchants’ daybooks, 
outset accounts, and letters, how Boston’s local economy operated during the eighteenth century 
would remain a mystery. In short, seafarers and ships built colonial Boston and the Atlantic 
World. They deserve a central place in the city’s history. 
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Destination 1687 1706 1707 1713 1714 1717 1718 1722 1723 1724 1728 1734 1739 1744
Coasting - North to Maine South to Pennsylvania 17 134 120 193 210 177 189 187 168 276 179 167 161 164
Newfoundland/Nova Scotia 6 23 12 30 28 37 54 37 25 65 100 63 82 30
Chesapeake/Carolinas 42 29 47 67 65 120 99 142 95 109 106 184 147 116
West Indies/Bays of Campeche and Honduras 156 110 90 187 192 167 140 159 143 195 181 155 196 149
England/N. Europe 13 27 6 25 40 69 62 48 41 69 61 68 48 45
Iberian Peninsula/Wine Islands 25 19 23 15 15 18 38 12 13 17 39 19 11 8
Africa 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 2 1
Total Clearances 259 342 298 517 550 588 582 585 485 731 668 656 647 513
Destination 1687 1706 1707 1713 1714 1717 1718 1722 1723 1724 1728 1734 1739 1744
Coasting - North to Maine South to Pennsylvania 6.50% 39.10% 40.30% 37.30% 38% 30% 33% 32% 34.70% 37.80% 26.80% 25.50% 24.90% 32%
Newfoundland/Nova Scotia 2.30% 6.70% 4% 6% 5.10% 6.30% 9.30% 6.30% 5.20% 8.90% 15.00% 9.90% 12.70% 5.90%
Chesapeake/Carolinas 16.20% 8.50% 15.80% 13.00% 11.80% 20.40% 17.00% 24.30% 19.60% 14.90% 15.90% 28% 23% 22.70%
West Indies/Bays of Campeche and Honduras 60.20% 32.10% 30.20% 36.20% 35% 28% 24% 27.20% 30% 26.70% 27.10% 23.60% 30.30% 29.10%
England/N. Europe 5% 7.90% 2% 5% 7.30% 11.70% 10.70% 8.20% 8.50% 9.40% 9.10% 10.40% 7.40% 8.80%
Iberian Peninsula/Wine Islands 9.70% 5.60% 7.70% 2.90% 2.70% 3.10% 6.50% 2.10% 2.70% 2.30% 5.80% 2.90% 1.70% 1.60%
Africa 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.30% 0.00% 0.30% 0.02%
Boston Vessel Clearances by Percentages
Boston Vessel Clearances
8.0 APPENDIX 
Table 1. Boston Vessel Clearances, 1687 – 1744  
Sources: For 1687 see, Charles F. Carroll, The Timber Economy of Puritan New England (Providence, Rhode 
Island: Brown University Press, 1973), Appendix, Table 4, 140; “Entrances and Clearances,” Boston News-letter
1706-1707, 1713-1714, 1717-1718, 1722-1724, 1728, 1734, 1739, and 1744. Note: Early American newspapers 
generally under reported their entrances and clearances and, at times, merchants misrepresented their vessels 
destination or prior port of call for the purposes of smuggling. I believe the overall results, however, are useful for 
understanding Boston’s trade patterns during the eighteenth century.
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Table 2. Boston Vessel Entrances, 1706 – 1747 
Sources: “Entrances and Clearances,” Boston News-letter 1706-1707, 1713-1714, 1717-1718, 1722-1724, 1728, 
1734, 1739, 1744, and 1747. Note: Early American newspapers generally under reported their entrances and 
clearances and, at times, merchants misrepresented their vessels destination or prior port of call for the purposes of 
smuggling. I believe the overall results, however, are useful for understanding Boston’s trade patterns during the 
eighteenth century.  
1706 1707 1713 1714 1717 1718 1722 1723 1724 1728 1734 1739 1744 1747
Destination
Coasting - North to Maine South to Pennsylvania 126 103 250 255 232 222 249 248 359 200 186 193 153 150
Newfoundland/Nova Scotia 12 9 25 25 35 45 34 40 56 74 51 66 31 91
Chesapeake/Carolinas 32 44 54 63 99 103 99 111 116 75 183 89 97 95
West Indies/Bays of Campeche and Honduras 112 59 112 122 138 116 110 97 142 149 98 125 97 73
England/N. Europe 10 14 36 44 75 89 56 47 70 65 51 48 38 33
Iberian Peninsula/Wine Islands 15 22 26 16 27 18 15 25 22 43 39 20 8 12
Africa/Cape Verde Islands 0 0 0 0 6 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 0 0
Total Entrances 307 251 503 525 612 593 563 568 765 606 608 544 424 454
Destination 1706 1707 1713 1714 1717 1718 1722 1723 1724 1728 1734 1739 1744 1747
Coasting - North to Maine - South to Pennsylvania 41.04% 41.04% 49.70% 48.57% 37.90% 37.40% 44.23% 43.66% 46.93% 33.00% 30.59% 35.50% 36.08% 33.04%
Newfoundland/Nova Scotia 3.91% 3.59% 5.00% 4.76% 5.70% 7.60% 6.04% 7.04% 7.32% 12.20% 8.39% 12.10% 7.31% 20.04%
Chesapeake/Carolinas 10.42% 17.53% 10.70% 12.00% 16.20% 17.40% 17.58% 19.54% 15.16% 12.40% 30.10% 16.40% 22.88% 20.93%
West Indies/Bays of Campeche and Honduras 36.48% 23.51% 22.30% 23.24% 22.50% 19.60% 19.54% 17.08% 18.56% 24.60% 16.12% 23.00% 22.88% 16.08%
England/N. Europe 3.26% 5.58% 7.20% 8.38% 12.30% 15.00% 9.95% 8.27% 9.15% 10.70% 8.39% 8.80% 8.96% 7.27%
Iberian Peninsula/Wine Islands 4.89% 8.76% 5.20% 3.05% 4.40% 3.00% 2.66% 4.40% 2.88% 7.10% 6.41% 3.60% 1.89% 2.64%
Africa/Cape Verde Islands 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 1.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.60% 0.00% 0.00%
Boston Vessel Entrances
Boston Vessel Entrances by Percentages
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Table 3. Retention of Boston-based Crews on Ships and Brigs, 1678 – 1734  
Sources: Portledge Bills for Two Sisters, Hopewell, Unity, Society, Dispatch, Mayflower, Content, Neptune, and 
Parkin Galley, Jeffries Family Papers, Boxes 14 – 20, Massachusetts Historical Society; Portledge Bills for the brig 
Sarah, Storke and Gainsborough Papers, Volume 6, New York State Library Manuscripts and Special Collections.  
Vessel Voyage Departure Month and Year 
Total Officers Sailors Total Officers Sailors Total Crew Officers Sailors
Boston to Bilboa to Boston June 1678 10 3 7
Boston to Bilboa to Boston November 1679 10 3 7 2 1 1 20.00% 33.33% 14.29%
Boston to Barbados to Newfoundland to Boston November 1693 7 2 5
Boston to Antigua to Boston December 1694 7 2 5 3 1 2 42.86% 50.00% 40.00%
Boston to Barbados to Boston November 1705 31 8 23
Boston to Barbados to Kingsail (IE) to London to Boston April 1707 28 7 21 16 2 14 51.61% 25.00% 60.87%
Boston to Antigua to Boston May 1707 13 4 9
Boston to Jamaica to Boston September 1707 15 4 11 6 2 4 46.15% 50.00% 44.44%
Boston to Port Royal [Nova Scotia] July 1710 29 11 18
Port Royal to France to Boston October 1710 30 5 25 13 5 8 44.83% 45.45% 44.44%
Oporto to Lisbon to Boston June 1711 6 2 4
Unknown December 1711 6 2 4 1 1 0 16.67% 50.00% 0.00%
Boston to Jamaica April 1712 18 5 13
Jamaica to Campeche to South Carolina to Boston July 1712 18 8 10 7 4 3 38.89% 80.00% 23.08%
Boston to Kingston to Boston January 1713 13 2 11
Boston to Jamaica [Kingston] to Boston December 1713 11 2 9 2 1 1 15.38% 50.00% 9.09%
Boston to Cowes to Boston September 1718 10 3 7
Boston to Barbados May 1719 9 3 6 3 1 2 30.00% 33.33% 28.57%
London to Newfoundland to Boston December 1733 10 2 8
Boston to Newfoundland October 1734 8 2 6 2 1 1 20.00% 50.00% 12.50%
Average 32.64% 46.71% 27.73%
Crew Size at Departure Retention from Previously Known Voyage Percentage of Retention 
Hopewell [Ship]
Two Sisters [Ship]










Table 4. Retention of Boston-based Crews on Sloops and Schooners, 1710 – 1766 
Sources: Portledge Bills for Elizabeth and Ann & Francis, Jeffries Family Papers, Boxes 17 and 20, Massachusetts 
Historical Society; Portledge Bills for Betty, Lydia, Dove, Fox, and Biddeford, Boxes 14-16, Melatiah Bourne 
Papers, Baker Library, Harvard Business School. 
Vessels Voyage Departure Month and Year
Total Officers Sailors Total Officers Sailors Total Crew Officers Sailors
Boston to Newfoundland to Boston June 1710 6 2 4
Boston to Newfoundland to Boston August  1710 6 2 4 5 2 3 Total 83.33% 100.00% 75.00%
Boston to North Carolina to Boston January 1718 5 2 3
Boston to North Carolina to Boston May 1718 5 2 3 4 2 2 80.00% 100.00% 66.67%
Boston to North Carolina to Boston August 1721 4 2 2 1 1 0 20.00% 50.00% 0.00%
Boston to North Carolina to Boston July 1722 5 2 3 2 2 0 50.00% 100.00% 0.00%
Boston to North Carolina to Boston December 1729 5 2 3 2 2 0 40.00% 100.00% 0.00%
Boston to North Carolina to Boston May 1730 5 2 3 3 2 1 60.00% 100.00% 33.33%
Boston to North Carolina to Boston April 1744 4 2 2
Boston to North Carolina to Boston June 1744 5 2 3 2 1 1 50.00% 50.00% 50.00%
Boston to North Carolina to Boston August 1744 6 2 4 2 1 1 40.00% 50.00% 33.33%
Boston to Barbados to Boston March 1745 7 2 5 1 1 0 16.67% 50.00% 0.00%
Boston to West Indies to Boston December 1746 5 2 3 1 1 0 14.29% 50.00% 0.00%
Boston to Philadelphia to Boston June 1747 5 2 3 0 0 0 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
Boston to Newfoundland to Boston August 1747 5 2 3 3 2 1 60.00% 100.00% 33.33%
Boston to Louisburg to Boston January 1759 5 2 3
Boston to Louisburg to Boston August 1759 5 2 3 1 0 1 20.00% 0.00% 33.33%
Boston to North Carolina to Boston November 1759 5 2 3 2 1 1 40.00% 50.00% 33.33%
Boston to North Carolina to Boston July 1760 5 2 3 2 1 1 40.00% 50.00% 33.33%
Boston to ? To Boston March 1760 5 2 3
Boston to Quebec to Boston July 1760 6 2 4 3 1 2 60.00% 50.00% 66.67%
Boston to South Carolina to Boston March 1762 5 2 3
Boston to Philadelphia to Boston May 1762 5 2 3 4 2 2 80.00% 100.00% 66.67%
Boston to Philadelphia to Boston July 1762 5 2 3 2 1 1 40.00% 50.00% 33.33%
Boston to Philadelphia to Boston August 1762 5 2 3 4 2 2 80.00% 100.00% 66.67%
Boston to Philadelphia to Boston October 1762 5 2 3 4 2 2 80.00% 100.00% 66.67%
Boston to Newfoundland to Boston June 1766 6 2 4
Boston to Philadelphia to Boston October 1766 6 2 4 6 2 4 100.00% 100.00% 100.00%








Crew Size at Departure Retention from Previously Known Voyage Percentage of Retention 
Retention of Boston-based Crews on Sloops and Schooners, 1710 - 1766 
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Table 5. Boston Vessels Seized by Pirates 
Sources: Boston News-letter 13 May 1717 and 22 July 1717 and 19 August 1717 and 28 October 1717 and 10 
March 1718 and 16 June 1718 and 18 August 1718 and 17 November 1718 and 29 December 1718 and 1 August 
1720 and 22 August 1720 and 21 November 1720 and 5 December 1720 and 30 April 1722 and 7 May 1722 and 18 
June 1722 and 21 March 1723 and 8 August 1723 and 19 September 1723 and 18 October 1723 and 16 July 1724 
and 15 April 1725 and 11 February 1725; Boston Gazette 27 June 1726; New England Courant 17 June 1723; 
American Weekly Mercury 8 August 1723 and 4 October 1723; Extracts of several letters from Carolina, December 
17, 1717 and Deposition of Jonathan Bull, December 19, 1718, CSPC, vol. 30 (1717-1718), nos. 660 and 797 iv; 
Deposition of Ralph Merry and Samuel Roberts May 11 and 16, 1717 and Trial of Thomas Davis, October 28, 1717 
in John Franklin Jameson ed., Privateering and Piracy In the Colonial Period: Illustrative Documents (New York, 
New York: Augustus M. Kelly, 1970), 301-307; Daniel Defoe, A General History of the Pyrates, Manuel Schonhorn 
ed.,  (New York: Dover Publications, 1999), 326, 338, 355, and 587; Peter Earle, The Pirate Wars (New York: 
Thomas Dunne Books, 2003), 170.      
Boston-owned or Based  Vessels Captain Pirate Estimated Dates Location Outcome 
Sloop Captain Beer Sam Bellamy April 1717 Near Block Island Lat. 40 Plundered
Sloop Robert Ingolls Sam Bellamy April 1717 Near Cape Cod Plundered
Sloop ? Paul Williams May 10, 1717 Martha's Vineyard Plundered
Sloop ? Paul Williams May 10, 1717 Martha's Vineyard Plundered
Sloop Stephen Minot and John Ellis, Owners Paul Williams May 11, 1717 Monhegen Taken
? Captain Thomas Fox ? July 1717 ? Plundered
Sloop Captain Turner Monsieur Laboar July 19, 1717 Latitude 36 Plundered
Snow Restoration Nathaniel Brooker Captain Napin and Capt. Nichols August 19, 1717 Near the Bahamas Plundered
Brig Thomas Porter Major Bonnet August 22, 1717 Near Carolina Plundered and Incapacitated 
"Great Ship" Christopher Taylor Edward Teach November 1717 Near St. Lucia Burned
Ship Protestant Caesar [400 tons] Captain William Wyer Edward Teach April 1718 Bay of Honduras Burned
Ship William ? Captain Richards Teach Consort Spring 1718 Near South Carolina Plundered
Schooner ? Major Bonnet August 1718 Near Philadelphia Plundered
Sloop Benjamin Edie Richard Worley November 1718 Near North Carolina Plundered
Schooner John Snoad Richard Worley November 1718 Near North Carolina Plundered
Ship Captain Cooker William Moudie December 1718 Near South Carolina Plundered
Ship Christiana Captain Jonathan Bull Edward England December 1718 Near St. Christophers Plundered
? Captain Bosworth French Pirate June 1720 Near St. Thomas Taken
Ship Samuel Captain Samuel Cary Bartholomew Roberts July 1720 Near Newfoundland Plundered
Snow Capt. Bowls Bartholomew Roberts July 1720 Near Newfoundland Taken
Snow Pheonix Joseph Richards Bartholomew Roberts July 1720 Near Newfoundland ?
Ship Mary Henry Fowle Bartholomew Roberts September 1720 Near St. Christophers Plundered
? ? Philip Lyne October 1721 ? ?
Brig Charles Captain James Douglass George Lowther 1721 Near Barbados ?
Ship Greyhound [200 tons] Captain Benjamin Edwards George Lowther and Edward Low Jan. 10, 1722 Bay of Honduras Burned
Brig ? George Lowther and Edward Low Ditto Bay of Honduras Burned
Brig ? George Lowther and Edward Low Ditto Bay of Honduras Sunk
Ship Mary Galley Captain Peter King George Lowther and Edward Low June 1722 Near Boston Plundered
Brig Rebecca Captain James Flucker George Lowther and Edward Low May 1722 Near Boston Taken
Ship Dove [120 tons] Captain Thomas Diamond John Evans September 1722 Near Puerto Rico Plundered
Ship John and William Captain William Blin ? 26 January 1723 Near Jamaica Plundered
Pink Stanhope Captain Andrew Delbridge Edward Low 1723' West Indies Burned
Ship Amsterdam Merchant [100 tons] Worth £1000 John Welland Edward Low and Charles Harris May 8, 1723 Near Bermuda Sunk
Schooner ? George Lowther September 1723 Near Newfoundland ?
Sloop Captain William Clark Edward Low July 1723 Near Piscataqua Crew Killed and Sloop Abandoned
Brig John and Elizabeth Captain Richard Stanny George Lowther August 1723 Near Newfoundland Plundered
? Captian Job Prince Edward Low August 1723 Near Canso ?
? Captain Robinson Edward Low August 1723 Near Canso Plundered 
? Captain John Hood Edward Low August 1723 Near Canso Plundered
? Captain Maccarty French Pirate October 1723 Near Jamaica Taken
Brig Mary Captain John Moore John Phillips September 1723 Near New England ?
Schooner ?  Francis Spriggs 1724 Near Bermuda Sunk
Brig Daniel Captain John Hopkins Francis Spriggs May 2, 1724 near Martinico Burned
Brig Prudent Hannah Captain Thomas Mousel Captain Signoir Don Benito June 5, 1724 Near Virginia Taken
Brig Captain Maccarty Captain Signoir Don Benito 1724 Near Virginia Taken
Brig Captain Burrington Captain Signoir Don Benito 1724 Near Virginia Taken
Sloop Captain Ebenezar Kent Captain  Shipton December 1724 Bay of Honduras Plundered
Ship John and Mary Captain Thomas Glen Captain Shipton December 1724 Bay of Honduras Taken
Sloop Captain Robert Peat ? May 1726 Bay of Honduras Burned
Boston Vessels Seized by Pirates
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Table 6. Employment Frequency of Waterfront Tradesmen in Merchant Ship Outfitting and Building Networks  
Merchants
Professions Names Percentages Network Size Names Percentages Network Size Names Percentages Network Size Names Percentages Network Size
Primary John Greenough 61% Waters and Glidden 100% Warren and Sharp 29% Samuel Clarke 39%
Secondary Samuel Clarke 14% N/A 0 N/A 0 William Welch 25%
Primary Edward Gray 39% John Boye 14% Edward Gray 29% Edward Gray 55%
Secondary John Smith 14% N/A 0 Thomas Hawding 29% Hugh McDaniels 33%
Primary John Baker 54% Ebenezar Bridge 100% Edward Marion 29% Jonathan Brown 95%
Secondary Samuel Franklin 21% Joseph Scott 57% N/A 0 Joseph Hubbard 7%
Primary Charles Morris 46% Alexander Chamberlain 86% Thornton Barrat 14% Newman Greenough 50%
Secondary Adino Bullfinch 25% Newman Greenough 14% N/A 0 Thomas Palfry 35%
Primary William Brown 21% William Brown 43% Thomas Sherbourne 14% Edward Edes 53%
Secondary Edward Edes 7% William Parkman 29% N/A 0 William Parkman 20%
Primary Thomas Lee 75% Benjamin Snelling 71% James Beighton 14% John Earle 75%
Secondary Richard Salter 4% Samuel Aves 29% James Allen 14% Thomas Lewis 8%
Primary Alexander Sherrar 65% Samuel Gooding 100% N/A 0 Edward Potter 75%
Secondary John Stevens 7% N/A N/A 0 Joseph Savells 2%
Primary Joseph & Elizebeth Rogers 25% Peter Roe 29% John Johnson 43% John Beacham 93%
Secondary Thomas & Hannah Platts 21% John Johnson 14% Jonah Langdon 14% N/A 0
Primary Nathaniel Oliver 46% James Davenport 71% Nathaniel Thwing 71% James Davenport 40%
Secondary Nathaniel Baker 18% N/A 0 N/A 0 Edward Veall 23%
Primary Nathaniel Oliver 46% John Smith 100% Sampson Salter 43% Sampson Salter 88%
Secondary Josiah Wadsworth 21% John Milk 14% N/A 0 N/A 0
Primary John Frizzel 11% William Tyler 100% Hezekial Leavitt 43% Daniel Henchman 23%
Secondary  Samuel Penhallow 7% William Clark 57% Jonathan Cushing 29% Samuel Hense 23%
Entire Network 154 Entire Network 81 Entire Network 50 Entire Network 105
Employment Frequency of Waterfront Tradesmen in Merchant Ship Outfitting and Building Networks 
Source Material: Ships’ Papers, Jeffries Family Papers, Boxes 15-20; Volume TH-1, Daybook, Hancock Family Papers, Baker Library, Harvard Business School; Account Book of Thomas Cushing, Jr., 1739-1742, Baker Library, Harvard Business School; Journal of John Erving 
of Boston, Mass., 1733-1745, Baker Library, Harvard Business School; Note on Method: For each merchant I created a database of their waterfront network based on “outset” accounts. I refrained from including individuals contributing to the vessels’ cargoes in order 
to emphasize waterfront tradesmen. Thomas Cushing’s accounts only included his ¼ or 1/8 share of the voyages he participated, except for one vessel he outfitted for a merchant partner. The rest of the voyages had completed outset accounts, although there is still 
a possibility that not all tradesmen’s bills had been accounted for.  
14
























































Figure 1. Edward Low’s Impact on Boston’s Trade, 1722-1724 










































































Figure 2. Bay of Honduras Entrances in Boston, 1718-1739 
Sources: “Entrances and Clearances,” Boston News-letter 6 January 1718 – 27 December 1739; “Entrances and 
Clearances,” Boston Gazette 10 January 1726 – 17 December 1739; “Entrances and Clearances,” Weekly Rehearsal 
27 September 1731 – 11 August 1735; “Entrances and Clearances,” New England Weekly Journal 21 April 1735 –
25 December 1739; “Entrances and Clearances,” Boston Post-Boy 6 October 1735 – 10 December 1739; “Entrances 
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